JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. J.I. Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A.M. Borah, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 and Mr. A.M. Mojumdar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam for the State respondent. 2. The present Criminal Revision has been preferred by the petitioner against the impugned order, 11.12.2015, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup (M) whereby the learned Court has accepted the final report submitted by the investigating Officer Sri Binod Kumar IPS, DIG of Police, at the conclusion of the investigation pertaining to the CID Case No. 95/2011. 3. Present petitioner, Smti. Barsa Borah Bordoloi, Deputy Superintendent of Excise Margherita Sub-Division, District-Tinsukia as complainant lodged a complaint on 19.5.2011, before the Director General of Police, which reads as follows- "Sub: Complaint against Sri Diganta Borah, I.P.S. just transferred Superintendent of Police of Tinsukia District, Assam. Sir, Most respectfully I have to inform you that I have been going through a very-very traumatic phase and my life has been ruined by Sri Diganta Borah, I.P.S. the newly posted Superintendent of Police of Karimganj. I know Sri Diganta Borah, I.P.S. since 2008 when he was the Additional Superintendent of Police (SQ) of Dibrugarh, Assam and I was the Inspector of Excise, Dibrugarh. Then in the year of 2009 both of us got transferred to Tinsukia on Promotion and became good friends. On 27th March, 2009 Sri Diganta Borah invited me to the Tinsukia Police Guest House through SMS and calls from his then Mobile No. 9435558144 to have some discussion/talk and without any second thought I met him there. But after a few minutes he outraged my modesty forcefully. I was completely shocked and surprised and somehow managed to leave the premises. Then on 10th of May, 2009 all of a sudden he visited my place with his PSO at night on his journey back home to Tinsukia from Dibrugarh where he attended the then Additional Deputy Commissioner of Dibrugarh Akashdeeps Party at a local Hotel. I was alone at home and he forcefully established physical relation with me by way of over power & threat. After this incident, he kept visiting my place oat Dibrugarh every now and then and had physical relation with me by way of over power and I could not do anything out of fear.
I was alone at home and he forcefully established physical relation with me by way of over power & threat. After this incident, he kept visiting my place oat Dibrugarh every now and then and had physical relation with me by way of over power and I could not do anything out of fear. Sensing my sufferings, he very cleverly convince me that he did everything for love only and he emotionally started blackmailing me only to escape any legal action that I could have taken against him. After few months my husband came to know about this and threatened to file a case and then Sri Diganta Borah changed his Mobile Number and stopped communication although I tried hard to contact him to sort out the matter. Finally he started communication only to threaten me of dire consequences. He treated me that he would shoot me & fabricate false case against me and my family members if I would take legal action against him. I could not believe his words and requested him through SMS, E-Mails, Letters & Calls to end my sufferings but in vain. I was very scared and hesitant to take any legal steps immediately because (1) he was the Superintendent of Police of the District where I too am posted and working and hence I waited helplessly out of fear. But I approached the then Inspector General of Police of Eastern Range Dr. L.R. Bishnoi in this connection in September, 2010 and he is very much aware of it (2) I had to think about the prestige, security and reputation of my family (3) I was and still am very much confused as he used to blackmail me emotionally and otherwise to escape the probable legal consequences of the offence committed by him and he is still continuing to do so. The impact of the same I am suffering from severe mental worries and agonies. Now the situation reached to such an extent that I am compelled to forward my complaint against Sri Diganta Borah to you for your kind consideration and necessary action against him for playing a Fun with my chastity in the manner as aforesaid." 4. On being forwarded, the said complaint was registered as CID Case No. 95/2011 under Section 341/354/506 IPC dated 02.11.2011.
