JUDGMENT : JOYMALYA BAGCHI, J. 1. The appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 25.02.2016 & 26.02.2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, 2nd Court, Alipore in Sessions Trial No.6(2) of 2011 and Sessions Case No.27(12) of 2010 convicting the appellant for commission of offence punishable under Sections 498A/302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- in default of fine to suffer further simple imprisonment for five months for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- in default of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for five months more under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, both the sentences will run concurrently. 2. Prosecution case as levelled against the appellant is to the effect that the appellant was married to Aklima, daughter of Nayeb, P.W.5 on 18.03.2009. At the time of marriage, a motorcycle, gold ornaments and other articles were gifted to the appellant. The appellant was employed in the armed forces and was posted at Jammu and Kashmir. After marriage Aklima started residing at her matrimonial home at village Golapara, P.O. Golapara, P.S. Abhyapuri, Dist. Bongaigaon, Assam. Few months after the marriage appellant and other in-laws started mental and physical torture upon Aklima on demand of a sum of Rs.30,000/-. Due to such torture father of Aklima, P.W.5 went to her matrimonial home to negotiate and saw Aklima was tortured in his presence and as a result he brought back his daughter to his residence. Subsequently, upon negotiation an agreement was executed between the appellant on the one hand and P.W.5, father of Aklima on the other hand wherein the appellant admitted that Aklima would not be tortured and would stay with the appellant at his place of work. On such undertaking she returned to the matrimonial home. Thereafter Aklima started residing with the appellant at Command Hospital Complex, Alipore. Prior to the incident, P.W.5 received a phone call that the appellant was again tortured Aklima. He had even threatened to throw her from the 6th floor apartment where they were residing. Hearing this father of Aklima, P.W.5 and his brother-in-law P.W.6 came to Calcutta from Assam. Thereafter Aklima started residing with the appellant at Command Hospital Complex, Alipore. Prior to the incident, P.W.5 received a phone call that the appellant was again tortured Aklima. He had even threatened to throw her from the 6th floor apartment where they were residing. Hearing this father of Aklima, P.W.5 and his brother-in-law P.W.6 came to Calcutta from Assam. On 18.08.2010 they went to the residence of the appellant and was informed by Aklima that she has been assaulted by the appellant. Subsequently, the appellant came with three military officers including one Hav- C. Angapan (P.W.12), Habilder S.N. Singh, Nayek U.S. Sahu and they informed P.W.5 that there was misunderstanding between the appellant and the victim and the incident will not be repeated. Thereafter, P.W.5 and 6 went to sleep in one room while the couple retired to bed in another room. All of them woke up at 3.45 A.M. as they were observing “Roja”. There are two bedrooms in the flat of the apartment and a veranda which was visible from both the rooms. At 6 A.M. appellant left for his duty. Around 7.30 A.M. P.W.5 heard a scream of his daughter that “he is throwing me down”. Peeping from the window of his room, P.W.5 saw the outstrached hands of the appellant at the side of the veranda. Thereafter, appellant withdrew his hands and fled away. Simultaneously, they heard a thud. P.W.5 & P.W.6 chased the appellant downstairs and when they reached the ground floor they found Aklima lying below the veranda in a bleeding condition. Appellant fled away to his office. P.W.5 & P.W.6 picked up Aklima. Jawans also came to the spot and the victim was taken to Command Hospital in a white sumo. Subsequently, Aklima was admitted at Command Hospital by P.W.10. P.W.5 made a statement to the police officer at the hospital which was registered as F.I.R. being Alipore P.S. Case No.184 dated 19.08.2010 under Section 498A/307 of the IPC. Subsequently Aklima expired on 28.08.2010 and Section 302 of the IPC was added. In the course of investigation P.W.18, I.O. made a requisition to the commanding officer for handing over custody of the appellant. He was medically examined in the course of investigation and injuries were found on his body. Subsequently Aklima expired on 28.08.2010 and Section 302 of the IPC was added. In the course of investigation P.W.18, I.O. made a requisition to the commanding officer for handing over custody of the appellant. He was medically examined in the course of investigation and injuries were found on his body. In the course of investigation TI parade was held and P.W 2, a labour working at the place of occurrence, identified the appellant as person who threw a lady from the sixth floor of the building and ran away. In conclusion of investigation, charge sheet was filed under sections 498A/302 IPC against the appellant. The case being a sessions triable one, was committed to the Court of Sessions and transferred to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court II, Alipore, South 24 Pgs for trial and disposal. Charges were framed under the aforesaid sections. