JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has prayed for quashing:- (i) Impugned letter bearing No.DC.RBF/XXII(T)184/2014-2018/102 dated 01.05.2018, in terms whereof, the respondent No.4-Executive Member In-charge Trade etc., Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council, Shillong has cancelled the appointment of the petitioner as an agent and also has revoked the Deed of Agreement dated 30.03.2016; (ii) Notice inviting tender dated 02.05.2018 issued by the respondent No.3; (iii) Letter dated 23.05.2018 appointing the respondent No.5 as an agent of Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council and also the Agreement of even date and; (iv) To command the respondents to permit the petitioner to operate as an agent in pursuance to his appointment order dated 30.03.2016 and agreement executed thereof dated 30.03.2016. 2. The Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (hereinafter referred to as “KHADC”) has been established under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India for administration of affairs relating to tribals belonging to Khasi Autonomous District. Under para 10 of the Sixth Schedule, the KHADC formulated regulation i.e. “the Khasi Hills District (Trading by Non-Tribals) Regulation, 1954” which essentially provide for regulating trading by non-tribals within the territorial jurisdiction of KHADC. 3. For the purpose of identifying/detecting trading by non-tribal traders, conducting business within the jurisdiction of the District Council, the KHADC for appointing an agent issued notice dated 22.02.2016 inviting tenders. The tender of the petitioner for appointment as an agent for detecting illegal trading by non-tribal traders was accepted so was appointed an agent as was conveyed to him on 30.03.2016 by the respondent No.3. In tune with the terms and conditions/guidelines, an agreement was executed by the respondent No.3 and the petitioner on 30.03.2016. As per the agreed terms, the petitioner as an agent was to pay to the Council a sum of Rs.15,05,000/- (Rupees fifteen lakhs five thousand) only per annum with liberty to the agent to pay the said amount either in one go or in 12 (twelve) monthly installments. 4. Shri Maiantis Mawlot who was earlier appointed as an agent had filed WP (C) No.113 of 2016 titled “Shri Maiantis Mawlot v. Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council & ors”, challenging the orders of the Executive Committee of KHADC dated 30.03.2016 and 01.03.2016, in terms whereof, his agency was terminated, same was dismissed. Therefore, the position of the petitioner as an agent remained undisturbed. 5. Therefore, the position of the petitioner as an agent remained undisturbed. 5. The respondents claim to have received certain complaints against the petitioner furthermore, the petitioner had not deposited the annual premium of Rs.15,05,000/- (Rupees fifteen lakhs five thousand) for the year 2017-18 as a result whereof, the respondent No.3 on 16.04.2018 issued a show cause notice conveying to the petitioner that (i) several complaints have been received about collecting exorbitant verification fees from commercial transport vehicles plying within the jurisdiction of KHADC; (ii) petitioner has failed to abide by the terms and conditions as laid down in the agreement dated 30.03.2016 and; (iii) action of the petitioner has brought about traffic congestion along the national highways and bye-lanes resulting inconvenience to the general public apart from being detrimental to the interest of KHADC. 6. In view of the aforesaid position, the petitioner has been asked to show cause in writing within seven days from the date of receipt of the notice as to why the Deed of Agreement and his appointment order as agent be not cancelled. The petitioner has responded to the show cause notice on 23.04.2018 wherein, he has denied all the allegations and also claimed that he has not violated any of the terms and conditions of the Deed of Agreement. On 01.05.2018, the respondent No.3 has issued revocation order mentioning therein as under:- “(i) The KHADC received several complaints that the petitioner is collecting exorbitant verification fees from commercial transport vehicles plying within the jurisdiction of KHADC; (ii) Whereas, the action of the petitioner has brought about traffic congestion along the national highways and bye-lanes causing great inconvenience to the general public at large apart from being detrimental to the interest of the Council; (iii) The petitioner has not maintained proper records and failed to submit the monthly reports to the Council, as such, has violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Agreement dated 30.03.2016; (iv) Whereas, inspite of several notices, the petitioner has failed to credit the annual premium for the year 2017-18 which is a willful violation of the terms and conditions as laid down in the Deed of Agreement dated 30.03.2016. (v) It is also mentioned that after perusal of the contention of the petitioner in his show cause reply dated 23.04.2018 has not been found satisfactory and hence not acceptable. (v) It is also mentioned that after perusal of the contention of the petitioner in his show cause reply dated 23.04.2018 has not been found satisfactory and hence not acceptable. Therefore, in default in crediting the annual premium for the year 2017-18 and for non-submission of monthly reports to the Council, change of the date of agreement was not acceptable. Therefore, the petitioner failure to honour and abide by the terms and conditions particularly for non-payment of the annual premium and non-submission of monthly reports, the Executive Committee has decided to revoke and cancel the order of appointment of the petitioner as an agent and also the Deed of Agreement dated 30.03.2016.” 7. On 23.05.2018, the respondent No.3 has conveyed to the Deputy Commissioners/Superintendents of Police that the appointment of petitioner as an agent has been cancelled and the KHADC has been pleased to appoint Shri Dominic Suting (respondent No.5) as an agent for detecting/identifying illegal eroding by commercial vehicles of non-tribal traders and at the same time to compound the offences within the jurisdiction of KHADC for a period of three years. 