ORDER : This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against an advertisement dated 06-12-2016, by which, the respondent No.3 has initiated the recruitment proceedings for appointment to the post of Field Assistant and Accountant (Class III). The petitioners, two in number, are working as Clerk-cum-Cashier in the services of the Federation and are presently posted at Mahasamund. The petitioners claim was that they are working in the Federation for the last 15 years on temporary basis and presently, they are also member of the Provident Fund Scheme. Case of the petitioners is that in the past, taking into consideration that number of temporary/dailywage employees have been working in the Federation for several years, the service rules were framed providing weightage for work experience. Referring to relevant rules mentioned in Rule 11(e) of the Service Rules, it is submitted that these rules provided weightage of 20 marks of work experience in service as temporary/dailywage basis, so that, they would compete with the candidates from the open market in the matter of direct recruitment. According to petitioners, these service rules were proposed under the resolution passed by the Federation and duly approved by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies. Under the new set up, approved in the year 2007, the post of Field Officer, Accountant (Class III) was to be filled up by way of direct recruitment. Vide resolution dated 16-02-2013, the Board of Directors amended Rule 11(e) and the provision for grant of weightage marks for experience, was added. Those amendments have already been subjected to challenge. The Board of Directors passed a resolution on 01-08-2015, proposing amendment in Rule 11(a), (b), (c) & (d), which related to maximum age, reservation and applicability of other conditions in the matter of recruitment. Further averment is that while proposing amendment in aforesaid clauses of Rule 11, as referred to above, the Board of Directors did not propose any amendment in the existing Rule 11(e) of the relevant service rule, which provided for grant of weightage marks for the work experience. However, when the resolution was sent to the Registrar for approval of the service rules, the Registrar, while granting his approval, amended Rule 11, on his own consideration, which was communicated vide order dated 05-08-2015 (Annexure P/15). However, when the resolution was sent to the Registrar for approval of the service rules, the Registrar, while granting his approval, amended Rule 11, on his own consideration, which was communicated vide order dated 05-08-2015 (Annexure P/15). The petitioners grievance arose at this stage when the Registrar substituted new Rule 11 in place of pre-existing provisions in Rule 11, which is completely different from the scheme of award of weightage marks for experience gained while working as temporary/dailywage employee. This was followed by impugned advertisement, inviting applications for appointment to the post of Field Assistant & Accountant. As the rule no longer provides for grant of weightage marks for work experience, the advertisement also does not provide for any such weightage. It is the aforesaid amendment in Rule 11, vide order dated 05-08-2015 and the impugned advertisement dated 06-12-2016, which is under challenge. 2. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the order of the Registrar dated 05-08-2015, incorporating the newly amended Rule 11 is in excess of power, arbitrary, illegal and is abuse of the its authority to determine the terms and conditions of employees of the Co-operative Society. The petitioners have worked in the Federation since long. If the weightage of experience is not given, the petitioners may not be able to compete with the candidates from open market. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, the proposal for amendment in the existing service rules having been sent to the Registrar, the Registrar could either approve or disapprove the same, but could not have amended the rule of its own. The submission is that the Board of Directors proposed amendment only in Clause(a) to (d) of Rule 11 of the Service Rules. Therefore, the Registrar could either approve or disapprove, but could not amend the entire rule 11, omitting the provision contained in Rule 11(e), which provided for grant of weightage marks for work experience. The Federation did not make any recruitment since long and the petitioners continued without any opportunity to compete in the open recruitment process. If at this stage, the weightage marks are excluded, the petitioners may be ousted from their employment in the event of their non selection. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned amendment is brought only to deprive the petitioners of fair competition with the open market candidates in the matter of direct recruitment. If at this stage, the weightage marks are excluded, the petitioners may be ousted from their employment in the event of their non selection. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned amendment is brought only to deprive the petitioners of fair competition with the open market candidates in the matter of direct recruitment. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Uma Devi and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , it is submitted that as the petitioners have been working in the Federation more than 10 years, they not only entitled to relaxation in age, but also entitled to proper weightage marks. The petitioners are qualified to hold the post and their appointment is not illegal, but only irregular. Relying upon the another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and another vs. Surjit Singh and others, (2017) 1 SCC 148 , it is submitted that the petitioners are entitled to appropriate relief of weightage. It has also been argued that the correctness and validity of the order dated 05-08-2015 of the Registrar amending the rules is essentially an administrative function, and therefore, its correctness and validity is required to be judged as administrative order. Reliance has also been placed on State of Mysore vs. P. R. Kulkarni and others, AIR 1972 SC 2170 and Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 334 . 3. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting respondent No.3- Federation would submit that the power exercised by the Registrar is essentially in the nature of delegated legislature as per the provisions contained in Section 55(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (In short “the Act of 1960”) which confers power on the Registrar to determine the service conditions of the employees of a Co-operative Society. It is argued that the Rule making power is legislative in nature and not administrative. The Registrar is the final authority to frame service rules. Though, the Board of Directors in exercise of power conferred under Section 48(C)(e)(ii) proposed amendment in the Rule, the same is subject to the approval of the Registrar and while considering the matter of approval, the Registrar exercises its power of rule making substantively conferred under Section 55(1) of the Act of 1960. Though, the Board of Directors in exercise of power conferred under Section 48(C)(e)(ii) proposed amendment in the Rule, the same is subject to the approval of the Registrar and while considering the matter of approval, the Registrar exercises its power of rule making substantively conferred under Section 55(1) of the Act of 1960. It is next submitted by learned counsel for respondent No.3 that the existing rules as amended and in force, are not against the constitutional provisions and cannot be said to be repugnant to the provisions of the Act of 1960. The petitioners could not claim, as of right, that they should be granted weightage marks for work experience. Whether or not the weightage of experience should be granted is essentially in the realm of policy of recruitment. The petitioners being daily wage employees cannot claim, as of right, that the services rendered by them as dailywage employees necessarily be regularized and weightage of work experience should be granted to them in the matter of direct recruitment. Grant of any such relaxation, on the contrary, would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is also submitted that the petitioners have been illegally appointed and it being illegal appointment and not irregular, the petitioners cannot seek any direction for consideration of their cases either for weightage marks or for age relaxation, according to judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra), though as per the advertisement, the petitioners are entitled to age relaxation in accordance with the policy of the State Government. 4. In the return filed by the respondents No.1 & 2, order dated 05-08-2015 of the Registrar amending Rule 11 has been defended on similar submissions. Learned State counsel would submit that the Registrar has the power under Section 55(1) of the Act of 1960 to determine the service conditions of the employees of the Co-operative Society. This power of the Registrar is legislative in nature and once the Registrar has framed the rules, upon due consideration of the proposal of the Board of Directors, the same could not be challenged except on limited grounds. He would submit that the rules did not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution nor the provisions of the governing act i.e. Cooperative Society Act, 1960. He would submit that the rules did not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution nor the provisions of the governing act i.e. Cooperative Society Act, 1960. Therefore, merely because the rule does not provide for grant of weightage marks for work experience gained as dailywage employees, it cannot be termed as illegal, arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. P. State Coop. Bank Limited, Bhopal vs. Nanuram Yadav and others, (2007) 8 SCC 264 . 5. Learned counsel for the parties have joined on the issue as to whether exercise undertaken by the Registrar in the matter of exercise of its power in view of the provisions contained under Section 48(C)(e)(ii) is administrative or legislative in nature. While according to the petitioner, the action of the Registrar in carrying out amendment in existing Rule 11(e) of the Service Rules is statutory administrative function, learned counsel for the respondents would argue that this is essentially a legislative function, in particular, exercise of delegated legislative power conferred under the statutory scheme under the Act of 1960 in the matter of determination of service conditions of employees of cooperative society. 