Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 803 (ORI)

A. Satyanarayana Senapati v. A. Manjula

2018-11-19

D.DASH

body2018
JUDGMENT The plaintiffs having been aggrieved by the judgment and preliminary decree dated 31.03.2000 and 07.04.2000 respectively passed by the learned 1st Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Cuttack in Title Suit No.271 of 1993 have filed the appeal under (A). The defendant Nos. 1 to 3 being aggrieved by said judgment and decree have also filed the appeal under (B). 2. Since both the appeals arise out of the same judgment and preliminary decree as agreed upon by the learned counsel for the parties, those have been heard together for disposal by this common judgment. 3. For the sake of convenience, in order to bring in clarity and avoid confusion, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the suit before the trial Court. The appellant No.2 (plaintiff No.2) having died during pendency of this appeal, his legal representatives have been substituted and they have joined hands with the appellant No.1 in pursuing the appeal. 4. Plaintiffs’ suit is for partition of the properties described in Schedule A, B and C. They claim 1/5th share for each of the three plaintiffs; 1/5th the share to defendant No.4 and 1/5th the share to defendant Nos. 1 to 3 over the properties, with a further prayer for allotment of 1/4th share to plaintiff No.3 (Respondent No.1) over the maturity value of the LIC policies of A. Bhaskar, the son of plaintiff No.3 as shown in the schedule ‘D”. 5. Plaintiffs case is that one A. Nageswar Senapati is the common ancestor and he died leaving behind his widow, plaintiff No.3 and three sons, plaintiff Nos. 1,2 and A. Bhaskar who is dead as well as a daughter, defendant No.4. Defendant Nos.1 is the widow and defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are the daughters of said deceased brother of the plaintiff No.1 namely, A. Bhaskar. It is stated that A. Nageswar had some ancestral joint family properties and in a partition of the ancestral properties, schedule ‘A’ property fell to the share of the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, their brother A. Bhaskar and mother, the defendant No.3. The partition is said to have been effected through a registered deed of partition dated 06.04.1985. It is stated that the plaintiffs and late A. Bhaskar constituted the Hindu joint family even after the death of A. Nageswar. 1 and 2, their brother A. Bhaskar and mother, the defendant No.3. The partition is said to have been effected through a registered deed of partition dated 06.04.1985. It is stated that the plaintiffs and late A. Bhaskar constituted the Hindu joint family even after the death of A. Nageswar. A. Bhaskar was then pursuing his studies in medical science with the help provided from the joint family funds as well as timely contribution made by the plaintiff No.1. A. Bhaskar subsequently, joined the service and then left the same as per the decision of the members of the joint family and started private medical practice at Cuttack. it is stated that the house standing over the schedule ‘A’ property was renovated for the said purpose and in order to provide all such facilities for A. Bhaskar to carry on his private medical practice. It is further stated that on 16.4.1985, A. Bhaskar married defendant No.1. However, as the said relationship did not augur well, a matrimonial dispute had been initiated. It is stated that O.S. No.19 of 1998 had been filed in the Court of learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack. For this reason, it is said that A. Bhaskar could not concentrate in the private medical practice at Cuttack and finally decided to shift his field of operation to a village near Salipur. For the purpose, a piece of land in that village Naliamua as described in schedule ‘B’ of the plaint was acquired. The acquisition although had been made in the name of A. Bhaskar, yet is said to have been made at the expense of joint family funds amounting to Rs. 50,000/-. The said property is thus claimed to be the joint family property. Unfortunately, before A. Bhaskar could properly start his private practice there in the village, he committed suicide on 20.9.1992. The plaintiffs claim that these properties in schedule A and B being the joint family properties, those including the movable which are described in the schedule ‘C’ of the plaint are liable to the partitioned. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that A. Bhaskar had obtained Life Insurance Policies providing nomination in favour of his wife, the defendant No.1. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that A. Bhaskar had obtained Life Insurance Policies providing nomination in favour of his wife, the defendant No.1. The plaintiff No.3 who happens to be the mother of A. Bhaskar has 1/4th share over the said maturity value of the policies which have already been withdrawn by the defendant No.1 as the nominee under the policies. It is alleged that after death of A. Bhaskar defendant No.1 gave out openly to transfer schedule ‘B’ property and further threatened that the plaintiffs would not be allowed to reside in the house standing over schedule ‘A’ land. The plaintiffs thus apprehending infringement upon their right, wanted an amicable partition and as their demand was not paid any heed to by the defendant No.1 have filed the suit claiming the reliefs as aforesaid. 