JUDGMENT : K.S. MUDAGAL, J. 1. The above appeal and cross-objections arise out of the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2005 in O.S. No. 146/1995 passed by the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Dharwad. 2. Smt. Elizabeth was defendant No. 1 in the suit. On the death of defendant No. 1 the appellant David came on record as defendant No. 1(a) as her legal representative. The cross-objectors are defendant Nos. 3 and 4 in the suit. Subhoda Prakash respondent No. 1 herein filed the said suit against defendant Nos. 1 to 4 for partition and separate possession of his half share in the suit schedule properties. 3. For the purpose of convenience, the parties will be referred to hereafter with their ranks before the trial Court. 4. The properties which are subject matter of the suit are shown in Schedules A to C of the plaint. Schedule A properties are six agricultural lands situated within the revenue limits of Murakatti village of Dharwad taluk; Schedule B property is the site bearing C.T.S. No. 2/27A measuring 407 and 3/3 sq. yards with a building thereon situated in Jaynagar, Hubli; Schedule C properties are the movables, like furniture, electronic goods, etc. 5. The plaintiff contended that himself and Devadatta the husband of first defendant were the sons of Artur N. Kumar, who died on 10.07.1974 and his wife Sulochanabai who died on 14.03.1991. Plaintiff contended that the couple left behind them seven sons including the plaintiff & Devadatta and two daughters. He contended that the suit lands were being cultivated by himself and his father jointly as tenants, as Devadatta was the eldest son, his name was entered in record of rights and occupancy rights were granted in his name. 6. Regarding the house property, he contended that the same was acquired by his father, but still the name of Devadatta was entered in the property records as he was the eldest son. He further contended that except himself and Devadatta, all other children of his parents are residing abroad therefore, they have no right in the suit properties. He contended that on death of Devadatta on 07.06.1981, of late defendant No. 1 is not co-operating for maintenance and enjoyment of the properties and when he demanded partition and separate possession of his share, she declined. Thus, he claimed decree for partition and separate possession of his share. 7. He contended that on death of Devadatta on 07.06.1981, of late defendant No. 1 is not co-operating for maintenance and enjoyment of the properties and when he demanded partition and separate possession of his share, she declined. Thus, he claimed decree for partition and separate possession of his share. 7. Defendant No. 1 contested the suit denying that the suit lands were being cultivated by Artur Kumar and plaintiff jointly. She further denied that Devadatta was only a name lender in acquiring the suit house and obtaining the occupancy rights of the lands in the property records because he being the eldest son. 8. She contended that the suit lands and the site and building were acquired by her husband and he was the exclusive owner of those properties. She contended that on the death of Devadatta Kumar, the properties have devolved exclusively on her as his legal representative. She contended that with similar contentions, the plaintiff went before the Revenue Courts and failed. Alternatively, she further contended that the suit is not properly valued and court fee paid is insufficient and sought dismissal of the suit. 9. Pending the suit, defendant No. 1 Elizabeth died and defendant No. 1(a) (present appellant) came on record contending that he is the adopted son of defendant No. 1 Elizabeth. He further contended that defendant No. 1 Elizabeth has executed registered Will dated 04.07.1997 bequeathing all the suit properties in his favour and the said Will is probated in P & Sc. No. 1/2001 by the order of I Additional District Court, Hubli. 10. Elizabeth sold plaint schedule Item Nos. 1 to 3 properties to defendant Nos. 2 to 7 under different sale deeds. The sale in favour of defendant No. 2 was effected on 19.12.1988. The sale in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 was effected on 20.02.1999 and sale in favour of defendant Nos. 5 to 7 was effected on 22.09.1999. Therefore, they were impleaded as defendant Nos. 2 to 7 in the suit subsequently. Defendant No. 2 died pending the suit. His L.Rs. were not brought on record. Therefore, the suit against him abated. 11. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court initially framed four issues. However, subsequently they were re-casted as follows and the additional issues were also framed. 