JUDGMENT : 1. Instant first appeal is directed against the judgement and decree dated 12.3.1997 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Behror (hereinafter “The Trial Court”), whereby the trial court dismissed the suit of specific performance filed by the plaintiffs-appellants. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this first appeal may be summarised as thus: The case of the plaintiffs-appellants is that the plaintiffs-appellants had entered into an agreement to sell with the defendant-respondents, agreeing to buy a certain parcel of land for a consideration of Rs. 90,000 (hereinafter “The Suit Property”, the details of which have been given in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the plaint. The said agreement to sell was executed between one Ramjilal and plaintiff no. 1 Umrao Singh and plaintiff no. 2 Gyarsi Lal on 20.6.1986. In pursuance of the said agreement, a sum of Rs. 42,000 was paid by the plaintiffs-appellants to Ramjilal and the possession of the suit property was also handed over to the plaintiffs. Further, it was also agreed between the parties that the sale deed for the said property would be executed on or before 20.6.1986. However, before the sale deed could be registered, Ramjilal died, because of which a subsequent agreement was entered into between the defendants-respondents and Smt. Mishri Devi (wife of plaintiff no. 1) and her sons, who are appellants no. 4, 5 and 6 herein on 10.5.1987. In furtherance of this agreement, a sum of Rs. 44,000 was paid to the defendants. Thus, up to 10.5.1987, a sum of Rs. 86,000 (42,000+44,000) was paid to the defendants. It is also the case of the plaintiffs that further sums of Rs. 700 and Rs. 1000 were paid by them to the defendants on 21.11.1987 and 15.5.1988 respectively. In the meanwhile, a notice was given by the plaintiffs to the defendants, asking them to get the sale deed registered but despite their repeated requests, the defendants failed to do so and, a suit for specific performance was filed by the plaintiffs-appellants. 3. In response to the plaint, the defendants-respondents filed a written statement, wherein they disputed the execution of the agreement itself, among other things. 3. In response to the plaint, the defendants-respondents filed a written statement, wherein they disputed the execution of the agreement itself, among other things. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues : ^^1- vk;k e`rd jkethyky us fnukad 20-06-86 dks oknh la[;k ,d o nks ds i{k esa viuh d`f"k Hkwfe [kljk ua&10] {ks=Qy pkj ch?kk nks fcLok rFkk [kljk ua&11 {ks=Qy rhu ch?kk nks fcLok xzke >kjksM+k dks uCcs gtkj :i;s esa fodz; djus dk vuqca/k dj 42]000@& :i;s izkIr djds oknhx.k ds i{k esa vuqca/k i= fu"ikfnr fd;k \ 2- vk;k fnukad 10-05-87 dks izfroknh la- ,d ls lkr us oknh la- 3 ls 6 ds i{k esa 44]000 :i;s izkIr djds iwoZ ds vuqca/k dks Lohdkj djrs gq, f}rh; vuqca/k i= fu"ikfnr fd;k \ 3- vk;k oknhx.k mDr vuqca/k dh 'krksZa dh ikyuk djus ds fy, lnSo rRij Fks vkSj rRij gSa rFkk vius fgLls dk vuqca/k iw.kZ djus ds fy, mnr o bPNqd jgs gSa \ 4- vk;k oknhx.k mDr vuqca/k ds isVs 2300 :i;s izfroknhx.k dks vnk djus ds fy, lnSo rRij jgs gSa\ 5- vk;k mDr vuqca/k dk fodz; i= fnukad 20-06-87 rd iathdj.k fd;k tkuk fuf'pr gqvk Fkk \ 6- vk;k lkr lkS :i;s dh jlhn o izys[k izfroknhx.k pUnwjke o xtkuan ds ncko ds dkj.k fu"ikfnr fd, \ 7- vk;k oknh la[;k rhu ls 6 }kjk izfroknh la- rhu dks fn;s x, ,d gtkj :i;s dh jlhn o mldk izys[k izfroknh la- rhu ds ncko ds dkj.k fu"ikfnr fd;k \ 8- vuqrks"k D;k gks \** 4. To support the claim, six witnesses were examined by the plaintiffs-appellants. However, no witness was examined by the defendants. After considering the argument by the counsels and the testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court decided issues no. 1 and 2 and 5 to 7 in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants and against the defendants, but issues no. 3 and 4 were decided in favour of the defendants-respondents and against the plaintiffs-appellants and the suit was dismissed. Hence, this first appeal. 5. Mr. Bihari Lal Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiffs-appellants supported the judgement of the trial court on issues no. 1, 2 and 5, 6 and 7. 3 and 4 were decided in favour of the defendants-respondents and against the plaintiffs-appellants and the suit was dismissed. Hence, this first appeal. 