6. The defendant Nos. 1 to 3 by filing the written statement, have denied the status of defendant No.4 as the daughter of A. Nageswar. They have also denied the fact that the plaintiffs, late A. Bhaskar and the defendants constituted an undivided joint family after A. Nageswar. They state that schedule ‘B’ property was never acquired with the aid of the joint family fund and the plaintiffs and defendant No.4 have also no right over the said property as also on the movables described in schedule ‘C’ of the plaint. It is stated that the members of the joint family had no contribution for the study of A. Bhaskar. It is also stated that the relationship between A. Bhaskar and his wife was not strained. It is the specific case of the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 that there was severance of the status of the joint family much prior to the marriage of A. Bhaskar with the defendant No.1. They assert that the dwelling house standing over the schedule ‘A’ land had been renovated and was being maintained by A. Bhaskar out of his own fund as well as with the contribution of his wife, the defendant No.1, from out of her ‘stridhan’ property. They state that for the purpose of development and maintenance of the house, A. Bhaskar and his wife defendant No.1 have spent huge amount which would be around 1/3rd of the total valuation of the land and building without receiving any such contribution from other members. They state that for the purpose of development and maintenance of the house, A. Bhaskar and his wife defendant No.1 have spent huge amount which would be around 1/3rd of the total valuation of the land and building without receiving any such contribution from other members. In this way and for that reason, they deny the plaintiffs right to have any share over the suit property in schedule ‘A’. It has been further stated that schedule ‘B’ property is the self-acquired property, purchased by A. Bhaskar from his own income with the help provided by the defendant No.1 for which the plaintiffs have no share in that. The construction raised over the schedule ‘B’ land is also stated to have been made by A. Bhaskar by spending money from his own purpose without any such help from any quarter. In so far as the Life Insurance Policies are concerned, the plaintiff No.3’s share over the maturity value under those policies is denied stating those to have been meant only for their benefit. It is next alleged that after the death of A. Bhaskar, the plaintiffs attempted to drive out the defendant No.1 from the said house which due to timely interference of the local gentries was somehow thwarted. It is also alleged that the plaintiff No.1 after the death of A. Bhaskar took away the movables belonging to defendant No.1 worth of Rs.1.50 lakhs (approximately). It is averred that the schedule ‘C” property is not partiable and in that item nos. 1 and 2 are not in existence. They state that the properties described in item Nos. 3 to 6 of Schedule ‘C” are the ‘stridhan’ properties of defendant No.1 and the rest items of the properties are not with her and as such are not available for partition. 7. The defendant No.4 filing the written statement has supported the case of the plaintiffs and claimed 1/5th share over the schedule A, B and C properties unto herself. 8. On the above rival pleadings, the trial Court has framed as many as ten issues which are the followings : 1. Whether the suit is maintainable ? 2. Is there any cause of action ? 3. Whether ‘A’ Schedule property is the joint family property of the parties.? 4. 8. On the above rival pleadings, the trial Court has framed as many as ten issues which are the followings : 1. Whether the suit is maintainable ? 2. Is there any cause of action ? 3. Whether ‘A’ Schedule property is the joint family property of the parties.? 4. Whether ‘B’ Schedule property is also the joint family property of the plaintiffs and late Bhaskar acquired out of their contribution of the self acquired property of late Bhaskar, husband of Defendant No.1 ? 5. Whether the ‘C’ schedule properties were acquired out of the joint family income ? 6. Whether late Bhaskar constructed and renovated the house in schedule ‘A’ out of his own income ? 7. Whether plaintiff No.3 entitled to share out of the LIC policy mentioned in Schedule ‘D’ property ? 8. Whether Defendant No.4 is the adopted daughter of plaintiff No.3 ? 9. Whether the suit schedule properties are liable for partition and if so what would be the share each of the co-sharers entitled to get ? 10. What relief the plaintiff is entitled to ? 9. The trial Court proceeding to answer the issue no.8 having gone through the evidence on record and upon their analysis has held the defendant No.4 to be not the adopted daughter of A. Nageswar Senapati and plaintiff No.3. 