2 to 7 in the suit subsequently. Defendant No. 2 died pending the suit. His L.Rs. were not brought on record. Therefore, the suit against him abated. 11. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court initially framed four issues. However, subsequently they were re-casted as follows and the additional issues were also framed. Re-casted Issues: i. Whether plaintiff proves that he is entitled for partition and separate possession of half share in the suit property? ii. Whether the defendants prove that the occupancy rights were granted by the Land Tribunal in respect of suit lands in the name of her deceased husband exclusively and that plaintiff is not entitled for any share in the suit lands? iii. Whether the court fee paid is not proper? iv. What decree or order the parties are entitled? v. Whether the defendant proves that the entire payment towards the costs of the house has been paid by her and her deceased husband? vi. Whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by Limitation? Additional Issues: i. Whether the suit of plaintiff suffers for want of necessary parties to the suit as contended in para 2 and 3 of W.S. of D3 and D4? ii. Whether the genealogy given by the plaintiff is not complete? iii. Whether D3 and D4 prove that they are bonafide purchasers of suit land R.S. No. 49 for valuable consideration without notice? iv. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit as contended in WS para 7 of D3, D4? v. Is there no cause of action to file this suit for plaintiff? vi. Whether defendant 1a proves that he has acquired absolute right over the suit properties by virtue of Will dated 04.04.1997 executed by deceased defendant Elizabeth in his favour and that plaintiff has no share? 12. In support of his case, the plaintiff got examined himself as P.W. 1 and one witness as P.W. 2. He got marked Exs. P-1 to 3. On behalf of defendants, D.Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Ex. D-1 to D-36 were marked. 13. 12. In support of his case, the plaintiff got examined himself as P.W. 1 and one witness as P.W. 2. He got marked Exs. P-1 to 3. On behalf of defendants, D.Ws. 1 to 4 were examined and Ex. D-1 to D-36 were marked. 13. The trial Court after hearing the parties negatived the contention of the plaintiff that the suit properties were acquired by his father Artur Kumar and suit lands were being cultivated by himself and Artur Kumar jointly and on the death of Artur Kumar, the occupancy rights of the lands were granted to Devadatta Kumar as he was the elder son etc. The trial Court held that the grant of occupancy rights in favour of Devadatta Kumar was in his own right and acquisition of the suit site and building was in his own right and there is no concept of joint family amongst the Christians. 14. However, the trial Court held that the parties, namely, plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are Christians and therefore they are governed by Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for short, 'the Act') and on the death of Devadatta Kumar, the property devolves in equal half share on plaintiff and defendant No. 1 Elizabeth by virtue of Section 33 of the said Act. Further, the trial Court held that the adoption of defendant No. 1(a) is proved by his evidence, Ex. D-35 the deed of affirmation and the Will executed by Elizabeth in his favour. Trial Court held that the Will of Elizabeth Ex. D-34 is proved by the order in P & Sc. No. 1/2001. However, the trial Court held that since plaintiff is entitled to half share by virtue of Section 33 of the Act, the Will does not bind him so far it relates to his half share. 15. So far as the contention of non-joinder of necessary parties, the trial Court states that the defendants have not given the full pedigree of Artur Kumar and since the other siblings of the plaintiff have acquired American citizenship, they are not necessary parties. 16. In respect of defendant Nos. 3 to 7 the trial Court held that they have failed to substantiate that they were the bona fide purchasers. Thus decreed the suit. 17. 