JUDGMENT : B.P. DHARMADHIKARI, J. 1. Petitioner by this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India questions the order dated 24th September, 2003 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Amravati dismissing his appeal and treating the period of suspension pending enquiry as suspension only. 2. Short submission of Shri Bhoskar, learned counsel on behalf of petitioner is the misconduct has not been established fully and hence, period of suspension could not have been regularized as suspension only. The suspension was only for a criminal prosecution and the petitioner has been acquitted by the Competent Court therefrom Charge sheet was also for said prosecution only and hence, the punishment as ordered by the Chief Executive Officer on 12th February, 2003 is rightly set aside. As punishment is not sustainable, suspension also must fall to ground. He has relied upon the Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of L. K. Verma Vrs. HMT Ltd. and another, reported at (2006) 2 SCC 269 and the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Bhaurao and Nanded Zilla Parishad, Nanded and others, reported at 2000 (87) FLR 603. 3. Ms. Mehta, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No.1 – Appellate Authority and Shri Dahat, learned counsel for respondent No.2 – Disciplinary Enquiry (Employer) have strongly opposed the petition. They submit that the Disciplinary Authority has found charges partly proved and therefore, a punishment of permanently deducting 15% of pension payable monthly, has been inflicted. As the petitioner was suspended during the period of prosecution, the period of suspension has been regularized by stipulating that it be recognized as period of suspension only. They pointed out that it is not a punishment at all. 4. They place reliance upon Judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Dewaji Dasaru Gaikwad (since deceased through his legal heirs) & others, reported at 2017 (5) Bom.C.R., 761 to which one of us (B.P.Dharmadhikari, J.) is a party. Attention is also invited to Judgment in the case of Union of India and another Vrs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, reported at (2013) 16 SCC 147 to advance arguments that such suspension cannot be viewed as punishment. 5. Shri Bhoskar, learned counsel in reply arguments, relies upon the Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dattatraya Vasudeo Kulkarni Vrs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, reported at (2013) 16 SCC 147 to advance arguments that such suspension cannot be viewed as punishment. 5. Shri Bhoskar, learned counsel in reply arguments, relies upon the Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dattatraya Vasudeo Kulkarni Vrs. Director of Agriculture, Maharashtra and others, reported at 1984 Mh.L.J. 406 to urge that when there is acquittal from criminal prosecution, the period of suspension needs to be regularized as period of duty. 6. The facts show that by order dated 07/03/1992, the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Amravati placed petitioner under suspension as offences under Sections 498, 306, 34 of the Indian Penal Code were registered against him on 14/01/1992 in Crime No.8/92. He was warned not to leave headquarters without previous permission and about his entitlement to subsistence allowance in terms of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Joining Time, Foreign Service and Payment during Suspension, Dismissal and Removal) Rules, 1981, particularly Rule 68. He was on 05/06/1992 served with a charge sheet and then on 02/12/2002, after receipt of enquiry report, he was served with a show cause notice dated 02/12/2002 as to why his monthly pension should not be permanently reduced by 25%. The petitioner gave his reply to it and on 12/02/2003, the Chief Executive Officer as Disciplinary Authority, passed order of punishment. The monthly pension was permanently reduced by 15%. While doing this, period of suspension has been directed to be regularized as suspension only. 7. Against this order, petitioner filed appeal under Rule 13 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads District Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules and respondent No.1 has on 24th September, 2003 allowed that appeal. The Appellate Authority found that after acquittal by Competent Court on 07/01/2002, such a punishment order became unsustainable. However, then the Appellate Authority maintained the regularization of period of suspension as suspension only. It appears that against this order, petitioner preferred a review and the review petition has been dismissed by respondent No.1 on 07/01/2004. Reviewing Authority has specifically looked into the contention that period of suspension could not have been treated as suspension and found that acquittal of the petitioner could not have been foreseen by his employer. The employer did not have any mala fide intention in suspending him and a teacher like the petitioner facing very serious charges, could not have been allowed to remain on duty. The employer did not have any mala fide intention in suspending him and a teacher like the petitioner facing very serious charges, could not have been allowed to remain on duty. Challenging this order, present petition has been filed. 8. It is not in dispute that the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads District Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules do not prescribe suspension as punishment at all. Clause-4 of the said Rules, describes various serious punishments and suspension is not included in it. In the case of Union of India and another Vrs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, reported at (2013) 16 SCC 147 in para 19, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that suspension pending enquiry is not a punishment at all. Shri Dahat, learned counsel has relied upon judgment in the case of Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar Vrs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported at (1997) 3 SCC 636 which points out types of suspension and rights of employee like petitioner. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that acquittal in criminal case does not automatically entitle a person to backwages. The Competent Authority is empowered to treat period of suspension as not spent on duty. This judgment is on Maharashtra Civil Services (Joining Time, Foreign Service and Payment during Suspension, Dismissal and Removal) Rules, 1981 only. 9. The counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment in the case of L. K. Verma Vrs. HMT Ltd. and another, reported at (2006) 2 SCC 269 there, the Hon'ble Apex Court has in the para 17 considered three kinds of suspension and also observed that delinquent officer is entitled to subsistence allowance, as per Service Rules during period of suspension pending enquiry. In present facts, this entitlement of petitioner in terms of Rules 68 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Joining Time, Foreign Services and Payment during Suspension, Dismissal and Removal) Rules, was informed to him on 07/03/1992 only and he never questioned it. 10. The Division Bench of this Court, reported at Bhaurao and Nanded Zilla Parishad, Nanded and others (supra) in para 6 finds that since the petitioner was suspended on the ground that he was involved in criminal case and was reinstated after acquittal, he was entitled to full salary for the period of suspension. 10. The Division Bench of this Court, reported at Bhaurao and Nanded Zilla Parishad, Nanded and others (supra) in para 6 finds that since the petitioner was suspended on the ground that he was involved in criminal case and was reinstated after acquittal, he was entitled to full salary for the period of suspension. Facts in para 3 of the said judgment show that the said petitioner Bhaurao was placed under suspension on 27/07/1984 as he was implicated in criminal case under Sections 44, 84, 147, 148, 149, 324 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. This Judgment, however does not consider the right of employer to put employee under suspension and power given by Rule 68 and Rule 72 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Joining Time, Foreign Services and Payment during Suspension, Dismissal and Removal) Rules to regularize it. In the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kirshnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar Vrs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra), we find that said judgment cannot be accepted as laying down any general proposition of law which can be extended to other matters. 11. This Division Bench has relied upon earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court, in Special C.A.No.209/1968 decided on 27th November, 1974 where again because of acquittal, the Division Bench found that period needed to be regularized as period spend on duty. This 1974 judgment has been looked into by other Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dattatraya Vasudeo Kulkarni Vrs. Director of Agriculture, Maharashtra and others, reported at 1984 Mh.L.J. 406. Facts in this matter show that the petitioner Dattatraya was acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The charge against him was for a criminal breach of trust by misappropriating an amount of Rs.7831.64. This charge was in relation to his official work and duty & Employer, therefore, failed to prove charge. In this situation, employer, therefore, might be at fault in falsely implicating Dattatraya in criminal matter. The Division Bench has also found that there was no independent departmental enquiry and only on account of involvement in offence, he was placed under suspension. After his acquittal, a show cause notice was issued and in reply to it, Dattatraya pointed out a need of departmental enquiry. He also sought opportunity to cross-examine witnesses on whose statement, his employer wanted to rely. After his acquittal, a show cause notice was issued and in reply to it, Dattatraya pointed out a need of departmental enquiry. He also sought opportunity to cross-examine witnesses on whose statement, his employer wanted to rely. Thus, on facts, even this Division Bench judgment is not attracted in present matter. It does not lay down a law for universal application. 12. In the case of Dewaji Dasaru Gaikwad (since deceased through his legal heirs) & others (supra), this Court has not referred to any Judgment by this Court and only judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court, reported at Union of India and another Vrs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra) has been relied upon. In para 11, this Court has observed as under: “11. When above principles governing the interim suspension are kept in mind, in present facts the disciplinary authority did not err in honouring the mandate of service rules by placing petitioner under suspension. In our view, there is no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the respondent No.2. But the pension and retirement benefits of petitioner cannot be withheld. If the petitioner is eligible to pension & other benefits due to his superannuation & the same are still not released to him, the same shall be worked out within next two months. The pension and other terminal benefits to which petitioner is found entitled, shall be released to him, within next 3 months.” 13. In present petition, petitioner Vitthal never independently challenged his suspension pending enquiry or then after it. Only after acquittal, he is seeking regularization of period of suspension as period spent on duty. Criminal offence for which he was prosecuted, did not pertain to his office work but arose out of his domestic relation in the family. His employer, therefore, was not involved in any manner in criminal prosecution. In Departmental Enquiry, ultimately by the order of Appellate Authority, he has been exonerated and hence, the order of withholding 15% of his pension has been set aside. Said authority however, has rightly observed that employer did not act with any malice and honestly used the powers and discretion available to it in the matter. 14. In these facts, we do not find anything wrong with the order dated 07/01/2004 passed by the respondent No.1. There is no jurisdictional error or perversity. Said authority however, has rightly observed that employer did not act with any malice and honestly used the powers and discretion available to it in the matter. 14. In these facts, we do not find anything wrong with the order dated 07/01/2004 passed by the respondent No.1. There is no jurisdictional error or perversity. Interim suspension of petitioner is not wiped out merely because of his acquittal in prosecution. Law obliges employer to pass suitable orders in this respect and gives him discretion. This discretion is not demonstrated to be used arbitrarily here. 15. Consequently, petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. No costs.