10. In answering issue No.3, the schedule ‘A’ property has been held to be the joint family property and the claim of the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 that late Bhaskar had constructed and renovated the house in schedule ‘A’ out of his own income has been taken to be of no such significance and impact in the matter of division of the properties, so as to deprive others of their legitimate share therein. It has been held that the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have got their share over the same. 11. Going to rule on issue No.4, the schedule ‘B’ property has been held to be the joint family property entitling the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 as having the share over the same. 12. Out of movables described in schedule ‘C’, item Nos. 3, 4 and 5 having been found available for partition, those have been so directed. 13. 1 to 3 as having the share over the same. 12. Out of movables described in schedule ‘C’, item Nos. 3, 4 and 5 having been found available for partition, those have been so directed. 13. In so far as the maturity value of the Life Insurance Policies standing in the name of A. Bhaskar described in schedule ‘D’ is concerned, the plaintiff No.3 has been held to be entitled to a share over the same together with defendant Nos. 1 to 3. 14. Having recorded the above findings, the trial Court has passed the order as under : In view of the finding in the foregoing issues that the ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties are the joint family properties each of the plaintiffs and Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are entitled to get 1/5th share. Similarly each of them are entitled to get 1/5th share in the movable properties mentioned in schedule ‘C’ of the plaint excepting item No.1, 2 and 5 as per the observations in the said issue and item No.7 is to be taken into consideration while effecting partition of the matured amount of L.I.C. Policy mentioned in schedule ‘D’ and the schedule ‘D’ property is liable to be partitioned and plaintiff No.3 and Defendant No.1 to 3 each entitled to 1/4th share. The issue is accordingly answered.” 15. In the appeal under (A) filed by the plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 without being joined by the plaintiff No.3, the finding of the trial Court that defendant No.4 is not the daughter of A. Nageswar has not been assailed. The first challenge is in the matter of assignment of share. It is specifically stated that the plaintiff nos. 1 to 3 are entitled to 1/4th share each, whereas the defendant nos. 1 to 3 are jointly entitled to rest 1/4th. It has been contended that on the face of its findings on all the issues, the Court below has erred in law declaring their entitlement to 1/5th each. This challenge itself shows that these plaintiffs have rather accepted and surrendered to the finding that A. Nageswar has no daughter namely Bijoyshree, the defendant No.4. 16. In the other appeal filed by the defendant nos. 1 to 3 under (B), the challenge is to the findings of the trial Court that the expenses made by late ‘A’. This challenge itself shows that these plaintiffs have rather accepted and surrendered to the finding that A. Nageswar has no daughter namely Bijoyshree, the defendant No.4. 16. In the other appeal filed by the defendant nos. 1 to 3 under (B), the challenge is to the findings of the trial Court that the expenses made by late ‘A’. Bhaskar for renovating and construction of the house over the schedule ‘A’ is of no significance and impact in the matter of division of the said property amongst the co-sharers and the consequential disinclination on the part of the trial Court to allow the prayer made by the defendant nos. 1 to 3 allotment of excess extent of land and house in that proportion towards their shares in the said schedule ‘A’ property, in view of the investments made by A. Bhaskar. The next challenge is to the finding of the trial Court holding the schedule ‘B’ property as the joint family and available for the partition amongst the co-sharers. They have also challenged the finding on the entitlement of a share by the plaintiff No.3 over the maturity amount under the LIC Policies of A. Bhaskar, equal to that of defendant nos. 1 to 3, each. Lastly, the grant of share to the plaintiffs in the movable in item nos. 3,4 and 6 and 7 of schedule ‘C’ has been assailed. 17. The defendant no.4 has not filed any cross objection/appeal nor participated in the hearing of the appeals despite notice. There being a definite finding as to the status of this defendant No.4 against what she had claimed when that defendant no.4 has not come forward to impeach the same in any manner/mode as available under the law and more so, when the plaintiffs who had projected that case favouring the claim of defendant no.4 do not in these appeals impeach that finding and instead advance claim unto themselves by almost abandoning their case on that score running against the case of the defendant no.4 as of acceptance of that finding, in my considered view there remains no more the need to judge the sustainability of that finding on issue no.8 which thus attains finality. 