16. In respect of defendant Nos. 3 to 7 the trial Court held that they have failed to substantiate that they were the bona fide purchasers. Thus decreed the suit. 17. Sri M.G. Naganuri, learned counsel for defendant No. 1(a)/appellant and Sri S.T. Patil, learned counsel for the cross-objectors seek to assail the impugned judgment and decree on the following grounds: i. Since the plaintiff himself in paragraph 2 of the plaint admitted that Artur Kumar had nine issues the question of defendants producing the full pedigree does not arise; ii. Merely because the other children of Artur Kumar have acquired American citizenship, the Indian Succession Act does not bar them from succession to his properties; iii. Since they have some interest/share in the properties, they are necessary parties to the suit. Therefore, suit ought to have been dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties; iv. The occupancy rights were granted in favour of Devadatta Kumar in the year 1977. Thereafter all along his name appeared in the record of rights of the lands. Therefore, the suit was barred by time; v. Defendants denied the title of the plaintiff much before the suit in the RTC proceedings which went on from 1994 to 1996. Therefore, the suit for partition was not maintainable. The plaintiff was required to seek declaration. vi. If the plaintiff claims that the suit properties are the ancestral joint family properties, then he has not included the house properties standing in his name. Therefore, the suit was bad for non-inclusion of all joint family properties. vii. Defendant Nos. 3 to 7 have purchased the property as they were standing in the name of defendant No. 1, and therefore, they were bona fide purchasers. viii. So far as defendant No. 2, though the suit was abated and abatement was recorded, the trial court proceeded to decree the suit against him which is illegal. 18. In support of their contentions, they rely upon the following judgments: i. Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of A.P. v. Collector and others, AIR 2003 SC 1805 ; ii. Smt. Puttakkaiah v. Smt. Basamma since dead by LRs and Others, 2013 (2) KCCR 1277 ; iii. B.C. Singh (D) by LRs. v. J.M. Utarid (D) by LRs., [2018] SCCR 448; iv. Vasanti and Others v. Pharez John Abraham and Others, ILR 2007 KAR 2375. 19. of A.P. v. Collector and others, AIR 2003 SC 1805 ; ii. Smt. Puttakkaiah v. Smt. Basamma since dead by LRs and Others, 2013 (2) KCCR 1277 ; iii. B.C. Singh (D) by LRs. v. J.M. Utarid (D) by LRs., [2018] SCCR 448; iv. Vasanti and Others v. Pharez John Abraham and Others, ILR 2007 KAR 2375. 19. Per contra, Shri. S.S. Bawakhan, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 seeks to support the judgment and decree of the trial court on the following grounds: (i) Even assuming that the properties were the self-acquired properties of Devadatta Kumar, he died issueless. Plaintiff has denied the adoption and Will set up by defendant No. 1(a). The same is not proved by defendant No. 1(a). Therefore, by virtue of Section 33 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, defendant No. 1(a) gets only half share and plaintiff being only sibling in India gets half share; (ii) Since other sons and daughters of Artur N. Kumar are permanently residing in America and have taken the citizenship of America, they are not entitled to claim a share in the suit schedule properties. Therefore, they are not necessary parties to the suit; (iii) Section 31 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 bars the nationals of Foreign State to acquire immoveable properties in India; the other heirs of Artur Kumar are not entitled to any share in the suit schedule properties; (iv) In this appeal, once the plaintiff and defendant No. 1(a) compromised the matter. In the compromise, they admitted the right of the plaintiff and therefore, now they cannot go back to deny his share; (v) Amongst the Christians, there is no concept of adoption and therefore, adoption set up by defendant No. 1(a) has no validity in the eye of law. 20. In support of his contentions, he relies upon the following judgment: (i) Joyce Pushapalath Karkada Alias Shiri and Geetha Hidi Shiri vs. Mrs. Shameela Nina, Ravindra Shiri and Naveetha Shreya, Laws(Kar) 2013 (9) 247. 21. Having regard to the rival contentions, the question that arises for consideration is: "Whether the trial court was justified in awarding half share to the plaintiff and whether the impugned judgment and decree is sustainable in law?" 22. Shameela Nina, Ravindra Shiri and Naveetha Shreya, Laws(Kar) 2013 (9) 247. 