5. Mr. Bihari Lal Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiffs-appellants supported the judgement of the trial court on issues no. 1, 2 and 5, 6 and 7. According to the learned counsel, the trial court was right in arriving at the conclusion that an agreement to sell was executed between Ramjilal and plaintiff numbers 1 and 2 on 20.6.1986 and a subsequent agreement was also executed in furtherance of this agreement on 10.5.1987. Supporting the observations of the trial court, Mr. Agarwal submitted that the plaintiffs-appellants had called and examined seven witnesses, who not only proved the execution of the agreement between the parties but also the fact that a total consideration of Rs. 87,700 was paid by the plaintiffs-appellants to the defendants up to 15.5.1988 and the possession of the suit property was also handed over to the plaintiffs. Further, no witness was examined on behalf of the defendants-respondents to proved the contrary. Thus, the trial court was right in holding that an agreement to sell was indeed executed between the parties. Mr. Agarwal however, challenged the findings of the trial court as regards issues number 3 and 4. It was the submission of Mr. Agarwal that the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiffs-appellants had failed to aver and prove readiness and willingness on their part. Not only had the plaintiffs-appellants paid a significant part of the consideration i.e. a sum of Rs. 87,700 out of the total agreed consideration of Rs. 90,000; they had also given a notice to the defendant-respondents to get the sale deed registered. Both these facts taken together go on to show that the plaintiffs-appellants were always ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement. Thus, the learned counsel submitted that the court should have exercised its discretion and granted a decree of specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. 6. On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Agarwal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants-respondents supported the findings of the trial court as regards issues 3 and 4. Mr. Agarwal however, challenged the findings arrived at by the trial court on the rest of the issues and put forth a number of arguments regarding them. 6. On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Agarwal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants-respondents supported the findings of the trial court as regards issues 3 and 4. Mr. Agarwal however, challenged the findings arrived at by the trial court on the rest of the issues and put forth a number of arguments regarding them. It would be apposite to set forth the arguments taken by Mr. Agarwal point wise. First, Mr. Agarwal contended that the suit property belonged to Late Mr. Mool Chand and after his death, the property devolved upon all his successors and not just Mr. Ramjilal. Since, some of the successors of Mr. Mool Chand were minors at the time when the agreement to sell was executed, it was necessary for Mr. Ramjilal to seek the permission of the District Judge before he could sell the property even though he might have been doing it for the bona fide need and interests of all the members of the family. Having sold the entire property without seeking appropriate permissions, the agreement to sell and invalid and void. To support his contentions, Mr. Agarwal relied on the judgements of the Supreme Court given in the case of Panni Lal v. Rajinder Singh and Another, (1993) 4 SCC 38 and Kallathil Sreedharan and Another v. Komath Pandyalal Prasana and Another, (1996) 6 SCC 218 . Second, the next argument taken by Mr. Agarwal was to the effect that the plaintiffs-appellants had miserably failed to prove the execution of the agreements to sell. The trial court without considering the evidence gave the finding in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants, which was blatantly wrong. Third, Mr. Agarwal next contended that since the parties had agreed to enter into a new agreement on 10.5.1987, there was a novation of the earlier agreement and because of the new agreement, the earlier agreement stood cancelled and neither of the parties was bound to perform the same. To support his contention, Mr. Agarwal relied on the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court given in the case of Bal Krishana and Another v. Bhagwan Das and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 145 . Fourth, the next contention put forward by Mr. Agarwal was that the agreement to sell was not signed by the plaintiffs-appellants. To support his contention, Mr. Agarwal relied on the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court given in the case of Bal Krishana and Another v. Bhagwan Das and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 145 . Fourth, the next contention put forward by Mr. Agarwal was that the agreement to sell was not signed by the plaintiffs-appellants. Since the plaintiffs did not put their signatures on the agreement, it was a unilateral agreement to sell, which was not binding on the defendants-respondents. Since, there was no binding agreement, the trial court was correct in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs for specific performance. Lastly, Mr. Agarwal also contended that the subsequent agreement to sell dated 10.5.1987 was signed between the plaintiffs-appellants and Smt. Mishri Devi (wife of plaintiff number 1) and she was never called into the witness box to prove her readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract on the count too, the trial court rightly rejected the plaintiffs’ suit for specific performance. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED 7. Having heard the arguments put forth by the learned counsels, the following issues merit the consideration by this court: I. Was the agreement to sell dated 20.6.1986 entered into between the parties invalid and void for the reason that Mr. Ramjilal, who executed the agreement on behalf of the defendants-respondent failed to take the permission from the district judge since minors had interest and stake in the suit property too? II. Have the plaintiffs-appellants been able to prove that an agreement to sell was executed between them and the defendants? III. Was there novation of the agreement to sell dated 20.6.1986 by the subsequent agreement entered into between the parties on 10.5.1987, because of which neither of the parties were any longer bound to perform the agreement? IV. Was the agreement to sell unenforceable and the defendants-respondents were not liable to perform them since it was unilateral? V. Were the plaintiffs-appellants able to prove their readiness and willingness and hence, the trial court erred in rejecting their suit for specific performance? ISSUE I It is the contention of the defendants-respondents that the agreement to sell executed by Mr. Ramjilal was invalid and void for the reason that minors had interest in the suit property and no permission from the district judge. It is far beyond settled that an agreement entered into with a minor is entirely void. ISSUE I It is the contention of the defendants-respondents that the agreement to sell executed by Mr. Ramjilal was invalid and void for the reason that minors had interest in the suit property and no permission from the district judge. It is far beyond settled that an agreement entered into with a minor is entirely void. Further, it is equally settled by virtue of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 that the natural guardian of a minor has no power to transfer or alienate the property in which a minor has a stake without taking leave from a court. There are streams of judgements by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various high courts on this point. It is not essential to discuss each one of them. The two judgements cited by the learned counsel of the defendants-respondents would suffice Panni Lal (Supra) and Kallathil Sreedharan (Supra). Though the argument put forth by the defendants-respondents seem plausible at first, a more careful reading of the pleadings and the testimonies of the witnesses dilutes the strength of the argument. As per Section 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proof to prove a particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe its existence. In the instant case, the burden of proof to prove the facts that some of defendants-respondents were minors at the time of execution of agreement was on the defendants-respondents. Apart from casually stating so in their written-statement, the defendant-respondents have not produced a single document to back their claim. Further, they failed to call any witness to corroborate their claim. Further, two of the witnesses i.e. (PW-1) Umrao Singh and (PW-4) Kabool Chand denied the assertion of the defendants-respondents that defendant no. 4 Haitram was 15-16 years of age at the time of execution of agreement. Furthermore, the statements of two witnesses namely (P.W. 2) Rameshwar and (P.W. 3) Rohtash Kumar who stated that the age of defendant number 4 Haitram might have been 15-16 years were based on mere conjecture and they were not really sure about the exact age of defendant-respondent. A statement made on mere conjectures and guesses cannot be relied upon by a court of law. Thus, this argument of the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents is liable to be brushed aside. A statement made on mere conjectures and guesses cannot be relied upon by a court of law. Thus, this argument of the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents is liable to be brushed aside. Therefore, this issue is decided against this defendants-respondents and in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. ISSUE II The next issue that arise for consideration is whether or not, the plaintiffs-appellants have been able to prove the execution of the agreement to sell dated 20.6.1986. It is true that the burden to prove the execution of the agreement to sell was on the plaintiffs-appellants and I think the plaintiffs-appellants have fairly discharged this burden. The factum of the execution of the said agreement has been stated by each of the witnesses brought to stand by the plaintiffs-appellants and the defendants-respondents have not been able to produce any evidence or witness to prove the contrary. Further, in their written-statement too, the defendants-respondents have challenged the validity of the agreement to sell, contending that Mr. Ramjilal had no authority or right to sell the suit property considering the fact that minors had stake in it. Having themselves accepted the execution of the agreement to sell by Mr. Ramjilal, the defendants-respondents cannot adopt and take a contrary stand now. Thus, the trial court was right in holding that the execution of agreement to sell dated 20.6.1986 was duly proved. Thus, this issue is also decided against the