JUDGMENT B.R.Sarangi, J. - The petitioner has filed the writ petition to quash the order of suspension dated 05.07.2004 published in daily "Sambad" in Annexure-5 and the memorandum of charges dated 09.03.2005 in Annexure-9 issued by opposite party no.5. He further seeks for direction to the opposite parties to release the suspension allowance in full along with other emoluments admissible to the post. 2. The factual matrix of the case in hand is that the petitioner, after completion of Higher Secondary Certificate Examination, was initially appointed on temporary basis in the post of Tax Sarkar (Collector), Kodala Notified Area Council (NAC). Pursuant to approval of the Chair-person-opposite party no.4, the petitioner was given regular appointment in the post of Tax Sarkar (Collector) vide order dated 11.11.1977 of opposite party no.5-Executive Officer, Kodala NAC. Opposite party no.5 being satisfied with sincerity, honesty and integrity of the petitioner in due discharge of his duties vide order dated 19.09.1981 recommended his name to opposite party no.4 for promotion to the post of Junior Clerk stating that the services of the petitioner were more useful than a new entrant and he could manage the work of a Clerk very satisfactorily. Opposite party no.2-Director of Municipal Administration, Housing & Urban Development Department forwarded the representation of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Junior Clerk to the Government for consideration vide order dated 10.09.1981 of opposite party no.5. On 08.03.1984, the Deputy Director, Municipal Administration, Housing and Urban Development Department directed opposite party no.5 to fill up the vacant post of Junior Assistant by giving promotion to the petitioner on ad hoc basis if he was senior most amongst the Tax Sarkars under the NAC. Consequentially, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Junior Assistant on ad hoc basis on 26.03.1984 and he was continuing without being confirmed in the said post. 2.1 After election held in the year 2003 under the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950, the newly elected body took over charge of Kodala NAC with effect from 30.09.2003. But one day prior to the same, the petitioner went on leave from 29.09.2003 to 01.10.2003 for medical check-up of his health at M.K.C.G. Medical College and Hospital, Berhampur which was duly sanctioned by opposite party no.5 vide order dated 27.09.2003. But one day prior to the same, the petitioner went on leave from 29.09.2003 to 01.10.2003 for medical check-up of his health at M.K.C.G. Medical College and Hospital, Berhampur which was duly sanctioned by opposite party no.5 vide order dated 27.09.2003. Since the petitioner was advised prolonged treatment for restoring his normal health, he had to apply for extension of his leave through telegram till 29.02.2004. Though opposite party no.5 acknowledged receipt of the application for extension of leave through telegram on 31.10.2003, later the application for extension of leave was returned to the petitioner with the endorsement either 'addressee is absent' or 'addressee refused'. However, the petitioner, after recovery from illness and being duly certified to that effect by the treating doctor, submitted his joining report along with the medical certificate before the Chairperson-opposite party no.4 on 01.03.2004. But opposite party no.4 refused to receive his joining report and also denied to give anything in writing to that effect. Consequentially, the petitioner submitted a representation on 08.03.2004 before opposite parties no.2 and 3. On 16.03.2004, the Tahasildar, Kodala took over the charge of Executive Officer of the NAC and on the very same day at about 4 P.M, the petitioner submitted a copy of his joining report along with the medical certificate before him personally who, though received the same, did not entrust him any work. Therefore, the petitioner approached opposite party no.5 for entrustment of work. Opposite party no.5 on 05.07.2004 directed the petitioner to submit a fresh joining report, although joining report submitted on 16.03.2004 was already available with him. But opposite party no.5 rejected his joining report stating that the petitioner had already been put under suspension with effect from 16.03.2004 which, the petitioner having avoided to receive, was published in local daily 'The Sambad' dated 05.07.2004 vide order dated 06.07.2004. Then the petitioner submitted representation before opposite party no.2 on 20.08.2004 requesting him to direct opposite party no.5 to accept his joining report with effect from 01.03.2004. Then the petitioner submitted representation before opposite party no.2 on 20.08.2004 requesting him to direct opposite party no.5 to accept his joining report with effect from 01.03.2004. Opposite party no.5 by order of the Chairperson on 09.03.2005 served the memorandum of charges along with article of charges, statement of imputation in support of such charges and the list of witnesses on the petitioner calling upon him to submit written statement of defence within 30 days from the date of receipt of the memorandum, failing which it would be presumed that he admitted all the charges/allegations levelled against him. Therefore, the order of suspension and consequential memorandum of charges in Annexures-5 and 9 are subject-matter of challenge before this Court in the present writ petition. 