8. Petitioner being aggrieved of his cancellation of appointment as an agent and appointment of the respondent No.5 as an agent had filed petition bearing WP (C) No.212 of 2018 contending therein that cancellation of his appointment is illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice. Furthermore, while appointing the respondent No.5 as an agent, the respondents have not issued any tender notice but when affidavit-in-opposition was filed, it became known to the petitioner that the tender notice has been issued and the agreement was also executed by the respondents No.3 and No.5. Confronted therewith, vide order dated 07.08.2018 learned counsel for the petitioner was permitted to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file fresh one. Thereafter, the instant fresh petition has been filed wherein, the said tender notice as well as the agreement have also been challenged. 9. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent-KHADC by one pretext or the other was hell-bent to remove the petitioner as an agent so as to accommodate respondent No.5 which they have done but in total derogation to the law and justice. Buttressing this contention submitted that the petitioner after proper competition was appointed as an agent and admittedly has executed the agreement. Buttressing this contention submitted that the petitioner after proper competition was appointed as an agent and admittedly has executed the agreement. The Council has the power to cancel the petitioner’s appointment as an agent, in case, the petitioner/agent fail to comply any or all of the terms and conditions but subject to adherence to Clause 14 of the agreement dated 30.03.2016 and is also subject to condition 15 of the terms and conditions/guidelines forming part of the tender notice. Both the Clause and condition have not been adhered to. For appreciating this contention, it shall be relevant to quote Clause 14 of the agreement dated 30.03.2016:- “14. The Council shall have the power to rescind from the contract should the agent fail to comply any or all of the above terms and conditions after giving the Agent three months prior notice and enough opportunity of being heard.” 10. Condition 15 of the terms and conditions/guidelines regarding appointment of an agent issued from the office of the Executive Committee, KHADC Shillong is also relevant to be quoted:- “15. The Council shall have the power to rescind from the contract should the agent fail to comply any or all of the above terms and conditions after giving the agent enough opportunity of being heard.” 11. Admittedly, a notice has been issued by the respondent No.3 on 16.04.2018 asking the petitioner to show cause in writing within seven days as to why his appointment as an agent be not cancelled, in response whereof petitioner has denied all the allegations. Without conducting any enquiry, the KHADC has issued the impugned order of revocation dated 01.05.2018, which shows that the respondents have taken decision in utter disregard to the terms and conditions/guidelines governing the appointment of agent and also Clause 14 of the agreement. The requirement as per Clause 14 is to give the agent three months prior notice and enough opportunity of being heard. Instead the respondents have given the petitioner seven days’ time and have not given him enough opportunity of being heard. What to speak about opportunity of being heard, even have not conducted any enquiry. Simply to say that there are complaints regarding collection of exorbitant fees is not enough unless such complaints are shown to have been received and copies furnished to the petitioner enabling him to counter the same and then to hold an enquiry. What to speak about opportunity of being heard, even have not conducted any enquiry. Simply to say that there are complaints regarding collection of exorbitant fees is not enough unless such complaints are shown to have been received and copies furnished to the petitioner enabling him to counter the same and then to hold an enquiry. In terms of Clause 14 of the agreement, three months prior notice and sufficient opportunity of being heard is sine qua non for rescinding the contract. The haste shown by the respondents in turn would suggest that they wanted to remove the petitioner and to accommodate respondent No.5. 12. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has been deprived of his right of proper hearing and on the basis of no evidence, his appointment as an agent has been revoked carries weight to prevail. 13. Another contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has never denied to deposit the annual premium, however, he had represented before the authorities that due to the pendency of the writ petition as was filed by the ex-agent and interference by the district authorities, he could not function as an agent therefore, the stipulated period of three years may be permitted to reckon from the date of judgment rendered in WP (C) No.113 of 2016 i.e. w.e.f. 27.09.2016, same was not accepted by the respondents. Thereafter, the respondents should have given time to the petitioner for depositing the annual premium for the year 2017-18 in accordance with Clause 2 of the agreement. 14. In his affidavit, he has specifically stated that he was always ready to pay the annual premium but he was not allowed to function in terms of the agreement dated 30.03.2016, same was brought to the notice of the District Council. Instead of taking any action in the matter, abruptly cancelled the appointment mentioning therein that the petitioner had not credited the annual premium for the year 2017-18. In case the respondents would have conducted the enquiry or would have given reasonable opportunity of being heard in tune with condition 15 of the terms and conditions/guidelines and Clause 14 of the agreement as quoted above, the petitioner would have deposited the annual premium for the year 2017-18. In case the respondents would have conducted the enquiry or would have given reasonable opportunity of being heard in tune with condition 15 of the terms and conditions/guidelines and Clause 14 of the agreement as quoted above, the petitioner would have deposited the annual premium for the year 2017-18. He further, added that the intention of the respondents to accommodate respondent No.5 is quite clear and supported by the records. The appointment of the petitioner has been terminated on 01.05.2018, on 02.05.2018 tender notice has been issued but not published in any newspaper. Then, it is shown that five persons had participated and respondent No.5 was successfully, as such, appointed on 23.05.2018. Why tender notice was not published in any newspaper is quite astonishing. 