JUDGMENT : VINOD CHANDRAN, J. 1. The petitioner, the father of a detenu, is before this Court challenging the detention and raising very many grounds against the same. The first objection is with respect to the order having not been passed in compliance with sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 ('KAAPA', for short). The date of arrest is 27.4.2018 and approval order of the Government is passed on 9.5.2018 by Ext.P2, which is beyond the 12 day period prescribed under Section 3(3). The second objection is with respect to the detaining authority having not entered into a subjective satisfaction of the need to keep the petitioner's son in detention. The last objection is on the delay caused in taking up the proceedings for preventive detention and the order passed, which is five months after the date on which the incident occurred on which the last crime was registered. 2. The learned Government Pleader points out that the order has been passed in compliance with sub- Section (3) of Section 3 of the KAAPA, especially taking into account the public holidays, which came within the period between the detention and the order of confirmation. The learned Government Pleader has taken us through the entire detention order to urge that a proper consideration was made by the detaining authority and it is on the satisfaction of the authority of an imminent necessity for preventive detention, the order was passed. On the question of delay, the learned Government Pleader submits, that there is an explanation in the detention order itself as available in para 23 of the order. It is also submitted that the petitioner's son is a known criminal and had been involved in various cases and was last so involved in a crime by reason of an incident that occurred on 26.10.2017. The detenu was a person, who was included in the rowdy sheet in January, 2017, specifically on 24.1.2017 which brings him under Section 2(p) of the KAAPA; as a 'known rowdy'. It is also submitted that on 31.1.2017, the jurisdictional Magistrate had initiated proceedings under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the petitioner had executed bond on 29.3.2017. After that the last crime on the basis of which the detention order was passed, has been committed. Hence, there can be no delay found, is the contention. 3. It is also submitted that on 31.1.2017, the jurisdictional Magistrate had initiated proceedings under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the petitioner had executed bond on 29.3.2017. After that the last crime on the basis of which the detention order was passed, has been committed. Hence, there can be no delay found, is the contention. 3. On the question of delay, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decisions in 2013(1) KLT 447 [Jimesh Jose v. State of Kerala] & 2013(2) KLT 838 [Praseedha Shiju v. State of Kerala] and the learned Government Pleader relied on the decision in 2016 (2) KLT 838 [Rahila Nazeer v. State of Kerala]; all decisions of the Division Benches of this Court. 4. On the question of sub-Section (3) of Section 3, it is to be noticed that the detention order at Ext.P1 was passed on 19.4.2018. The detenu was arrested on 27.4.2018 and produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate and detained in custody from 28.4.2018. Hence, the 12 days as provided under Section 3(3) has to be counted from the date of the detention i.e. 28.4.2018. Confirmation order by the Government was passed on 9.5.2018 (Ext.P2). 29.4.2018 and 6.5.2018 were Sundays and 1.5.2018 was a public holiday. Hence, even counting the days from 27.4.2018, the order passed on 9.5.2018 is on the 11th day within the 12 day period. 5. We also see from the order of the detaining authority that there was a proper consideration with respect to the detention on the individual crimes committed by the detenu in the last four years starting from crime Nos.143/2011 (FIR dated 22.2.2011), 430/2015 (FIR dated 1.5.2015), 45/2016 (FIR dated 11.1.2016), 821/2016 (FIR dated 11.8.2016), 1270/2016 (FIR dated 14.11.2016) and 1200/2017 (FIR dated 26.10.2017). The first of the above cases was not considered for the purpose of detention, since it was prior to seven years and there was an acquittal in the said case. The detaining authority has further considered the issue of the detenu having been included in the rowdy sheet on January, 2017. The detaining authority also took note of the bond executed by the detenu under Section 107 of the Cr.PC. We, hence, do not see any reason to interfere with the order of detention on the basis of the argument so addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. The detaining authority also took note of the bond executed by the detenu under Section 107 of the Cr.PC. We, hence, do not see any reason to interfere with the order of detention on the basis of the argument so addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. The next issue is with respect to the delay caused in passing the detention order. Before we proceed to decide as to whether there was any delay occasioned in the present case, we have to notice the judgments placed before us by the learned Government Pleader as also the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. Jimesh Jose (Supra) was a case in which there was said to be an inordinate and unexplained delay of 4½ months in passing the detention order, after the last anti-social activity was committed. A Division Bench of this Court considered the issue in the background of the maximum period of detention under KAAPA being six months from the date of detention as seen from Section 12. The detaining authority when passing a detention order was found to be exercising powers under Section 3 of KAAPA for the purpose of restraining a 'known goonda' or a 'known rowdy' from committing any anti-social activities, thus protecting the members of the general public from such activities. The legislature had also thought it fit to fix a maximum period of six months for a detention under KAAPA. Therein, the last alleged anti-social activity occurred on 10.1.2012 and the detention order was passed on 26.5.2012. The delay of 4½ months in passing the detention order after the last anti social activity was held to be inordinate, especially keeping in mind the maximum period permitted of detention; being six months. 