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In the course of trial, prosecution examined 20 witnesses and exhibited a number of documents. It was the specific defence of the appellant that the relationship between the appellant and the victim was cordial and he was on duty at the time when the victim had suffered a fall from the veranda. He, however, did not examine any witness to probabilise such defence. In conclusion of trial, the trial Judge by the impugned judgement and order dated 25/26.2.2016 convicted and sentenced the appellant, as aforesaid. 3. Mr. Bhattacharya, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstances relied on by the trial judge had neither been proved nor did they form a complete chain pointing to the guilt of the appellant. Although P.Ws 5 and 6 claimed to be eye-witnesses who had seen the appellant throw the victim from the veranda of his apartment, it was reported in the medical papers at the command hospital that the victim had suffered “accidental fall”. It is pertinent to note that the aforesaid version of P.W 5 and 6 is in clear contradiction to the FIR as well as their earlier statement before the police. Recording of FIR is shrouded in mystery and it is unclear when P.W 5 the appellant was arrested from the custody of the commanding officer, the latter not being examined in this case. Recording of FIR is shrouded in mystery and it is unclear when P.W 5 the appellant was arrested from the custody of the commanding officer, the latter not being examined in this case. No investigation was done with regard to the place where the victim allegedly fall from the veranda of the six-storied apartment and no blood was collected from the place of occurrence. Medical papers relating to the treatment of the victim have also not been seized. He vehemently argued that no reliance ought to be placed on the evidence of P.W 2, a chance witness, as his presence at the place of occurrence is improbabilised by the version of his employer, P.W 4 who stated that the site of work was outside the compound of the command hospital and the same was separated by a boundary wall. T.I parade was held two months after the incident and suffers from various infirmities. On the other hand, P.W 18 in cross examination admitted that the documents show that the appellant was on duty on the fateful day between 6 am to 12.30 p.m. clearly improbabilises the prosecution case. Evidences of P.W 7 and 8 with regard to the drafting and execution of the agreement between the appellant and P.W 5 relating to the torture of the victim is highly improbable. Evidence of P.W 12 also does not inspire confidence. On the other hand, it establishes the fact that the appellant had informed about the accidental fall of his wife at the earliest opportunity which is also reflected in the medical papers contemporaneously prepared at the command hospital even prior to the lodging of FIR. Hence, the prosecution case is liable to be rejected and the appellant is entitled to an order of acquittal. He supplemented his oral argument with written statement. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Panda, learned Counsel appearing for the State submitted that presence of P.W 5 and 6 at the place of occurrence has been admitted by the appellant himself in his examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. P.W 5 stated that he heard a cry from his daughter and thereafter had seen the appellant lift his wife and throw her from the veranda. His version is corroborated by P.W 6. Evidence of the aforesaid witnesses is corroborated by P.W 2, a local labourer who was present at the spot. His version is corroborated by P.W 6. Evidence of the aforesaid witnesses is corroborated by P.W 2, a local labourer who was present at the spot. All these witnesses clearly deposed that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence and had thrown his wife from the veranda. Their versions were corroborated by P.W 12, a colleague of the appellant attached to the armed force who claimed that soon after the incident the appellant rushed to his office in a perplexed manner and informed him about the incident. Ocular versions of the aforesaid witnesses have been corroborated by the medical evidence of P.W 10, 11 and 14. Moreover, injuries were found on the body of the appellant as appearing from the evidence of P.W 17 probabilising the prosecution case of skirmish immediately prior to the incident. Minor contradictions or inconsistencies do not erode the consistent versions of the prosecution witnesses. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. (a) Evidence on Record: 5. P.W.1, Narayan Barua is a photographer attached to D.D. Lalbazar. He took photographs of the building, room and the verandah. He proved the photographs marked Ext.1 to 6. 