defendants-respondents and in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. ISSUED III The third argument on which a lot of emphasis has been given by the learned counsel of defendant-respondent Mr. R.K. Agarwal it that because of the subsequent agreement dated 10.5.1987 entered into between the parties, there was a novation of the earlier agreement to sell dated 20.6.1986 and since the earlier agreement stood cancelled, neither of the parties were bound to perform it. In order to consider and analyse the argument put forward by the learned counsel, it is essential to briefly discuss the law related to novation of a contract/agreement. Briefly put, novation of a contract happens when the parties to a contract agree to substitute the existing contract with a new contract altogether. The concept of novation is contained and delineated in Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Briefly put, novation of a contract happens when the parties to a contract agree to substitute the existing contract with a new contract altogether. The concept of novation is contained and delineated in Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. For the sake of convenience, Section 62 is re-produced as below : “Effect of novation, rescission, and alteration of contract – If the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed.” As is evident from the plain language of the section, novation of a contract happens in two situations namely: when the parties to the contract agree to substitute a new contract for the old one and/or to rescind or alter the original contract. The law related to novation of a contract was succinctly explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Lata Construction v. Rameshchandra Ramniklal, AIR 2000 SC 380 . The Hon’ble court observed as below : “One of the essential requirements of ‘Novation’; as contemplated by Section 62, is that there should be complete substitution of a new contract in place of the old. It is in that situation that the original contract need not be performed. Substitution of a new contract in place of the old contract which would have the effect of rescinding or completely altering the terms of the original contract, has to be by agreement between the parties. A substituted contract should rescind or alter or extinguish the previous contract. But if the terms of the two contracts are inconsistent and they cannot stand together, the subsequent contract cannot be said to be in substitution of the earlier contract”. As noted by the Supreme Court, for a contract to undergo novation, there has to be complete rescission or alteration of the earlier contract and its substitution by a new one. Having briefly discussed the law related to novation, it is now essential to advert to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, an agreement to sell was executed between plaintiff numbers 1 and 2 and one Ramjilal on 20.6.1986, wherein the parties had agreed to buy/sell the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 90,000. However, after Mr. Ramjilal passed away, a subsequent agreement was signed on 10.5.1987. In the instant case, an agreement to sell was executed between plaintiff numbers 1 and 2 and one Ramjilal on 20.6.1986, wherein the parties had agreed to buy/sell the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 90,000. However, after Mr. Ramjilal passed away, a subsequent agreement was signed on 10.5.1987. However, the property to be sold remained the same in both these agreements and so did the consideration (the part consideration that had been paid while executing the original agreement dated 20.6.1986 was adjusted in the later agreement and the parties did not agree to modify or alter the consideration that had been decided by virtue of the original agreement). As had already been stated, for novation to happen, there has to be a complete alteration or rescission of the original contract. This was certainly not the case here. Hence, I am not inclined to entertain and get convinced by the argument put forth by the learned counsel for defendants-respondents. Further, the decision by the Apex Court given in the case of Bal Krishana (supra) would not help the defendants-respondents either. Briefly stated, the facts of that case are that one Mainabai had executed a registered sale deed and delivered possession of the property involved to the vendee for a consideration of Rs. 25,000, out of which a sum of Rs. 10,000 was paid upfront by the defendant-vendee. However, later the parties changed their mind and there was a new agreement whereby the defendant-vendee agreed to re-convey the property to the plaintiffs. Since, the terms of this new agreement were not clear, a subsequent agreement dated 21.7.1952 was entered into between the parties. However, when the defendant-vendee failed to re-convey the property back to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance. The trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs but observed that the plaintiffs has been paid 25,000 by the defendants and so, for re-conveyance, the plaintiffs could not say that they needed to pay only Rs. 10,000. The plaintiffs challenged this before the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the high court observed that the subsequent agreement dated 21.7.1952 was a completely separate agreement and since it did not make any reference to the earlier agreement and the terms were entirely different, the parties were bound by this agreement and not the earlier agreement. 