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2018 DIGILAW 814 (CAL)

Anal Chatterjee v. Bally Investment Trust Limited

2018-11-22

SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA

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JUDGMENT : SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J. 1. The present revisional application arises from a suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunctions filed in connection with an immovable property. The property, at present, is comprised of a land as well as structures. The plaintiffs in the said suit have challenged an order of affirmance, whereby both the Courts below dismissed an application for injunction filed by the petitioners, seeking an order of restraint on the opposite party no. 1, Bally Investment Trust Limited and/or its men, agents, servants and followers from raising any construction on the suit property and/or encumbering the suit properties in any manner whatsoever and/or from changing the nature and character of the suit property, as well as opposite party no. 2, Howrah Municipal Corporation, from giving effect to the plan, if sanctioned in respect of the suit property. 2. Upon contested hearing, both the Courts below refused such injunction. 3. It appears from the contentions of the parties that one Khodan Bala Debi was the original owner of the suit property. One Kalipada unilaterally executed and registered a Kabuliyat, whereby Khodan Bala was supposed to give on annual lease the suit (which was a bastu land at that juncture) in favour of Kalipada on July 25, 1933. 4. Khodan Bala subsequently transferred the suit property to her three sons by registered deed of sale. The present plaintiffs/petitioners are successors-in-interest of such sons. 5. On the other hand, Kalipada transferred the suit property to one Jashoda on December 17, 1945 who, in turn, transferred the same in the year 1955 to the opposite party no. 1, Bally Investment Trust Limited. Bally Investment thereafter transferred the property to one Raj Kumar and ultimately the suit property was transferred to the defendants/opposite party nos. 3 and 4. Apparently opposite party no. 1 also transferred an interest in the property to the opposite party no. 5. 6. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the original kabuliyat dated July 25, 1933 was a unilateral document, singed only by Kalipada, the lessee, and not by Khodan Bala, the lessor. Moreover, no corresponding patta was executed in favour of Kalipada by Khodan Bala. 7. 5. 6. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the original kabuliyat dated July 25, 1933 was a unilateral document, singed only by Kalipada, the lessee, and not by Khodan Bala, the lessor. Moreover, no corresponding patta was executed in favour of Kalipada by Khodan Bala. 7. Placing reliance on a judgment [Ram Kumar Das vs. Jagdish Chandra Deo reported at, Dhabal Deb and another, AIR (1952) SC 23] as well as the provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners argues that no lease from year and year was created by virtue of such document but only, at best, a monthly tenancy was created. 8. The subsequent transfers by the lessee and his successors-in-interest could not create any title in the suit property and as such those only amounted to illegal sub-letting. However, since subsequently the successors-in-interest accepted rent from the transferee-subtenants, the monthly tenancy was, in effect, perpetuated. Thereafter such tenancy was terminated by the plaintiffs but despite such termination, the opposite parties, in particular opposite party no. 1, has allegedly been constructing illegally on the suit premises. 9. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners further argues that the interest of Khodan Bala, which ultimately vested in the plaintiffs/petitioners as owners of the suit property, was retained and was not vested in the State as per the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. It is argued that, as per Section 2(1) of the said Act of 1953, the term ‘proprietor’ comes within the definition of ‘intermediary’. Taking into consideration the language of Section 6(1)(a), the homestead land comprised in the suit property (since subsequently structures had come up thereon) was automatically retained by the plaintiffs. 10. In this context, learned Senior Advocate relies on a judgment [State of West Bengal and others vs. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited and others reported at, (2009) 4 SCC 453 ] which, according to the learned Senior Advocate, laid down that all properties contemplated in Section 1(a) to (e) of the 1953 Act were automatically retained by the intermediary, that is, the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest. 11. 11. Learned Senior Advocate next places reliance on certain extracts from records of rights annexed to the present revisional application, to argue that Khodan Bala was recorded as ‘dakhalkar basat praja’ in the records of rights, and, in their written objection the opposite parties admitted the rent-receiving interest of Khodan Bala. As such, it is argued that the property was a homestead one. 12. It is further argued on behalf of the petitioners, by placing reliance on an un-reported judgment rendered by a co-ordinate bench of this Court on June 11, 2002 in S.A. Nos. 543 and 544 of 1971 [Shrimati Ayesha Khatoon and another vs. M/s Sanganeria and Company Pvt. Ltd. and another] and the judgment [Shibsankar Nandy vs. Prabartak Sangha and ors. reported at, AIR (1967) SC 940], that non-agricultural tenancies were not vested under the Estate Acquisition Act. In the present case, the suit property was a non-agricultural tenancy, it is argued, and as such the same did not vest in the State. 