JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ajit Kumar, J.—This appeal alongwith an application seeking leave to appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 10.11.2009 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Anti Corruption Act, Bareilly acquitting the accused respondents under Sections 307 read with Section 34 and 504 IPC in Sessions Trial No. 438 of 2008, State v. Santosh and others. 2. Per Prosecution: The brother-in-law of the informant Radhey Shyam, namely Harpal son of Pyare Lal Gangwar resident of village Ahmedabad, police station Hafijganj was running a medical store for the last eight months at Bhopatpur station since prior to the date of incident. It so happened that on 22.1.2004 in the evening around 7.00 p.m. when the informant alongwith his brother-in-law and one Chaitanya Prakash were moving out from the place after closing the medical store and reached at the Canal flyover, all of a sudden Santosh accompanied by two unknown persons came from the temple side and Santosh abused his brother-in-law Harpal and with an intention to kill Harpal, fired two shots which hit on the head, right side hand and right side thigh of Harpal. It is also claimed that there was old enmity between Santosh and Harpal. The First Information Report (hereinafter to be referred as ‘FIR’) of the incident was got registered by the informant on 22.1.2004 at 8.30 p.m. at Police Station Diyurniya which was about 6 km from the place of incident. 3. The police conducted the investigation and submitted charge-sheet under Section 307/34 and 504 IPC and on the basis of charge-sheet, case was committed to the Court of sessions on 17.4.2008 for trial. 4. The first informant was examined by the trial Court as PW-1 whereas, Medical Officer Dr. Rajendra Kumar, who examined the injuries of injured, was examined as PW-2. The injured Harpal was examined as PW-3, Station House Officer, Bhuvnesh Kumar Gautam, Investigating Officer, was examined as PW-4 and Dr. B.K. Saxena, the Radiologist was examined as PW-5. 5. The injury report of injured Harpal, prepared by the medical officer was marked as Exhibit-2, whereas, supplementary report received from the Radiologist was marked as Exhibit-10. The Majrubi Chitthi (Exhibit-4) on the basis of which the injured was examined by Medical Officer and thereafter, the FIR was registered, was also produced and proved. 6. 5. The injury report of injured Harpal, prepared by the medical officer was marked as Exhibit-2, whereas, supplementary report received from the Radiologist was marked as Exhibit-10. The Majrubi Chitthi (Exhibit-4) on the basis of which the injured was examined by Medical Officer and thereafter, the FIR was registered, was also produced and proved. 6. According to the medical examination, the following injuries were found on the body of the injured: (i) lacerated wound 5 cm x 0.5 cm x muscle deep on the left side of head and below 8 cm of the left ear, there was swelling and blood was oozing out from the wound; (ii) lacerated wound 5 cm x 5 cm x 0.5 cm x muscle deep on the right side of the head and below 4 cm of right ear, there was swelling and blood was oozing out; (iii) lacerated wound 0.8 cm x 0.8 cm x muscle deep on the back side of the left hand 6 cm above the wrist, the injuries were in everted in direction; and (iv) lacerated wound 0.8 cm x 0.6 cm x muscle deep on the back side of the right hand 4 cm above the wrist, blood was oozing out. There was also tattooing and blackening around the injury in the area of 12 cm x 7 cm. 7. According to the opinion of the doctor, x-ray was advised for injury Nos. 3 and 4 and were opined as injuries that could be caused by the fire-arm. According to the supplementary report/x-ray report, no fracture was found on the head, whereas, on the right hand, the second and third metacarpal bones were found to be fractured. 8. As per the testimony of PW-1 Radhey Shyam, the incident, as narrated in the FIR, took place at the time and date given in FIR, but what is very interesting to note is that in his testimony, he said that around 7.00 p.m. on 27.1.2004, admittedly a winter season, there was a day light but then he says that there was moon light also and when they reached Bhopatpur station then suddenly Santosh alongwith two persons came and caught hold of his brother-in-law Harpal. All the three persons were armed with fire-arm and Harpal tried to get out of the hold of Santosh and in that scuffle, Santosh and Harpal both fell on the ground and it is thereafter, Santosh abused his brother-in-law and exhorted the other accused persons to kill him and then Santosh himself fired upon his brother-in-law and when Harpal tried to stop the shot fired by Santosh, he suffered injuries in his hand. PW-1 admitted that he knew Santosh since prior to the date of incident and also admitted that there was old enmity going on between two and then seeing Babu Ram and Ram Chandra in Court, he claimed that he know them and claimed that they were persons behind Santosh on spot. 9. Firstly, day light and moon light would not be available simultaneously. Moon light appears after day light disappears. Again it is very interesting to note that Ram Chandra is real brother of Santosh and since Santosh is related to Harpal, the injured, it was most unlikely that Harpal would not recognize Ram Chandra. More so, under the circumstance, when there is enmity going on in between Santosh and Harpal and it is in the murder case of sister of Santosh that Harpal had been in jail, the circumstance speak by itself, it is most unlikely that the name of Ram Chandra will not be taken at the time when FIR was being lodged and that too when it is claimed by injured Harpal, that the FIR was being dictated in his presence. 10. It has been held in the case of Joseph v. State of Kerala, (2003) 1 SCC 465 , that where the prosecution case is based on evidence of solitary eye-witness, evidence must be wholly reliable so as to record conviction on that basis. Here, we find that there is one eye-witness account and the other one is the injured and we may notice that the complete story being conveyed at the police station by the eye-witness account in front of the injured witness, yet the contradictions and inconsistencies have crept-in in their respective testimonies before the Court. The Court held (supra) that when one evidence is in conflict with the other evidence, the view taken by the trial Court that it is unsafe to convict the accused on his sole testimony cannot be said to be unreasonable. 11. The Court held (supra) that when one evidence is in conflict with the other evidence, the view taken by the trial Court that it is unsafe to convict the accused on his sole testimony cannot be said to be unreasonable. 