JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Dr. B. Ahmed, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. Also heard Mr. S.P. Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. This is an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 filed by the present appellants/petitioners for condonation of delay of 372 days in filing the connected first appeal against the judgment and decree dated 20.07.2015, passed in Title Suit No.45/2014 by the learned Civil Judge at Karimganj. 3. Dr. Ahmed submits that the suit preferred by the respondents was against the contractual payment purportedly due to the respondents from the Office of the Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Karimganj Division. The present petitioners/appellants are officials of the Irrigation Department of the Government of Assam, represented by the learned Government Pleader at Karimganj in Title Suit No.45/2014. The suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 20.07.2015 whereafter the conducting Government Pleader, vide his letter dated 10.09.2015, informed the Executive Engineer, Karimganj about the disposal of the suit. It was also advised by the said letter dated 10.09.2015 that there are good grounds for preferring the appeal indicating to the Executive Engineer that the said appeal would lie before the Gauhati High Court. Anticipating that the appeal is to be filed before this Court, the Executive Engineer, Karimganj Division sent the para-wise comments to the Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Department vide letter dated 19.09.2015 and a copy thereof was also sent to the learned Standing Counsel of this Court of the said Department. Subsequent thereto, vide letter dated 29.10.2015, the Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department requested the present learned Standing Counsel to take effective steps with regard to the judgment and decree dated 20.07.2015. It is further submitted by Dr. Ahmed that the dealing Executive Engineer, Sri Baktaruddin Laskar was transferred vide notification dated 20.02.2016 as the Executive Engineer, Guwahati West Division. Thereafter on receipt of the said case record, it is submitted by Dr. Ahmed that the relevant plaint, written statements, evidence and other necessary documents were not placed before the learned Standing Counsel following which he had to ask for it from the concerned Division at Karimganj. Owing to the transfer of the earlier Executive Engineer, though another official was posted, however, as he was quite new, he took some time in arranging the said requisite documents. Owing to the transfer of the earlier Executive Engineer, though another official was posted, however, as he was quite new, he took some time in arranging the said requisite documents. Finally, the said required documents were placed in the Office of the learned Standing Counsel in the month of February, 2016. On further scrutiny of the said documents and the record, the learned Standing Counsel again had to request for the running bill accounts but as the Executive Engineer was new in the said Division he was unable to bring the running bills instantly which were scattered at various places for which the appeal could not be filed up to April, 2016. The General Assembly Election and its process started in the month of May, 2016 and the officers were entrusted with the election duties and as such no one could bring the aforesaid documents sought for, by the learned Standing Counsel. It is further submitted that in the first week of August, 2016, all the necessary records were made available in the Office of the Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department and finally in the second week of August, 2016, the same were transmitted to the learned Standing Counsel. Thereafter, since record of payment etc. and the running bills were voluminous, the learned Standing Counsel took one month’s time to prepare exact account tallying with the actual work done and only in the month of September, 2016 the appeal memo was ready. Though the appeal memo was made ready before the Puja vacation in the year 2016, it could be filed after the Puja vacation on 18.11.2016 as the learned Standing Counsel met with a serious accident. In the process, delay of 372 days occurred. 4. Dr. Ahmed submits that the grounds mentioned in this application are sufficient enough to bring within the ambit and scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. There was no intentional delay on the part of any of the officials in preferring this appeal. The administrative approval of certain process, procedures are to be followed by the Government officers while dealing with the legal matters and such observation of procedure had not consumed much time, rather it was the documents for which the learned Standing Counsel could not prefer the appeal coupled with the two months delay in informing the Executive Engineer by the learned Government Pleader at Karimganj. As such Dr. As such Dr. Ahmed sought for condonation of delay so caused in filing the appeal. 