6. In order to appreciate the submission of learned counsel for the parties, it would be useful to extract the two relevant provisions dealing with framing of rules/policy governing terms and conditions of employees of co-operative society. 48 (c) Powers of [Board]-- The Board or the [Board] of a society shall in accordance with the bye laws, have power to-- (a) ---- xx ---- (b) ---- xx ---- (c) ---- xx ---- (d) ---- xx ---- (e) frame policies concerning------ (i) ----- xx ---- (ii) qualifications, recruitment, service conditions of the staff and other matters relating to staff with the approval of the Registrar; Section 55. Registrar's power to determine conditions of employment in societies.-(1) The Registrar may, from time to time, frame rules governing the terms and conditions of employment in a society or class of societies and the society or class of societies to which such terms and conditions of employment are applicable shall comply with the order that may be issued by the Registrar in this behalf. A reading of the aforesaid provision under Section 55(1) of the Act of 1960 shows that the legislature has conferred power on the Registrar in the matter of framing of rules, which is a power in the nature of sub-ordinate legislation. The Registrar while exercising aforesaid power acts as delegate of legislature. Primary legislation has been framed by the State legislature wherein, under the aforesaid scheme, the legislature has delegated to the Registrar, legislative power of framing of service rules. A bare reading of the said provision undoubtedly establishes that this is not an administrative function to be performed by the Registrar under the Act of 1960, but it is legislative in nature. Indeed, this is no longer res integra in view of the decision of this Court in the case of P. N. Upadhyay vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others and batch of petitions (WP(S)No.5672 of 2014 and batch of petitions, decided on 15-12-2015), wherein, relying upon the earlier decisions of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the cases of Hemant Kumar Ganga Prasad Gupta vs. President, District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. And others, 1983 MPLJ 461 and Bikal Bihari Soni and others vs. State of M.P. And others, 1986 MPLJ 347, it has been authoritatively pronounced that the rule framed under Section 55(1) of the Act of 1960 is in the nature of legislative power delegated to him by the Act and distinguished him from the executive power or quasi judicial function. In the aforesaid judgment, judgment of Full Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Sevaram Totaram Pargir vs. Board of Revenue, M.P. Gwalior and another, 1983 MPLJ 645 was also relied upon to hold that the rule framed under Section 55(1) of the Act of 1960 are statutory in nature and they cannot be equated with bye laws framed for internal management. 7. While the power of the Registrar to frame rules under Section 55(1) of the Act of 1960 stands as above, there is corresponding provision contained in Section 48(C), which deals with power of the Board, reproduced hereinabove. A close analysis of the aforesaid provision reveals that in so far as framing of policies concerning qualification, recruitment, service conditions of the staff and other matters relating to staff are concerned, it requires approval of the Registrar. A close analysis of the aforesaid provision reveals that in so far as framing of policies concerning qualification, recruitment, service conditions of the staff and other matters relating to staff are concerned, it requires approval of the Registrar. It would be worth noticeable that as far as other powers of the Board of the Society which relates to matters contained under Section 48C (a) (b) (c) (d) & (e) (i)(iii)(iv)(v) & (vi), the Board enjoys all statutory power in respect of the matters enumerated in the aforesaid clause. However, framing of policy relating to service conditions of the staff of the society is subject to the approval of the Registrar. The aforesaid two provisions, one under Section 55(1) and other under Section 48(C)(e)(ii) when read in juxtaposition, mean that the final authority in the matter of laying down terms and conditions of the services of the employees/staff of the society vests in the Registrar. The aforesaid two provisions are not in conflict with each other but are required to be construed harmoniously. At this juncture, it is relevant to state cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that the provisions of an enactment have to be read together to give effect to each of the provisions. In this regard, the principle propounded by the Supreme Court in the cases of State of AP vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao, (1964) 3 SCR 297 , is as below:- “26... it is a rule of construction that all the provisions of a statute are to be read together and given effect to and that it is therefore, the duty of the Court to construe a statute harmoniously..” In another decision in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan vs. Mohd. Shafi, (2001) 8 SCC 540 , the principle was propounded in a following manner:- “8. ----- The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “dead letter” is not harmonious construction.” 8. The aforesaid principles of statutory interpretation require this Court to read the provisions harmoniously to find out the scheme of statute. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “dead letter” is not harmonious construction.” 