11. The Court, having scanned the entire evidence available on record, has observed that the presence of Chaitanya Prakash and Dwarika Prasad at the time of incident allegedly accompanied Harpal and Radhey Shyam was very doubtful because PW-1 in the FIR stated that Chaitanya Prakash was accompanying them, then he stated in his testimony that Dwarika Prasad also accompanied them, but injured Ram Chandra has not taken the name of either Dwarika Prasad or Chaitanya Prakash. The Court has also found that testimony of PW-1 Radhey Shyam and PW-3 are even otherwise quite contradictory and this leads to the serious doubt about the manner in which the FIR was claimed to have been lodged. PW-1 has stated that he dictated the FIR to Vishambhar Dayal on spot whereas, PW-3 in his cross-examination has stated that it is in his presence that FIR was dictated at the police station. 12. The Court has further observed that as far as the injuries are concerned, the medical officer has not given any confirmed opinion. The opinion expressed by the doctor only renders the case doubtful from medico-legal aspect. The medical officer in his testimony stated that such injuries could have been caused by fire-arm but in such event seeing the depth of injuries which are muscle deep it was unlikely that pellets will move away hitting the injured. Such injuries cannot be caused just by pellets touching the skin of injured and moving away. The medical officer has also stated that in case if, injuries were caused by fire-arm then the injuries should be inverted over but in this case, the injuries were everted in direction and not in inverted. Further, the doctor opined that injury Nos. 3 and 4 could have been caused by fire-arm but there was no blackening on the place of injury. It has come in the x-ray report that no pellets were found. The Court has also observed that in the Majroobi Chitthi (Exhibit-4) by which the injured came to be examined, only showed three injuries as against the four injuries that have come in the medical evidence. It has come in the x-ray report that no pellets were found. The Court has also observed that in the Majroobi Chitthi (Exhibit-4) by which the injured came to be examined, only showed three injuries as against the four injuries that have come in the medical evidence. Thus, we find that even the injury report is not supportive of the FIR version and the testimony of PW-1 informant and PW-2 injured Harpal. 13. In cases of appeal against acquittal, the innocence of the accused gets further affirm and unless and until the findings recorded by the trial Court are found to be perverse, ignorance of any material evidence or perversity in the evaluation of evidences, this Court in appeal will desist from interfering in the judgment of acquittal. 14. In case of complete analysis of the evidence in the proper perspective by the trial Court and in the absence of any glaring and material infirmity shaking the conscience, the Court in appeal would not, in our considered opinion, interfere merely because it might reach to another possible conclusion. Absence of perversity makes the decision sound, free from any incomprehensible findings of fact. Unless the Court sitting in appeal finds any cogent and incriminating material fact or intrinsic evidence to have escaped from the scanning eyes of the trial Judge, it will not interfere on a mere hypothesis. 15. In Dharam Pal and others v. State of U.P., 1981 (Supp.) SCC 20, the Apex Court has held that if the view taken by trial Judge is in the given facts of the case is a reasonably possible one, the Court, in appeal, should not interfere. vide para 4 the Court held thus: “....... it is well-settled that even if the High Court m ay not have agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court, if the view taken by the trial Court was reasonably possible, that would be no ground to reverse the order of acquittal. In the instant case, even accepting the reasoning of the High Court at its face value we are not in a position to hold that the view taken by the trial Court was not reasonably possible.” 16. In the instant case, even accepting the reasoning of the High Court at its face value we are not in a position to hold that the view taken by the trial Court was not reasonably possible.” 16. In the case of Sriniwas Das and others v. Duli Chand and others, (1997) 7 SCC 522 , the Apex Court has taken the view that High Court cannot be swayed away by emotion alongwith presumption and conjectures to take the place of prove to set aside the order of acquittal. If, on a careful scanning of ocular account improbability looms large on the face of prosecution story, the only resistible conclusion could be that prosecution failed to discharge its burden to prove the guilt beyond doubt. 17. Further, the Court has to keep in mind that there exist double presumption of innocence in favour of a person acquitted, while hearing the appeal. The Apex Court in the case of V.S. Achyutanand v. R. Bala Krishnapillai, (2011) 3 SCC 317 , held that an appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is a double presumption in favour of accused. The presumption of innocence is available to a person and in a criminal jurisprudence every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. It is also settled that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 18. We may, at this stage also refer to the decision of Apex Court in the case of Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , wherein the Court, while dealing with the scope of appeal and the exercise of powers of the Court while hearing appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. vide para 42 of the judgment, laid down broad principles which are as under: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.” 19. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case and on a meticulous examination of the entire evidence on record, as has come to be discussed by the trial Judge, the truthfulness and trustworthiness of the eye-witness account, in our opinion, stands eroded and we do not find any error in the findings recorded by the trial Court that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge. 20. 20. Thus, the trial Court has given very cogent convincing and satisfactory reasons in its judgment of acquittal and we do not find any perversity in it, inasmuch as, the learned Additional Government Advocate has not been able to pin point any perversity or illegality in the judgment so as to warrant interference in the present appeal. 21. Under the circumstances, we do not find any good ground to grant leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal is accordingly rejected and so also this appeal.