JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned advocate Mr.Vishal Patel for the petitioners and learned advocate Mr.Deep Vyas for the respondent. 2. This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution prays to set aside order dated 13th April, 2011 passed below Exh.1 by learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Porbandar, in Execution Petition No.17 of 1994. 3. Judgment and decree dated 07.05.1993 was passed in Regular Civil Suit No.78 of 1989 in favour of respondent, who was appointed as daily-rated tradesman under the petitioner Board. It was declared that action on part of the petitioner Board in not absorbing the plaintiff – respondent herein on the vacant post on the establishment and filling up the post by junior employee, was discriminatory. The order of dismissal passed against plaintiff was set aside and it was directed to take him back in service. It was held that he was entitled to all benefits in relation to the post. It was ordered to treat the services as continuous and the plaintiff was held entitled to benefits of increments and other benefits of service payable to the work-charge employees. 3.1 It appears that execution petition was filed in the year 1994 to execute the aforesaid decree claiming monetary benefits thereunder, pursuant to which the petitioner judgment debtor deposited the amount which by inadvertence was more than the entitlement of the plaintiff. The proceedings were closed at that time and the Civil Miscellaneous Application No.01 of 1995 by the petitioner - judgment debtor seeking to be given back the excess deposited amount was not accepted, as such amount was already paid to the respondent. 3.2 At a subsequent stage, after lapse of time, however the respondent - judgment creditor made an application dated 20th May, 2006 and prayed therein that though his pay was fixed upon reinstatement and the decree was executed, he was not paid higher payscale on the basis of the nine years service and that it was his entitlement to be paid under the decree. It appears that the petitioner applied for voluntary retirement and requested that his request for voluntary retirement should be allowed after refixing the pay by extending the benefit of higher pay-scale as flowing from the decree. It appears that the petitioner applied for voluntary retirement and requested that his request for voluntary retirement should be allowed after refixing the pay by extending the benefit of higher pay-scale as flowing from the decree. This prayer was objected to by the petitioner Board relying on State Government Resolution dated 16.08.1994 of the Finance Department, contending that passing of departmental examination was necessary before the employee could avail the benefit of higher pay-scale. 3.3 The executing court took the view that the decree passed in favour of the respondent – plaintiff was for grant of all service benefits inclusive of the higher pay-scale. Resultantly, learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Porbandar – the executing court, directed the judgment debtor to pay the benefit of higher pay-scales to the decree holder – respondent within specified time. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner in his submissions to assail the impugned order, highlighted the condition of passing of departmental examination to be entitled to receive the higher pay-scale under the Finance Department Resolution dated 16.08.1994. It was submitted that when the respondent had not passed the examination as per the applicable rules, there was no question of granting him the higher payscale. It was submitted that even otherwise, by mistake, Rs.01,52,576/- was deposited in excess and this amount came to be paid to the decree-holder. He relied on decision of Division Bench of this Court in M.T. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat being Letters Patent Appeal No.1578 of 2012 arising from Special Civil Application No.9016 of 2000, in which it was held that unless a person was qualified for higher promotion, higher pay-scale could not be granted. In that case, the appellant had not passed the departmental examination and because of that the Court held that they could not be said to be qualified for higher post and therefore could not be entitled to higher pay-scale. 4.1 On the other hand, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the decree passed in the suit provided for continuity of service to the plaintiff with all service benefits which would necessarily mean payment of the higher pay-scale grantable to the plaintiff upon completion of requisite number of years, which submitted learned advocate, the plaintiff had completed. 4.1 On the other hand, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the decree passed in the suit provided for continuity of service to the plaintiff with all service benefits which would necessarily mean payment of the higher pay-scale grantable to the plaintiff upon completion of requisite number of years, which submitted learned advocate, the plaintiff had completed. On the basis of judgment of this Court in Bhikhubhai Ramanbhai Dave v. Chief Executive Officer being Special Civil Application No.11390 of 2014 decided on 05th December, 2014, it was submitted that passing of departmental examination could not be treated as precondition. According to learned advocate for the plaintiff – decree holder, decree was required to be interpreted in its true spirit which was comprehensive to taken into its sweep the benefit of higher pay-scale which was a service benefit. 