JUDGMENT & ORDER : Paresh Upadhyay, J. This Appeal is filed by the original defendant No.1 and is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court (City Civil Court, Ahmedabad) dated 29.04.2011 in Civil Suit No. 2444 of 2002. The said suit was initially filed before the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad on 30.04.1996 and was registered as HRP Suit No.584 of 1996, the plaint of which was subsequently returned by the Small Causes Court to the plaintiff on 11.07.2002, to present the same (the plaint) before the competent Court, which was presented before the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad on 15.07.2002 by the plaintiff, which was registered as Civil Suit No.2444 of 2002. The Trial Court has decreed that suit in favour of the plaintiff, in part, by directing the defendant No.1 to handover the possession of the suit property (shop) to the plaintiff. It is this judgment which is challenged by the original defendant No.1 in this Appeal. 2. It is noted that, this Court (Coram : Hon'ble Ms. Justice Bela M. Trivedi) had, on 04.05.2018, fixed the Appeal for final hearing on 09.05.2018. Thereafter, on 11.06.2018, this Court (Coram : Hon'ble Ms. Justice Bela M. Trivedi) had called for the record and proceedings from the Trial Court and had further ordered that, the Appeal be finally heard. The record and proceedings are received from the Trial Court. This Appeal was listed for final hearing yesterday i.e. on 28.06.2018, along with Interim Application No.1 of 2018. Mr. J.T. Trivedi, learned advocate for the appellant had indicated that, there was urgency, for the reasons recorded in the said Interim Application and therefore, the matter may be heard finally. For this reason, the matter was taken up for final hearing yesterday i.e. on 28.06.2018. 3. Heard learned advocates. 4. It is noted that, both the learned advocates have extensively taken this Court through the record and proceedings of the case, which is received by this Court from the Trial Court. Independent of that also, this Court has considered the record and proceedings of the case. 5.1 Mr. J. T. Trivedi, learned advocate for the appellant has submitted that, the suit was barred by limitation and the Trial Court fell in error in holding that issue in favour of the plaintiff. Independent of that also, this Court has considered the record and proceedings of the case. 5.1 Mr. J. T. Trivedi, learned advocate for the appellant has submitted that, the suit was barred by limitation and the Trial Court fell in error in holding that issue in favour of the plaintiff. For this purpose, he has taken this Court through the pleadings on record and has contended that, if the cause of action as pleaded in the plaint is taken into consideration, the suit was beyond the period of limitation of 12 years, even if the institution of the proceedings in the year 1996 is accepted as it is. It is further submitted that this Appeal needs to be allowed on that count alone. In support of his submission, he has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Shakuntala S. Tiwari versus Hem Chand M. Singhania, (1987) AIR SC 1823. 5.2 It is additionally submitted by him that, the Trial Court fell in error while deciding the Issue No.1 in favour of the plaintiff. It is submitted that, the finding recorded by the Trial Court qua the said issue was inconsistent with the material on record and therefore, the same needs to be interfered with. Learned advocate for the appellant has mainly concentrated on these two points to challenge the impugned judgment of the Trial Court. It is submitted by him that, the judgment and decree be quashed and set aside and the suit be dismissed. 6.1 On the other hand, Mr. J.F. Mehta, learned advocate for the contesting respondent No.1 original plaintiff has supported the judgment of the Trial Court. He has submitted that it was the case of the defendant No.1 herself before the Trial Court that, she had come in the occupation of the suit property (shop) in the year 1988. It is submitted that the suit was instituted in the year 1996. Thus, the suit could not be said to have been barred by limitation. He has submitted that it was the case of the defendant No.1 herself before the Trial Court that, she had come in the occupation of the suit property (shop) in the year 1988. It is submitted that the suit was instituted in the year 1996. Thus, the suit could not be said to have been barred by limitation. He has also submitted that the decision relied by learned advocate for the appellant in case of Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari, is inapplicable in the present case and in any case, the ratio to the effect that law of limitation would be applicable in the cases of rent suits as well, would not take the case of the appellant any further, since the matter was not considered by the Trial Court under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, and the said Court (Small Causes Court) had returned the plaint to the plaintiff, thus the said argument on behalf of the appellant is not well founded. 6.2 Learned advocate for the original plaintiff has also taken this Court extensively through the findings recorded by the Trial Court on each issue framed by it, and has submitted that the same does not call for any interference by this Court. It is submitted that this Appeal be dismissed. 7. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and having considered the material on record, this Court finds that, the following points arise for determination of this Court in this First Appeal. (i) Whether the suit instituted by the plaintiff - present respondent No.1 was barred by limitation? (ii) Whether the plaintiff proved before the Trial Court that, it was he (and not the defendant No.1), who was given the suit property (Shop No.17) on lease by defendant No.5 (Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation) ? (iii) Whether the final judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court calls for any interference on any other count? 8.1 So far the first issue as noted above, which pertains to limitation is concerned, this Court finds that, it is a matter of record that the suit initially filed before the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad on 30.04.1996 and was registered as HRP Suit No.584 of 1996. 8.1 So far the first issue as noted above, which pertains to limitation is concerned, this Court finds that, it is a matter of record that the suit initially filed before the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad on 30.04.1996 and was registered as HRP Suit No.584 of 1996. The plaint of the said suit was subsequently returned by the Small Causes Court to the plaintiff on 11.07.2002, to present the same (the plaint) before the competent Court. The plaintiff presented the same before the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad on 15.07.2002. While answering the first point for determination as noted above (which was the Issue No.4 as framed by the Trial Court, pertaining to limitation), this Court finds that, the period from 30.04.1996 to 11.07.2002 needs to be excluded while counting the period of limitation against the plaintiff. The Trial Court has also held so, and rightly so. 8.2 Even with the above finding, the said point can not be finally held to be in favour of the plaintiff. It is further required to be seen, as to whether, even as on 30.04.1996 (the date on which the suit was instituted), the suit could be said to be within limitation. In this regard, it is noted that, it is not in dispute that, in the present case, the period of limitation would be 12 years (vide Article 65/66 of the Limitation Act, 1963). It is not even the case of the appellant (original defendant No.1) that, the said period should not be 12 years but less. The argument of the appellant is that, even if 30.04.1996 is accepted to be the date of institution of the proceedings, even on that day, it was beyond the period of 12 years, going by the averments in the plaint that the defendant was in illegal possession since year 1983. This Court finds that, the said argument is not well founded for the reason that, it was the case of the present appellant herself before the Trial Court that, she became the owner of the suit property in the year 1988 and came in possession. This is evident from the evidence of the defendant No.1 herself before the Trial Court vide evidence at Exh.117, more particularly para : 2 of her Examination-in-Chief dated 06.03.2009 and cross-examination dated 01.04.2009. This is evident from the evidence of the defendant No.1 herself before the Trial Court vide evidence at Exh.117, more particularly para : 2 of her Examination-in-Chief dated 06.03.2009 and cross-examination dated 01.04.2009. It is noted that, the cross-examination of defendant No.1 makes her case more vulnerable not only on delay but also on merits which is noted hereinafter. It is her say in the cross-examination that, she had purchased the suit property from the plaintiff and that is how she is the owner of the suit property. On overall consideration of this material, this Court finds that, the institution of the proceeding by the plaintiff in the year 1996, could not be termed to be beyond the period of limitation, which is 12 years. The authority relied by the learned advocate for the appellant (Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari, Supra) shall not take the case of the appellant any further, in view of the above finding. 8.3 For the above reason, it is held that, the suit was not barred by limitation. The point for determination No.1 is thus answered in favour of the original plaintiff. 9.1 So far the second point for determination (pertaining to the Issue No.1, as was framed by the Trial Court) is concerned, this Court finds as under. 9.2 The said issue as framed by the Trial Court was, "whether the plaintiff proves that defendant No.5 has leased the suit property to the plaintiff?". The Trial Court has held the said issue as affirmative i.e. in favour of the plaintiff. 