JUDGMENT Dr. B.R. SARANGI, J. - The petitioner, who was working as “Naik” under the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), has filed this application challenging the order dated 23.04.1996 under Annexure-4 passed by the disciplinary authority imposing punishment of compulsory retirement from service with the direction to fix pension at the rate of two third subject to other conditions laid down in the CCS (Pension) Rules, and also the order dated 16/17.07.1997 in Annexure- 5 passed by the appellate authority rejecting the appeal as barred by time. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in hand, is that the petitioner, being selected by following due procedure of selection, joined as a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force (in short ‘CISF’) and posted at Rourkela Steel Plant. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of “Lance Naik” in the year 1981 and to the post of “Naik” in the year 1982 and posted at NALCO, Damanjodi. While the petitioner was so continuing, his daughter suffered from some disease for which she lost all the hairs from her head and became bald. Suddenly, she met with an accident and sustained severe head injury, for which she was referred from NALCO Hospital, Damanjodi to King Judge Hospital at Vishakhapatanam. As the incident was serious and severe, the petitioner verbally reported the matter at CISF Control Room, NALCO at Damanjodi, where the Headquarter Company Commander, Inspector Sarveswar Das was present along with Sub-Inspector K.N. Rao and Constable N.K. Pati. The condition of his daughter was so serious, the petitioner was fully unstable to give in writing and obtain permission from his superior. But he was put under suspension by the Commander on 28.10.1994. 2.1 On 05.12.1994, an inquiry officer was appointed, who called upon the petitioner to show cause on the charges levelled against him. In response thereto, the petitioner submitted his reply on 19.11.1995 and requested to examine S.I.-K.N. Rao and Constable-N.K. Pati as witnesses on his behalf. As the same was not considered, subsequently, by letter dated 20.02.1996, petitioner reiterated the aforesaid stand for examination of witnesses, but no opportunity was given to the petitioner to do so. Rather, the inquiry officer submitted his report on 18.03.1996 holding the petitioner guilty of both the charges. As the same was not considered, subsequently, by letter dated 20.02.1996, petitioner reiterated the aforesaid stand for examination of witnesses, but no opportunity was given to the petitioner to do so. Rather, the inquiry officer submitted his report on 18.03.1996 holding the petitioner guilty of both the charges. 2.2 While the foresaid proceeding was under consideration, the petitioner was removed from service in connection with another proceeding, for which the present proceeding was kept under abeyance. But the petitioner, having preferred appeal, was reinstated in service with certain punishment of reduction in rank for a period of three years in the said proceeding and, on his reinstatement on 25.09.1995, the present proceeding was directed to be reenquired into. While the present proceeding was continuing, the petitioner was transferred from NALCO to P.T.P.S., Patratu, Hazaribag, Bihar and enquiry was conducted by another officer-R. Manvalan, Asst. commandant, who found him guilty of charges and on that basis, the disciplinary authority, by order dated 23.04.1996, imposed punishment of compulsory retirement from service with the direction to fix the pension at the rate of two third subject to other conditions laid down in the CCS (Pension) Rules. Against the said order of punishment, the petitioner preferred appeal, which was dismissed, vide order dated 11.01.1997, as barred by time. Hence, this writ petition. 3. Ms. S. Biswal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. S.D. Das, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that imposition of penalty of compulsory retirement from service with direction to fix the pension at the rate of two third subject to other conditions laid down in the CCS (Pension) Rules is not contemplated under the provisions of the CISF Act and Rules. Therefore, the punishment so imposed by the disciplinary authority, vide order dated 23.04.1996, and consequential rejection of appeal, vide order dated 11.01.1997, are liable to be quashed. On merits it is contended that the penalty imposed does not commensurate the offence of unauthorized absence. To substantiate his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of the apex Court in Vijay Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 5 SCC 242 ; State of Uttar Pradesh. v. Dhirendra Pal Singh, 2016 (7) Supreme 643 ; and Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 . 4. Per contra, Mr. v. Dhirendra Pal Singh, 2016 (7) Supreme 643 ; and Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 . 4. Per contra, Mr. D.R. Swain, learned Central Government Counsel argued with vehemence justifying the orders impugned passed by the authorities concerned and contended that since the petitioner remained unauthorized absence, the action as due, just and proper has been taken against him in imposing penalty by following due procedure and the same does not call for interference of this Court at this stage. 5. This Court heard Ms. S. Biswal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. S.D. Das, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner; and Mr. D.R. Swain, learned Central Government Counsel. Pleadings having been exchanged between the parties and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 6. The facts delineated above are undisputed. During pendency of the writ application, the petitioner Bhaskar Sabat died. Therefore, pursuant to order dated 17.07.2017, the legal representatives of the petitioner have been brought on record by amending the writ application. Thereby, the legal representatives of the petitioner have been heard in the matter. 7. The punishment, as imposed against the petitioner, has been contemplated in paragraph 6 of the impugned order dated 23.04.1996 passed by the disciplinary authority, which is extracted hereunder:- “6. Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred on me vide rule 29-A, Schedule-II, read in conjunction with Rule-31© of CISF Rules, 1969, I hereby award the penalty of COMPULSORY RETIREMENT FROM SERVICE to N-713190180 Lance Naik Bhaskar Sabat of CISF Unit PTPS, Patratu, with immediate effect. The pension to be granted in this case shall be at the rate of two third subject to the other conditions laid down in the CCS(Pension) Rules.” The contention raised is that the authority cannot impose punishment beyond what is prescribed under the Act and Rules. The Central Industrial Security Force, Act, 1968 (in short “the Act, 1968”) was framed to provide for the constitution and regulation of an armed force of the Union for better protection and security of industrial undertakings owned by the Central Government, certain other industrial undertakings, employees of all such undertakings and to provide technical consultancy services to industrial establishments in the private sector and for matters connected therewith. 8. 8. Section 22 of the Act, 1968, deals with power to make Rules, and envisages that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. Accordingly, the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 1969 were framed. Rule 31 of the 1969 Rules reads as follows:- “31. Nature of penalties – The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided be imposed on a member of the Force, namely :- (a) dismissal; (b) removal: (c) compulsory retirement: (d) reduction to a lower class or grade or rank or to a lower time scale or to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay: (e) withholding of increment or promotion; (f) removal from any office of distinction or deprivation of special emolument; (g) fine to any amount not exceeding 7 day’s pay; (h) censure.” Sub-Rule(c) of Rule 31 mentioned supra indicates compulsory retirement, which is one of the penalties, which can be awarded for good and sufficient reasons and be imposed on a member of the Force. Therefore, the imposition of penalty under Rule 31(c) of Rules, 1969 awarding compulsory retirement from service may come within the purview of the said Rules. But the subsequent direction given by the disciplinary authority on 23.04.1996, that the pension of the petitioner shall be fixed at the rate of two third subject to other conditions laid down in CCS (Pension) