JUDGMENT : Letters Patent Appeal No. 582 of 2009 is by the State being aggrieved by judgment dated 27th August, 2009 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 3413 of 2005, whereunder the order of termination and the order dismissing the writ petitioner's appeal as also the order, by which his review representation were rejected, were quashed. It was held that the writ petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in service. 2. Letters Patent Appeal No. 425 of 2009 is by the writ petitioner against part of the same impugned judgment, whereunder the Writ Court refused to grant back wages to the employee for the period he remained out of service. 3. Writ petitioner approached this Court being aggrieved by Departmental Proceeding No. 32 of 2003 and the chargesheet dated 9th August. 2003 (Annexure-I) issued by Commandant, J.A.P.-l. He also sought quashing of the order of his dismissal from service contained in Memo No.581/Secret dated 18th December, 2003. Petitioner also challenged the order of Appellate Authority dated 5th May, 2004 and the order passed on his representation bearing Memo No. 382/P dated 7th April, 2005, whereunder his prayer for reinstatement on the ground of acquittal in criminal proceeding was also rejected. 4. Petitioner, a Sweeper in Jharkhand Armed Police-I, was proceeded against both departmentally and in a criminal case on the allegation that he had sexually exploited X (name withheld), who was employed as a domestic help in his house. The F.I.R. was lodged at the behest of the victim bearing Doranda P.S. Case No. 201 of 2003 registered under Sections 366-A/354/341/342/323/376 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The departmental proceeding was separately initiated by the employer/Commandant. J.A.P.-l. Ranchi with the following allegations : (i) That the lady. X (name withheld) had been brought by the wife of employee, Pramila Devi to Ranchi by deception and was sexually exploited for 15 days. On protest lodged by lady she was subjected to physical as well as mental torture and threatened to be killed. In this connection, Doranda P.S. Case No. 201 of 2003 had been registered under the foregoing sections. The employee was absconding. He had been placed under suspension. 5. On protest lodged by lady she was subjected to physical as well as mental torture and threatened to be killed. In this connection, Doranda P.S. Case No. 201 of 2003 had been registered under the foregoing sections. The employee was absconding. He had been placed under suspension. 5. The departmental proceeding ended up in the findings of guilt against the employee as per report of Enquiry Officer, Kamal Kumar Pradhan, Company Commander, J.A.P. -I, (Annexure-5 dated 30.11.2003) before whom the following persons were adduced as witnesses by the Presenting Officer : (i) Sub-Inspector, Manohar Lal Chhetri, J.A.P.-I (ii) Sub-Inspector, Ram Prasad Gurung, J.A.P.-I (iii) Havildar, Manil Tamang, J.A.P.-I (iv) Sepoy 714, Sahdeo Upadhyaya, J.A.P.-I (v) Smt. Manju Devi wife of cook Anil Rana, J.A.P.-I (vi) Smt. Sushila Rana wife of Sepoy 77 Ajay Rana, J.A.P.-I and (vii) Smt. Rani Gurung wife of Sepoy 33 Shravan Gurung. Another witness, Smt. Bindu Chhetri, wife of cook Ajit Chhetri, had also made deposition in the same manner as Rani Gurung. 6. Victim lady had not been adduced as a witness by the Presenting Officer, Commandant-J.A.P.-I, Ranchi upon consideration of the materials produced during inquiry and the enquiry report found the allegations proved and issued second show cause notice upon the delinquent employee vide Memo No.560 dated 6th December, 2003. Second show cause notice was served on the delinquent employee through the Assistant Jailor, Birsa Munda Central Jail, Ranchi, as the employee was in jail. The Commandant, J.A.P.-I, Ranchi, thereafter passed the order of dismissal contained in Memo No. 581/Secret dated 18th December, 2003, on consideration of the materials on record and the report of Enquiry Officer, though the reply to the second show cause notice was not furnished by the employee. According to the Disciplinary Authority, the materials on record established the charges, which were very serious in nature. The employee was found to be indisciplined of dubious character and immoral whose continuation in the service would have effect on the administration of the police department. Appellate Authority rejected the appeal preferred by the delinquent employee/writ petitioner by order dated 5th May, 2004 (Annexure-6) to L.P.A. No. 425 of 2009 taking into account the report of Medical Officer and other materials adduced during inquiry proceeding. 7. Appellate Authority rejected the appeal preferred by the delinquent employee/writ petitioner by order dated 5th May, 2004 (Annexure-6) to L.P.A. No. 425 of 2009 taking into account the report of Medical Officer and other materials adduced during inquiry proceeding. 