6. P.W.2, Basu Das was a labourer working in the compound of Command Hospital. He saw a man in military dress throw a woman from the 5/6th floor of the building. When he rushed to the spot, he noticed the woman was lying in a bleeding condition on the ground and the said man ran away. 7. P.W.3, Md. Sultan is the labour contractor who supplied labour including P.W.2 for construction work of Command Hospital by P.W.4, Jashmin Sing Chowdhury. 8. P.W.5, Md. Nayeb Ali is the father of the victim Aklima and the de facto complainant in this case. He deposed of torture on the victim on demands of money at her matrimonial home at Kolgachia, Dimapur and that a salish was held in connection with such dispute. An agreement (Ext.8/4) was executed between the appellant and himself, which was drafted by a lawyer (P.W.8) and witnessed by a local person (P.W.7). In that agreement the appellant agreed not to torture the victim in future. Subsequently, the couple started residing in the official quarter in the 6th floor of Command Hospital Complex. He received telephone call that his daughter was again being tortured. On 18.8.2010 he and his brother-in-law (P.W.6) came to the residence of the appellant. In that agreement the appellant agreed not to torture the victim in future. Subsequently, the couple started residing in the official quarter in the 6th floor of Command Hospital Complex. He received telephone call that his daughter was again being tortured. On 18.8.2010 he and his brother-in-law (P.W.6) came to the residence of the appellant. Colleagues of the appellant including P.W.12, C. Angappa came to his house and assured him that the matter would be settled. Next day, that is 19.8.2010 in the morning P.W.5 saw the appellant heard his daughter shout “he is throwing me down” and then saw the appellant threw the victim from the verandah of his room. Thereafter, the appellant ran away to his office. Victim was lying in the ground writhing in pain. A jawan shifted her to Command Hospital. He went to the hospital. He made a statement to the police at the hospital which was treated as F.I.R. (Ext.9). His daughter died at the hospital on 28.8.2010. P.W.6, Ismail Hossain his brother-in-law and P.W.9, Maymana Khatoon, his wife have corroborated his evidence. 9. P.W.10, Major Deepti Sahran who is a doctor admitted Aklima at Command Hospital. She deposed the victim was unable to speak. 10. P.W.14, Lieutenant Colonel Manoj Kumar, another doctor who declared the victim dead on 28.8.2010. 11. P.W.13, Satyajit Banerjee held inquest over the body of the victim (Ext.16). 12. P.W.11, Dr. Bikash Mukherjee held the post-mortem (Ext.15) and found multiple injuries with severe fractures. 13. P.W.12, C. Angappa a colleague of the appellant deposed that he had gone to the appellant’s house on 18.8.2010 and had intervened in the dispute between the couple in the presence of P.W.5. On the next day around 07.30 AM, appellant came to his office in a perplexed manner and informed his wife had suffered a fall from his room. He asked the appellant why he did not take his wife to hospital. 14. P.W.15, Ganesh Ch. Garai is the plan maker who prepared final and blue print map of the quarter and the ground floor of the building (Ext.20/1 and 20/2). 15. P.W.16, Sandip Karmakar held T.I. Parade of the appellant wherein P.W.2 identified him (Ext.21). 16. P.W.17, Dr. Uma Prasanna Ghosal medically examined the appellant on 19.8.2010 after his arrest and found nail marks and abrasions on his body (Ext.22). 17. 15. P.W.16, Sandip Karmakar held T.I. Parade of the appellant wherein P.W.2 identified him (Ext.21). 16. P.W.17, Dr. Uma Prasanna Ghosal medically examined the appellant on 19.8.2010 after his arrest and found nail marks and abrasions on his body (Ext.22). 17. P.W.18, Acwoa Singh is the investigating officer who conducted investigation and submitted charge-sheet. 18. It may be profitable to break down the prosecution case into the following stages to enable oneself to assess where it has been proved beyond doubt. (b) Torture upon the victim by the appellant 19. Evidence of P.W 5, 6 and 9 are relevant in this regard. P.W 5 is the father of the victim and the de facto complainant in the instant case. He deposed that the victim was married to the appellant on 18.3.2009 as per Muslim rites and customs. He proved the kabilnama (Ext 7). After marriage victim started residing at her matrimonial home at Kalgachi, Dimapur. She complained of torture by the appellant and other in-laws. P.W 5 along with his wife P.W 9 went to the paternal home in order to negotiate the matter. Local people were also requested to intervene and a salish was held. Subsequently, an agreement was executed by the appellant at the one hand and P.W 9 on the other. In the agreement the appellant undertook not to torture his wife, stay with her peacefully and keep her with him. Drafting and execution of the aforesaid agreement is corroborated by P.W 7 who was a witness to the said agreement and P.W.8, a lawyer who had drafted the same. Subsequent to the aforesaid arrangement, the couple started