13. The petitioners also submit that both the Courts below shirked the responsibility of objectively determining all questions involved and in a cursory manner, relegated such determination, even on a prima facie footing, to the trial of the suit. This, according to the petitioners, was a jurisdictional error. In support of such submission, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners cites a judgment [Mandali Ranganna and others vs. T. Ramachandra and others reported at, (2008) 11 SCC 1 ]. 14. The primary contesting opposite parties, who also contested in the Court below, are the opposite party nos. 3 and 4. It is submitted on behalf of the said opposite parties that the suit property was at best a ‘bastu’ land, as contemplated in Section 6(1)(c) of the 1953 Act, as opposed to a ‘homestead’ as contemplated in Section 6(1)(a) of the said Act. As such, it is argued, there could not be automatic retention of the said land, with structures, unless the petitioners were in khas possession of such land and did not have any such land exceeding 15 acres in area, excluding any land retained under clause (a) of Section 6(1) of the 1953 Act. Hence, it is submitted, the land vested in the State in any event and the opposite party nos. 3 and 4 were direct tenants under the State. 15. Hence, it is submitted, the land vested in the State in any event and the opposite party nos. 3 and 4 were direct tenants under the State. 15. Pointing to prayer (c) of the plaint next, it is submitted on behalf of the opposite party nos. 3 and 4 that recovery of possession of the suit property was also claimed by the plaintiffs, thereby admitting that they were not in khas possession of the said property. Hence, clause (c), and not clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 6 of the 1953 Act was attracted. 16. Moreover, it is shown from the initial document of 1933 that the suit property was, at that juncture, described as a ‘bastu’ land, which character could not be construed to be changed subsequently, at least vis Khodan Bala and her successors-in-interest. 17. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party nos. 3 and 4 also submits that the vesting order was challenged by the petitioners in this Court by way of a writ petition. Subsequently, the matter went to the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal and was dismissed for default. Such vesting thus stands unaffected till date. 18. This apart, it is argued, there were five transfer deeds executed in the interregnum. None of those deeds was challenged by the petitioners. In any event, such challenge has long become time-barred. Hence, the petitioners could not claim declaration outright, without challenging the deeds. 19. Even if buildings and structures were raised on the ‘bastu’ land subsequently by the defendants/opposite parties and/or their predecessor-in-interest, who were tenants, the said buildings and structures could not be arrogated by the petitioners or their predecessor-in- interest as owned by them, or by any person, not being a tenant, holding under them by leave or license, giving the petitioners the advantage of automatic retention as contemplated in Section 6 (1) (b) of the 1953 Act. 20. Accordingly, it is argued that the revisional application ought to be dismissed. 21. In this context, certain provisions of law are relevant. Those are quoted below: West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955:- “Section 3A. Rights of non-agricultural tenants and under-tenants in non-agricultural land to vest in the State. 20. Accordingly, it is argued that the revisional application ought to be dismissed. 21. In this context, certain provisions of law are relevant. Those are quoted below: West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955:- “Section 3A. Rights of non-agricultural tenants and under-tenants in non-agricultural land to vest in the State. - (1) The rights and interests of all non-agricultural tenants and under-tenants under the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (West Bengal Act XX of 1949) shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances, and the provisions of sections 5 and 5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal Act I of 1954) shall apply, with such modifications as may be necessary, mutatis mutandis to all such non-agricultural tenants and under-tenants as if such non- agricultural tenants and under-tenants were intermediaries and the land held by them were estates and a person holding under a non-agricultural tenant or under-tenant were a raiyat. Explanation. Nothing in sections 5 and 5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 shall be construed to affect in any way the vesting of the rights and interests of a non-agricultural tenant or under-tenant under the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 in the State under sub- section (1) of this section. