JUDGMENT J.B. Pardiwala, J. This Second Appeal under Section100 of the CPC is at the instance of the original defendant - tenant and is directed against the judgment and order dated 30/12/2017 passed by the Additional District Judge, Jamnagar, in Regular Civil Appeal No.51 of 2013 arising from the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge allowing the Regular Civil Suit No.85 of 2007 filed by the respondent herein - original plaintiff - l landlord for recovery of possession of the rented premises as well as arrears towards the rent. 2. It appears from the materials on record that the respondent herein - original plaintiff is the owner of the suit property, which is a shop situated in Jamnagar. The said shop was taken on rent by the appellant herein. The rent fixed was at Rs. 175/per month. The agreement between the parties is of the year 1987. As the appellant herein stopped paying the rent and the amount of Rs. 7,525/was due and payable towards the arrears of rent of last six months, the plaintiff terminated the tenancy by issuing a statutory notice Exh.19 dated 21/11/2006. Despite service of notice, the tenant failed to make the payment. The plaintiff thereafter proceeded to file a Regular Civil Suit No.85 of 2007 in the Court of the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Jamnagar for possession of the shop as well as arrears of rent. 3. The appellant herein appeared before the Civil Court and filed his written statement. The appellant opposed the suit filed by the plaintiff substantially on the ground of nonjoinder of parties. According to appellant, he is not the sole tenant. His brothers are also cotenants along with him. As the brothers were not joined in the suit, the appellant herein prayed that the suit be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. The appellant also raised issue with regard to the legality and validity of the statutory notice Exh.19 issued by the plaintiff. 4. The trial Court framed the following issues vide Exh.13. (1) What should be the standard rent and permitted increases if any for the suit premises? (2) Whether the plaintiff proves that the rent is due as claimed in the suit? (3) If so does the defendant prove that he was and is ready and willing to pay rent? (4) Whether the suit notice is legal & valid? (1) What should be the standard rent and permitted increases if any for the suit premises? (2) Whether the plaintiff proves that the rent is due as claimed in the suit? (3) If so does the defendant prove that he was and is ready and willing to pay rent? (4) Whether the suit notice is legal & valid? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get possession? (6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled mesne profit? (7) What order and decree? 5. The issues framed by the trial Court referred to above came to be answered as under: (1) In the negative. (2) In the affirmative. (3) In the negative. (4) In the affirmative. (5) In the affirmative. (6) partly affirmative. (7) as per final order. 6. The trial Court, ultimately, allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff. The operative part of the judgment and order reads as under: : ORDER : (1) The suit of the plaintiff is allowed. (2) It is ordered that the defendant shall pay suit amount of Rs. 7525/(seven thousand five hundred twenty five only) from the date of filing the suit till the recovery of amount with six percent annual interest and the defendant shall handover vacant possession of place mentioned in tip of Mark 'A' to the plaintiff and the defendant shall pay outstanding accrued rent at the rate of Rs. 175/per month to the plaintiff from 1/2/2007 till the vacant possession of the place is handed over. (3) The defendant shall bear the cost incurred by the plaintiff for this suit and the defendant shall bear his own cost. (4) Decree be drawn as per the order. 7. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of eviction, the appellant herein - original defendant preferred Regular Civil Appeal No.51 of 2013 in the District Court at Jamnagar. The first appellate Court upon reappreciation of the evidence on record affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 8. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the first appellate Court, the appellant - original defendant is here before this Court with this present Second Appeal under Section100 of the CPC. 9. The following questions have been formulated in the memorandum of Second Appeal as the substantial questions of law. 8. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the first appellate Court, the appellant - original defendant is here before this Court with this present Second Appeal under Section100 of the CPC. 9. The following questions have been formulated in the memorandum of Second Appeal as the substantial questions of law. (A) Whether the courts below have committed substantial error of law in not framing proper issues for determination as per Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1980? (B) Whether the courts below have committed substantial error of law in not holding that the suit of the respondent is not maintainable for nonjoinder of the necessary parties? (C) Whether the courts below have committed substantial error of law by not appreciating the documentary evidence, showing bonafide intention of the present appellant tenant by making payment of entire arrears of rent payable? (D) Whether the courts below have committed substantial error of law by not appreciating and misreading the documentary and oral evidences while passing the impugned orders? 10. Mr. Langa, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted that the first appellate Court committed a serious error of law in dismissing the first appeal without framing points for determination in accordance with Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC. On this ground alone, according to Mr. Langa, the judgment and order of the first appellate Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. The second contention of Mr. Langa is with regard to non-joinder of the necessary parties. According to him, his client is not the sole tenant of the Shop in question. The two brothers of the appellant are also tenants and they have joint tenancy rights. According to Mr. Langa, the suit ought to have been dismissed on the ground of nonjoinder of the necessary parties too. 11. In support of his submissions, Mr. Langa has placed reliance on the following decisions. (1) Gauri Shankar Vs.Rakesh Kumar and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 792 . (2) Baluram Vs. P. Chellathangam, (2015) 13 SCC 579 (3) Kanakalata Das & Others Vs. Naba Kumar Das & Others, (2018) 2 SCC 352 . (4) H.C. Pandey Vs. G.C.Paul, (1989) 3 SCC 77 (5) Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwai (Dead by L.Rs., (2001) 3 SCC 179 (3) Ramavilasom Grandhasala and Others. Vs. N.S.S. Karayogam, (2000) 5 SCC 64 12. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Naba Kumar Das & Others, (2018) 2 SCC 352 . (4) H.C. Pandey Vs. G.C.Paul, (1989) 3 SCC 77 (5) Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwai (Dead by L.Rs., (2001) 3 SCC 179 (3) Ramavilasom Grandhasala and Others. Vs. N.S.S. Karayogam, (2000) 5 SCC 64 12. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Langa prays that there being merit in his Second Appeal, the same may be admitted on the substantial questions of law formulated in the memorandum of the second appeal. 13. On the other hand, this Second Appeal has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Majmudar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent - original plaintiff - landlord. Mr. Majmudar, the learned counsel is on a caveat. According to Mr. Majmudar, no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the courts below. According to Mr. Majmudar, none of the questions formulated in the memorandum of the second appeal could be termed as the substantial questions of law. According to him, all the questions formulated at best could be termed as a mixed questions of law and fact. He would submit that as no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal, the same does not merit admission. 14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether this Second Appeal involves any substantial question of law. 15. So far as the principal argument as regards the nonjoinder of necessary parties is concerned, the trial Court recorded the following findings. Considering the dispute and the written statement filed by the defendant, the defendant has come with a case that, he alone is not the tenant of the property, but there are other tenants also. But, such defences as taken in the written statement is not proved by him on affidavit, nor the original rent note has been produced in this case. In such circumstances, there is no reason not to believe the deposition of the plaintiff given on affidavit. In this case, the copies of office copy of the rent notes given by the plaintiff to the defendant are produced vide Exh.22 to 43. Considering the same, the name fo present Defendant i.e. Bharatbhai Dhanjibhai Kuber is mentioned as tenant in the same and the rent is mentioned Rs. In this case, the copies of office copy of the rent notes given by the plaintiff to the defendant are produced vide Exh.22 to 43. Considering the same, the name fo present Defendant i.e. Bharatbhai Dhanjibhai Kuber is mentioned as tenant in the same and the rent is mentioned Rs. 175/. Thus, considering all the facts, no reason appears for not to believe the evidence of the plaintiff, because no evidence against the evidence of plaintiff is produced in this case. Further, the important fact is to be that, even though enough opportunity is given to the defendant, neither he has produced his evidence, nor done any cross-examination of the plaintiff in these circumstances, there is a reason to believe that the defendant admits the evidence of the plaintiff indirectly. Thus, the fact is clearly proved by the evidences produced that, as stated by the plaintiff, the defendant has not paid the rent amount to the plaintiff, so due to nonpayment of rent, the defendant is responsible to vacate the said disputed property. Further, the learned advocate for the plaintiff has in support of his case, produced the judgments passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in. I agree with all these judgments with respect. I agree with the principles established by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in said judgments, and all these judgments are also helpful to the plaintiff, and considering the provisions of law also, when the defendant has not paid the amount of rent for the period of more than six moths, in these circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to vacant possession of disputed property due to nonpayment of rent. In this case, the Issue No.1 for Standard Rent is raised, but as there is no evidence with the parties in this regard, its reply is given in negative. The plaintiff could prove the facts that the rent mentioned in the suit is due with the defendant, so the reply of Issue No.2 is given in affirmative. While, the defendant has not produced any evidence in this case showing that he was ready to pay the rent, or he is ready to pay, so the reply of Issue No.3 is given in negative. While, the defendant has not produced any evidence in this case showing that he was ready to pay the rent, or he is ready to pay, so the reply of Issue No.3 is given in negative. The Notice given the plaintiff is served to the defendant, which was given by the plaintiff to recover the arrear of rent before filing the suit, which is legal, hence, the reply of Issue No.5 is given in affirmative. In this case, except the arrears of rent, the plaintiff has demanded for the relief that the defendant has to give Rs. 175/per month for rent to the plaintiff from the date 1/02/2007 till the vacant possession of the place is given, but in this case, the defendant is a tenant and monthly rent of Rs. 175/was decided between the plaintiff - defendant from the very beginning, in these circumstances, not interim recovery, but it shall be justifiable that, the order shall be passed to give remaining arrear of rent from 1/2/2007, and considering the same, following final order is being passed regarding the Issue No.7. 16. Let me also look into the findings recorded by the first appellate Court as regards the issue of non-joinder of necessary parties. "The third issue is that the Trial Court has erred in not framing the issue of non-joinder of parties, as the appellant's brother is also a cotenant. As regards this issue, on careful perusal of pleadings of parties with the deposition of respondent - tenant at Ex.18 with Rent Receipts at Ex.22 to 43 in absence of any contrary evidence from the appellant - tenant that Court has no hesitation to accept the respondent case with arguments that shop is rented only to appellant and appellant only paid rent to the landlord - respondent, which can be read out from the Rent Receipt at Ex.22 to 43. Therefore, non-framing of issue of non-joinder of party does not make the judgment decree illegal and contrary to the law in order." 17. Having gone through the concurrent findings of the two courts below, I am of the view that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the courts below. Both the courts have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the appellant herein is the sole tenant. 18. Having gone through the concurrent findings of the two courts below, I am of the view that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the courts below. Both the courts have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the appellant herein is the sole tenant. 18. It is important to note that except filing of the written statement, no other evidence has been led by the appellant. The appellant did not enter the box. 19. Although it is not necessary for me to delvedeep into this issue, however, for the guidance of the subordinate judiciary, let me explain the concept of non-joinder of parties. Order 1 Rule 9 of the CPC read as under: 9. Misjoinder and nonjoinder: No suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties and the Court may in every Suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the right and interests of the parties actually before it. 20. Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC reads as under: Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC empowers the court to delete or add parties to a suit at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, whether as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively or completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 21. The two provisions of the CPC referred to above make it clear that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties and that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings either upon or without the application of either party and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit be added. 22. 22. When proper parties are not included in the suit, the suit is not bad for non-joinder, but if the parties who are not on the array of the parties in the suit who are necessary parties in whose absence no final adjudication could be made, then the suit has to be be held bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties. In the absence of a necessary party, no effective decree could be passed. To put it in other words, nonjoinder of proper party is not fatal, while nonjoinder of necessary party is fatal to the case. 23. None of the judgments which have been relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant are applicable in the present case and therefore, are not helpful to the appellant in any manner. 24. So far as the contention with regard to Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC is concerned, the same is without any merit. 25. In the course of my present sitting, I have noticed that practically in all Second Appeals, one common question, which is formulated as one of the substantial questions of law in the memorandum of the Second Appeal is with regard to Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC. According to Mr. Langa, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is mandatory and compliance is necessary. According to him, when the points of determination have not been specifically indicated, the appellant judgment becomes vulnerable. 26. On the other hand, the submission of Mr. Majmudar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent is that there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. According Mr. Majmudar, all necessary issues relevant for the purpose of deciding the First Appeal were taken into consideration by the first appellate Court and after an elaborate discussion, the appeal came to be dismissed. 27. An appellate judgment is expected not merely to deal with the materials and the evidence on record. but also to deal with the judgment of the trial Court in so far as it is assailed in the appellate Court. It is only in very rare cases that some criticism is not levelled or cannot be levelled against the judgment of a trial Court. but also to deal with the judgment of the trial Court in so far as it is assailed in the appellate Court. It is only in very rare cases that some criticism is not levelled or cannot be levelled against the judgment of a trial Court. In order that the higher tribunals may be satisfied and the judgment of the appellate Court may not be assailed on the ground of lack of application of mind it is expedient that the appellate judgment must indicate the points which were raised or formulated in the appeal and the arguments which were urged for or against the same and the criticisms which were levelled against the reasoning adopted by the trial Court. The judgment of an appellate Court must show that the Court had applied its mind to the facts in controversy. But it cannot be contended that in every such case, a remand must be made and the second appellate Court has no jurisdiction to decide the appeal. There are several cases in which the High Courts do find that on material questions the lower Court has either not applied its mind or omitted to record its decision. Such questions usually do arise specially in Second Appeals. It is a well settled law that in such a situation the second appellate Court itself determines the question. This is specifically provided for by sec. 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and by the provisions contained in Order 41 rule 25. There is no reason why unless there are strong reasons for not doing so this Court should not follow the principles underlying these provisions of law even in a case which discloses that the lower Court had not discharged its duty of applying its mind to the determination of all the points in controversy. 28. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC: Provide guidelines for the appellate Court as to how the Court has to proceed and decide the case. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. Thus, it must be evident from the judgment of the appellate Court that the Court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. Thus, it must be evident from the judgment of the appellate Court that the Court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. It would amount to substantial compliance of the said provisions if the appellate Court's judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all important aspects of the matter and the findings of the appellate Court are well founded and quite convincing. It is mandatory for the appellate Court to independently assess the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on those points. Being the final Court of fact, the first appellate Court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial Court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial Court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the Court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory provisions. (Vide: Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh & Another., (1963) AIR SC 146; Girijanandini Devi and Others. v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, (1967) AIR SC 1124; G. Amalorpavam and Others. v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai and Others., (2006) 3 SCC 224 ; Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari, (2007) 8 SCC 600 ; and Gannmani Anasuya and Others. v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary and Others., (2007) AIR SC 2380) 29. In the case of B.V. Nagesh & Another. v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 10 JT 551 , while dealing with the issue, this Supreme Court held as under: "The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case therein is open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case therein is open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. Sitting as a Court of appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. [Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 and Madhukar and Others v. Sangram and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ]" 30. In the case of G. Amalorpavam Vs. R.C. Diocese Of Madurai, (2006) LawSuit(SC) 178, the Supreme Court held as under: 8. The question whether in a particular case there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Noncompliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second Appellate Court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower Appellate Court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Or. 41 R. 31 Code of Civil Procedure. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the Appellate Court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the Appellate Court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Or. Where the Appellate Court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the Appellate Court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Or. 41 R. 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower Appellate Court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the Appellate Court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. At this juncture it would be relevant to note what this Court said in Girijanandini Devi and Ors. V/s. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, it was noted as follows: "........It is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." 10. The view was reiterated in Santosh Hazari V/s. Purshottam Tiwari (Deceased) by Lrs. It was held with reference to Girijanandini Devi's case (supra) as follows: "........The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." 10. The view was reiterated in Santosh Hazari V/s. Purshottam Tiwari (Deceased) by Lrs. It was held with reference to Girijanandini Devi's case (supra) as follows: "........The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the Appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the Appellate Court. The task of an Appellate Court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The Appellate Court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice Girijanandini Devi V/s. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, (1967) AIR SC 1124. We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the Appellate Court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the Appellate Court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the Appellate Court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the Appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the Appellate Court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. Madhusudan Das V/s. Narayanibai, (1983) 1 SCC 35 . As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the Appellate Court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. Madhusudan Das V/s. Narayanibai, (1983) 1 SCC 35 . The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lie, the Appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu V/s. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, (1951) AIR SC 120 Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the Appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first Appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first Appellate Courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Sec. 100 substituted in the Code. The first Appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first Appellate Court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first Appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one." 31. Let me also refer to and rely upon a full bench decision of the Allahaband High Court, in the case of Durga Thathera Vs. Narain Thathera and Anr reported in, (1931) AIR Allahabad 597 held as under: 20. Let me also refer to and rely upon a full bench decision of the Allahaband High Court, in the case of Durga Thathera Vs. Narain Thathera and Anr reported in, (1931) AIR Allahabad 597 held as under: 20. The question whether in a particular case there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Rule 31 is a (different one depending on the nature of (the judgment delivered in each case. A (noncompliance with the strict provisions of this rule may not vitiate the judgment (and make it wholly void, and the irregularity may be ignored if there has been a substantial compliance with it and the second appellate Court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate Court. Our attention has not been drawn to any reported case of this Court after the passing of the new Code, in which the case of Samin Hasan has been followed. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. 