7. After passing of the appellate order writ petitioner-employee was acquitted by learned Court of Additional Judicial Commissioner (Fast Track Court), Ranchi in Sessions Trial No. 116 of 2004 vide judgment dated 22nd December, 2004 for the charges under Sections 376, 341/34, 342/34, 323/34 and 102-B of the Indian Penal Code (Annexure-B). The employee again represented before Commandant. J.A.P-I for reconsideration and reinstatement pursuant to his acquittal. However, the same was rejected by order dated 7th April, 2005 (Annexure-9) communicated through the office of Deputy Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Jharkhand on the ground that the proceeding in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding are based on different sets of standard. Therefore, no decision is required to be taken on such a representation. These orders were made the subject-matter of writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 3413 of 2005 by the employee. Learned Single Judge came to a finding that : (i) The charges in the departmental proceeding were essentially based on the allegations in the F.I.R. lodged by the complainant and the charges in the criminal trial was the same as the charges in the departmental proceeding. Not only this, the proof of the charges in the departmental proceeding depended upon the same set of witnesses who were declared as witnesses in the criminal trial. (ii) In the criminal trial, the complainant lady was examined and from the perusal of her deposition, it appears that she had not supported the prosecution's case and had not made any allegation whatsoever to support the charges against the petitioner. This witness though was a material witness, was not examined in the departmental proceeding. (iii) The evidences recorded in the departmental proceeding was of witnesses other than the complainant and each of these witnesses had deposed on the basis of what they had purportedly heard. There is no direct evidence to support the allegation as mentioned in the charges, against the petitioner. 8. Learned Court was of the view that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer was based on no evidence and is therefore perverse and contrary to the weight of evidence on record. There is no direct evidence to support the allegation as mentioned in the charges, against the petitioner. 8. Learned Court was of the view that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer was based on no evidence and is therefore perverse and contrary to the weight of evidence on record. The Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority had ignored these aspects in the inquiry report and had merely adopted the findings of the Enquiry Officer without application of judicial mind. Non-examination of the complainant in the departmental proceeding had caused serious prejudice to him, as the same complainant had, in the criminal trial, not supported the allegation, on which the charge was based. This resulted in the finding of acquittal in favour of the writ petitioner. Considering the fact that the charges in both the proceedings were one and the same and the finding in the criminal trial had acquitted the petitioner from the charges, the benefit of such acquittal should necessarily be given to the petitioner, though the final decision in the criminal trial came much later i.e. after the orders passed in the departmental proceeding. Learned Court found that the competent authority before whom the representation was made after acquittal of the petitioner had not considered the grounds advanced in proper perspective particularly relating to the petitioner's acquittal in the criminal trial on the same set of charges. Based on these findings learned Single Judge was persuaded to quash the impugned orders of dismissal and the subsequent orders passed in the appeal and review. However, learned Court was of the view that since petitioner had remained out of service and had not specifically pleaded that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere, no order can be passed on his claim of back wages. However, petitioner shall be treated to be in continuous service from the date of his termination till the date of his reinstatement. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant-State and the writ petitioner both have made considerable submissions in support of their challenge to the respective findings in impugned order which goes against them. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that the case of reconsideration and reinstatement was not made out as the learned Sessions Court had while recording the findings of acquittal clearly observed that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the case free from all reasonable doubts. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that the case of reconsideration and reinstatement was not made out as the learned Sessions Court had while recording the findings of acquittal clearly observed that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the case free from all reasonable doubts. It was therefore not honourable or clean acquittal, rather on the failure of the prosecution to prove the charges beyond shadow of all reasonable doubts. In such circumstances, the benefit of acquittal should not entail any review of the order passed in the disciplinary proceeding. 