8. Praseedha Shiju (Supra) was a case wherein there was delay of three months in passing the detention order after the alleged last anti social activity. There, the Division Bench found that if there is a proper explanation for the delay and the link with respect to the apprehension of continued commission of anti-social activities and detention order is not snapped, then the order so passed would not be vitiated. Therein the last incident took place on 2.9.2012 and the detention order was passed on 26.12.2012. The explanation was that the report of the Sub Inspector of Police, Pulpalli was addressed to the District Police Chief through proper channel on 7.9.2012. Therein the last incident took place on 2.9.2012 and the detention order was passed on 26.12.2012. The explanation was that the report of the Sub Inspector of Police, Pulpalli was addressed to the District Police Chief through proper channel on 7.9.2012. The Inspector of Police, Pulpalli and the Deputy Superintendent of Police perused the report and an enquiry was conducted and a further report was sent to the District Police Chief on 15.9.2012. The District Police Chief also submitted a proposal to the detaining authority on 12.10.2012. A further report on the present stages of the cases of the detenu were submitted to the detaining authority on 9.11.2012 and 13.12.2012. The delay was found to have occurred only for the reason of a full application of mind having been rendered for proper evaluation of the circumstances. Hence, it was held that there was no snapping of the live-link between the last alleged prejudicial activity and the order of detention. 9. Rahila Nazeer (supra) again was a case in which the order of detention was passed after a lapse of few months from the date of last prejudicial activity. The detaining authority had noticed that the investigation of the last crime was pending and the charge-sheet in that case was filed on 16.4.2015. The detenu also was in judicial custody till his release on bail on 7.8.2015, which was specifically noticed by the detaining authority. It was in such circumstances that the Division Bench found that the delay is properly explained. After noticing various decisions of this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Rahila Nazeer (Supra) held that mere delay would not vitiate the order. If there is a proper explanation for the delay, which also leads to the conclusion that the live-link between the prejudicial activity and the order of detention is not snapped the order could be sustained was the finding. Only if the two circumstances do not exist or are absent, could there be an interference caused to the detention order on grounds of delay. 10. We do not see any satisfaction having been entered into by the detaining authority with respect to the delay in passing the detention order at Ext.P1. The learned Government Pleader specifically referred to paragraphs 19 to 23. Paras 19 to 22 are with respect to the antecedents of the detenu. 10. We do not see any satisfaction having been entered into by the detaining authority with respect to the delay in passing the detention order at Ext.P1. The learned Government Pleader specifically referred to paragraphs 19 to 23. Paras 19 to 22 are with respect to the antecedents of the detenu. Para 23 is extracted here-under:- Any Other Language This does not offer any explanation nor does it show an objective consideration of the detaining authority in finding the delay to be proper in which period, the live-link between the prejudicial act and the detention order had not been snapped. 11. The learned Government Pleader then points to the counter affidavit filed by respondents 1, 2 and 3. It is trite that the impugned order cannot be supplemented by or supplanted with, averments in a counter affidavit, especially when the adjudicatory authority has to consider the aspect of delay in the order which permits preventive detention and enter satisfaction on the live-link with the last alleged anti-social activity having not been broken. Even then we perused the counter-affidavits; which too offer little by way of a valid or satisfactory explanation. 12. The first respondent-State in para 11 submits that the investigation in Crime No.1200/2017 of Muhamma Police Station being the last crime in the series committed in the last seven years; was on 6.11.2017 and the sponsoring authority submitted its report to the authorised officer on 20.2.2018 after more than three months. The second respondent, the detaining authority, has in her counter affidavit asserted that the time of five months and 23 days is normal and is a part of normal office procedure for the collection of all case records and for the enquiry of other cases, if any, pending against the petitioner in nearby Police Station of the District. 