On being forwarded, the said complaint was registered as CID Case No. 95/2011 under Section 341/354/506 IPC dated 02.11.2011. At the same time, the respondent Diganta Borah also lodged a FIR against the present petitioner which was registered as Karimganj PS Case No. 483/2011. The said FIR was challenged by the petitioner before the High Court by filing a Criminal Petition No. 554/2012 and the Hon’ble High Court initially granted stay and finally decided the same on 26.06.2012 and the said order was challenged by the petitioner by filing a SLP No. 6252/2012 and the Hon’ble Apex Court stayed the operation of the said order and directed the Director General of Police, Assam to investigate both the case of Karimganj PS Case No. 483/2011 (filed by the Dignanta Borah) and CID PS Case No. 95/2011 (filed by the Barsha Borah Bordoloi). Accordingly, the case was investigated by the DIG of Police and final report was submitted in both the cases. 5. In respect of the Karimganj PS Case No. 483/2011, the Ld. CJM, Karimganj accepted the final report by its order, dated 15.05.2015, after providing an opportunity of being heard of the informant Dignata Borah. However, acceptance of said final report is not challenged by said Diganta Borah. But the present petitioner challenged the final report that was filed in CID PS Case No. 95/2011 by way of a protest petition and the learned CJM, Kamrup by its order, dated 11.12.2015, was pleased to accept the final report rejecting the protest petition which has now been impugned in the present petition. 6. The content of FIR is already discussed above so let us discussed about the findings of the I.O. after the investigation. In his report, the I.O. has mentioned that he has examined all the available witnesses and recorded their statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and connected documents including electronic devices were seized and got then examined by expert of FSL, with ample opportunity to the petitioner/complainant to adduce her evidence. An after evaluation of all evidence including oral, documentary, digital evidence it was found that there was a cordial relation between the parties and most of the communication was made at the behest of the complainant and as the accused person declined to receive phone calls of the complainant, she continued to send SMS from her mobile and she made all her attempt to restore their relationship.
During the investigation no cogent evidence come to light to establish such allegation brought by the complainant but matters that has surfaced proved the case otherwise. The letter written by the petitioner to the accused during the said crucial period that is 2009 to 2011 and by SMS send by her was seized during the course of investigation (which is not disputed) reveals that she had more than cordial relation with the respondent. Thus, after all elaborate discussion on each and every material collected during the investigation the I.O. has come to a findings with the evidence available on record do not make out a case under section 341/354/506 IPC and the case has been filed after 2 years of the occurrence only to pressurize the respondent to restore their earlier relationship for which she has continuously sending SMS for sorting of the problem through mediation. Accordingly, the final report was submitted. 7. The Ld. CJM, Kamrup after providing an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner and also taking into account the protest petition filed by her accepted the final report rejecting the protest petition and the present revision has been preferred assailing the said order. 8. I have heard learned counsel for both parties at length and also gone through the written submissions tendered by them. 9. Highlighting all the matters on record learned counsel for petitioner Mr. J.I. Borbhuiya has put forward his argument vehemently assailing the impugned order on the ground that the said order has been passed without application of mind and despite the fact that a prima facie case is made out under section 66A/67A Information Technology Act read with section 376 IPC but the I.O. has neither registered the case properly nor investigated the same in due manner and has whimsically filed the final report to favour the respondent. The I.O. did not respond to several communications made by the petitioner to record her statement and other witnesses under section 164 Cr.P.C., which speaks of his bias conduct. It is stated that even a husband cannot send vulgar SMS to his wife in the public domain. According Mr.
The I.O. did not respond to several communications made by the petitioner to record her statement and other witnesses under section 164 Cr.P.C., which speaks of his bias conduct. It is stated that even a husband cannot send vulgar SMS to his wife in the public domain. According Mr. Borbhuiya, the petitioner in her protest petition has duly projected the case by inserting new facts which will attract the offence under the Information Technology Act, in short IT Act, and it is stated that the learned Court has failed to appreciate the legal aspect as to how a final report is to be accepted and how to deal with a protest petition. It has been further assailed that the Court was in a position to take cognizance of the protest petition even on the basis of the material surfaced in course of investigation but denial of the same has prejudiced the petitioner. 10. Reference is made to different SMSes as indicated in the paper book to say that messages have established an emotional blackmailing of petitioner. It is contended that the petitioner has duly projected her case by inserting new facts relating to the commission of offence under Sections 66/67 (A) of the IT Act, and the admissibility of the same to be tested under Section 65 (B) of the Evidence Act and the petitioner has produced relevant certificate issued by a private laboratory namely Truth Lab as required under Section 65 (B) of the Evidence Act to prove that the SMSes were sent by the respondent, and none else. 11. It is further contended by learned counsel for petitioner that the learned court has failed to follow the guidelines given in Moinul Hoque and others vs. State of Assam and another reported in GLT 2013 (4) 1038, which says how to deal with a protest petition, whether content of the protest petition have fulfilled the definition under Section 2 (d) of the Cr.P.C. and the learned court without examining the petitioner under Section 200/202 of the Cr.P.C. passed the impugned order holding that there was no scope for further investigation, which is bad in law, as she never prayed further investigation, but prayed to accept her protest petition rejecting the final report. 12.