residing at the flat in the sixth floor at command hospital complex at Alipore in Kolkata. Few days prior to the incident, P.W 5 received a phone call that the victim was again being tortured by the appellant. On receiving of such telephonic message, he immediately rushed to Kolkata along with his brother in-law, P.W 6. Coming to Kolkata they went to the residence of the appellant. On 18.8.2010 in the morning three colleagues of the appellant including P.W 12, came to the residence of the appellant and assured P.W.5 that the matter would be settled. It has been contended that the aforesaid agreement was not proved in accordance with law. Coming to Kolkata they went to the residence of the appellant. On 18.8.2010 in the morning three colleagues of the appellant including P.W 12, came to the residence of the appellant and assured P.W.5 that the matter would be settled. It has been contended that the aforesaid agreement was not proved in accordance with law. It is also argued that there was cordial relation between the couple as P.W.5 and 6 resided in the flat of the appellant and all of them had food together in the morning prior to observing ‘Roja’ immediately prior to the incident improbabilise the strain relationship between the couple. 20. I am unable to accept such contentions. Evidence of the parents and other relations of the victim with regard to torture is contemporaneously reflected in the agreement dated 12th July, 2010 executed by and between the appellant and P.W.5. It was drafted by a lawyer (P.W.8) and also witnessed by a local person (P.W.7). That apart, immediately prior to the incident on 18th August, 2010 P.W.12 and some of his colleagues had come to the house of the appellant and had assured P.W.5 that the matter would be settled. The aforesaid facts clearly show that the allegations of torture upon the victim by the appellant is not only established by her relations but also corroborated by contemporaneous document and the independent versions of P.Ws.7, 8 and 12. Hence, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has been able to prove that the victim was subjected to torture and ill-treatment by the appellant during her matrimonial life till her death in the morning of 19th August, 2010. (c) Death of the Victim: Whether accidental or homicidal 21. It is the prosecution case that the victim died at Command Hospital on 28.8.2010. Death Certificate of the victim had been issued by Lieutenant Colonel Manoj Kumar (P.W.14) who deposed that on 28th August, 2010 at 17.30 hours upon getting a call from ICU he examined the patient Aklima Khatoon and declared her dead. P.W.10, Major Deepti Sahran deposed that on 19.8.2010 she had admitted Aklima Khatoon who was brought by a sepai driver K. Kushwaha of Command Hospital and her father P.W.5. P.W.10, Major Deepti Sahran deposed that on 19.8.2010 she had admitted Aklima Khatoon who was brought by a sepai driver K. Kushwaha of Command Hospital and her father P.W.5. A medico legal case was initiated and on examination it was found that she sustained head injuries, lacerated wound on left side of face, right arm, deformity and swelling of left arm and left thigh, multiple broken teeth, sluggish reaction to light. She proved her report (Ext.18). Patient was unable to understand anything and was making inappropriate responses. Patient was brought to the emergency room with history of accidental fall from 6th floor of II Lines, Block No.127 at Command Hospital with multiple injuries. After her demise, P.W.11, Dr. Bikash Mukherjee conducted post mortem of the victim and found following injuries :- 1. Abrasion 2 inch x 2 inch over right knee 2. Fracture lower 1/3rd of shaft of left femur 3. Fracture upper part of left humerus 4. Fracture middle part of mandible 5. 3 inch x 2 inch bruise right temporal skull region 6. 4 inch x 4 inch bruise right side of mandible 7. Right chest 10 inch x 8 inch bruise 8. Right lung bruise 9. Right kidney bruise 10. one to ten ribs fracture right chest wall 11. Rupture of liver 12. Evidence of subdural haemorrhage with collection of blood and fluid under the right hemisphere of brain. 22. He opined that the death was due to above-noted injuries which are ante mortem in nature. 23. P.Ws.5 and 6 deposed that on the date of the incident they were present in the flat at the 6th floor of the apartment. They were sleeping in one room while the appellant and the victim were sleeping in the other room. All of them woke up at 3.45 a.m. in order to have their food as they were observing roza. At 6.00 a.m. the appellant left for his duty. Thereafter he returned to his quarter at 7.30 a.m. and P.W.5 heard a scream from his daughter “He is throwing me down”. Then P.W.s5 and 6 saw the appellant taking the victim in his lap and throwing her from the verandah of the room. Thereafter the appellant ran downstairs. They followed him and when they reached downstairs, they found Aklima lying in a bleeding condition. The appellant fled away. Then P.W.s5 and 6 saw the appellant taking the victim in his lap and throwing her