13. As has already been noticed, the binding precedents of this Court have emphasised the aspect of delay in the context of the maximum period of detention being six months. The statement of the detaining authority that 5½ months is normal office procedure cannot at all be sustained. It has to be accentuated and stressed that an order of preventive detention passed when there is no conviction recorded and merely on the basis of reported crimes, cannot be treated as normal office work. The statement of the detaining authority that 5½ months is normal office procedure cannot at all be sustained. It has to be accentuated and stressed that an order of preventive detention passed when there is no conviction recorded and merely on the basis of reported crimes, cannot be treated as normal office work. The order interferes with and restricts the freedom of an individual who has not yet been found guilty of the charges raised against him. It is an absolute power conferred on an authority, who is not competent to look into the guilt or otherwise of the individual which brings with it an onerous duty, coupled with responsibility to comply scrupulously with the procedural aspects and deal with every aspect providing mitigation to the individual whose freedom is sought to be curtailed. The sponsoring authority has to take immediate steps if the detenu is to be prevented from further commission of offences and the detaining authority also should not yield to normal office procedures in passing an order under KAAPA which also is to ensure public safety and peace. When there is a delay, which period has to be considered in juxtaposition with the maximum detention period of six months; the question or apprehension arises as to why the detention is carried out at all since for a considerable time the detenu has not committed any anti-social activities. This offers mitigation against the drastic step of preventive detention and hence the delay has to be explained properly by the sponsoring authority and satisfaction on those aspects entered by the detaining authority. 14. We are fortified in opining so by the following paragraphs from (2011) 5 SCC 244 [Rekha v. State of Tamilnadu through Secretary to Govt. & Others]: “21. It is all very well to say that preventive detention is preventive not punitive. The truth of the matter, though, is that in substance a detention order of one year (or any other period) is a punishment of one year’s imprisonment. What difference is it to the detenu whether his imprisonment is called preventive or punitive? xxx xxx xxx xxx 35. It must be remembered that in cases of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. What difference is it to the detenu whether his imprisonment is called preventive or punitive? xxx xxx xxx xxx 35. It must be remembered that in cases of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is often described as a “jurisdiction of suspicion” (vide State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande (2008) 3 SCC 613 , SCC para 63). The detaining authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clauses (1) and (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of this potentially dangerous power the law of preventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical, is, in our opinion, mandatory and vital. 36. It has been held that the history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. (See Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India (1995) 4 SCC 51 vide para 49.) These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged activities of the detenu. As observed in Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 481 : (SCC p. 483, para 4) “4. … May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus.” 37. As observed in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha (1987) 2 SCC 22 vide SCC para 5: (SCC p. 27) “5. … The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. As observed in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha (1987) 2 SCC 22 vide SCC para 5: (SCC p. 27) “5. … The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard.” As observed by Mr. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court in Joint Anti- US Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath341 123 (1950): (US p. 179) “… It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule [of] law and rule [of] whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards [are the main assurances] that there will be equal justice under law.” 38. Procedural rights are not based on sentimental concerns for the detenu. The procedural safeguards are not devised to coddle criminals or provide technical loopholes through which dangerous persons escape the consequences of their acts. They are basically society’s assurances that the authorities will behave properly within rules distilled from long centuries of concrete experiences. 39. Personal liberty protected under Article 21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional values that it is the obligation of the detaining authority to show that the impugned detention meticulously accords with the procedure established by law. The stringency and concern of judicial vigilance that is needed was aptly described in the following words in Thomas Pelham Dale case (1881) 6 QB 376 (CA): (QBD p. 461) “Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. It is a general rule, which has always been acted upon by the courts of England, that if any person procures the imprisonment of another he must take care to do so by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and that if he fails to follow every step in the process with extreme regularity the court will not allow the imprisonment to continue.”” 15. The further explanation offered is in the counter affidavit of the third respondent, who is the District Police Chief. But for a mere statement that there is no inordinate delay between the crime and the detention order, there is absolutely no explanation offered for the 5½ months delay. The further explanation offered is in the counter affidavit of the third respondent, who is the District Police Chief. But for a mere statement that there is no inordinate delay between the crime and the detention order, there is absolutely no explanation offered for the 5½ months delay. In such circumstances, we are constrained to set aside the detention order and order release of the detenu immediately. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. The detenu, Subin @ Pappy, aged 28 years, S/o Ponnappan, shall be released forthwith, if he is not wanted in connection with any other crime.