12. As regards the letter written by the petitioner vide MR no.42 in her case, it is the contention of petitioner that the said letter was written to the accused as well as the mother of the accused seeking natural justice but it does not mean that she has given a clean chit for commission of the offence under Section 66/67 (A) of the IT Act and insofar as the offence under Section 354 of the IPC is concerned the landmark of the Apex Court in Asharam Bapu is referred wherein cognizance of offence is taken for the offence that was committed long back. But the learned trial court has failed to take cognizance of the offence despite a protest petition being made before the court. Similarly the finding of the court that the case is doubtful for delay of more than two years is also stated to be on wrong appreciation of the matter. Only delay cannot be the ground to reject the case projected by petitioner when she has duly explained the delay in her FIR. 13. In support of his contentions canvassed before this court that the Magistrate can take cognizance of offence under Section 190 (1) (b) of the Cr.P.C. despite the police report that no case has been made out against the accused and the fact that only for delay in lodging the FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and that admissibility of secondary evidence of electronic record can be accepted under the provisions of Section 65 (B) of the Evidence Act, the following decisions are relied on: (1) Moinul Hoque (Md) and others vs. State of Assam and another, reported in 2013 (4) GLT 1038. (2) 2006 (4) SCC 359 , Minu Kumari and another v. State of Bihar. (3) (2012) 1 SCC 130 , Shiv Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar and another. (4) (2014) 13 SCC 133 , Rakesh and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another. (5) (2008) 2 SCC 492 , SK Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Ltd and others. (6) AIR 2002 SC 483 , Kishore Kumar Gyanchandani vs. GD Mehrotra and another. (7) 2004 (7) SCC 768 , Gangadhar Janardan and Hatre vs. State of Maharashtra and others. (8) 2007 (2) SCC 170 , Ramdas and others v. State of Maharashtra.
(5) (2008) 2 SCC 492 , SK Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Ltd and others. (6) AIR 2002 SC 483 , Kishore Kumar Gyanchandani vs. GD Mehrotra and another. (7) 2004 (7) SCC 768 , Gangadhar Janardan and Hatre vs. State of Maharashtra and others. (8) 2007 (2) SCC 170 , Ramdas and others v. State of Maharashtra. (9) AIR 2006 SC 2002 , Sahebarao and another v. State of Maharashtra. (10) (2014) 10 SCC 473 , Anbar P.V. vs. PK Basir and others. (11) (2009) 10 SCC 184 , Nilu Chopra and another vs. Bharti. 14. Refuting the submissions of learned counsel for petitioner it is vehemently contended by learned senior counsel for respondent Mr. A.M. Bora on several counts as discussed below. 15. As regards the delay in filing the FIR it is submitted that the first date of the alleged incident on 27.3.2009, at Tinsukia police guest house and the second alleged incident is on 10.5.2009, at the residence of informant where the respondent allegedly established physical relation with her by overpowering and kept visiting her place on various subsequent occasions establishing physical relationship with her and the FIR was lodged on 19.5.2011, which is more than two and half years of the alleged occurrence but no proper explanation for delay is given despite the informant being a qualified lady holding the post of Deputy Superintendent of Excise and she is well versed with the legal procedure. More so during such two years she has written several letters to the accused and his family fervently requesting him to restore their sweet relation. In such backdrop her simple averment that out of fear she did not lodge the FIR holds no water. In this context the decision of the Supreme Court in State of HP v. Shree Kant Shekari, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 153 is referred, wherein it is held that if the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is possibility of embezzlement or exaggeration in the prosecution version on account of delay is a relevant factor. 16.