21. Having regard to the rival contentions, the question that arises for consideration is: "Whether the trial court was justified in awarding half share to the plaintiff and whether the impugned judgment and decree is sustainable in law?" 22. The plaintiff himself in his plaint stated that his father Artur N. Kumar left behind him the following nine children: Sons (i) Devadatta Kumar; (ii) John; (iii) Samual; (iv) Subhodha Prakash (plaintiff) (v) Sumanth David; (vi) Manohar; (vii) Vijayaprabhakar Nathaniyal; Daughters (viii) Sophia; (ix) Lilavati; 23. There is no dispute between the parties that they are Christians and they are governed by Indian Succession Act. The occupancy rights of the suit lands were granted in favour of Devadatta Kumar under Ex. D-27 by the order of the Land Tribunal. He also did not dispute that the site wherein the suit house situates was allotted to Devadatta Kumar and the house thereon was constructed in his name. 24. As already pointed out, the trial court has held that the acquisition of plaint 'A' and 'B' immovable properties was by Devadatta Kumar and he was the exclusive owner of those properties. The plaintiff has not filed any cross-objection challenging those findings. Therefore, those findings have become final. 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in LAXMAN TATTYABA KANKATE AND ANOTHER vs. TARAMATI HARISHCHANDRA DHATRAK, (2010) 7 SCC 717 , held that the party may be able to support the decree and challenge the findings without filing cross-objections. In this regard, paragraph 24 of the said judgment reads as follows: "24. It is a settled principle of law that before the First Appellate Court, the party may be able to support the decree but cannot challenge the findings without filing the cross objections. As it appears from the record, the present appellants have neither filed cross objections nor their appeal challenging the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. In fact, the entire conduct of the present appellants shows that they have not only failed to prove their claim before the Courts of competent jurisdiction but have even not raised proper pleas in their pleadings." (Emphasis supplied) 26. In fact, the entire conduct of the present appellants shows that they have not only failed to prove their claim before the Courts of competent jurisdiction but have even not raised proper pleas in their pleadings." (Emphasis supplied) 26. Under the circumstances, now it is not open to the plaintiff to contend that the suit properties were acquired in the name of Devadatta Kumar/husband of defendant No. 1 as the elder son of the family and therefore, he has a share in that. Moreover, as rightly held by the trial court, there is no concept of joint family in the Christian personal law by which the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are governed. REG. NON-JOINDER OF NECESSARY PARTIES: 27. Learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that by virtue of Section 33 of the Act, he is entitled to a share in the property of his brother-Devadatta Kumar. Section 33 of the Act, 1925 reads as under: "33. Where intestate has left widow and lineal descendants, or widow and kindred only, or widow and no kindred. -Where the intestate has left a widow-- (a) if he has also left any lineal descendants, one-third of his property shall belong to his widow, and the remaining two-thirds shall go to his lineal descendants, according to the rules hereinafter contained; (b) save as provided by section 33A, if he has left no lineal descendant, but has left persons who are of kindred to him, one-half of his property shall belong to his widow, and the other half shall go to those who are of kindred to him, in the order and according to the rules hereinafter contained; (c) if he has left none who are of kindred to him, the whole of his property shall belong to his widow." (Emphasis supplied to him) 28. Section 33(b) of the Act applies to a case where the intestate has left no lineal descendants. Plaintiff is not the lineal descendant of deceased Devadatta Kumar to come under Section 33(a) of the Act. Even to bring the case of the plaintiff under Section 33(b) of the Act, along with him, his other brothers and sisters also get a share. In that event, they are necessary parties to the suit. 29. Plaintiff is not the lineal descendant of deceased Devadatta Kumar to come under Section 33(a) of the Act. Even to bring the case of the plaintiff under Section 33(b) of the Act, along with him, his other brothers and sisters also get a share. In that event, they are necessary parties to the suit. 29. Contention of the plaintiff that the other brothers and sisters have acquired the foreign citizenship and therefore, they are not entitled to a share, deserves no merit having regard to the judgment of the Apex Court in this regard in B.C. SINGH (D) BY LRs (supra). 