18. I have heard the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs nos. 1 and 2 (appellants); the defendant nos. 1 to 3 (respondent nos. 1 to 3) at length. 18. I have heard the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs nos. 1 and 2 (appellants); the defendant nos. 1 to 3 (respondent nos. 1 to 3) at length. None appeared on behalf of rest of the defendants (respondents). I have also given a careful reading to the impugned judgment in entirety. 19. The points for determination in these appeals are the followings:- 1. whether the finding of the trial Court that the properties under schedule ‘A’ are the joint family properties is based on sound appreciation of evidence keeping in view the settled position of law holding the field; as also whether the trial Court having rejected the claim of the defendant nos. 1 and 3 either by way of deprivation of share to the plaintiffs or the allotment of more extent in their share proportionate to the investment made by A. Bhaskar and giving a mileage to them over others in assigning share Schedule ‘A’ land and house has committed any such error either on fact or law. 2. whether the trial Court on the available evidence is right in saying that the ’B’ schedule properties were acquired out of the joint family income and by such utilization and as such is liable to partition.; 3. whether the plaintiff no. 3’s entitlement to a share over the maturity amount under LIC Policies of A. Bhaskar who happens to be son of the defendant No.3 is sustainable.; 4. whether the trial Court’s order of partition of the movables described in schedule ‘D’ is sustainable; and 5. Whether the quantification of the share of the parties over the properties is in order. 20. The schedule ‘A’ property is the dwelling house and it stands admitted to be the part of the ancestral house falling to the share of these three plaintiffs and A. Bhaskar, the predecessor-in-interest of defendant nos. 1 to 3 who was then living, in a partition evidenced by a registered deed under Ext. 1 with other members of the family. In view of the allotment of the said properties as above, in the said partition with other members of the family each having 1/4th share; that has been taken by the trial Court to be the ancestral joint family property in their hands. 1 with other members of the family. In view of the allotment of the said properties as above, in the said partition with other members of the family each having 1/4th share; that has been taken by the trial Court to be the ancestral joint family property in their hands. When this partition took place, the plaintiffs and A. Bhaskar have got the property as the members of the family representing the branch of A. Nageswar and as his Class-I legal heirs and successors. Coparcenary as was prior to the said partition stood severed in the eye of law. Therefore, the trial Court is not correct in proceeding with a notion that schedule ‘A’ property is the joint ancestral property of the parties which is erroneous. They having come to succeed as aforesaid after having got the same in partition, the character of the property as joint family property does no more survive. It is the joint properties of the plaintiffs and late A. Bhaskar on whose death his widow and children (defendant nos. 1 to 3) have stepped into his shoes in respect of his share therein. The trial Court thus erred in law, in proceeding with that impression to decide all the issues. As per the case of defendant nos. 1 to 3, late A. Bhaskar had spent huge amount towards renovation and addition of the house which was already in existence. Above being the case laid, it clearly leads say that each had their defined share over the same. In that view of the matter, any amount of construction added by any one of the members or members of the family in that house in question, in the absence of any prior express agreement or even let us say any implied agreement subsequent thereto, available to be drawn from long standing conduct of the parties by omission or commission as to the consequential impact of such constructions in the matter of assignment of share amongst the members of the family or as to adjustment in any such given way/manner, the constructions even though made by one or two members of the family would certainly ensure to the benefit of all the members. It has thus to be presumed to have been so made for the convenient user and enjoyment of all. This being not the case here and the defendant nos. It has thus to be presumed to have been so made for the convenient user and enjoyment of all. This being not the case here and the defendant nos. 1 to 3 having not tendered any such acceptable evidence on that score; merely basing upon the evidence from the side of defendant nos. 1 to 3 that A. Bhaskar had renovated and was maintaining the said house by spending money from his own purse, this Court finds that the trial Court’s ultimate decision that schedule ‘A’ is liable to be partitioned amongst the plaintiffs and defendant nos. 1 to 3 is in order. 