5. Mr. Roy, on the other hand, submits that the causes shown are not covered within the ambit and scope of the term “sufficient cause” of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is his contention that the letter requesting the learned Standing Counsel to go ahead in preparing and filing the appeal was issued on 29.10.2015 and thereafter the same was filed on 18.11.2016 which is almost around one year from 29.10.2015. The causes for the delay during the said period are not explained and as such there is undoubtedly negligence on the part of the officials of the Department and also on the part of the counsel. It is submitted that sufficient causes are facts to be stated in order to draw the conclusion on examination of the same by the Court with regard to the due diligence on the part of the appellant. If there is a satisfactory explanation, the length of delay does not count. But in this case there is no such explanation to draw a satisfactory conclusion in favour of the appellants/petitioners. Mr. Roy relies P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and Anr., reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276 and citing the findings of the Hon’ble Apex Court, Mr. Roy submits that non-filing of the appeal after receipt of the record by the learned Standing Counsel and the grounds for the same cannot be termed to be a reasonable/satisfactory explanation for seeking condonation of delay, more so when there is no proof of the constraints faced by the counsel. Referring to a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Gujarat, reported in Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad through the Municipal Commissioner vs. Voltas Limited ad etc. etc., AIR 1995 Guj 29 , Mr. Roy stated the meaning of the word “sufficient cause”. 6. Considered the submission of the learned counsel. The connected appeal giving rise to this delay condonation petition for condoning the delay of 372 days is preferred by the Irrigation Department under the Government and the appellants/petitioners are the officials of the said Department. The law is well settled so far the criteria for condonation of delay in an appeal preferred by the Government Department and the appreciation of the reasons forwarded for explanation of the said delay. The law is well settled so far the criteria for condonation of delay in an appeal preferred by the Government Department and the appreciation of the reasons forwarded for explanation of the said delay. Keeping in view of certain hurdles faced by the officials of a Government Department the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana vs Chandra Mani and others, reported in AIR 1996 SC 1623 explains the manner of appreciation of the causes as follows:- “10…….When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach injustice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants…….” Keeping in view of the said broad principle, let me scrutinize the reasons mentioned for the said delay without reproducing the factual matrix for the sake of brevity to the extent so pleaded. 7. The judgment and decree was passed on 20.07.2015 and as per the submission of the learned Standing Counsel, the appeal ought to have been filed within 12.11.2015 but from the said last date of filing there was delay of 372 days. It is on record that the Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department on 29.10.2015 forwarded the para-wise comments to the learned Standing Counsel in order to prefer the appeal. However, the same could not be prepared as the other documents such as plaint, written statement, evidence, running bill accounts etc. were not forwarded to the learned Standing Counsel. The said records were scattered at different places, some were in the original file of the Government Pleader at Karimganj, some were in the Office of the Executive Engineer, Karimganj and some were in the Office of the Assistant Executive Engineer, Karimganj Sub-Division at Patharkandi which is about 30 kms away from Karimganj. Only in the first week of August, 2016 all the necessary documents were made available to the Office of the Chief Engineer and in the second week of August, 2016 same were sent to the Office of the learned Standing Counsel though in the petition it was mentioned as July, 2016. The documents were voluminous and it took about a month to prepare the exact account tallying with the actual work done and in the month of September, 2016, the appeal memo was ready. This Court was under long Puja vacation for the year 2016 and during that period the learned Standing Counsel met with a serious accident and as such the appeal was filed after the reopening of the Court after the vacation. This Court was under long Puja vacation for the year 2016 and during that period the learned Standing Counsel met with a serious accident and as such the appeal was filed after the reopening of the Court after the vacation. In the process there was a delay of one year and one month in filing the appeal. 8. It is an appeal which the Department is supposed to prefer against the judgment passed in the Title Suit which was over and that too within a limited time period. In the said suit, the present Department contested the claim of the respondents. A presumption follows therefore that the relevant papers were readily available either with the conducting counsel in the trial court or in the Office of the Executive Engineer at Karimganj. In order to rebut the said presumption, certain degree of burden lies upon the officials to show that those documents required by the learned Standing Counsel were not placed before the counsel at Karimganj or not on record in the Office. Similarly, for rebuttal of the presumption and for drawing the satisfaction of the Court, there must be some record of official communication from the learned Standing Counsel or from the Office of the Chief Engineer to the Office of the Executive Engineer, Karimganj keeping in view the practice and procedure habituated to by the officials so far the documents as sought for by the learned Standing Counsel of the Department for preparation of the appeal are concerned. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana vs Chandramoni (supra.) held that in the event of filing an appeal, prompt action ought to be pursued by the officials responsible to file the appeal and for that purpose the Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cell to examine the cases. The said observation was after considering the factors which are peculiar to the functioning of the Governmental conditions. It was also held that even if the appellant is Government Department the Court must decide the matter on merit and for that purpose no separate standard to determine the sufficiency of the causes placed by the Government Department vis-à-vis the private litigant are to be followed. 10. It was also held that even if the appellant is Government Department the Court must decide the matter on merit and for that purpose no separate standard to determine the sufficiency of the causes placed by the Government Department vis-à-vis the private litigant are to be followed. 10. In State of Nagaland vs Lipok Ao and others, reported in AIR 2005 SC 2191 , the Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to the requirement of proof by sufficient cause held as follows: “The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into accounting using the discretion. In N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamur ( AIR 1998 SC 3222 ) it was hell by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have been resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case is sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suit or, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels.” There is a prescribed period within which an appeal is to be preferred and as such extension of the said period requires extraordinary power to be invoked by the Court. Keeping that point in view, the Hon’ble Apex Court laid the stress on the sufficiency of the causes and in order to examine such sufficiency it is the court to visualise a situation so laid before the Court and from that point of view the sufficiency of the causes must be examined. After visualisation of such a situation the court while examining the sufficiency must give a little bit concession if the appellant is Government Department considering the working condition and the practice and procedures so habituated by the officials. 11. After visualisation of such a situation the court while examining the sufficiency must give a little bit concession if the appellant is Government Department considering the working condition and the practice and procedures so habituated by the officials. 11. Adopting the aforesaid test it is seen that in order to dislodge the presumption which is mentioned hereinabove, the grounds stated in this application cannot be accepted to be sufficient causes. It is stated in this application that by the end of the year 2015 all the records like plaint, written statement and evidence were brought from Karimganj to the Office of the Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department and thereafter in the month of February, 2016 the said records were handed over to the learned Standing Counsel. It is totally a vague reasoning inasmuch as no definite conclusion can be gathered as to why it took two months period to reach the said documents from the Office of the Chief Engineer at Guwahati to the Office of the learned Standing Counsel at Guwahati. Similarly after receipt of the said documents by the learned Standing Counsel, subsequent requirement of documents on being informed to the Office of the Chief Engineer the same could be made available in the first week of August, 2016 and for the said consumption of interim period in collecting the said documents the explanation is that the documents were scattered at different places. But in order to accept such reasoning at least the petitioners could have put some official letters to justify the delay. Nothing has been brought on record. That explanation also cannot be accepted inasmuch as it is the second round of litigation in the form of appeal which the Department is preparing to undergo on the basis of the materials already placed before the trial court and such prolonged period cannot be accepted for delivering the said documents to the learned Standing Counsel. The mishap of the learned Standing Counsel was during the Puja holidays and same has nothing to do with the delay inasmuch as immediately on the reopening day of the Court, the appeal could have been preferred which is the practice required by the Limitation Act as it is the contention that prior to Puja vacation the appeal memo was ready. Thus, from 12.11.2015 the date on which the limitation period for preferring the appeal expired till the date of its filing on 18.11.2016 the explanation placed for condonation of the delay, if visualised from the ground reality cannot be accepted as sufficient causes to condone the inordinate delay of 372 days. There is no specific explanation as to why the appeal could not be filed on 12.11.2015, the last date on which limitation period expired. In P.K. Ramachandran vs State of Kerala and another, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2276 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that Law of Limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. 12. Applying the said principle, I find that this delay condonation petition has no merit and devoid of sufficient causes for condonation of the inordinate delay of 372 days in preferring the connected appeal. This petition stands dismissed virtually leading to dismissal of the appeal. No costs.