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a non-agricultural tenant or under- tenant under the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, holding in his Khas possession any land to which the provisions of sub-section (1) apply, shall, subject to the other provisions of this Act, be entitled to retain as a raiyat the said land which together with other lands, if any, held by him shall not exceed the ceiling area under section 14M. (3) Every intermediary,- (a) Whose land held in his Khas possession has vested in the State under sub-section (1), or (b) Whose estates or interests, other than land held in his khas possession, have vested in the State under sub-section (1), shall be entitled to receive an amount to be determined in accordance with the provisions of section 14V. (4) The provision of this section shall not apply to any land to which the provisions of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001 (West Ben. Act XXXII of 2001), apply. (4) The provision of this section shall not apply to any land to which the provisions of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001 (West Ben. Act XXXII of 2001), apply. (5) This section shall be deemed to have come into force on and from the 9th day of September, 1980.” “Section 63: Repeal and savings. (1) With effect from the date of coming into force of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1981 (West Bengal Act 50 of 1981) in any district or in any area of Calcutta, such provisions of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (West Ben. Act XX of 1949) as are repugnant to the provisions of this Act, shall cease to have effect in that district or area. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (1) any proceeding pending on the date of such coming into force before any authority appointed under the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 or before any court shall be continued or disposed of as if the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1981 had not come into force in that district or area.” West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953:- “Section 2. Definitions. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, - . . . (g) “Homestead” means a dwelling house together with any courtyard, compound, garden, out-house, place of worship, family grave-yard, library, office, guest-house, tanks, wells, privies, latrines, drains and boundary walls annexed to or appertaining to such dwelling house; .. . (i) “Intermediary” means a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-tenure-holder or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant and includes a service tenure-holder and, in relation to mines and minerals, includes a lessee and a sub-lessee. (j) “Non-agricultural land” means land other than agricultural land or other than land comprised in a forest. (k) “Non-agricultural tenant” means a tenant of non-agricultural land who holds under a proprietor, a tenure-holder, a service tenure-holder or an under-tenure-holder.” “Section 6. Right of intermediary to retain certain lands. (j) “Non-agricultural land” means land other than agricultural land or other than land comprised in a forest. (k) “Non-agricultural tenant” means a tenant of non-agricultural land who holds under a proprietor, a tenure-holder, a service tenure-holder or an under-tenure-holder.” “Section 6. Right of intermediary to retain certain lands. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 4 and 5, an intermediary shall, except in the cases mentioned in the proviso to sub- section (2) but subject to the other provisions of that sub-section, be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting (a) Land comprised in homesteads; (b) Land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures owned by the intermediary or by any person, not being a tenant, holding under him by leave or license; Explanation. For the purposes of this clause ‘tenant’ shall not include a thika tenant as defined in the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 (West Ben. Act II of 1949); (c) Non-agricultural land in his khas possession including land held under him by any person, not being a tenant, by leave or license, not exceeding fifteen acres in area, and excluding any land retained under clause (a): Provided that the total area of land retained by an intermediary under clauses (a) and (c) shall not exceed twenty acres, as may be chosen by him: Provided further that if the land retained by an intermediary under clause (c) or any part thereof is not utilized for a period of five consecutive years from the date of vesting, for a gainful or productive purpose, the land or the part thereof may be resumed by the State Government subject to payment of compensation determined in accordance with the principles laid down in sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ((I of 1894); (d) Agricultural land in his khas possession, not exceeding twenty-five acres in area, as may be chosen by him: Provided that in such portions of the district of Darjeeling as may be declared by notification by the State Government to be hilly portions, an intermediary shall be entitled to retain all agricultural land in his khas possession, or any part thereof as may be chosen by him; (e) Tank-fisheries: Explanation. ‘Tank fishery’ means a reservoir or place for the storage of water, whether formed naturally or by excavation or by construction of embankments, which is being used for pisciculture or for fishing, together with the sub-soil and the banks of such reservoir or place, except such portion of the banks as are included in a homestead or in a garden or orchard and includes any right of pisciculture or fishing in such reservoir or place; (f) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), land comprised in tea gardens or orchards or land used for the purpose of livestock breeding, poultry farming or