In this context the decision of the Supreme Court in State of HP v. Shree Kant Shekari, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 153 is referred, wherein it is held that if the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is possibility of embezzlement or exaggeration in the prosecution version on account of delay is a relevant factor. 16. It is pointed out that the investigation of the present case was carried out under the monitoring of the Supreme Court, wherein the investigation was conducted by a IPS Officer in the rank of DIG as per the direction of the Supreme Court and after duly conducting the investigation and elaborately examining the material including oral, documentary and digital, the final report has been filed and the learned trial court has also duly appreciated all the material aspect of the case including the case diary and there appears to be no irregularity or illegality in the impugned order. Certain other point has been highlighted by learned counsel Mr. Borah, as mentioned below. (a) Connected documents including the electronic devices like numerous SMS were seized and examined by the forensic science laboratory, which clearly indicates that there was cordial relation between the informant and the accused and the communication between the parties continued mostly at the behest of informant and when accused discontinued communication, informant carried on sending SMSes and making phone calls to which sometimes accused responded (b) There was no evidence of molestation of the petitioner on 27.3.2009 nor there was any material regarding requisition of vehicle by the excise department for visiting Tinsukia police guest house as contended by petitioner. (c) Informant engaged advocates who acted as emissaries to restore their strained relation and she did not say anything of the alleged incident to them. (d) In her letter informant asked the respondent as well as his family members for restoration/continuation of the cordial relation between the parties which is not at all disputed by her. (e) Informant lodged the case only to pressurize the accused to continue her earlier relationship when her all efforts through letter, SMSes etc did not yield any result. (f) Brother of the informant in his statement before the police has categorically stated that informant has not told him about any incident as alleged in the FIR.
(e) Informant lodged the case only to pressurize the accused to continue her earlier relationship when her all efforts through letter, SMSes etc did not yield any result. (f) Brother of the informant in his statement before the police has categorically stated that informant has not told him about any incident as alleged in the FIR. (g) The protest petition filed by petitioner failed to bring anything to constitute an offence, so as to treat it as a complaint as envisaged in Section 2 (d) of the Cr.P.C. Yet another thrust of argument of learned counsel for respondent that the learned Court rightly did not take cognizance on the said protest petition. The observations made by the Apex Court in (2009) 10 SCC 184 , Neelu Chopra & Anr. Vs. Bharti are referred, wherein it is held that in order to lodge a proper complaint mere mention of section and the language of Section is not to be all and end of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the Court, is the particular of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role of the accused in committing the offence. Further, the following references are relied on by learned counsel for respondent as regard the procedure to be adopted by the court after receiving the final report as well as the protest petition against such report. (a) H.S. Bains, Director of Small Savings cum Deputy Secretary, Finance, Punjab and Chandigars vs. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), 1980 4 SCC 631 . (b) Moinul Hoque vs. State of Assam, 2013 (4) GLT 1038. (c) Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2004) 7 SCC 768 . 17. It is further contended by Mr. Bora that unless the order of the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the Court is unreasonable for non-consideration of relevant material and misreading of evidence etc, the power of the revisional Court is barred in interfering the order of the Magistrate. In the given case the learned Court has duly considered all material on record and there appears to be no perversity in the impugned order. Reliance is placed on the decisions mentioned below. (i) (2015) 3 SCC 123 , Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan Vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke & Ors. (ii) (1993) 1 SCC 561 , Sampat Singh Vs. State of Haryana.