10,000. The plaintiffs challenged this before the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the high court observed that the subsequent agreement dated 21.7.1952 was a completely separate agreement and since it did not make any reference to the earlier agreement and the terms were entirely different, the parties were bound by this agreement and not the earlier agreement. On an appeal being filed in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the High Court. As apparent from the factual matrix of this case, it is clear that the said decision would not apply to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, not only did the subsequent agreement clearly mention the original agreement dated 20.6.1986 but the property to be sold and the consideration remained the same. There not being any alteration or rescission of the earlier contract, the principles of novation will not apply. Thus, this issue is also decided against the defendants-respondents and in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. ISSUE IV The next submission of the learned counsel of the defendant-respondent is that the agreement to sell did not bear the signatures of the plaintiffs-appellants and the agreement being unilateral, the defendants-respondents were not bound by it. I have gone through the pleadings and the testimonies of the witnesses and after doing so, I am of the considered opinion that this argument does not hold water for two reasons. First, it is a settled law that for an agreement to sell to be binding, reducing the terms of the agreement in writing is not a sine qua non. There can be an oral agreement to sell too and an agreement to sell, whether written or oral would not be non-binding on the parties simply because it does not bear the signatures of both the parties. Second, is also a settled law that an agreement to sell signed by the vendor and given to the purchaser would remain binding on the vendor even if the purchaser/vendee did not put his signatures on the spot. I find support from the ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for plaintiffs-appellants given in the case of Alka Bose v. Parmatma Devi and Others reported as 2009 (1) Civil Court Cases 412 (SC). Thus, this issue is also decided against the defendants-respondents and in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. I find support from the ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel for plaintiffs-appellants given in the case of Alka Bose v. Parmatma Devi and Others reported as 2009 (1) Civil Court Cases 412 (SC). Thus, this issue is also decided against the defendants-respondents and in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. ISSUE V After a careful analysis of all the issues, the last issue that needs for consideration is whether or not the plaintiffs-appellants have been able to proved their readiness and willingness for getting a decree of specific performance. After a careful analysis of the pleadings and the conduct of the parties, I am of the firm opinion that the plaintiffs-appellants could not have proved their readiness and willingness more than they already did. The plaintiffs have not only specifically averred in the plaint their readiness and willingness but the factum of paying a sum of Rs. 87,700 out of a total consideration of Rs. 90,000 further goes on to show that the plaintiffs were indeed always ready and willing and had also performed a significant part of their agreement. Therefore, the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their readiness and willingness based only on the reason that they were not ready and willing to pay Rs. 2300/- and registration charges. In Motilal Jain v. Ramdasi Devi (Smt) and Others (2000) 6 SC 420 it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that where major portion of the consideration was paid at the time of execution of the contract, readiness & willingness of the purchaser is apparent. Relevant para of the said judgement is reproduced as under:- “10. In the instant case of perusal of paras 6 to 11 of the plaint does clearly indicate the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. The only obligation which he had to comply with was payment of balance of consideration. It was stated that he demanded the defendant to receive the balance of consideration of Rs. 8000 and execute the sale deed. The defendant was in Patna (Bihar) at the time of notices and when he came back to his place the plaintiff filed the suit against him. In support of his case, he adduced the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2. The plaintiff had parted with two-thirds of the consideration at the time of execution of Ext. 2. The defendant was in