9.3 It is not in dispute that, the suit property is a shop, in the market which was constructed by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. The Municipal Corporation is defendant No.5. The shops were leased to individuals in the year 1969. The lease deed qua the suit property (Shop No.17) is on record at Exh.104. In the said document, the plaintiff Kiritkumar Gokuldas Pandya is shown as the lessee. Exh.105 indicates that the Municipal taxes, etc. were paid by the plaintiff for the suit property. Exh.106 and Exh.107 are the electricity bills in the name of the plaintiff on the suit property. Exh.98 is the document dated 03.05.1969 which also indicates that the relationship between the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and the plaintiff was as lessor and lessee. Exh.105 indicates that the Municipal taxes, etc. were paid by the plaintiff for the suit property. Exh.106 and Exh.107 are the electricity bills in the name of the plaintiff on the suit property. Exh.98 is the document dated 03.05.1969 which also indicates that the relationship between the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and the plaintiff was as lessor and lessee. Thus there is overwhelming contemporaneous material on record to indicate that, there was a relationship of lessor and lessee between the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and the plaintiff. There is no material contrary to this. The said lease is never terminated by the Municipal Corporation. There is no material to the effect that, it is the plaintiff who had sold any of his rights qua the suit property to anyone, much less to the defendant No.1. On the face of this material, the case of the present appellant (defendant No.1) before the Trial Court (vide Exh.117) was to the effect that, she had purchased the property from the plaintiff in the year 1988. She has not been able to show any material in support of the said assertion. Thus the evidence of the defendant No.1 to this effect was contrary to record. The same therefore can not be accepted. The Trial Court has rightly not accepted the same. 9.4 There is an additional factor, which would further tilt the balance against the appellant on this point i.e. on merits. It is noted that, during the course of hearing before this Court, the issue pertaining to partnership between the plaintiff and defendants No.3 and 4 had also cropped up. This Court has taken into consideration the contents of the Partnership Deed between the plaintiff and defendants No.3 and 4 (Exh. 102). Clause 13 and 14 thereof make it clear that, the defendants No.3 & 4 did not have any right/interest in the suit property. Defendants No.3 & 4 thus could not have transferred any interest in favour of defendants No.1 and 2, since they themselves did not have any. The plaintiff has never transferred his right to any other person, not even to defendant No.1. The Municipal Corporation did not have any authority, to pass on the interest of the plaintiff to anyone, not even to defendant No.1, without first terminating the lease in favour of the plaintiff, which it had never done. The plaintiff has never transferred his right to any other person, not even to defendant No.1. The Municipal Corporation did not have any authority, to pass on the interest of the plaintiff to anyone, not even to defendant No.1, without first terminating the lease in favour of the plaintiff, which it had never done. Viewing the matter from this angle also, on merits, the finding recorded by the Trial Court is just and proper. 9.5 For the above reason, the point for determination No.2 is answered in favour of the original plaintiff. The same was Issue No.1 before the Trial Court and the Trial Court has also, on the basis of material before it, arrived at the same conclusion. The same need not be reversed. 10. Learned advocate for the appellant has not pressed into service any other argument, except two, as noted and answered hereinabove. Inspite of that, this Court has, independently examined, as to whether the Trial Court has committed any error, which may ultimately change the final decree. Having viewed the matter from all possible angles, this Court finds that, the Trial Court has not committed any error while allowing the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The point for determination No.3 as noted above is also answered in favour of the original plaintiff. This Appeal therefore needs to be dismissed. 11. It is noted that the plaintiff had also asked for mesne profit from the defendants. The Trial Court has rejected the said claim. The said aspect is not under challenge before this Court, either by way of a substantial appeal or cross-objection in this Appeal or by any other proceeding, by the original plaintiff. That aspect therefore is not gone into by this Court. 12. For the reasons and the findings recorded above, the following order is passed. 12.1 This Appeal is dismissed. 12.2 The judgment and decree dated 29.04.2011, passed by the Trial Court (Ahmedabad City Civil Court) in Civil Suit no.2444 of 2011 is confirmed. 12.3 Decree be drawn accordingly. 12.4 Record and proceedings be returned to the concerned Trial Court. 13. After the pronouncement of this order, Mr. Trivedi, learned advocate for the appellant has requested that, this order be stayed for some time. 12.3 Decree be drawn accordingly. 12.4 Record and proceedings be returned to the concerned Trial Court. 13. After the pronouncement of this order, Mr. Trivedi, learned advocate for the appellant has requested that, this order be stayed for some time. With a view to see that, challenge if any to this order remains meaningful to the present appellant, it is ordered that, if any coercive order is passed by the Executing Court (which is seized of the execution proceeding), the said order shall not be executed, against the appellant, for a period of two months from today.