In the given case the learned Court has duly considered all material on record and there appears to be no perversity in the impugned order. Reliance is placed on the decisions mentioned below. (i) (2015) 3 SCC 123 , Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan Vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke & Ors. (ii) (1993) 1 SCC 561 , Sampat Singh Vs. State of Haryana. (iii) (2011) 3 SCC 351 , Harshendra Kumar D. Vs. Rabatilata Koley. (iv) (2007) 13 SCC 71 , Sanjay Bansal & Anr. Vs. Jawaharlal Vats & Ors. (v) (2012) 1 SCC 680 , Ashish Chadha Vs. Asha Kumari & Anr. 18. As regards the contention regarding the offence under the provisions of the IT Act it is submitted that no such offence is made under the IT Act against the respondent as SMSes sent by the parties to each other are obviously, consensual and the accused cannot be singled out for the offence, if any, under the provisions of the law. It is categorically challenged that no any ingredient of offence u/s 67 (A) of the IT Act is discernible in the present case and there is no certificate as mandated by Section 65 (B) of the Evidence Act to prove the genuineness of the purported SMSes. The material brought by the informant through a private investigating agency cannot be admissible in evidence which was verified by a privately run laboratory. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2000) 8 SCC 323 , Navinchandra N. Magithla Vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors., it is held that "the Code does not recognize the private agency. If any person is interested in hiring such private agency, he may do so at his own risks and costs but such investigation would not be regarded as investigation made under the law. Any evidence collected by such private investigation and any conclusion reached by such investigation cannot be permitted by the public prosecutor in any trial. Of course it may be possible for the defence to present such case. 19. Learned counsel summarized his argument with a great exclamation that here is the case where the victim herself wrote several letters to the person who is alleged to have sexually exploited her after the alleged incident requesting him to continue with the relationship which is self-explanatory (the letters dated 30.7.2010, 10.9.2010 addressed to the accused and 13.6.2012 and 8.11.2012 addressed to the mother of accused is mentioned).
A mention is made to the latest order in SLP (crl) 281/2018, X vs. Mahmood Farooqui, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court took into account the communication made by the prosecutrix to the accused and his wife after the alleged incident has upheld the order of acquittal under Section 376 IPC. 20. Deliberation of both parties at length is duly considered and carefully gone through the case diary of all matters on record. In this petition this court is confronted basically with two aspects of the matter, firstly whether the Magistrate is justified in accepting the final report by rejecting the protest petition and/or the Court is bound to take cognizance of the offence of the protest petition filed by the petitioner? Secondly whether the revisional Court has jurisdiction to decide the merit of the case while by appreciating all merit learned counsel has accepted the final report, given by the investigating officer? 21. The power and duty enjoins to a Magistrate after filing of F.F. is discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sampat Singh (supra) in the following manner. "It is not for the Court to keep track of an investigation and watch its day to day progress but when an investigation culminates in the final report as contemplated under Section 173 of the Code, then the Magistrate enjoins a duty within his authority sanctioned by law to scrupulously scrutinize the final report and the accompaniments by applying a judicial mind and take a decision either to accept or to reject the final report. But the court should not be indirectly used as an instrumentality by anyone to attain or obtain any beneficial achievement which one would not get through normal process. If anyone approaches the court with ulterior motive designed to wrench some personal benefit by putting another, within the clutches of law and using the court as a device only for that end but not to get any legal remedy, then in such a situation the court should heavily come upon such a person and see that the authority of the court is not misused." 22. In Gangadhar (supra), the Apex Court held that there is no provision in the Code to file a protest petition by informant who lodged the FIR. But this has been the practice.