from the verandah of the room. Thereafter the appellant ran downstairs. They followed him and when they reached downstairs, they found Aklima lying in a bleeding condition. The appellant fled away. With the help of a jawan they removed the victim to Command Hospital where she died in ten days. Evidence of the aforesaid witnesses are corroborated by that of P.W.2, a labour who was working under P.W.4 in the quarter compound of Command Hospital. He deposed that he saw a person in military uniform throwing a woman from the 5th storey of the building to the ground floor. He rushed to the spot and found that the lady was twisting in pain. Two persons came to the ground floor and ran towards the lady while the man in military uniform ran away from the spot. 24. The aforesaid evidence of P.Ws.2, 5 and 6 shows that the victim had been thrown from the verandah of the apartment by the appellant and thereby had suffered multiple injuries. Their ocular version is corroborated by the medical evidence of P.Ws.10 and 11 that the victim had suffered severe injuries and multiple fractures on her body. In the face of the aforesaid evidence on record, I find little substance in the argument on behalf of the appellant that the prosecution case ought to be disbelieved as the place where the victim had fallen from the apartment of the 6th storeyed building had not been identified by the Investigating Officer or blood had not been collected from the spot. 25. It is pertinent to note that even the appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had admitted that the victim had fallen from his 6th storeyed apartment and had suffered injuries and died. 26. It is without doubt that the victim had suffered a fall and died. The moot question is whether the victim fell accidentally or had been thrown by the appellant from the verandah of his 6th storeyed apartment. 27. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant argued that he was not at all present at the spot when the victim died. 26. It is without doubt that the victim had suffered a fall and died. The moot question is whether the victim fell accidentally or had been thrown by the appellant from the verandah of his 6th storeyed apartment. 27. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant argued that he was not at all present at the spot when the victim died. He was, in fact, in office and it has been admitted in cross examination by P.W.18 that the records show that he was on duty between 6.00 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. Moreover, the evidence of P.Ws.2, 5 and 6 suffer from various infirmities and ought not to be relied upon as gospel truth. P.W.2 is a labourer employed under P.W.4 who claimed that the site of work was beside the building of the Command Hospital and the building from which the lady fell was beyond the compound and is intervened by boundary wall. 28. It is also argued that P.W.2 was unsure as to the time when the incident occurred. Identification of the appellant by P.W.2 is also fraught with defects. With regard to P.Ws.5 and 6, it has been argued that they have improved their versions at various stages. Although P.W.5 accompanied the victim to the Command Hospital, it is reflected in the medical records (Ext.14) that the victim suffered accidental fall. Had P.W.5 seen the incident of throwing of the victim by the appellant, such fact would certainly not have been reflected in the medical papers. 29. Furthermore, version of P.W.5 with regard to the incident is inconsistent with his version in FIR. Hence, P.W.5 is not an eyewitness and cannot be relied upon. Similarly, P.W.6 did not state to the Investigating Officer that he had seen the appellant lift the victim to his lap and threw her from the verandah. 30. I have given our anxious consideration to the aforesaid submissions on behalf of the appellant. It is true neither P.W.5 nor P.W.6 stated in the FIR or in their previous statement to the police that they have seen the appellant lift the victim and throw her from the verandah. 30. I have given our anxious consideration to the aforesaid submissions on behalf of the appellant. It is true neither P.W.5 nor P.W.6 stated in the FIR or in their previous statement to the police that they have seen the appellant lift the victim and throw her from the verandah. However, P.W.5 in his first information report stated that he heard the victim cry “he is throwing me down” and thereafter from the window of his room saw the hands of the appellant at the side of the verandah and soon thereafter the hands were withdrawn and he heard a loud thud. Thereafter, the appellant ran from his apartment to the ground floor. Following him downstairs, P.W.5 saw his daughter lying in bleeding condition and writhing in pain on the ground. The appellant ran away from the spot. 31. If the evidence of P.W.5 is tested in the backdrop of the aforesaid version narrated by him in the first information report recorded by P.W.18 at the Command Hospital, I have no doubt in my mind that he had heard the victim exclaim that she was