ORDER : 1. This appeal of claimant arises out of the order dated 20.03.2008 passed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Sub-division-I Ballari, in No.KaaAaBa-1/KaNaPa/CR-96/2007. By the impugned order, the Commissioner has rejected the claim petition of the appellant seeking compensation under Section 22 of the Work men’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short ‘the Act’). 2. The appellant is the wife of one Vadde Mallikarjuna. He died in a motor accident on 23.05.2002. The clamant filed the petition contending that her husband was working as Cleaner under respondent No.3 / Hanumanth Reddy as Cleaner in Lorry No.KA-13/9797. She further contended that while so working in the lorry, on 23.05.2002 at 10.30 a.m., near B.T.Project on Bairavani Tappe, Ananthpur District, the driver of the said lorry drove the same in rash and negligent manner and caused death of Mallikarjuna. She contended that she was depending on his income and he was drawing wages of Rs.4,000/per month and thus, she claimed compensation of Rs.4,50,000/-. She contended that respondent No.1 was the registered owner and respondent No.2 was the insurer of offending lorry and respondent No.3 was the employer of her deceased husband. 3. Respondent No.1 did not contest the petition. Respondent No.2 / the insurer contested the petition contending that it has issued policy to respondent No.1, denying that there was any jural relationship of employer and workman between respondent No.1 and the deceased. It further contended that in the absence of said jural relationship, it is not liable to pay any compensation. 4. Respondent No.3 filed his objection statement contending that the deceased was working as Cleaner under him in lorry bearing No.KA-13/9797 on a monthly wage of Rs.4,000/- and the lorry belonged to him. He further contended that as on the date of accident, the vehicle was covered with insurance policy issued by respondent No.2, therefore, he is not liable to pay compensation and insurer has to pay. 5. The parties adduced evidence. The claimant was examined as PW1 and she got marked copies of FIR, PM report and ration card as Exs.P1 to P3. Respondent No.2 examined its Administrative Officer as RW1 and got marked the policy and statement of claimant as Ex.R2(1) and Ex.R2(1a). Respondent No.3 got himself examined as RW2. 6. 5. The parties adduced evidence. The claimant was examined as PW1 and she got marked copies of FIR, PM report and ration card as Exs.P1 to P3. Respondent No.2 examined its Administrative Officer as RW1 and got marked the policy and statement of claimant as Ex.R2(1) and Ex.R2(1a). Respondent No.3 got himself examined as RW2. 6. The Commissioner, after hearing the parties, by the impugned order dismissed the claim petition holding that the records produced by the claimant herself and her own statement Ex.P1 (FIR) do not corroborate her claim that the accident has occurred in the course of employment or her husband was an employee in the lorry. 7. This Court on hearing the parties, formulated the following substantial question of law: “(i) Whether the impugned order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner is contrary to the evidence adduced before hi m?” 8. Sri.Y.Lakshmikant Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant submits that respondent No.3/owner of the lorry himself admitted that the deceased was an employee under him and the accident occurred during the course of employment, therefore, the Commissioner was not justified in rejecting the claim petition. 9. Sri.M.K.Soudagar, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the policy was issued to respondent No.1 and nothing was produced to show that respondent No.1 was the employer of the deceased or that respondent No.3 was the registered owner of the vehicle. He further submits that respondent No.3, though supported the case of the clamant in the petition, did not produce any documents to show that he was the owner of the lorry nor tendered himself for crossexamination. Therefore, the Commissioner was fully justified in rejecting the claim. 10. In support of his arguments, he relies upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED Vs. PREMLATA SHUKLA AND OTHERS, (2009) 1 SCC (Cri ) 204 : 2007 ACJ 1928 . 11. To invoke the jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act, there should be relationship of employer and employee. Further, to make a claim against the insurer, the insured should be the employer. In this case, the policy Ex.R2 issued by respondent No.2 stands in the name of respondent No.1. It is not the case of claimant herself that her husband was the employee under respondent No.1. 12. Further, to make a claim against the insurer, the insured should be the employer. In this case, the policy Ex.R2 issued by respondent No.2 stands in the name of respondent No.1. It is not the case of claimant herself that her husband was the employee under respondent No.1. 12. Respondent No.3 though contended that he is the registered owner of the vehicle, did not produce the Registration Certificate of the offending vehicle. He did not tender himself for crossexamination. Therefore, no value can be attached to his evidence in chief-examination. 13. Even to fasten the liability to respondent No.3, the accident should have occurred during the course of employment. In Ex.P1 complaint filed by claimant herself, she does not state that her husband had gone in the said vehicle as Cleaner of the lorry in the course of employment. On the contrary, she has stated that he had gone in the said lorry as marriage party to attend to a marriage. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that respondent No.3 in his written statement to claim petition has admitted that accident occurred during the course of employment and the deceased was in the lorry as an employee. He submits therefore, even if in Ex.P1 it is stated that the deceased had gone in the lorry for a marriage, that does not erase the admission of respondent No.3. 15. Ex.P1 is the appellant’s own document wherein she has clearly stated that the deceased had gone in the lorry to attend the marriage with a marriage party. She relies on the said document to sustain her claim of accident and she wants to partly resile from the said document. 16. In this regard, in Prem Lata Shukla’s case (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court referring to Hukam Singh’s case has held as follows: “15. A party objecting to the admissibility of a document must raise its objection at the appropriate time. If the objection is not raised and the document is allowed to be marked and that too at the instance of a party which had proved the same and wherefor consent of the other party has been obtained, the former in our opinion cannot be permitted to turn round and raise a contention that the contents of the documents had not been proved and, thus, should not be relied upon. In Hukam Singh (supra), the law was correctly been laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court stating: (PLR p.911, para 8) "8. Mr. G.C. Mittal, learned counsel for the respondent contended that Ram Partap had produced only his former deposition and gave no evidence in Court which could be considered by the Additional District Judge. I am afraid there is no merit in this contention. The Trial Court had discussed the evidence of Ram Partap in the light of the report Exhibit D.1 produced by him. The Additional District Judge while hearing the appeal could have commented on that evidence and held it to be inadmissible if law so permitted. But he did not at all have this evidence before his mind. It was not a case of inadmissible evidence either. No doubt the procedure adopted by the trial Court in letting in a certified copy of the previous deposition of Ram Partap made in the criminal proceedings and allowing the same to be proved by Ram Partap himself was not correct and he should have been examined again in regard to all that he had stated earlier in the statement made by him in the committing court. It appears that the counsel for the parties in order to save time did not object to the previous deposition being proved by Ram Partap himself who was only crossexamined. It is not a case where irrelevant evidence had been let in with the consent of the parties but the only objection is that the procedure followed in the matter of giving evidence in Court was not correct. When the parties themselves have allowed certain statements to be placed on the record as a part of their evidence, it is not open to them to urge later either in the same Court or in a court of appeal that the evidence produced was inadmissible. To allow them to do so would indeed be permitting them both to appropriate and reprobate.” 17. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, it is not open to the claimant to approbate and reprobate. Having regard to all the evidence on record, the Commissioner has rightly rejected the claim. Therefore, the substantial question of law is answered in negative. The appeal is dismissed. 18. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, it is not open to the claimant to approbate and reprobate. Having regard to all the evidence on record, the Commissioner has rightly rejected the claim. Therefore, the substantial question of law is answered in negative. The appeal is dismissed. 18. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant seeks liberty to proceed under the Motor Vehicles Act to claim compensation against the registered owner of the vehicle. If such remedy is available to the appellant under law, it is open to her to proceed in accordance with law.