In Gangadhar (supra), the Apex Court held that there is no provision in the Code to file a protest petition by informant who lodged the FIR. But this has been the practice. Absence of this provision in the Code relating to filing protest petition is considered in Bhagwat Singh v. The Commander of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537 , wherein it is held that when on consideration of the report made by the officer in charge of a police station under sub-Section (2) (i) of Section 173 the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence, the informant must be given an opportunity of hearing so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process. 23. In Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra reported in AIR 1968 SC 117 , it is held that while considering the provisions u/s 156 (3)/169/178/190 of the Code, the Magistrate is not under any obligation to accept the final report if he does not agree with the opinion formed by the police. The power to take cognizance, notwithstanding formation of opinion by the police, which is the final stage of investigation, has been provided for in Section 191 (1) (C) of the Code. 24. When a report is forwarded by police to the Magistrate under Section 173 (2) (1) is placed before him the following situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons in such a case the Magistrate may either (1) accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding, or (3) may direct further investigation u/s 156 (3) and may require the police to make a further report. The report may on the other hand states that according to police no offence appears to have been committed. When such a report is placed before the Magistrate he has again option for adopting one of three courses open as mentioned below : (1) He may accept the report and drop the proceeding, or (2) He may disagree with the report and take the view that there is sufficient ground for further proceeding, take cognizance of offence and issue process. (3) He may direct further investigation to be made by the police under Section 156 (3).
(3) He may direct further investigation to be made by the police under Section 156 (3). 25. The position is therefore well settled that upon receipt of a police report u/s 173 (2) a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of offence under Section 190 (b) of the Code, even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against accused. The Magistrate can take into account statement of witnesses examined by the police during investigation and take cognizance of the offence if he thinks it fit and he is not bound to follow the procedure envisaged in Sections 200/202 of the Cr.P.C. 26. A similar aspect is dealt with in the decision of Moinul Hoque (supra), wherein it is held that when a police officer after investigation has return the case in final report on the ground of insufficient evidence, if the complaint nevertheless wants to protest, thereby inviting the Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190 (1) (a), if it were be so, the protest petition filed would have to satisfy the requirement of a complaint as defined in Section (2) (d) of the Cr.P.C. and that the complaint should contain allegations of fact which constitute the offences upon which alone the Magistrate can take cognizance u/s 190 (1) (a) of the Cr.P.C. However, if the protest petition does not contain any allegation of facts which can constitute an offence or is without containing those necessary particulars that a normal complaint has to contain, it cannot be treated as a complaint for the purpose of proceeding u/s 200 of the Cr.P.C. 27. In Sanjay Singh (supra) the same principle is reiterated that the court is not bound by the report submitted by police and the Magistrate is still free to reject the report and take cognizance, but for the purpose of taking cognizance of an offence the legal requirement to constitute the offence u/s 190 (1) (b) of the Code is to be fulfilled. However, once the legal requirement to constitute the offence qua the accused is lacking there is no point of taking cognizance and proceeding further against him. 28.
However, once the legal requirement to constitute the offence qua the accused is lacking there is no point of taking cognizance and proceeding further against him. 28. As regards the taking of cognizance of an offence it is held that at the stage of taking cognizance of a case what is to be seen is whether there is any sufficient ground for taking judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiate further proceeding. The word cognizance is an indefinite import. It merely means (became aware of) and it connotes take notice of judicially. It occurs that as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Taking of cognizance is a sine qua non or a condition precedent for holding a valid trial. 29. In Ashish Chandra (supra) 2012 and Sanjay Singh (supra) (2015) the following question was taken into consideration that once the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction in proper application of mind decides to accept the closer report submitted by the police u/s 173 (2) of the Code, whether the High Court is justified in setting aside the same in exercise of revisional jurisdiction merely because another view may be possible, it was answered in the negative holding that the revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order merely because another view is possible. The revisional Court is not meant to act as appellate court. The whole purpose of revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power is not to be equated with that of appeal. Unless finding of the court whose decision is sought to be revised is shown to be perverse and untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the court may not interfere the decision in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Apex Court further made a strong conclusion by holding that unmerited and undeserved prosecution is an infringement of the guarantee under the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 assured every person of the right to life and personal liberty.