being thrown downstairs and also had noted the presence of the appellant in the room where the incident happened. He had also seen the appellant running away from the spot. This version of P.W.5 is corroborated by P.W.6. It is the duty of the court to sift the evidence on record and separate the gain from the chaff. Evidence of witnesses ought not to be rejected in toto although they may have exaggerated facts. Embellishments and exaggerations from their earlier versions may be ignored but the crux of their depositions which is in sync with their earlier statements ought not be rejected. The principle of ‘falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus’ is not strictly adhered to in our jurisprudence. At this juncture, one may profitably recount the opinion of the Privy Council in Bankim Bihari Maiti vs. Shrimati Matangini Dase, AIR (1919) PC 157. “in India litigation it is not safe to assume that a case must be a false case if some of the evidence in support of it appears to be doubtful or is clearly untrue. There is on some occasions a tendency amongst litigants in India, as elsewhere, to back up a good case by false or exaggerated evidence 32. “in India litigation it is not safe to assume that a case must be a false case if some of the evidence in support of it appears to be doubtful or is clearly untrue. There is on some occasions a tendency amongst litigants in India, as elsewhere, to back up a good case by false or exaggerated evidence 32. Judged from this premise, even if we discount the embellishments in their evidence of the said witness with regard to the appellant lifting the victim and throwing her down from the window, the kernel of truth emerging by distilling their depositions in the backdrop of the FIR or previous statement to the police, I have no doubt P.W.5 and 6 noted the presence of the appellant in the room from where the victim suffered a fall and soon thereafter the appellant ran downstairs and fled away towards his office without saving his wife. Evidence of the aforesaid witnesses are also corroborated by P.W.2, a labourer who was working in a site adjacent to the building where the couple resided. 33. It has been argued that there was a boundary wall between the site and the building itself. One should not lose sight of the fact that the incident occurred in a verandah on the 6th floor of a high rise building. Even if a person stands on the other side of a boundary wall, it is not impossible for him to see an incident which takes place in the verandah of the 6th floor of a high rise building which much above the boundary wall. It is nobody’s case that the boundary wall is so high that the incident occurring on the verandah of the 6th floor of a high rise building is not visible to a person standing on the other side of the said wall. That apart, P.W.2 claimed immediately seeing the incident he ran near the spot and saw a lady lying in bleeding condition and writhing in pain. He also saw the appellant running away from the spot. P.W.2 identified the appellant in the course of T.I. Parade. P.W.16, the Magistrate held T.I. Parade examination of the appellant. He deposed that he had complied with legal formalities and proved the T.I. Parade report (Ext.21). I have examined the said report and I do not find any infirmity in such exercise. P.W.2 identified the appellant in the course of T.I. Parade. P.W.16, the Magistrate held T.I. Parade examination of the appellant. He deposed that he had complied with legal formalities and proved the T.I. Parade report (Ext.21). I have examined the said report and I do not find any infirmity in such exercise. The aforesaid version of P.W.2 leaves no doubt in my mind that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence and soon after the incident had run away there from. The fact that the appellant had ran away from the spot is corroborated by the version of P.W.12, a colleague who claimed that immediately after the incident the appellant came to him and deposed that his wife had suffered a fall from the verandah. He was in a perplexed condition and could not explain as to why he had not assisted his wife or taken her to the hospital. If the appellant was at his office, did he come to know that the victim had suffered a fall from the verandah? And if so, why did he not rush to the spot to save his wife? These unanswered questions tear asunder the fragile plea of the appellant that he was at his office and not at the place of occurrence when the incident occurred. 34. With regard to the incorrect disclosure of the incident in the medical records at Command Hospital, it ought to be borne in mind that the victim had been carried to the hospital by a Sepai from the Command Hospital along with P.W.5. P.W.10 did not disclose in her deposition that she had interviewed P.W.5 with regard to the history of the incident. Nor any question was put to P.W.5 in cross-examination whether he had disclosed the cause of the injuries suffered by his daughter at the hospital. Hence, the cause of injury noted in the medical papers cannot be related to P.W.5 so as to discredit his version in Court. On the other hand, it is more probable it was narrated by the Sepai who carried the victim to hospital and was based on his surmise. 