32. I may also refer to a three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Thakur Sukhpal Singh Versus Thakur Kalyan Singh reported in, (1962) LawSuit(SC) 165 held as under: It is urged that the Judgment of the appellate Court has to state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision, and these the appellate Court cannot do till it has gone through the record and considered the entire matter on record including the Judgment under appeal. These matters have to be in the Judgment when points in dispute between the parties are raised before the appellate Court. If no such points are raised for consideration the appellate Judgment cannot refer to the points for determination in its Judgment and, when there be no points raised for determination, there can possibly be no decision thereon and no reasons for such decision. Such is the position when the appellant does not address the Court and does not submit anything against the decision of the Court below. The memorandum of appeal does contain the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from, without any argument or narrative as laid down in subr. (2) of R. 1, Or. XLI. Such grounds cannot take the place of the points for determination contemplated by R. 31. The memorandum of appeal does contain the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from, without any argument or narrative as laid down in subr. (2) of R. 1, Or. XLI. Such grounds cannot take the place of the points for determination contemplated by R. 31. Not unoften certain grounds of objection raised in the memorandum of appeal are not argued or pressed at the hearing and in that case such grounds cannot be taken to be the points for determination and are rightly not discussed in the judgment at all. It is for the appellant to raise the points against the Judgment appealed from. He has to submit reasons against its correctness. He cannot just raise objections in his memorandum of appeal and leave it to the appellate Court to give its decision on those points after going through the record and determining the correctness thereof. It is not for the appellate Court itself to find out what the points for determination can be and then proceed to give a decision on those points. 6 The Privy Council observed in Mt. Fakrunisa V/s. Moulvi Izarus: "In every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants to show some reason why the Judgment appealed from should be disturbed; there must be some balance in their favour when all the circumstances are considered, to justify the alteration of the Judgment that stands. Their Lordships are unable to find that this duty has been discharged." With respect, we agree with this and hold that it is the duty of the appellant to show that the Judgment under appeal is erroneous for certain reasons and it is only after the appellant has shown this that the appellate Court would call upon the respondent to reply to the contention. It is only then that the Judgment of the appellate Court can fully contain all the various matters mentioned in R. 31, Or. XLI 7 Court observed in Sengram Singh V/s. Election Tribunal, Kotah, (1955) 2 SCR 1 : "Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: ......... XLI 7 Court observed in Sengram Singh V/s. Election Tribunal, Kotah, (1955) 2 SCR 1 : "Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: ......... Too technical construction of section that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it." The provisions of R. 31 should therefore be reasonably construed and should be held to require the various particulars to be mentioned in the Judgment only when the appellant has actually raised certain points for determination by the appellate Court, and not when no such points have been raised as had been the case in the present instance when the appellant did not address the court at all. 8 The provisions of R. 30 of Or. XLI support our construction of R. 31. This rule reads: "The appellate Court, after hearing the parties or their pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings, whether on appeal or in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, to which reference may be considered necessary, shall pronounce Judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. "It is to be noticed that this rule does not make it incumbent on the appellate Court to refer to any part of these proceedings in the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred. The appellate Court can refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of these proceedings to which reference be considered necessary. It is in the discretion of the appellate Court to refer to the proceedings. It is competent to pronounce Judgment after hearing what the parties or their pleaders submit to it for consideration. It follows therefore that if the appellant submits nothing for its consideration, the appellate Court can decide the appeal without any reference to any proceedings of the Courts below and, in doing so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged any thing which would tend to show that the Judgment and decree under appeal were wrong. 9 In this connection, reference may be made to the provisions of sec. 9 In this connection, reference may be made to the provisions of sec. 423, Criminal Procedure Code, which provides the procedure to be followed by the appellate Court in disposing of criminal appeals. The relevant portion of its sub sec. (1) is: "The Appellate Court shall then send for the record of the case, if such record is not already in Court. After perusing such record, and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears, and, in case of an appeal u/s. 411A, sub sec. (2), or sec. 417 the accused, if he appears, the Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering dismiss the appeal, or may..." The appellate Court is thus enjoined to pass the final order in the appeal after it had perused the record and heard the appellant or his pleader and the Public Prosecutor. The perusal of the record is enjoined on the Court. The Court cannot dispose of the appeal merely after hearing the appellant or his pleader and the Public Prosecutor. It has to peruse the record. In this respect, these provisions are different from the provisions of R. 30 Or. XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Legislature specifically requires the perusal of the record by the appellate Court before deciding the appeal. It does not so provide in R. 30, Or. XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10 The view that we take, also finds support from the object which the Legislature probably had in providing that the Judgment must contain the matters mentioned in R. 31. The object seems to be that the parties should know for what reasons the decision has gone against them and thereby be in a position to decide whether they should go up in appeal or revision against the judgment. If they do not know the decision and the reasons there for, they cannot make up their mind and, even if they have no intention to go up in appeal, they may not even be satisfied about the Court considering the matter for determination properly. 