The Hon’ble Apex Court further made a strong conclusion by holding that unmerited and undeserved prosecution is an infringement of the guarantee under the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 assured every person of the right to life and personal liberty. The word personal liberty is of widest amplitude covering variety of rights which goes to constitute personal liberty of a person. Its deprivation shall be only as per the procedure prescribed in the court and the Evidence Act conformable to the mandate of the supreme law, the Constitution. 30. In para 20 of the judgment in Ashish Chandra (supra) it is held that the High Court has in its revisional jurisdiction apprised the evidence which could not have done. It is the trial court that has to decide whether the evidence on record is sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the accused. The revisional power under the Code cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such power the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial court and the appellate court is required to do so. 31. On the anvil of the above legal position, when we examine the merit of the instant matter, it can be noticed that the learned court has taken into account all the relevant matter as regards the delay in filing the FIR, mutual relation of both the parties, materials in the Case Diary and on the basis of all, the learned Court has accepted the findings given by the I.O. with the observation that the protest petition is liable to be rejected. For taking cognizance, the Magistrate firstly have to disagree with the findings given by the I.O. and to satisfy itself of a prima-facie case to proceed with. Although, the learned Court has not discussed all detail about the protest petition but on a careful examination of the same there appears no any description of the manner of commission of offence on the part of the accused/ respondent. The petitioner herein has no where mentioned that the aforesaid conduct was carried out against her consent or will.
Although, the learned Court has not discussed all detail about the protest petition but on a careful examination of the same there appears no any description of the manner of commission of offence on the part of the accused/ respondent. The petitioner herein has no where mentioned that the aforesaid conduct was carried out against her consent or will. Except alleging about unfair conduct of the I.O. by not recording her statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. and not examining the call details of the respondent by FSL etc., the petitioner has not made out any offence as alleged as per requirement of section 2 (d) Cr.P.C., to treat the protest petition as complaint. 32. The petitioner laid much emphasis on the SMS sent through the phone numbers of the respondent to her, only to establish that the accused respondent constantly made communication to her and even sent vulgar messages. It is to be noted with concern that the SMS was exchanged only with the petitioner to which she responded very well (it doesn’t matter how much message sent by other side) and it was mostly discussed on their affectionate and physical relation and in such mutual process sending of even vulgar message will not attract the provision of offence under Information and Technology Act. It will be a feeble attempt on the part of the petitioner to inculpate the respondent by taking a u turn from the whole episode. Peculiar to note that even after so called vulgar SMS given by respondent, the petitioner continues to reciprocate with all subsequent messages. 33. The materials in the Case Diary reveals that there is no any supporting evidence to the allegation and even her own brother denied to have any knowledge about the occurrence. The driver who accompanied with the petitioner on the day of first alleged incident is also silent about any offence. The other witness/the advocate was simply requested by the petitioner to persuade the respondent to restore their cordial relationship but he was not reported about the purported offence committed by the respondent. Another pertinent point to be noted that even after the said incident, the petitioner used to write to the respondent and her mother with a fervent request to restore their relationship. In such backdrop, can a reasonable man accept such version that a victim of sexual assault will ever wrote a letter to such accused?
Another pertinent point to be noted that even after the said incident, the petitioner used to write to the respondent and her mother with a fervent request to restore their relationship. In such backdrop, can a reasonable man accept such version that a victim of sexual assault will ever wrote a letter to such accused? Perhaps nothing more requires to hold that after her attempt to restore the relation to the respondent failed, the petitioner has come up with the complaint after 2 (two) years of the occurrence and the aspect of afterthought cannot be denuded. Recording of statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. in course of investigation is not a must to establish a case. In the given case, investigation was conducted by DIG under the supervision of Hon’ble Apex Court and I.O. after elaborate investigation, submitted final report in both the cases filed by both the parties against each other. The petitioner raised no complain about defective investigation before the Apex Court. 34. Fear factor as indicated in FIR, holds no good. In view of the discussion above, her conduct during the crucial period reveals otherwise. The aforesaid FIR nowhere discloses that the accused conducted the aforesaid affair by showing any threat to her. Can the respondent indulge such sexual assault upon a married woman over a period of 2 (two) years, had there been no any consensus between the parties? The more crucial aspect of the matter is that till the husband of the petitioner came to know all about, the said affairs continued without any protest on the part of petitioner and at the behest of her husband she was compelled to file the FIR. Even after threatening by her husband, the petitioner try to contact the respondent by writing letter, sending SMS and only when the respondent avoided her, threatened her not to file any fake case, she ultimately filed the FIR. 35. It is not disputed that the petitioner wrote letters to the respondent as well as his mother after the said incident and without narrating all details some relevant portion can be extracted herein below- (1) In her letter dated 30.07.2010 addressed to Diganta Borah (charged accused) by the informant (present petitioner) she had asked him to talk to her and keep talking to her and otherwise she would call him from a superior officers call.