Patna (Bihar) at the time of notices and when he came back to his place the plaintiff filed the suit against him. In support of his case, he adduced the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2. The plaintiff had parted with two-thirds of the consideration at the time of execution of Ext. 2. There is no reason why he would not pay the balance of one-third consideration of Rs. 8000 to have the property conveyed in his favour.” It is also contended by Mr. R.K. Agarwal in this regard that plaintiff no. 3 Smt. Mishri Devi did not come to the witness box to prove the readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiffs and hence, the learned trial court was right in holding that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. Having considered the argument made by the learned counsel, I am of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no need for Smt. Mishri Devi to come in the witness box for two reasons. First, plaintiff no. 1 Umrao Singh who was the husband of Mishri Devi came in the witness box and proved readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiffs. Being the husband of Smt. Mishri Devi, it was natural for him to have been acquainted with all the details of the transaction. Second, since Umrao Singh was a party to the original agreement to sell and it has already been stated by me that the subsequent agreement to sell was a mere continuation of the original agreement and there was no novation of the contract, his evidence and testimony was sufficient to prove readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiffs. Thus, this issue is also decided against the defendants-respondents and in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. OTHER ARGUMENTS It is also contended by Mr. R.K. Agarwal that plaintiffs no. 4 to 6 were minors at the time when the contract was entered into between the parties and being minors, they could not have entered into a legal binding contract in view of Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. I have considered the argument of the learned counsel. R.K. Agarwal that plaintiffs no. 4 to 6 were minors at the time when the contract was entered into between the parties and being minors, they could not have entered into a legal binding contract in view of Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. I have considered the argument of the learned counsel. It is true that minors are not capable of entering into legally binding contracts but it also a well-settled position of law that a parent/guardian can enter into a contract on behalf of the minor without the permission of the court if it is for the benefit of the minor. This has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik Chand & Another v. Ramchandra AIR 1981 SC 519 . Thus, this argument is also brushed aside. It is next contended by Mr. R.K. Agarwal that though the suit was filed by the plaintiffs within limitation, it was not filed by them within a reasonable time and since it was not filed within a reasonable time, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the discretionary relief of Specific performance. After considering the argument by the learned counsel, I am of the firm opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the suit has not been filed with undue delay. It is next contended by Mr. R.K. Agarwal that the trial court erred in holding that a sum of Rs. 2700/- was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants vide (Ex. 3) and (Ex. 4) since these receipts did not bear the signatures of all the defendants and the receipts had signature of only defendants 3 and 4. This argument by Mr. Agarwal is also devoid of any substance. The defendants failed to appear before the court and also failed to deny that the said sum was not taken by defendant no. 3 and 4 on behalf of all the defendants. Thus, the trial court was right in holding that a sum or Rs. 2700/- was indeed paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants. In light of the issues discussed and examined above this first appeal is allowed. The judgement and decree of the trial court dated 12.3.1997 is consequently set aside and the plaintiff’s suit for the specific performance of the contract is decreed. The plaintiffs-appellants are, thus, directed to deposit the balance amount of Rs. 2300/- within two months from today. In light of the issues discussed and examined above this first appeal is allowed. The judgement and decree of the trial court dated 12.3.1997 is consequently set aside and the plaintiff’s suit for the specific performance of the contract is decreed. The plaintiffs-appellants are, thus, directed to deposit the balance amount of Rs. 2300/- within two months from today. On their so depositing the amount in the trial court, the defendants-respondents shall execute the sale deed in respect of the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants and get it registered. If the defendants fail to do so, the plaintiffs will be entitled to get the sale deed executed by the court. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to costs of both the courts.