10. We have considered the grounds of challenge made by the appellant-State specifically in a reference to the nature of the charges in both criminal proceeding as well as in disciplinary proceeding, as also noted above. We find that, on the one hand, during the course of departmental proceeding, the Presenting Officer adduced about eight witnesses, named above, who had not seen the occurrence and had deposed more or less on the basis of what they had heard, the complainant herself was not examined before the Enquiry Officer. On the other hand, in the criminal case, the prosecution had examined the victim lady as PW1, Meena Gautam, PW2, Anju Devi @ Manju Devi, PW3, Sushila Rana, PW4, Suku Rait, PW5, Dr. Manju Prasad, PW6, Manohar Lal Chetri, PW7, Sahdeo Upadhyay, PW8, Mani Kumar Tamang, PW9, Rani Gurung and PW10, Grace Kullu, the Investigating Officer. Out of these 10 witnesses 6 of them were the same who had made statements in the departmental proceeding also. 11. Medical Officer had found a case of old ruptured hymen but not found any injury any way on her private part of her body. No stain on her private part and on her cloth were found. No matting of pubic hair and no foreign hair found on her cloths and private parts. She had on Radiological examination, been found to be aged 16-17 years and evidence of sexual intercourse was found at the time of examination. 12. PW 1, the victim lady had, in her cross-examination, stated that she was not brought by Pramila Devi from Nepal and she did domestic work there for 10-15 days. At para 2 of her disposition, she had stated that no rape was committed with her and she had not gone to police station for lodging report nor she had given her statement before the police. At para 2 of her disposition, she had stated that no rape was committed with her and she had not gone to police station for lodging report nor she had given her statement before the police. She was declared hostile by the prosecution. However, at para 4 of her deposition, she had stated that she lived for 10-15 days in the house of Pramila Devi with her husband. When she was put her signature on fardbeyan that paper was blank and nothing was written on that, Pramila Devi had never assaulted her and Taini Ram-accused had never misbehaved with her nor he committed rape on her. 13. PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 9 were declared as hostile as they denied any knowledge of the occurrence. P.Ws. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 were also witnesses in the disciplinary proceeding. 14. Learned trial Court on the basis of analysis of the entire evidence found that PW 5, who is the Doctor and PW 10, the Investigating Officer of the case and other eight witnesses have not at all supported the prosecution story. Not even the victim lady (PW 1), who was declared hostile, had supported the case. She had denied any assault or rape on her by Taini Ram-accused. P.Ws. 6, 7 and 8 were hearsay witnesses who in their evidence, stated that they had no personal knowledge of the occurrence. Therefore, as per the findings recorded in para 15 of the judgment by learned trial Court, the prosecution had totally failed to prove the involvement of accused persons in this occurrence. 15. From the aforesaid discussions, it is quite evident that learned Single Judge was right in coming to an opinion that the charges of such serious nature were not established during criminal trial also for the reasons that the complainant had failed to support it during her deposition. The nature of the acquittal in totality could not be said to be only on the basis of benefit of doubt, rather the whole case of the prosecution had crumbled due to lack of any material evidence on record to bring home the charges. A number of witnesses, who had been examined during trial were also adduced in the departmental proceeding and had stated that they had not seen the occurrence. A number of witnesses, who had been examined during trial were also adduced in the departmental proceeding and had stated that they had not seen the occurrence. In such circumstances, the finding of guilt recorded by the Disciplinary Authority on the basis of material during inquiry proceeding for the same set of charges and the evidence in which six witnesses out of total eight were the same became susceptible to reconsideration as the delinquent employee/writ petitioner had been acquitted in the criminal trial as well. 16. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent in L.P.A. No. 582 of 2009 has placed reliance upon the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and others, reported in 2006 (3) JCR 309 (SC) : (2006) 5 SCC 446 and in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 and other judgments, to submit that if it is a case of honourable acquittal not based only on the benefit of doubt on the same set of charges, the order passed in a disciplinary proceeding are susceptible to be reviewed as in effect there are no evidences as such to hold the employee guilt of such serious charge. The order of learned Single Judge is therefore proper in the eye of law and needs no interference. 17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 has considered the issue taking into account all earlier judgments on the point and held as under : "23. In Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. v. N. Balakrishnan, this Court reconsidered the issue taking into account all earlier judgments and observed as under: (SCC pp. 766-67, paras 21-22) "21. There are evidently two lines of decisions of this Court operating in the field. One being the cases which would come within the purview of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat. 766-67, paras 21-22) "21. There are evidently two lines of decisions of this Court operating in the field. One being the cases which would come within the purview of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat. However, the second line of decisions show that an honourable acquittal in the criminal case itself may not be held to be determinative in respect of order of punishment meted out to the delinquent officer, inter alia, when : (i) the order of acquittal has not been passed on the same set of facts or same set of evidence; (ii) the effect of difference in the standard of proof in a criminal trial and disciplinary proceeding has not been considered (see Commr. of Police v. Narender Singh), or; where the delinquent officer was charged with something more than the subject-matter of the criminal case and/or covered by a decision of the Civil Court (see G.M. Tank, Jasbir Singh v. Punjab & Sind Bank and Noida Entrepreneurs Assn. v. Noida, SCC at p. 394, para 16). 