(seized vide MR No. 38/12) (2) In her letter dated 10.09.2010 written in Assamese language addressed to Diganta Borah (charged accused) by the informant (present petitioner) she had stated that she had loved him completely and for that reason she had given herself completely to him. She also stated that she established a relationship from her side only once and that is with him and therefore would love him and wait for him till she is alive. (seized vide MR No. 42/12). (3) In her letter dated 13.06.2012 written in Assamese language addressed to Digantas mother (charged accuseds brother) by the informant (present petitioner) she had requested them to settle the matter by means of compromise and discussion rather than going to Courts of law and also stated that she did not wish any harm to come to Diganata (charged accused) (seized vice MR No. 18/13). (4) In her letter dated 08.11.2012 written in Assamese language addressed to Digantas mother (charged accuseds mother) by the informant (present petitioner) she had requested her to provide a neutral and acceptable solution to their problem. 36. In view of the above, what left for appreciation about forceful physical relation or about the fear factor that has been raised in the aforesaid FIR. The immediate and the post conduct of the petitioner indicative of her consent towards the whole affairs. The law comes into play when there is infringement of rights of a person as prescribed under the statute. Law always based on human behavior, natural conduct, instinct, expectation (normal) with moral values in normal course of affairs in day to day life. Law is guided by such relevant criteria and not a separate concrete theory (hypothesis), while assessing an act whether it will come within the purview of an offence. This Court failed to understand what solution of matter was asked for by petitioner (if she is a victim of sexual assault) against the accused. 37. In constituting an offence u/s 376 Indian Penal Code, the following ingredients of rape is to be proved.
This Court failed to understand what solution of matter was asked for by petitioner (if she is a victim of sexual assault) against the accused. 37. In constituting an offence u/s 376 Indian Penal Code, the following ingredients of rape is to be proved. "375 Rape-A man is said to commit "rape", if he- (a) Penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) Inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) Manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) Applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:- First- Against her will. Secondly-without her consent. Thirdly- with her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly- with her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly- with her consent, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly- with or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Seventhly- When she is unable to communicate consent." Explanation 1.- Explanation 2.- Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Exception 1.- A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.
Seventhly- When she is unable to communicate consent." Explanation 1.- Explanation 2.- Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Exception 1.- A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. Exception 2.- Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape. 38. It is not a case of the petitioner that physical relation was conducted against her will or consent which is the crucial ingredient of the offence. The allegation about forceful physical relation became inconsequential while it prevails for quite a long span of time (two years) between the parties. Her own letter written to respondent speaks more than loudly that she was in deep love with the respondent and she requested him to maintain the relation at any situation. On one hand, she wrote letter to respondent after the incident and on the other hand, she come up with the allegation which is not at all sufficient to satisfy judicial conscience to adhere to a criminal proceeding. A victim woman cannot twisted her version to suit her purpose at her own sweet will. Her conduct reveals otherwise what is said in the FIR. The undisputed letters written by her as well as mutual exchange of SMS between the parties is enough to destroy the merit in the contention raised in the First Information Report (FIR) to drag the matter for a valid criminal trial. As has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court unmerited and undeserved prosecution is an infringement of personal liberty as enshrine in the constitution. Such an episode depicted in the case will certainly shaken the judicial conscience to take cognizance of any sexual offence where the victim is a married, dignified working woman, not a pretty teenage girl who may falls prey to such emotional black mailing on the part of a male counterpart. 39. In view of all above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court has rightly accepted the final report filed by the I.O. and no any illegality is attributed towards such acceptance, which calls for no interference. Resultantly, the revision petition stands dismissed. Return the LCRs along with the Case Diary, forthwith.