30. In paragraph 9 of the said judgment, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "9. Dr. S.L. Singh died on 20.3.1976 without leaving any issue. It is not disputed that Ida Utarid is the real sister of Dr. S.L. Singh. According to the admitted pedigree, M. Utarid had two sons, namely, Dr. M.B. Utarid and Nazir Utarid. Nazir Utarid had two daughters, namely, Dr. S.L. Singh (wife of the original plaintiff) and Ida Utarid. J.M. Utarid (defendant No. 1) is the son of E. Utarid and grandson of Dr. M.B. Utarid. Dr. S.L. Singh is admittedly an Indian Christian. Therefore, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for short 'the Act') would be applicable to the succession of the property left by her. This Act does not bar the succession of property of any Indian Christian by a person who is not an Indian national. There is no prohibition for succession of the property in India by a foreign national by inheritance." (Emphasis supplied) 31. In view of the aforesaid judgment, if once it is held that the brothers and sisters are also entitled to get a share along with the plaintiff if he succeeds in the suit, in their absence, whether the suit is maintainable is the question. 32. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kenchegowda (Since deceased) by Legal Representatives Vs. Siddegowda Alias Motegowda, (1994) 4 SCC 294 , in paragraph 16 of the judgment has held as follows: "16. ……………..Even otherwise, a suit for partial partition in the absence of inclusion of other joint family properties and the impleadment of the other co-sharers was not warranted in law. Thus, we find no difficulty in allowing these appeals, which accordingly are allowed. ……………..Even otherwise, a suit for partial partition in the absence of inclusion of other joint family properties and the impleadment of the other co-sharers was not warranted in law. Thus, we find no difficulty in allowing these appeals, which accordingly are allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court are restored. However, there shall be no order as to costs." (Emphasis supplied) 33. In Smt. Puttakkaiah (supra), this Court in paragraph 11 of the judgment, in this regard has held as follows: "11. …………..It is settled principle of law that partition suit should include all the joint family properties and also of persons who are entitled for a share are to be impleaded as parties. Otherwise, the such a suit is not maintainable. In the absence of a sharer who has interest in the suit property, no effective decree for partition can be passed. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial court cannot be sustained." (Emphasis supplied) 34. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relying on Order I Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'CPC'), contends that for non-joinder of necessary parties, a suit cannot be dismissed. Order I Rule 2 of CPC operates in a totally different sphere. In view of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Court directly on the point, the said contention carries no merit. 35. Section 31 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 also operates in a totally different sphere. Even otherwise, Section 31 does not impose a total bar on the acquisition of property. Bar is for the acquisition without previous general or special permission of the Reserve Bank. If at all such permission is required for person getting a share by virtue of a decree, then how that matter has to be dealt with by the authorities concerned under the said Act is a different issue. But, that does not totally bar a person from acquiring properties by succession and the judgment in B.C. SINGH referred to supra is a complete answer for such argument. REG. SECTION 33(b) OF INDIAN SUCCESSION ACT: 36. Section 33(b) of the Act comes into picture only when a Christian male dies without leaving behind him the widow and lineal descendents. In this case, defendant No. 1(a) claimed to be an adopted son. REG. SECTION 33(b) OF INDIAN SUCCESSION ACT: 36. Section 33(b) of the Act comes into picture only when a Christian male dies without leaving behind him the widow and lineal descendents. In this case, defendant No. 1(a) claimed to be an adopted son. As already pointed out the Trial Court held that he has proved his adoption and gave a finding in his favour. 37. In JOYCE PUSHAPALATH KARKADA (supra) relied upon the learned counsel for plaintiff, it is not held that there is bar for Christians for adopting a child. What is said is, Christian law does not recognize adoption, but Christian law does not prohibit adoption. Therefore, the said judgment in no way advances the case of the plaintiff. 