22. .............'41. We may not be understood to have laid down a law that in all such circumstances the decision of the Civil Court or the Criminal Court would be binding on the disciplinary authorities as this Court in a large number of decisions points out that the same would depend upon other factors as well. (See e.g. Krishnakali Tea Estate and RBI v. S. Mani.) Each case is, therefore, required to be considered on its own facts..........” (See also Ram Tawekya Sharma v. State of Bihar and Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank.) 24. Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal proposition that as the standard of proof in both the proceedings is quite different, and the termination is not based on mere conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee in a criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. Nor can such an action of the department be termed as double jeopardy. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony does not lay down the law of universal application. Facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. Nor can such an action of the department be termed as double jeopardy. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony does not lay down the law of universal application. Facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry." The Apex Court has held that each case is required to be considered on its own facts. Facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic Enquiry. In the present case, as observed above, the prosecution of the employee in the criminal case and departmental proceedings were based on the same set of facts and so far as the evidence is concerned, out of eight witnesses examined during the departmental proceedings, six of them were also witnesses in the criminal case where three of them turned hostile and other three were found to be hearsay witnesses who, in their evidences, stated that they had no personal knowledge of the occurrence. Moreover, the delinquent employee was not charged with something more than the subject-matter of the criminal case. 18. Upon consideration of the aforesaid fact and materials on record and submission of parties, we are also of the view that the findings recorded by learned Single Judge do not suffer from such error or illegality which deserve interference in appeal. 19. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner/appellant in L.P.A. No. 425 of 2009 has on her part pressed the prayer for grant of back wages on the ground that the employee had been reinstated in service after rendering a finding that no charge of such nature were established against him during criminal trial where the standard of proof is much strict. In effect, the employee was dismissed from service on wholly unsubstantiated charges. Therefore, interest of justice require that the claim for back wages for the period of dismissal be granted. 20. We are not convinced with the aforesaid plea for the following reasons : The criminal prosecution and the departmental proceeding based on the same set of charges were not initiated at the instance of the employer. In fact, it was at the instance of third party. 20. We are not convinced with the aforesaid plea for the following reasons : The criminal prosecution and the departmental proceeding based on the same set of charges were not initiated at the instance of the employer. In fact, it was at the instance of third party. As a result of his dismissal, the employer could not avail of the services of the employee during the period he was out of service for no fault of their. Ultimately if the prosecution failed on the same set of charges and the learned Writ Court had reason to direct his reinstatement, the employer could not be suffered for the payment of back wages for the period the employee remained out of service on account of such implication in a criminal case by a third party and the employer could not avail of the services of the concerned employee. Learned Single Judge has also observed that the petitioner had not even pleaded that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere during the period he was out of service. Therefore, the plea raised by the writ petitioner/appellant for back wages does not merit acceptance. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner/appellant has stated that even before filing of Letters Patent Appeal by the State, the employee was reinstated in service in compliance of the directions passed in the writ petition and is continuing in service. 21. As an upshot of the aforesaid discussion and the reasons recorded, we do not find any reason to interfere in the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge in both the appeals. Accordingly, both the Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed. L.P.A. dismissed.