8. The aforesaid principles of statutory interpretation require this Court to read the provisions harmoniously to find out the scheme of statute. Interpreted in this manner, two provisions referred to hereinabove, have to be interpreted in the manner that the power of framing of service rules in the matter of service conditions of the employees of the Co-operative society vests with the Registrar of the Co-operative Society. While under Section 55(1) of the Act of 1960, the Registrar may, on its own motion, frame rules determining service conditions, the Board of Directors of a society has also been given a parallel power to propose service conditions of the employees which ultimately will have to be approved by the Registrar meaning thereby it is the Registrar, who enjoys the final authority under the Scheme of the Act to lay down the terms and conditions of services of the employees of the Co-operative Society. Therefore, whether it is a case of framing of service rules under Section 55(1) of the Act of 1960 of granting approval to any suggested policy governing terms and conditions of the employees/staff of the Society with or without any modification, the Registrar essentially acts as delegate of the legislature. In both the cases, it would be a matter of exercise of delegated legislative function. 9. Therefore, I am unable to accept the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that while granting approval under Section 48 (C)(e)(ii) of the Act of 1960, the nature of exercise of power is administrative. Therefore, in this regard, contention of learned counsel for the respondents has to be accepted and upheld. 10. Having held so, the next issue arising for consideration is as to what is the scope of interference by this Court when challenge is laid to a legislation or delegated legislation, as in the case in hand. The legal position in this regard is also no longer res integra and in plethora of decisions of the Supreme Court, it has been succinctly held that this Court could interfere only when legislation or delegated legislation is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of India or where it lacks competence. The legal position in this regard is also no longer res integra and in plethora of decisions of the Supreme Court, it has been succinctly held that this Court could interfere only when legislation or delegated legislation is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of India or where it lacks competence. In case of delegated legislation, it would be open to attack on the ground that it is in excess of the power conferred under the governing Act or while framing or while exercising legislative power any of the provisions of the governing Act have been violated. Judicial review is permissible to examine whether rules or regulations made by the executive or any other are within their statutory power. Please see-Bhim Sen vs. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 435 . It has also been held that A delegate must exercise power to make rules strictly within the limits of the authority conferred by the Act. If the authority transcends the limits of power in making a rule, that rule will be declared ultra vires and consequently invalid by the courts in judicial review. Please see: State of Kerala vs. K.M.C. Abdulla & Co., AIR 1965 SC 1585 . It has also been held that A delegate acts ultra vires when it acts in excess of his power or when he abuses his power by acting in bad faith or for an inadmissible purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant consideration or with gross unreasonableness. Please see: Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1277 . 11. Applying the aforesaid principles laying down contours of judicial review, it has to be examined whether the Registrar has violated the provisions of the governing Act i.e. the Co-operative Society Act while modifying and substituting new Rule 11(e) in place of earlier rules. 12. Please see: Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1277 . 11. Applying the aforesaid principles laying down contours of judicial review, it has to be examined whether the Registrar has violated the provisions of the governing Act i.e. the Co-operative Society Act while modifying and substituting new Rule 11(e) in place of earlier rules. 12. It is not in dispute that prior to amendment, as communicated vide letter dated 05-08-2015 of the Registrar, Rule 11 (e) of Chhattisgarh State Cooperative Marketing Federation Service Rules, 2007, stood as below:- ^^lh/kh HkrhZ gsrq lekpkj i= rFkk jkstxkj dk;kZy; ls uke vkeaf=r fd;s tk,xsaA fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa izkIr vkosnuksa@ukeksa dks ,d iath esa ntZ fd;k tk,xk rFkk izkIr vkosnuksa@ukeksa dh esfjV fyLV rS;kj djus ds vk/kkj fuEukuqlkj gksxk%& 1- U;wure 'kS{kf.kd vgrkZ dh ijh{kk esa izkIrkadksa 2-5 izfr'kr vadks dks 1 vad nsrs gq, vf/kdre 40 vadA 2- izca/kdh; in gsrq izca/kdh; Lukrd@fMIyksek rFkk vU; inksa gsrq dEI;wVj Lukrd@fMIyksek 25 vadA izca/ku@dEI;wVj esa LukrdksRrj fMxzh/kkjh dks 25 vad feysaxsa] tcfd LukrdksRrj fMIyksek/kkjh dks vf/kdre 15 vad feysaxsaA 3- dk;kZuqHko la?k ds ckgj dk;ksZ dk 15 vad rFkk la?k esa fd;s x;s dk;ksZ gsrq 20 vadA 'ks"k 15 vad lk{kkRdkj gsrq fu;e gksaxsaA lk{kkRdkj ds fy;s ,d fjDr in ds fo:} 3 mEehnokj] 'kS{kf.kd vgZrk] izca/kdh;@dEI;wVj vgZrk rFkk dk;kZuqHko ds vadksa ds vk/kkj ij cqyk, tk,axsaA** 13. Earlier the rules provided for grant of weightage marks for working experience gained within or outside the Federation. The scheme was that weightage marks were to be given towards working experience outside the Federation whereas 20 marks provided as weightage marks towards working experience gained within the Federation. 