21. Let us now examine the sustainability of the answer of the trial Court to the question whether the property described in schedule ‘B’ is the self acquired property of A. Bhaskar or the joint family property. The trial Court has held the said property to be the joint family property which run against the claim of defendant nos. 1 to 3 that it is self-acquired property of late A.Bhaskar. The plaintiffs’ claim that the said property is the joint family property as it had been purchased from out of the joint family fund and with the contribution made by all the brothers. It is said that the acquisition was for and on behalf of the joint family and therefore it is to be taken to have been so purchased for the benefit of the members of the family. It is also stated by the plaintiffs that the building which is over the said schedule ‘B’ land has been constructed by utilising of the joint family fund. The defendant nos. 1 to 3 have averred that schedule ‘B’ land was purchased by A. Bhaskar, who was a medical practitioner and it is he who had constructed the house by spending money from out of his own income and savings. 22. Indisputedly, the sale deeds in respect of the land under schedule ‘B’ which have been admitted in evidence and marked as Ext.2 and 3 stand in the name of A. Bhaskar, the husband of defendant no.1. 22. Indisputedly, the sale deeds in respect of the land under schedule ‘B’ which have been admitted in evidence and marked as Ext.2 and 3 stand in the name of A. Bhaskar, the husband of defendant no.1. The purpose of acquisition is also not in dispute that it was for A. Bhaskar to have his medical practice there, by running clinic as was decided by him when his profession at Cuttack after leaving the service, in view of the dissension in the family did not take of so well. The property in schedule ‘B’ is situated at the village near Salipur. The record of right of land Ext. 12 is in the name of A. Bhaskar. In the earlier paragraph, it has already been said that in view of the partition of the ancestral properties of the parties with the members of other branches of the family and the plaintiffs and A. Bhaskar having got the land towards their share belonging to the branch of A. Maheswar per stripes so described under a registered partition deed, no joint family constituting the plaintiffs and A. Bhaskar existed. They got the properties as the Class-I heir of A. Nageswar in that partition which stood evidenced by the registered deed of partition Ext. 1. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that they all returned after that partition. No evidence whatsoever on that score has been let in. Mere factum as of their continuing to reside as such and dealing with the properties as before are not sufficient enough to elbow the legal presumption and those at best provide some inference but do not stand as the foundation of a finding as to the existence of joint family. So even on the admitted case that schedule ‘’A’ property had not been divided by metes and bounds amongst the plaintiffs and A. Bhaskar, the trial Court has erred in law by drawing a presumption of jointness. 23. Admittedly, A. Bhaskar was a holder of MBBS decree and was in Govt. service for some time and also thereafter in private medical practice at Cuttack. The plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 are also service holders residing at their respective place of service. 23. Admittedly, A. Bhaskar was a holder of MBBS decree and was in Govt. service for some time and also thereafter in private medical practice at Cuttack. The plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 are also service holders residing at their respective place of service. Even assuming for a moment that joint family had been reconstituted, in the instant case, I find that the case projected by the plaintiffs in respect of schedule ‘B’ property in is rather directionless, when once it is said that it was by the joint family fund, next, it is said that for the acquisition and also towards the construction and expenses met for same, all have jointly contributed. 24. At this juncture, for right approach and better appreciation, it is necessary to take note of the settled position of law. There is no presumption that the family, because it is joint, possesses joint property and when in a suit for partition, a party claims that any particular item (s) of property held by an individual member is the joint family property, the burden of proof that it is so, rests upon the party asserting the same. Existence of joint family does not raise a presumption that it owned only the joint family property. But when such nucleus is either proved or admitted, when from its nature and relative value, it could be inferred that such property could have been acquired, the burden shifts to the parties alleging self-acquisition and he must establish affirmatively that such property was not acquired with the aid of the joint family. In order to raise the presumption that a property acquired