3. Mr. V. Narsingha, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that opposite party no.3-CoNector, Ganjam, vide letter dated 25.02.2005, issued to opposite party no.5 stated that as per Clause-2(a) of the circular vide D.O. No.24042/Gen/18.09.1991 of the Chief Secretary, Orissa-opposite party no.1 addressed to all departments charges against an officer placed under suspension should be served within three months from the date of suspension, departmental proceeding should be initiated within first three months of suspension and period of suspension should not ordinarily extend beyond six months from the date of framing of charges, but in the case of the petitioner period of suspension having already exceeded more than 11 months, immediate action as per the guidelines prescribed by Government be taken and compliance communicated within 7 days from the date of receipt of the letter. It is further contended that the departmental proceeding, which has been initiated against the petitioner, has no basis. Therefore, the very initiation of departmental proceeding much after the order of suspension beyond the statutory period is contrary to the Government circular vide Annexure-8 dated 17.09.1991 which states guidelines for dealing with cases of suspension of officers. Referring to Annexure-E/5 dated 09.06.2005, it is further contended that the memorandum, along with the imputation of charges, was served on the petitioner on 09.03.2005. He had submitted his written statement of defence on 06.04.2005, i.e, within due date and had not admitted the charges. Therefore, it was necessary to appoint an enquiring officer to further investigate into the charges and furnish his findings under Rule 15(4) of Orissa Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1962. He had submitted his written statement of defence on 06.04.2005, i.e, within due date and had not admitted the charges. Therefore, it was necessary to appoint an enquiring officer to further investigate into the charges and furnish his findings under Rule 15(4) of Orissa Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1962. But till date no such enquiry officer has been appointed. Thus, there is gross delay on the part of the authority to proceed with the matter against the petitioner. It is further contended that in the meantime on attaining the age of superannuation the petitioner has been superannuated from service on 31.12.2007. Even after retirement, no enquiry officer has been appointed pursuant to letter dated 09.03.2005, nor the petitioner has been paid all the dues, save and except provisional pension for a period of three months. Therefore, for the delay in causing enquiry, the proceeding has to be quashed, and all consequential benefits in accordance with law be granted to the petitioner. 4. M/s. S.N. Mohapatra and associates initially entered appearance for opposite party no.5 and filed counter affidavit. When the matter was listed on 11.07.2017, Mr. S. Ghose, learned counsel for opposite party no.5 sought time to obtain instruction whether opposite party no.5 was interested to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner or not, which is pending since 2005. On 26.07.2017 when the matter was listed Mr. S. Ghosh, learned counsel for opposite party no.5 by filing a memo in Court stated that he had no further instructions in the matter and his appearance be ignored. Accordingly, his appearance was ignored and the petitioner was permitted to take fresh notice against opposite party no.5 by registered post with A.D., but none appeared for opposite party no.5. Consequentially, the petitioner took notice by special messenger pursuant to order dated 12.01.2018. In response to same, Mr. S.K. Pradhan, learned counsel entered appearance for opposite party no.5 by filing vakalatnama on 19.01.2018. When the matter was listed on 16.03.2018 since his name was not reflected in the cause list, this Court directed to list the matter after one week showing the name of Mr. S.K. Pradhan as learned counsel for opposite party no.5. On that date, he made request to list the matter after one week to enable him to obtain necessary instructions. When the matter is listed today, none appeared for opposite party no.5. S.K. Pradhan as learned counsel for opposite party no.5. On that date, he made request to list the matter after one week to enable him to obtain necessary instructions. When the matter is listed today, none appeared for opposite party no.5. Since this matter is of the year 2005 and in the meantime 13 years have elapsed and the petitioner has been retired from service on 31.12.2007 without getting any financial benefits as due admissible to him, this Court is not inclined to grant any further adjournment to the opposite parties and decided to proceed with the matter on the basis of the materials available on record. 5. Heard Mr. V. Narasingha, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. B. Senapati, learned Additional Government Advocate for opposite parties no.1 to 3 and perused the counter affidavit filed by opposite party no.5. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is being disposed of at the stage of admission. 