11 Another object can be that the second appellate Court or the revision Court be in a position to know why the Court below came to a certain conclusion. Such knowledge is undoubtedly of great assistance to the Court. 11 Another object can be that the second appellate Court or the revision Court be in a position to know why the Court below came to a certain conclusion. Such knowledge is undoubtedly of great assistance to the Court. If therefore, no contention is raised by the appellant in the first appellate Court, no question of raising any contention in the next appellate Court arises and therefore, the necessity of writing a complete Judgment contemplated by R. 31 does not arise. 33. Thus, the principle discernible from the case law referred to above, is that whether in a particular case there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered. Noncompliance with the provisions by itself would not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void. If it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. The judgment of the appellate Court should reflect an honest endeavour to consider the controversy between the parties and that there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations. If all relevant aspects of the matter are gone into by the appellate Court and discussed properly, then the same would be a valid judgment even though it may not have framed the points for determination. 34. It does not appear to me in the present case that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is open to that criticism. The lower appellate Court has discussed all the points raised on behalf of both the sides as well as he has considered whole evidence on record in details. The issues framed by the trial Court have also been discussed in the judgment and on this score only, the judgment of the lower appellate Court cannot be said to be bad in law. 35. In the last, I may refer to and rely upon a decision of this Court in the case of Kikubhai Parshottambhai Patel Vs. Babubhai Vallabhbhai Patel reported in, (2005) 1 GLH 602 . The relevant observations are as under: 17. Another point which is canvassed by Mr. 35. In the last, I may refer to and rely upon a decision of this Court in the case of Kikubhai Parshottambhai Patel Vs. Babubhai Vallabhbhai Patel reported in, (2005) 1 GLH 602 . The relevant observations are as under: 17. Another point which is canvassed by Mr. Shah, learned advocate of defendants, is that under Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code, the appellate Court must have framed points for determination. According to this Court, the said contention is also without substance. In the case of Dumala Vighpara Gram Panchayat (supra), this Court has held that serious issues tried by trial Court were required to be enquired into and scrutinised by appellate Court. In that case, instead the appellate court merely considering that there was an earlier suit in which the permission for construction was granted decided the appeal in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the case was remitted to the trial court. The said judgment is of no assistance to the case of the defendants. Further more, the said judgment does not lay down an absolute proposition of law that non-framing of points for determination in appeal by the first appellate Court vitiates the well reasoned judgment delivered by the first appellate Judge and hence the same cannot be considered as a substantial question of law. 18. In the case of Navinchandra Nathalal Doshi (supra) this Court has held that all the courts, including the appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, are required to frame appropriate points for determination at the time of deciding such appeal. When the appellate court is deciding an appeal under the Bombay Rent Act, it is necessary to comply with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code, which also require that the points for determination are framed by the Court. The appellate Court, therefore, should take appropriate care in all such cases to frame appropriate points for determination. In fact, it is the duty of the appellate Court to see that such points for determination are framed. In the said decision this Court has also held that simply because the appellate Bench has not framed the points for determination, that itself cannot vitiate the judgment of the appellate Bench on the aforesaid point. This judgment is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case and is the complete answer to the contentions raised by Mr. In the said decision this Court has also held that simply because the appellate Bench has not framed the points for determination, that itself cannot vitiate the judgment of the appellate Bench on the aforesaid point. This judgment is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case and is the complete answer to the contentions raised by Mr. Suresh M. Shah, learned advocate of the defendants. It is true that in this judgment it has been held that it is the duty of the appellate Court to see that points for determination are framed. However, the said judgment has also laid down the proposition that non-framing of points for determination, that itself cannot vitiate the judgment of the appellate Court. 19. One more contention advanced by Mr. Shah, learned advocate of the defendants, is that Rule 414 of the Civil Manual also stipulates that the appellate Court should frame points for determination in appeal as framed in the trial Court but in instant case since the appellate Court has not framed points for determination and since there is a breach of the provisions of Rule 414 of the Civil Manual committed by the first appellate Judge, this matter requires consideration and this being a substantial question of law, the appeal requires to be admitted. This Court finds no substance and merit in the aforesaid contention raised by Mr. Shah. According to this Court, Rule 414 of the Civil Manual is based on Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code and since this Court has held that non-framing of points for determination that itself cannot vitiate the well-reasoned judgment of the appellate Court, the aforesaid contention is also required to be rejected and accordingly it is also rejected. 36. Except the contention with regard to the nonjoinder of parties and order 41 Rule 31 CPS, no other contention has been raised in this Second Appeal 37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have reached to the conclusion that this Second Appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. In the result, this Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.