5. The contention could be countenanced that grant of higher pay-scale was dependent upon the fulfillment of conditions stipulated in Finance Department Resolution dated 16th August, 1994. Paragraph 3(5) of the said Resolution provides for the requirement to be fulfilled are include passing of the examination wherever necessary. Thus, the entitlement to receive higher pay-scale was not consequential service benefit to be readily made available to the government servant. Grant of higher pay-scale was an independent claim in itself to be applied as per the policy guidelines in the aforesaid Resolution. 5.1 Even otherwise, the powers of the executing court derived under Section 47 read with Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 have their clear limits in terms of the decree which is to be executed. 5.2 In Rajasthan Financial Corporation v. Man Industrial Corporation Limited [ (2003) 7 SCC 522 ] the principle stated was that the executing court cannot go beyond the decree and that the executing court must take the decree according to its tenor. It was held that however when a decree is in terms of award or document, then the terms of document have to be looked at. In that case the decree was based on compromise agreement, in respect of which it was observed that Court cannot travel beyond the compromises converted in form of decree. Similar principle was laid down in Bhanwarlal Bhandari v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises [ (1999) 1 SCC 558 ] that when the executing court goes behind the decree, it acts without jurisdiction. Similar principle was laid down in Bhanwarlal Bhandari v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises [ (1999) 1 SCC 558 ] that when the executing court goes behind the decree, it acts without jurisdiction. 5.3 In Vedik Girls Senior Secondary School, Arya Samaj Mandir, Jhajjar v. Rajwanti (Smt.) & Ors. [ (2007) 5 SCC 97 ] the decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff – respondent who was a teacher in the school entitling him to regularization in service and to receive salary through cross cheques and restraining appellant – school from deducting any amount from her monthly emoluments was under execution. The respondent stated that the decree had been passed with a direction to defendant to make payments to her by cheque and without deducting any amount as per government’s scale. The decree had not specified the amount of salary and there were conflicting claims regarding the respondent’s payscale. The respondent was claiming the government scale of Rs.1400-2600 whereas the appellant stated that the respondent - teacher was in pay-scale of 480-760. The executing court passed order directing the appellant to make payment to respondent as per government scale. It was held that the executing court exceeded its jurisdiction and went beyond the scope of decree. 5.4 Again in Deepa Bhargava & Anr. v. Mahesh Bhargava & Ors. [ (2009) 2 SCC 294 ] the Apex Court stated that the executing court has no jurisdiction to modify the decree and it must execute the decree as it is. Rameshwar Daas Gupta v. State of U.P. & Anr. [ (1996) 5 SCC 728 ] was a case before the Supreme Court wherein the executing court calculated interest for delayed payment of salary etc. accepting the contention that in view of unreasonable stand taken by the judgment debtors and prolonging the payment of legitimate claims of the petitioner, payment of interest was attracted. The Supreme Court termed the order of the executing court as void to hold, “An executing court cannot travel beyond the order or decree under execution. It gets jurisdiction only to execute the order in accordance with the procedure laid down under Order 21 CPC. In view of the fact that it was a money claim, what was to be computed was the arrears of the salary, gratuity and pension after computation of his promotional benefits in accordance with the service law. It gets jurisdiction only to execute the order in accordance with the procedure laid down under Order 21 CPC. In view of the fact that it was a money claim, what was to be computed was the arrears of the salary, gratuity and pension after computation of his promotional benefits in accordance with the service law. That having been done and the court having decided the entitlement of the decreeholder, the executing court exceeded its jurisdiction in stepping out and granting a decree for interest which was not part of the decree for execution on the ground of delay in payment or for unreasonable stand taken in execution. The order of the executing was without jurisdiction and therefore, void.” (Para 4) 6. Reverting to the present case, the decree passed by the court contemplated for the decree holder the continuous service and other consequential benefits including the increments. The grant of higher pay-scale was not specifically mentioned, even as, as noted above, this benefit was to be conferred in terms of the Finance Department Resolution dated 16th August, 1994. Apart from that aspect, when the higher pay-scale was not specifically mentioned to be one of the benefit granted under the decree, the executing court was not competent to pass order to grant such benefit. The executing court was enjoined in law to read the decree as it stood and execute the same in the precise terms it provided for. When the higher pay-scale benefit was not mentioned, process of inclusion of the said benefit could not have been permitted by the executing court. It would mean adding a benefit in the decree which was not decreed. It would have effect of modifying or re-writing the decree. The executing court is not conferred with such powers. Therefore, in granting higher pay-scale reading the same to be a benefit in the decree, was a manifest error of jurisdiction committed by the executing court. 7. For the foregoing reasons and discussion, order dated 13th April, 2011 passed below Exh.1 in Execution Petition No.17 of 2014 of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Porbandar, is hereby set aside. The petition stands allowed.