35. Hence, the cause of injury noted in the medical papers cannot be related to P.W.5 so as to discredit his version in Court. On the other hand, it is more probable it was narrated by the Sepai who carried the victim to hospital and was based on his surmise. 35. Furthermore, I have examined the defence plea of accidental death in the light of the other evidence on record particularly the evidence of P.W.1, the photographer and P.W.15, the plan maker with regard to the height of the wall in the verandah where the incident occurred. It appears from the deposition of P.W.15 and the final plan exhibited as Ext.20/1 and 20/2 that the height of the wall is 1 mtr. Post mortem report that the height of the lady was around 5 ft. it is highly unlikely that an able-bodied conscious lady of around 5 ft. would accidentally topple over a one mtr. (around 3 ft.) wall surrounding the verandah as proposed by the defence. That apart, immediately after his arrest, the appellant was medically examined by P.W.17 who noticed nail marks/abrasions on appellant probabilising a scuffle on or about the time of occurrence. This evidence is criticised on the ground presence of injuries on the appellant were not notice by P.W.12 nor was it recorded in the case diary or forwarding report prepared by investigating officer (P.W.18). Nail scratch/abrasions noticed by P.W.17 are minor injuries which may have been missed by P.W.12 who had not clinically examined the appellant like P.W.17, a doctor. Moreover, failure to examine the Commanding Officer from whose custody the appellant was arrested or to record his injuries in the case diary/forwarding memos are remissness on the part of the investigating officer (P.W.18) which, however, in my estimation are not so vital so as to discard the independent opinion of a medical personnel. The aforesaid facts and circumstances of the instant case, therefore, leave no doubt in my mind that the defence version of an accidental fall is a myth and ought to be ruled out. 36. The plea of the appellant that he was not at the place of occurrence but was at his place of duty has not been established. The aforesaid facts and circumstances of the instant case, therefore, leave no doubt in my mind that the defence version of an accidental fall is a myth and ought to be ruled out. 36. The plea of the appellant that he was not at the place of occurrence but was at his place of duty has not been established. There is overwhelming evidence of P.Ws.2, 5, 6 and 12 which establishes the prosecution case that the appellant was at the place of occurrence and ran away there from soon after the incident. The appellant could not explain why he failed to render assistance to his wife who, he claimed, suffered from an accidental fall. 37. It has been argued on behalf of the defence that P.W.18 admitted in cross-examination that the office records show that the appellant was on duty between 6.00 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. on that date. The office record merely show the duty roster of the appellant during the said period. His office was adjacent to his quarters within the compound of Command Hospital. There is no evidence that the appellant remained in his office throughout the entire period of his duty. On the other hand, the appellant is a driver and had ample opportunity to come out of office and retain home and commit the crime. If he had been physically at office at time of occurrence, such fact being in the nature of alibi ought to have been proved by him by leading evidence. Apart from a mere statement during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he was on duty, no evidence was led by him to probabilise such alibi. 38. As discussed earlier, there is overwhelming evidence on record that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence and had soon thereafter ran away from the spot. These circumstances, therefore, leave no doubt in my mind that it was the appellant who had thrown his wife from the verandah of his 6th floor apartment and thereafter had run away from the spot. Prosecution case is, accordingly, established beyond reasonable doubt. 39. The appeal is dismissed. 40. The period of detention suffered by appellant during investigation, enquiry or trial shall be set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Copy of the judgment along with LCR be sent down to the trial court at once. 41. Prosecution case is, accordingly, established beyond reasonable doubt. 39. The appeal is dismissed. 40. The period of detention suffered by appellant during investigation, enquiry or trial shall be set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Copy of the judgment along with LCR be sent down to the trial court at once. 41. Urgent Photostat Certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all necessary legal formalities. Ravi Krishan Kapur, J. : I agree.