38. Further, this Court in Vasanti's case (supra), in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment in this regard has held as follows: "14. The question whether the adopted children have right of inheritance under the Indian Succession Act is no more res-integra. In the enlightening Division Bench judgment of Allahabad High court in the case of Ajit Datt v. Mrs. Ethel Walters and Ors. reported in AIR 2001 Allahabad 109 on the proposition of right of inheritance of adopted child of an Indian Christian, divergent views are expressed by Sri G.P. Mathur J., and S.R. Singh J., My Lord G.P. Mathur takes the view that "Although there is no rule or law which permits adoption. In Christianity there is no prohibition against adoption. The right to inheritance by an adopted child in the estate of adopted father, is a statutory right. Whereas in U.K. and USA and other European Countries, the State has made a law giving right of inheritance to the adopted child. Since there is no such adoption procedures in India the adoptive child does not have a right to claim the property in accordance with the Christian Canons. My Lord S.R. Singh J., on the other hand while interpreting the provisions of Section 3(57) of the General Clauses Act, 1904 declares that an adopted son is also a son and the adoption is not prohibited in Christianity. Therefore, holds that adopted child has right of inheritance in view of the definition of the 'son' in the General Clauses Act. 15. The Kerala High Court in the case of Philips Alfred Malvin v. Y.J. Gonsalvis and Ors. Therefore, holds that adopted child has right of inheritance in view of the definition of the 'son' in the General Clauses Act. 15. The Kerala High Court in the case of Philips Alfred Malvin v. Y.J. Gonsalvis and Ors. has held that the Christian couple can adopt and the adopted child gets all rights of a naturally born child and entitled to inherit assets of the adoptive parents. I am in full agreement with the view of the Kerala High Court and with the view of my Lord S.R. Singh J., that an adopted child of a Christian parents shall have right of inheritance. Unlike in Hindu Law, there is no law prohibiting the Christian, couple to adopt male or a female child although they may have natural born male and a female child as the case may be. The adoption according to Christians is based on both temporal and spiritual values. Therefore, I am of the view that the 3rd defendant and the defendants 4 and 5 are entitled to a share notwithstanding that the third defendant and late Maccabeaus are the adopted children." (Emphasis supplied) 39. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that adoption is alien to the Christian personal law and therefore, defendant No. 1(a) does not become a lineal descendant. When there is a widow and lineal descendant, the question of properties devolving amongst the kindred under Section 33(b) of the Act does not arise. But, the trial court without adverting to these facts, relying on Section 33(b) of the Act, has decreed the suit awarding half share to the plaintiff which is unsustainable in law. REG. LIMITATION: 40. The trial court has concluded that the acquisition of the property by Devadatta Kumar was in his own right. The plaintiff himself states that those acquisitions were in the name of Devadatta Kumar in 1977 and the site and buildings were acquired in his name. Devadatta Kumar himself died on 07.06.1981, therefore, it is clear that such acquisition was before 1981. But the plaintiff filed suit in the year 1995. 41. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the defendants, right of the plaintiff was denied much prior to the suit, atleast in the proceedings before the Tahasildar prior to 1994. But, he did not seek a declaration of his title to the suit properties. But the plaintiff filed suit in the year 1995. 41. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the defendants, right of the plaintiff was denied much prior to the suit, atleast in the proceedings before the Tahasildar prior to 1994. But, he did not seek a declaration of his title to the suit properties. He brought the suit for partition simpliciter after fourteen years of the death of Devadatta kumar. Therefore, there is force in the contention that the suit is barred by time and the suit as framed is not maintainable. 42. Having regard to these facts and circumstances, the trial court was not justified in decreeing the suit over-looking all these aspects. Therefore, the appeal and cross-objection are allowed. The judgment and decree dated 17.08.2005 passed by the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Dharwad in OS No. 146/1995 is hereby set aside. The suit is dismissed. No order as to costs. In view of the disposal of the appeal and cross-objection, IA No. 1 of 2014 does not survive for consideration and is disposed of accordingly.