by a member of a joint family is joint property not only should the nucleus be established as sufficient for the acquisition of the property but it should also be established that it was so available with the acquirer. There may be presumption that there is joint family, but there can be no presumption that the joint family possesses joint family properties. Thus, there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only because of existence of a joint family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is joint family property. There may be presumption that there is joint family, but there can be no presumption that the joint family possesses joint family properties. Thus, there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only because of existence of a joint family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is joint family property. The persons so asserting when proves that there was a nucleus with which the joint family could have acquired the property, there would be presumption that the property is joint when only the onus shifts on the persons who claims to have solely acquired the property to prove that he did so with his own funds. When it is asserted that the property has been purchased by way of contribution being so poured in by the members of the family, the said facts are to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. But even with such proof, the test does not end to say that it is the joint family property or the joint property. The property having been purchased in the name of one, the other claimants must further prove that even with their contribution, they had never intended to prove the benefit of said acquisition in entirety upon that one member of the family as its owner but had intended that they all would thereby be benefitted, keeping that one member in whose name the acquisition has been made in pen and paper as mere name lender. 25. In the instant case, no evidence is there as to availability of joint family funds as surplus at the relevant time of acquisition. The case is now as that of a joint acquisition by way of contribution by all members. In the given facts of the case, in my considered opinion the bar contained in the provision of Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 would squarely apply. Here, A. Bhaskar in whose the property has been acquired, cannot be said to have held the same as a coparcener in the Hindu undivided family and in the fact situations, it was not so as has already been held. Therefore the property cannot be said to have been held by him for the benefit of coparceners in the family. Here, A. Bhaskar in whose the property has been acquired, cannot be said to have held the same as a coparcener in the Hindu undivided family and in the fact situations, it was not so as has already been held. Therefore the property cannot be said to have been held by him for the benefit of coparceners in the family. So the very claim of the plaintiffs in so far as the schedule ‘B’ property is concerned is not at all cognizable in the eye of law in view of the prohibition contained in Section 4 of the said Act. Next even on going through the evidence, I am not in agreement with the reasons given by the trial Court in recording a finding that the schedule ‘B’ property is the joint family property of the parties. It has drawn an inference from the matrimonial dispute pending between A. Bhaskar and his wife, defendant No.1 to the effect that since the plaintiff was not having good relationship with the defendant No.1, there remains no reason for the plaintiff in not going for such purchase to benefit of all the members of the family. I am unable to follow the same particularly as it has no bearing on the contentious issue as it is not the case of the plaintiffs that A. Bhaskar had alone purchased the property benefit all of them and on the other hand, they assert it to have been purchased by all with the contributions as to be joint family property although the transaction was only in the name of A. Bhaskar. The production of the original documents concerning the land as also Life Insurance Policies by the plaintiffs have been taken as good circumstance, heavily weighing in favour of the case of the plaintiffs that schedule ‘B’ property is the joint family property with which I am unable to subscribe. The ordinary presumption remains that when property is the name of one, it is his own property. Here, it is not shown that the joint family had any such funds for being invested for the purpose. Plaintiff nos. 1 to 3 were serving and A. Bhaskar was in medical practice who was also an Income Tax Assessee. Oral evidence with regard to contribution is of no importance in such a case and cannot be accepted as gospel truth. The pass book and bank account, Ext. Plaintiff nos. 1 to 3 were serving and A. Bhaskar was in medical practice who was also an Income Tax Assessee. Oral evidence with regard to contribution is of no importance in such a case and cannot be accepted as gospel truth. The pass book and bank account, Ext. 1 and B show that A. Bhaskar