dairy; (g) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), land comprised in mills, factories, or workshops; (h) Where the intermediary is a local authority, - land held by such authority, notwithstanding such land or any part thereof may have been let out by such authority: Provided that where any land which has been let out by any local authority is retained by such authority under this clause, no person holding such land shall have any right of occupancy therein, and every such person shall be bound to deliver possession of the land to the local authority when required by it for its purposes; (i) Where the intermediary is a corporation or an institution established exclusively for a religious or a charitable purpose or both, or is a person holding under a trust or an endowment or other legal obligation exclusively for a purpose which is charitable or religious or both land held in khas by such corporation or institution, or person, for such purpose including land held by any person, not being a tenant, by leave or license of such Corporation or institution or person; (j) Where the intermediary is a co-operative society registered or deemed to have been registered under the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 (Ben. Act XXI of 1940), or a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913), engaged exclusively in farming (and in business, if any, connected directly with such farming), - agricultural land in the khas possession of the society or the company on the 1st day of January, 1952, and chosen by the society or the company, not exceeding in area the number of acres which persons, who were the members of the society or the company on such date, would have been entitled to retain in the aggregate under clause (d), if every such person were an intermediary: Provided that where any such person retains any land under clause (d), such person shall not be taken into account in calculating the aggregate area of the land which the society or the company may retain. (k) so much of requisitioned land as the intermediary would be entitled to retain after taking into consideration any other land which he may have retained under the other clauses; Explanation. ‘Requisitioned land’ means any land which was in the khas possession of the intermediary and which was requisitioned by Government under the provisions of any law for the time being in force or was occupied by Government in pursuance of rule 49 of the Defence of India Rules and continued to be subject to requisition or occupation on the date mentioned in the notification issued under section 4; (l) so much of land in the unauthorized occupation of refugees from East Bengal immediately before the date of vesting as an intermediary would be entitled to retain after taking into consideration any other land which he may have retained under the other clauses; Explanation. ‘Refugees from East Bengal’ includes those who are displaced persons within the meaning of the rehabilitation of Displaced Persons and Eviction of Persons in Unauthorized Occupation of Land Act, 1951 (West Ben. Act XVI of 1951). Exception. Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (3), nothing in this sub- section shall entitle an intermediary or any other person to retain any land comprised in a forest or any land comprised in any embankment as defined in the Bengal Embankment Act, 1882 (Ben. Act II of 1882), the proper maintenance of which should, in the opinion of the State Government, be taken over by the State Government in the public interest. Act II of 1882), the proper maintenance of which should, in the opinion of the State Government, be taken over by the State Government in the public interest. (2) An intermediary who is entitled to retain possession of any land under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to hold such land directly under the State from the date of vesting as a tenant, subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed and subject to payment of such rent as may be determined under the provisions of this Act and as entered in the record-of-rights finally published under Chapter V except that no rent shall be payable for land referred to in clause (h) or (i): Provided that if any tank fishery or any land comprised in a tea-garden, orchard, mill, factory or workshop was held immediately before the date of vesting under a lease, such lease shall be deemed to have been given by the State Government on the same terms and conditions as immediately before such date subject to such modification therein as the State Government may think fit to make. (3) In the case of land comprised in a tea-garden, mill, factory or workshop the intermediary, or where the land is held under a lease, the lessee, shall be entitled to retain only so much of such land as, in the opinion of the State Government, is required for the tea-garden, mill, factory or workshop, as the case may be, and a person holding under a lease shall, for the purpose of assessment of compensation, be deemed to be an intermediary: Provided that the State Government may, if it thinks fit so to do after revealing the circumstances of a case and after giving the intermediary or the lessee, as the case may be, an opportunity of being heard, revise any order made by it under this sub-section specifying the land which the intermediary or the lessee shall be entitled to retain as being required by him for the tea-garden, mill, factory or workshop, as the case may be. Explanation I. The expression “land held under a lease” includes any land held directly under the State under a lease. Explanation II. Explanation I. The expression “land held under a lease” includes any land held directly under the State under a lease. Explanation II. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression “revise any order” mentioned in the proviso to this sub-section, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any agreement or in any decree, judgment, decision, award of any court, tribunal or other authority include revision of an order of retention made under this sub-section, at any time after such order of retention so made, if the intermediary or the lessee, as the case may be, fails to use or ceases to use the whole or any part of the land for the purpose for which it has been retained i.e. for tea-garden, mill, factory or workshop, as the case may be, by him, so as to resume such land as being surplus to his requirement, by the State Government in the manner laid down in this proviso. Exception. In the case of land allowed to be retained by an intermediary or lessee in respect of a tea-garden, such land may include any land comprised in a forest if, in the opinion of the State Government, the land comprised in a forest is required for the tea-garden. (3A) Land which may be retained under clause (k) or clause (l) of sub-section (1) shall, if necessary, be demarcated in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be specified in an order made in this behalf by a Revenue Officer specially empowered for the purpose by the State Government. (3B) In executing any order for eviction of persons in unauthorized occupation of land in pursuance of proceedings under the Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons and Eviction of Persons in Unauthorized Occupation of Land Act, 1951 (West Ben. Act XVI of 1951), possession shall be given to the intermediary of only so much of such land as he is entitled to retain under clause (l) of sub-section (1) and possession of any land in excess thereof shall be given to the Revenue Officer having jurisdiction over the area in which the land is situated. Act XVI of 1951), possession shall be given to the intermediary of only so much of such land as he is entitled to retain under clause (l) of sub-section (1) and possession of any land in excess thereof shall be given to the Revenue Officer having jurisdiction over the area in which the land is situated. (3C) For the purpose of sub-section (3B) the officer or authority executing the order for eviction shall ascertain from the Revenue Officer referred to in sub-section (3A) particulars of the land possession of which may be given to the intermediary. (3D) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act or in the rules made there under, the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 (VIII of 1885) or the Cooch Behar Tenancy Act, 1910 (Cooch Behar Act V of 1910) shall not apply in the case of any land referred to in sub-section (2). (4) In the case of lands comprised in a forest or in any embankment, referred in the Exception to sub-section (1) and held by a person other than an intermediary which vest in the State, such person shall, for the purpose of assessment of compensation, be deemed to be an intermediary. (5) An intermediary shall exercise his choice for retention of land under sub-section (1) within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. If no choice is exercised by him during the prescribed period, the Revenue Officer shall, after giving him an opportunity of being heard, allow him to retain so much of the lands as do not exceed the limits specified in clauses (c), (d) and (j) of that sub-section: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall require an intermediary to exercise the choice if he has already done so before the date of coming into force of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1957.” Transfer of Property Act: “Section 106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage. (1) In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months’ notice; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days’ notice. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the period mentioned in sub-section (1) shall commence from the date of receipt of notice. (3) A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section. (4) Every notice under sub-section (1) must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.” “Section 107. Leases how made. A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee: Provided that the State Government may from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession.” 22. The records reveal that the unilateral execution of a kabuliyat by Kalipada could at best create a monthly tenancy as contemplated in Sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer Property Act. In that respect, the argument of the petitioners is sound. 23. It is also seen that the term ‘intermediary’ as found in Section 2(i) of the 1953 Act, includes a proprietor, thus indicating that Khodan Bala and her successors-in-interest could fall within the ambit of intermediary by virtue of their proprietorship of the property. 24. However, when the property was initially rented out in the year 1933, the same, as described in the kabuliyat-in-question (which could be looked into for the collateral and limited purpose of ascertaining the then character of the said property) was at best a non-agricultural land as envisaged in Section 6(1) (c) of the Act of 1953. 