JUDGMENT : RUMI KUMARI PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. A.M. Borah, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A.M. Mojumdar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent and also Mr. J. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. 2. The petitioner herein is a Superintendent of Police, Dhubri District and the respondent No. 2 is a Deputy Superintendent of Excise at Gohpur, Sonitpur and prior to that she was working at Margherita. Raising certain allegations of molestation etc. against the petitioner, respondent No. 2 filed a complaint on 19.05.2011, before the Director General of Police, Assam which was subsequently got registered as CID P.S. Case No. 95/2011 under Section 341/354/506 IPC. The present petitioner also lodged an First Information Report(FIR) against the respondent No. 2 on 30.08.2011 in Karimganj P.S. which was registered as Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/2011 under Section 120 B/384/385/389/353/IPC read with Section 66(A) of Information and Technology Act. Following the FIR lodged by the petitioner, Officer-in-Charge, Karimganj P.S. with Police personnel arrived in the house of respondent No. 2 along with Media Persons and searched in her house and seized a Laptop, two of her Mobile Phones and her husband Mobile Phone and caused inhuman behavior to the respondent and her family. On the challenged being made about the entire incident by respondent No. 2 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the investigation of both the cases filed by both the parties against each other being CID PS Case No. 95/2011 and Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/2011 was investigated by DIG who is above the rank of the SP, as per the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the investigation was also monitored by the Supreme Court. Finally both the cases ended in final report and the learned Court accepted the final report in both the cases, the present petitioner did not challenged the acceptance of the final report but however the respondent No. 2 by filing a protest petition, challenged the final report and subsequently she has preferred revision against such acceptance of the final report. 3. 3. After all the incident above, respondent No. 2 filed a complaint petition before the learned Court which was registered as complaint Case No. 783/2015 with the allegation that the petitioner being the IPS Officer by misusing his official power and position, lodged the false and fictitious FIR and she has to suffer a lot both mentally and physically as well as financially and her name and fame has been ruined by the conduct of the present petitioner. The learned Court on examination of the complainant and her preliminary witnesses took the cognizance of the offence under Section 500/501 Indian Penal Code. 4. Being highly aggrieved for initiation of aforesaid criminal proceeding, the present petition has been preferred for quashing the said proceeding in CR Case No. 783/2015 and the order of taking cognizance, dated 18.11.2016, on the grounds that there is no material that the petitioner has commit the alleged offence of defamation and the cognizance taken by the Court is bad in law in as much as the FIR was lodged in the year 2011 and the search and seizure was also made in the same year but the complaint has been filed in the year 2015 so the case is barred by limitation. Further it is contended that case is also bad for not making the electronic media and print media as a party to the case and the case has been filed by the respondent with some oblique purpose in a vindictive manner. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner in his argument has basically challenged the case on the point of limitation urging before this Court that as the cause of action arose for filing the case as soon as the FIR was lodged by the petitioner in the year 2011 and the complaint case was filed in the year 2015 and in terms of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (1978) 2 SCC 403 : AIR 1978 SC 986 , a complain under Section 500 IPC for defamation will be barred if filed after 3 (three) years of the commission of the offence. 6. Mr. J. Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently opposed such contention of the petitioner urging before this Court that there is sufficient material for the purpose of taking cognizance of the offence, on the part of the Court. 6. Mr. J. Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently opposed such contention of the petitioner urging before this Court that there is sufficient material for the purpose of taking cognizance of the offence, on the part of the Court. It has been contended that although the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision referring to the Section 468 Cr.P.C. but yet the petitioner is under the remedy as provided under Section 470(2) Cr.P.C. By referring to the various challenges made by the petitioner before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (Cri) 6252 and the stay granted in respect of impugned proceeding pertaining to the FIR of Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/2011 (filed by the petitioner) and by calculating the stay period granted by the Hon'ble High Court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court there remain 170 days in the hand of the respondent No. 2 to file her case so the respondent No. 2 is protected under Section 470(2) Cr.P.C. and both the Section 468 as well as 470 Cr.P.C. are interlinked so it is to be read together. 7. As the basic challenge to the complaint case so filed by the respondent pertaining to limitation, let the said aspect be taken up for appreciation. The petitioner herein lodged the Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/11 against the respondent and others which resulted final report and the same report was also accepted by the learned Court on 15.05.2015 and the same was not challenged. The respondent/complainant challenged the said FIR of Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/11, before the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court vide Criminal Pet. No. 554/11 and the Court was pleased to grant stay of the impugned proceeding of the FIR by order 24.01.2012, which continued up to 26.06.2012. The findings of the said order in Crl. Pet. No. 554/2011 was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was registered as SLP (cri) 6252/12 and thereafter, the impugned proceeding pertaining to the Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/11 was stayed by Hon'ble Supreme Court by order, dated 27.08.2012, which continued up to 30.09.2013, when the investigation was directed to be conducted by the Superior Officer above the rank of the Superintendent of Police and thus there was stay of the said proceeding of said FIR both in Hon'ble Gauhati High Court as well as the Apex Court. Following calculation has been shown by the respondent regarding filing of the case - “Total period w.e.f. 30/8/2011 (Date of lodging FIR of Karimganj P.S. Case no. 483/2011 to 17/9/15 date of filing Complaint Case No. 783/2015) was = 1482 Days. If 3 years period as per Section 468(2)(C) Cr.P.C. is taken into account than the complainant was needed to file her CR. Case No. 783/2015 on or before 29/8/2014 i.e. within 1095 days. From 29/8/2014 to 17/9/2015 delay has arisen 385 days i.e. 1482-1095 = 385 days. Now total stay period both in Hon'ble High Court as well as Hon'ble Apex Court if added, it comes into total at 555 days, and if delay period of 385 days is deducted from stay period of 555 days than there remained 170 days in hand of the complainant. As such, the case of the respondent/complainant is protected u/s 470(2) of Cr.P.C.” 8. The above contention of the respondent is not under challenged that the proceeding pertaining to the said case was stayed under the order of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court as well as the Supreme Court for a long period and as per the provision of Section 470(2) Cr.P.C., the period of stay is to be excluded from the limitation period. From the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court in SLP (cri) 6252/12, dated 27.10.2014, it reveals that the said SLP was disposed of on that very day. Going by the calculation as shown by the respondent, period of limitation in this case cannot be counted in terms of the Section 468 Cr.P.C. and the case will come u/s 470(2) Cr.P.C. and in that view of the matter, the case is not bared by limitation as has been contended by the petitioner side and accordingly, it can be held that the case was filed within the period of limitation in terms of Section 470(2) Cr.P.C. 9. As regard the case of the respondent, she has examined herself and other two witnesses u/s 202 Cr.P.C. and according to their statement, the aforesaid FIR of Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/11 was drafted by the accused himself, knowing it to be false and fictitious and entire content was defamatory in nature which has destroyed the reputation of the complainant. As regard the case of the respondent, she has examined herself and other two witnesses u/s 202 Cr.P.C. and according to their statement, the aforesaid FIR of Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/11 was drafted by the accused himself, knowing it to be false and fictitious and entire content was defamatory in nature which has destroyed the reputation of the complainant. The accused person after filing of said FIR projected false evidence thereby making false charge of the offence knowing fully well that there was no authenticity and on the strength of the said FIR, search was made in her house and her mobile phone and laptop was seized, which was broadcasted in public media and published in print media. Everything was done deliberately by the petitioner only to lower the esteem of the complainant in the society and the entire episode conducted by the petitioner stated to be enough to defame the respondent in the society. On the basis of above statement, the learned Court took cognizance of the offence under Section 500/501 Indian Penal Code. 10. The complaint petition as well as the above statement of the respondent obviously made out a prima facie case for proceeding. The truthfulness of the allegation cannot be tested in a petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and even the learned Trial Court cannot embark into an enquiry regarding the authenticity of the allegation which is the subject matter of trial. 11. Challenged has been made towards the cognizance taken by the Court in both the cases. What is cognizance and the object and scope of 202 Cr.P.C. has been elaborately dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (2008) 2 SCC 492 , S.K. Sinha Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. in the following manner- “The expression cognizance has not been defined in Cr.P.C. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means “become aware of” and when used with reference to a Court of a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the point when a Court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone. “Taking cognizance” does not involve any formal action of any kind. It indicates the point when a Court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone. “Taking cognizance” does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance. The underlying object of the inquiry under Section 202 is to ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the accused. It thus allows a Magistrate to form an opinion whether the process should or should not be issued. The scope of inquiry under Section 202 is extremely limited. At that stage, what a Magistrate is called upon to see is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the matter and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused.” 12. Now the scope of provision under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is well settled. The power of quashing criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that to in the rarest of rare cases, the extra-ordinary or inherent power do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims. The Court will not justify in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in the FIR or complaint. In Minu Kumari v. State of Biharreported in (2006) 4 SCC 359 , it has been held that inherent jurisdiction though wide but exercise of such jurisdiction is justified by the case specifically laid down in Section 482. Such power to be exercised to prevent the process of the Court but not to be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Further it has been held that Section 482 of the procedure does not confer any new power on the High Court. Such power to be exercised to prevent the process of the Court but not to be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Further it has been held that Section 482 of the procedure does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed and it envisage three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (I) to give effect to an order under the Court, (II) to prevent the abuse of process of Court (III) to otherwise secure ends of justice. While exercising such power, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. 13. Exercise of powers under the Section would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds the initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of process of Court or quashing of this proceeding would serve the ends of justice. 14. Turning to the matter in hand, as has been discussed above the learned Trial Court has taken the cognizance on the basis of the evidence on record after holding an enquiry and the proceeding before the Trial Court does not suffer from any sort of illegality or impropriety, continuance of which can be held as abuse of process of law nor the order of the Revisional Court is improper, which may necessitate the interference into the matter by invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C. 15. For the reasons above, this Court is not inclined to interfere into the order under challenged. 16. Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed. The interim order stand vacated. 17. Return the Case Diary.