15. In the affidavit-in-opposition, the respondents have stated that there is no requirement of publishing the notice in the newspaper however, it was given wide publicity by affixing it at various places and offices. 16. The approach of the respondents appears not to be genuine they cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold. First tender notice dated 22.02.2016 in pursuance whereof petitioner was appointed was published in two newspapers to whom copy of the advertisement was sent whereas, copy of the tender notice dated 02.05.2018 has not been sent to any newspaper. Furthermore, the eligible persons from four districts could not participate. Why only five persons participated would suggest that there has not been proper publicity. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the case of Nagar Nigam, Meerut v. Al Faheem Meat Exports (P) Ltd. & ors., (2006) 13 SCC 382. Para 18 of the said judgment is relevant to be quoted:- “18. The law is, thus, clear that ordinarily all contracts by the Government or by an instrumentality of the State should be granted only by public auction or by inviting tenders, after advertising the same in well-known newspapers having wide circulation, so that all eligible persons will have an opportunity to bid in the bid (sic auction), and there is total transparency. In our opinion this is an essential requirement in a democracy, where the people are supreme, and all official acts must be actuated by the public interest, and should inspire public confidence.” 17. In our opinion this is an essential requirement in a democracy, where the people are supreme, and all official acts must be actuated by the public interest, and should inspire public confidence.” 17. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that dispute is contractual, therefore, dispute relating to contract cannot be agitated nor terms of the contract can be enforced through writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this behalf has placed reliance on the judgment reported in (2013) 5 SCC 470 rendered in the case of “Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation and anr v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited & anr”. But the said judgment in the facts and circumstances of the case advances the case of the petitioner. Para 21 of the reported judgment is advantageous to be quoted:- “21. It is evident from the above that generally the court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction to enforce the contractual obligation. The primary purpose of a writ of mandamus is to protect and establish rights and to impose a corresponding imperative duty existing in law. It is designed to promote justice (ex debito justitiae). The grant or refusal of the writ is at the discretion of the court. The writ cannot be granted unless it is established that there is an existing legal right of the applicant, or an existing duty of the respondent. Thus, the writ does not lie to create or to establish a legal right, but to enforce one that is already established. While dealing with a writ petition, the court must exercise discretion, taking into consideration a wide variety of circumstances, inter-alia, the facts of the case, the exigency that warrants such exercise of discretion, the consequences of grant or refusal of the writ, and the nature and extent of injury that is likely to ensue by such grant or refusal.” 18. Learned counsel for the respondents further placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the case of State of Bihar & ors v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216 . The facts of the said case are altogether different. Therefore, is not applicable to the present case. 19. Next learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the case of State Bank of Patiala & ors v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 . The facts of the said case are altogether different. Therefore, is not applicable to the present case. 19. Next learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the case of State Bank of Patiala & ors v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 . The said judgment also advances the case of the petitioner because the petitioner has all along contended that principles of natural justice have been violated as he had not been given proper opportunity in tune with condition 15 of the terms and conditions/guidelines governing the tender notice and also Clause 14 of the agreement as quoted above. It shall be advantageous to quote para 28 of the said judgment. “28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 All ER 109: 65 TLR 225 way back in 1949, these principle cannot be put in a straight-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272 ). The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 152 and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 ). As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak & ors. v. Union India & Ors., (1969) 2 SCC 262 ), the dividing line between quasi-judicial function and administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable – a fact also emphasized by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 AllER 935: (1984) 3 WLR 1174: 1985 AC 374, HL where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing – applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called – that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing – applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called – that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/no hearing may defeat the very proceeding – which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 465 . There may also be cases where the public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between “no notice”/“no hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or to put it in different words, “no opportunity” and “no adequate opportunity”. To illustrate – take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66: (1963) 2 WLR 935). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr, 1980 AC 574: (1979) 2 All ER 440: (1979) 2 WLR 755, PC). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer’s report (Managing Director, ECIL. But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer’s report (Managing Director, ECIL. v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi, (1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62) it would be a case falling in the latter category – violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice – in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touch-stone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did nor did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct – in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704 should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid.” 20. Applying the said law to the present case, it is quite evident that neither proper opportunity nor proper hearing has been given to the petitioner. In a slipshod manner, appointment of the petitioner as an agent and as well as the agreement have been cancelled. 21. While meeting the challenge to the maintainability of this writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner in the background of the facts and circumstances of the case has rightly placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the case of Michigan Rubber (India) Limited v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2012) 8 SCC 216 . Para 24 of the judgment is advantageous to be quoted:- “24. Para 24 of the judgment is advantageous to be quoted:- “24. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters, in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions:- (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authorities is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached”? and (ii) Whether the public interest is affected? If the answers to the above questions are in the negative, then there should be no interference under Article 226.” 22. Applying the said test to the present case, it is quite evident that the petitioner has been ousted on flimsy grounds and without affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, when proper hearing was sine qua non in terms of Clause 14 of the agreement dated 30.03.2016. His appointment as an agent and the contract has been cancelled, on 01.05.2018 in a quick succession in a clandestine manner, a tender notice has been issued on 02.05.2018 without giving the same wide publicity, at least not having been published in the newspaper thereby, resulting in participation of just five persons from four districts falling within the jurisdiction of the District Council and then appointing respondent No.5 as an agent clearly shows that there was an intent to favour respondent No.5. The manner and method adopted for cancellation of the petitioner’s appointment as an agent and then cancellation of the agreement is totally irrational and arbitrary appears to be tainted with bias. When it is so, interference by this Court in exercise of power of judicial review cannot be denied. 23. The action of the respondents No.1 to 4 was required to be open, fair, honest and aboveboard. Simply to say that there were complaints against the petitioner without showing any complaint to the petitioner; without conducting any enquiry regarding those complaints and then, failure to produce such complaints in the Court, only suggest that the respondents had made up their mind to remove the petitioner which they have done in a most arbitrary manner. 24. Simply to say that there were complaints against the petitioner without showing any complaint to the petitioner; without conducting any enquiry regarding those complaints and then, failure to produce such complaints in the Court, only suggest that the respondents had made up their mind to remove the petitioner which they have done in a most arbitrary manner. 24. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment rendered in the case of Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India & Ors., (2013) 5 SCC 252 is quite relevant. In the background of the facts of the present case, para 62 of the judgment is relevant to be quoted:- “62. It is by now well settled that judicial review of the administrative action/quasi-judicial orders passed by the Government is limited only to correcting the errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements which may lead to manifest injustice. When the conclusions of the authority are based on evidence, the same cannot be re-appreciated by the court in exercise of its powers of judicial review. The court does not exercise the powers of an appellate court in exercise of its powers of judicial review. It is only in cases where either findings recorded by the administrative/quasi-judicial authority are based on no evidence or are so perverse that no reasonable person would have reached such a conclusion on the basis of the material available that the court would be justified to interfere with the decision. The scope of judicial review is limited to the decision-making process and not to the decision itself, even if the same appears to be erroneous.” (Emphasis added) 25. It is quite evident from the record that the conclusions of the respondents regarding the complaints against the petitioner are based on no evidence. Therefore, the decision making process regarding termination of the petitioner’s appointment as an agent and cancellation of his agreement being bad falls within the scope of judicial review. Therefore, interference by this Court invoking power under Article 226 is warranted. 