14. It appears that the Board of Directors of the Federation in its meeting dated 01-08-2015 proposed certain amendments in the existing rules. Amongst other things, amendments were proposed in Rule 11 ¼v] c] l] n½ , there was no amendment in the existing rule 11(e). 14. It appears that the Board of Directors of the Federation in its meeting dated 01-08-2015 proposed certain amendments in the existing rules. Amongst other things, amendments were proposed in Rule 11 ¼v] c] l] n½ , there was no amendment in the existing rule 11(e). However, when it was sent for consideration and approval of the Registrar, the Registrar invoked its jurisdiction under Section 55(1) read with Section 48(C)(e)(ii) of the Act modifying the existing Rule 11 as a whole, as below:- ^^lh/kh Hkjrh ds inksa ds fy, mEehnokjksa dh vgZrk,a lsokfu;e ds vuq:i rFkk vkj{k.k rFkk vk;q laca/kh vgZrk,a le;≤ ij N-x- 'kklu ds lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx }kjk tkjh funsZ'kksa ds vuq:i gksaxs rFkk mEehnokjksa dk NRrhlx<+ dk ewy fuoklh gksuk vfuok;Z gSA 2- izFke Js.kh] f}rh; Js.kh rFkk r`rh; Js.kh dk;Zikfyd inksa ds fy, mEehnokjksa dk p;u ljdkjh fu;qfDr ,tsUlh ds ek/;e ls vFkok foi.ku la?k ds iz'kkldh; lfefr ds ek/;e ls fd;k tk;sxkA r`rh; Js.kh ds 'ks"k inksa ij ,oa prqFkZ Js.kh ds inksa ij p;u lsokfu;e dh dafMdk 8 ds vuqlkj ukekafdr lfefr }kjk dh tk;sxhA 3- ljdkjh fu;qfDr ,tsUlh }kjk p;u djus dh fLFkfr esa ,tsalh }kjk izfr;ksxh ijh{kk ds ek/;e ls p;u lwph rS;kjh dj foi.ku la?k dks miyC/k djkbZ tk;sxhA 4- foi.ku la?k }kjk iz'kkldh; lfefr ds ek/;e ls Hkjrh fd;s tkus dh fLFkfr esa] iath;d }kjk vuqeksnu i'pkr] izfØz;k dk ikyu djrs gq, mEehnokjksa dk p;u fd;k tk;sxkA** It would thus appear that though the Board of Directors had suggested certain amendments in respect of only a part of the existing rules, the Registrar having considered the entire aspect of the matter amended the existing rule in the manner provided as above, which also omitted the earlier scheme of providing weightage marks. As far as age relaxation was concerned, it is now provided that eligibility with regard to age would be those provided in the instructions issued from time to time by the General Administration Department, State of Chhattisgarh. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out as to how this exercise of power to determine terms and conditions of the services of the employees of the Co-operative society was in violation of the any of the provisions of the Act of 1960. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out as to how this exercise of power to determine terms and conditions of the services of the employees of the Co-operative society was in violation of the any of the provisions of the Act of 1960. There is nothing in the provisions contained under Section 48(C), which even remotely suggest that the Registrar was bound to approve the amendments in the service rules only in the manner proposed by the Board of Directors of the Federation. Once, it has been held that in both the situations i.e. while framing service rules under Section 55(1) of the Act of 1960 or while granting approval as envisaged in Section 48(C)(e)(ii) of the Act of 1960, the Registrar exercises sub-ordinate legislative function, his power to amend the existing rules is untrammeled and uncontrolled much less confined to suggested amendments by the Board of Directors of the Society. While examining the proposal for amendment, the Registrar has authority and jurisdiction to give a fresh look on the entire scheme of the rules and the scheme itself may be modified or completely substituted by a new rule with regard to recruitment and eligibility, qualification, age criteria and all other connected and incidental matters relating to appointment, recruitment and other terms and conditions of service. There is no reason to accept the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that amendment in the rule beyond what has been proposed would be in excess of power of the Registrar. Putting such a fetter would be curtailing the unlimited power of the Registrar to determine terms and conditions of the services of the employees of the Co-operative Society. This could be done only by the Legislature. Neither expressly nor by any necessary implication, conjoint reading of Section 55(1) and Section 48(C) (e)(ii) of the Act of 1960 suggests such restriction/fetter on the power of the Registrar. 15. How the amendment now doing away with the scheme of grant of weightage marks is unconstitutional could not be established by learned counsel for the petitioner. It is an admitted position that the petitioners were not selected by any open direct recruitment, but were employed as dailywage/temporary employees. Grant of weightage marks for experience gained by dailywage/temporary employee which is in the nature of backdoor appointment, would amount to putting premium on irregular if not illegal, appointment. It is an admitted position that the petitioners were not selected by any open direct recruitment, but were employed as dailywage/temporary employees. Grant of weightage marks for experience gained by dailywage/temporary employee which is in the nature of backdoor appointment, would amount to putting premium on irregular if not illegal, appointment. There were many more eligible candidates in the open market awaiting for opportunity to compete for appointment to those posts, occupied by the petitioners, under an open advertisement inviting applications from the open market. Indeed, grant of such weightage marks would be violative of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. 