6. The facts narrated above are undisputed. Admittedly, the petitioner was served with memorandum along with imputation of charges on 09.03.2005 calling upon him to submit his written statement of defence, which was done on 06.04.2005, i.e., within the due date, wherein the petitioner has not admitted the charges levelled against him. Therefore, necessary implications would be that enquiring officer was to be appointed to make enquiry and submit his report. But till date, no enquiring officer has been appointed to cause further enquiry into the charges and furnish his findings under Rule 15(4) of O.C.S.(C.C.A.) Rules, 1962 which is applicable to the petitioner. The action of opposite parties no.4 and 5 clearly indicates a gross laches and negligence in conducting enquiry as against the petitioner. No doubt the memorandum of charges has been framed calling upon the petitioner to submit written statement of defence within the time stipulated and the same has been complied with. If the authorities were not satisfied, then they should have appointed an enquiring officer to cause further enquiry into the charges and furnish report. Even though the proceeding was initiated in 2005 and in the meantime the petitioner has been superannuated from service on 31.12.2007 and the matter is pending before this Court since 2005, till date no enquiry has been conducted against the petitioner and in the meantime, more than 11 years have elapsed from the date of his retirement. 7. Even though the proceeding was initiated in 2005 and in the meantime the petitioner has been superannuated from service on 31.12.2007 and the matter is pending before this Court since 2005, till date no enquiry has been conducted against the petitioner and in the meantime, more than 11 years have elapsed from the date of his retirement. 7. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. N. Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833 , the apex Court held in paragraphs-19 and 20 as follows:- "19. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse considerations. 20. In the present case we find that without any reference to records merely on the report of the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, charges were framed against the respondent and ten others, and all in verbatim and without particularizing the role played by each of the officers charged. There were four charges against the respondent. With three of them he was not concerned. He offered explanation regarding the fourth charge but the disciplinary authority did not examine the same nor did it choose to appoint any inquiry officer even assuming that action was validly being initiated under 1991 Rules. There is no explanation whatsoever for delay in concluding the inquiry proceedings all these years. The case depended on records of the Department only and Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau had pointed out that no witnesses had been examined before he gave his report. The Inquiry Officers, who had been appointed one after the other, had just to examine the records to see if the alleged deviations and constructions were illegal and unauthorised and then as to who was responsible for condoning or approving the same against the bye-laws. It is nobody's case that respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the State as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 and directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 and directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996. The Tribunal rightly did not quash these two later memos." Applying the aforementioned principles, as laid down by the apex Court, to the present case, on perusal of the counter affidavit filed by opposite party no.5 it is found that nothing has been placed on record to indicate why till date enquiring officer has not been appointed nor the petitioner has been given the benefit as due admissible to him in accordance with law from the date of his superannuation i.e., 31.12.2007, save and except payment of provisional pension for a period of three months. It has been held by the apex Court, that the delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. No doubt it is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Nothing has been placed on record indicating that delay causes due to laches on the part of the employee. 8. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the considered view that initiation of proceedings against the petitioner and delay in concluding the same causes great prejudice to the petitioner. Therefore, the order of suspension published in newspaper in Annexure-5 dated 05.07.2004 suspending the petitioner from service on 16.03.2004 and consequential memorandum issued in Annexure-9 dated 09.03.2005 cannot sustain in the eye of law. Therefore, the same are liable to be quashed and accordingly quashed. Therefore, the order of suspension published in newspaper in Annexure-5 dated 05.07.2004 suspending the petitioner from service on 16.03.2004 and consequential memorandum issued in Annexure-9 dated 09.03.2005 cannot sustain in the eye of law. Therefore, the same are liable to be quashed and accordingly quashed. Consequentially, the petitioner is entitled to get all the benefits as due admissible to him in accordance with law and the same should be paid to the petitioner as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the date of communication of the judgment. 9. The writ petition is thus allowed. No order as to cost.