was having handsome bank balance which had been withdrawn during the relevant period. The Court below has eschewed those from considerations rather on flimsy ground; one such instance is that, finding that Ext. 1 reflects withdrawal of amount which is asserted by the defendant nos. 1 to 3 to be for the purpose of such purchase of land and putting up construction, it has been explained away in this way that in the absence of any thing to show that the said amount has been utilized for the purpose, the case of defendant nos. 1 to 3 is not acceptable. Testing the evidence in the touchstone of the settled position of law, this Court concludes that the schedule ’B’ is not the joint family/joint property available for partition amongst the plaintiffs and defendant nos. 1 to 3. That land and house property being the property of A. Bhaskar, the plaintiff no.3 and defendant nos. 1 to 3 who are his class-I heirs have succeeded thereto and thus each of them have 1/4th share over said schedule ‘B’ property i.e. plaintiff no. 3 (mother)-1/4th, defendant no. 1 (widow)-1/4th, defendant no.2 (daughter)-1/4th and defendant no.3 (daughter)-1/4th. 26. Coming to the movables described in schedule ‘C’, the trial Court has directed for partition of the movables shown under item nos. 3,4, 6 and 7; these are one old Bajaj scooter, old Godrej refrigerator, old Konark colour T.V. and cash of Rs.15,000/- payable on account of LIC Policies. The movables described in item nos. 1,2 and 5 have been kept out of the purview of the partition. The discussion of the evidence in deciding the issue No.5 concerning the movables under schedule ’D’ has been made by the trial Court at para-10 of its judgment. It has been said by the trial Court that the movables under item nos.1 and 2 are personal belongings of the defendant no.1. The discussion of the evidence in deciding the issue No.5 concerning the movables under schedule ’D’ has been made by the trial Court at para-10 of its judgment. It has been said by the trial Court that the movables under item nos.1 and 2 are personal belongings of the defendant no.1. It is said that scooter and colour T.V. are standing in the name of the husband of defendant no.1 and those were with defendant no.1 when this scooter has been given away towards payment of the arrear dues. It has been further said by the trial Court that the colour T.V. being kept for personal use of defendant no.1 in her bed room that is not to be partitioned. It has found that those described in item nos. 3, 4 and 5 are liable for partitioned. The movables in the schedule ‘C’, item nos. 3, 4 and 5 are one Gitanjali Black and While T.V. set in possession of the defendant no.1 and the Bajaj scooter and Godrej refrigerator. It has been found that the Bajaj scooter is no more with the defendant no.1. The suit has been filed in the year 1993. Looking at the age of all these movables which are electronic items having no resale value as such in the present days market, this Court is of the view that the value of those movable by now stand at almost at zero. At this stage, therefore, there remains no need for considering the prayer for partition of those movables treating those to be not so available. The plaintiffs have claimed that over the maturity amount under the LIC Policies of A. Bhaskar, the plaintiff no.3 being the mother, a Class-I heir of her deceased son is entitled to 1/4th share and it is stated that defendant nos. 1 to 3 are entitled to 1/4th each. It is further stated that the maturity amount has already been taken by the defendant no.1. In any case, the defendant no.1 being the nominee had the right to receive but such receipt by her is for and on behalf of all these legal heirs and successors of the policy holder and for their benefit. Therefore, the plaintiff no.3 and defendant nos. 1 to 3 are having the share over the amount which was payable under LIC Policies of A. Bhaskar and is said to have received by the defendant No.1. Therefore, the plaintiff no.3 and defendant nos. 1 to 3 are having the share over the amount which was payable under LIC Policies of A. Bhaskar and is said to have received by the defendant No.1. 27. For the aforesaid discussion and reasons, the impugned judgment and the preliminary decree passed in the suit are set aside, followed by passing of the preliminary decree as under : (i) the property described in schedule ‘A of the plaint is liable to be partitioned and each of the plaintiffs is entitled to 1/4th share whereas defendant nos. 1 to 3 are jointly entitled to 1/4th share, each having 1/12th share; (ii) the property described in schedule ‘B’ is liable to be partitioned amongst the plaintiff no.3, defendant nos. 1 to 3 with each having 1/4th share; and (iii) the plaintiff no.3, defendant nos. 1 to 3 are entitled to get 1/4th share each over the maturity value of the LIC Policies as described in schedule ‘D’ which has to be accordingly worked out in case, the same has already been paid to any of them. 28. The appeals stand disposed of as aforesaid and in the facts and circumstances without cost. Appeals disposed of.