16. I must hasten to add here that the present is not a case where the petitioners are claiming regularization in service. Consideration in the matter of claim of regularization of services, may be different. Present is a matter where challenge is laid to service rules on the ground that it does not provide weightage marks for work experience gained as temporary/dailywage employee. 17. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relied upon directions, as one time measure, for consideration of regularization, by the Supreme Court in paras 53 & 54 of the Constitutional Judgment in the case of Uma Devi (supra), as under :- 53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. NARAYANAPPA (supra), R.N. NANJUNDAPPA (supra), and B.N. NAGARAJAN (supra), and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. 54. It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision, or in which directions running counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their status as precedents.” It is to be borne in mind that Their Lordships in the Supreme Court were considering the issue of regularization of services of dailywage employees. In respect of those appointments which were irregular as distinguished from illegal, directions were issued to consider the cases of regularization of those, who had continued in service for a long time by granting proper relaxation, which will have no application in the present case. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision in the case of State of Mysore vs. P. R. Kulkarni and others, AIR 1972 SC 2170 and Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 334 , to draw support to his submission that the Registrar has abused its power and the same is otherwise arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 19. 19. In view of the discussions as above, I am unable to uphold that the Registrar has acted in excess of power or abused its authority under the law for the purpose other than the purpose it was granted or that the rule is in any manner violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 20. Reliance on the verdict in the case of State of Karnataka vs. M. L. Kesarim, (2010) 9 SCC 247 is also misplaced. That was a case dealing with the case of regularization. In the present petition in hand, the challenge is to the validity of the recruitment rules. Even if for the sake of argument, it is accepted that the appointment of the petitioners was not illegal but only irregular, that would be a matter of consideration relevant to petitioner's claim for regularization in service but of no avail in the matter of challenge to the legality and validity of the service rules laying down the terms and conditions of eligibility for recruitment. 21. Lastly, the claim of age relaxation has also been made by the petitioner relying upon the decision in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Suresh Kumar Verma and another, AIR 1996 SC 1565 . That was a case where the dailywage employees were terminated due to coming to end of project, in which, they were employed. It was held that the Court cannot give any direction to re-engage them without any work or appoint them against existing vacancies, otherwise, judicial process would become other mode of recruitment dehors the rules. On facts, it was stated before the Court that such employees had become overage, it was observed that if they apply for regular appointment, by which time if they become barred by age, the State was directed to consider necessary relaxation of their age to the extent of their period of service on daily wages and then to consider their cases according to rules, if they are otherwise eligible. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the newly amended provision, provides for age relaxation, according to policy of age relaxation, promulgated by the State in its circulars from time to time. It will be open for the petitioner to claim age relaxation in accordance with the existing policies provided that they have applied for recruitment under the impugned advertisement dated 06-02-2016. 22. It will be open for the petitioner to claim age relaxation in accordance with the existing policies provided that they have applied for recruitment under the impugned advertisement dated 06-02-2016. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent No.3, referring to the specific averment made in the reply stated that the age relaxation as is given by the State Government, would also be available for the petitioners. Before parting with the case, it needs to be clarified that the petitioners neither raised any claim of regularization nor this Court has examined petitioners entitlement for regularization in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra) or any other decision. 23. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Interim order passed in this case is hereby vacated.