26. Next learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that his existing right has been violated in an arbitrary manner so as to pave way for accommodating respondent No.5. On 01.05.2018, petitioner’s appointment as an agent has been revoked, on 02.05.2018, fresh tender notice was issued and on 23.05.2018 respondent No.5 has been appointed as an agent. 26. Next learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that his existing right has been violated in an arbitrary manner so as to pave way for accommodating respondent No.5. On 01.05.2018, petitioner’s appointment as an agent has been revoked, on 02.05.2018, fresh tender notice was issued and on 23.05.2018 respondent No.5 has been appointed as an agent. The tender notice so issued is faulty because same has not been given wide publicity and even not published in any newspaper. In support of his submission has placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the case of “Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation and anr. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited & anr”, para 21 which is already quoted hereinabove. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner while meeting the argument of learned counsel for the respondents, that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing suit for damages, would contend that availability of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar for exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this behalf, placed reliance on the judgment rendered in the case of Harbanslal Sahnia & anr v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. & ors., (2003) 2 SCC 107 . Para 7 of the judgment is relevant to be quoted:- “7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or, (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ). The present case attracts applicability of first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners’ dealership, which is their bread and butter came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ). The present case attracts applicability of first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners’ dealership, which is their bread and butter came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.” 28. In the present case, violation of the principles of natural justice is quite evident as discussed and referred to in detail hereinabove. When the respondents have exercised the power in an arbitrary manner in violation to the principles of natural justice, exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is warranted. The authorities of KHADC cannot claim to be above the law, their functions have to be within the limit of law and their actions must pass the test of fairness and reasonableness. In case the orders were passed in an arbitrary manner, implying that by any means they have authority to do the same cannot be permitted. 29. If there were complaints against the petitioner, why those complaints were not enquired into; why they have not conducted the enquiry is a million dollar question to be answered. Respondent No.3 has issued the show cause notice dated 16.04.2018 mentioning therein that several complaints have been received regarding collection of exorbitant fees and also the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of the agreement. The said show cause too has been drafted in a manner not giving clear indication as to what the petitioner had to answer but despite that the petitioner has responded to it within seven days, as was required in terms of the show cause notice, denying all the allegations. When it was so what prevented the respondents in not conducting the enquiry instead rushed to pass the order of revocation on 01.05.2018. 30. Condition 15 of the terms and conditions/guidelines governing the contract and Clause 14 of the agreement providing for giving three months prior notice and sufficient opportunity of being heard have been totally ignored which by itself speak as to how the respondents have acted arbitrarily. 30. Condition 15 of the terms and conditions/guidelines governing the contract and Clause 14 of the agreement providing for giving three months prior notice and sufficient opportunity of being heard have been totally ignored which by itself speak as to how the respondents have acted arbitrarily. Again cancellation of petitioner’s appointment as an agent on 01.05.2018, then issue of fresh tender notice on 02.05.2018 and then appointment of respondent No.5 as an agent on 23.05.2018, itself shows, as to how the respondents were in haste to exclude the petitioner and to accommodate respondent No.5. Such type of action does not stand the test of reasonableness and fairness, so offend the very spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution. 31. While summing up for the reasons, facts and law as stated hereinabove, impugned cancellation order dated 01.05.2018 is unsustainable and as a necessary corollary thereto, issue of fresh notice dated 02.05.2018 and appointment of respondent No.5 on 23.05.2018 as an agent are also unsustainable as such, quashed. Since the respondent No.5 has been working as an agent from the date of his appointment in pursuance to the order dated 23.05.2018, respondent No.3 shall settle the amount which he has deposited proportionately for the period he has worked as an agent till date. The position of the petitioner as an agent is restored subject to his deposit of annual premium of Rs.15,05,000/- (Rupees fifteen lakhs five thousand) for the year 2017-18 less by amount proportionate for the period he had remained out w.e.f. 01.05.2018 till date. 32. The respondent-KHADC, regarding complaints if any against the petitioner, if so chooses shall be at liberty to hold the enquiry but in the process adherence to Clause 14 of the agreement as quoted hereinabove shall be sine qua non. In case respondents choose to hold enquiry against the petitioner on the basis of any complaint and on the basis of violation of any of the terms and conditions, same shall not deprive the petitioner from continuing as an agent till a decision is taken on the basis of the enquiry if conducted. 33. Petition is allowed as above with costs quantified at Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) payable by the respondents No.1 to 4 to the petitioner.