25. A combined reading of Section 3A and Section 63 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 makes it clear that, even if the property could be defined previously as a non- agricultural tenancy under the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, the rigours of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 would apply after coming into force of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. 26. In such view of the matter and taking into consideration Section 6(1)(c) of the 1953 Act, non-agricultural land had to be in the khas possession of the intermediary (which the petitioners claimed to be), apart from the ceiling of 15 acres having to be satisfied, for the intermediary to automatically retain the said land. 27. The pleadings of the petitioners in the plaint and prayer (c) of the same make it abundantly clear that the petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest were never in khas possession of the suit property during the relevant period. The possession of the petitioners, if any, had all along been through the opposite parties or their predecessor-in-interest, who were monthly tenants even as per the petitioners’ arguments. 28. Even if we take into the zone of consideration clause (b) of Section 6(1) of the 1953 Act, the buildings and structures which the land in question had to be comprised in or appertain to, had to be owned by the intermediary (the petitioners in the present case) or by any person, not being a tenant (emphasis supplied), holding under the intermediary by leave or licence. 29. 29. Hence, neither clause (a) nor clause (b) of Section 6(1) of the 1953 Act applied to the suit property. The provisions of the subsequent clauses of the said sub-section mandate, in the case of a non-agricultural land or even an agricultural land, to be in khas possession of the intermediary-in-question, which is admittedly not the present case. 30. In this context, if we examine the ratio laid down in the judgment of State of West Bengal and others vs. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited and others (supra), it was held therein that a perusal of Section 6 of the 1953 Act discloses a difference between clauses (a) to (e) of Section 6(1) on the one hand and clauses (f) and (g) on the other. While in the case of lands which can be retained (emphasis supplied) under clauses (a) to (e), the retention is automatic from the date of vesting and no order of any authority need be passed for that purpose, in the case of clauses (f) and (g) the retention after the date of vesting is not automatic but it is only when the State Government passed an order under Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act. 31. It is to be noted that the key phrase, as highlighted above, in the said ratio is that the proponent has to satisfy the Court that the lands could otherwise be retained, even for lands/properties falling under clauses (a) to (e) of Section 6(1) to be automatically retained. 32. In the present case, as discussed above, the suit property could at best fall within the contemplation of Sub-Sections (b) or (c) of Section 6(1). Since the necessary conditions for being retained automatically by virtue of the said clauses is not prima facie satisfied by the petitioners, it could not be said that the ratio laid down in State of West Bengal and others vs. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited and others (supra) is applicable. 33. As such, both the Courts below were substantially correct in arriving at the conclusion that the petitioners could not make out a prima facie case as regards the land not having been vested and the petitioners still having right, title and interest in the suit property to entitle the petitioners to a grant of injunction. 34. 33. As such, both the Courts below were substantially correct in arriving at the conclusion that the petitioners could not make out a prima facie case as regards the land not having been vested and the petitioners still having right, title and interest in the suit property to entitle the petitioners to a grant of injunction. 34. In view of the primary test of prima facie case having not been satisfied, the question of the Court academically delving into the other yardsticks for grant of injunction would serve no useful purpose. 35. Even if Khodan Bala and her successors-in-interest were intermediaries in respect of the property-in-question, the necessary criteria for automatic vesting were not satisfied by the petitioners in the Courts below to grant an injunction in their favour. 36. This apart, since both the Courts below arrived at concurrent findings of fact and law while refusing injunction, it would not be prudent for this Court to interfere with such conclusion and/or findings merely because another view was possible, even if such was the case, which would be contrary to settled law. 37. Hence, the impugned orders suffer from no infirmity and/or jurisdictional error. 38. Accordingly, C.O. No. 3040 of 2018 is dismissed, thereby affirming the impugned orders, without any order as to costs. 39. However, it is made clear that the findings arrived at and observations made by this Court and the Courts below were tentative for the purpose of the suit and were rendered in the context of the injunction application only. The Trial Court will be free to proceed with the hearing of the suit without being unduly influenced by such observations, either of this Court or of the Courts below. 40. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon due compliance with the requisite formalities.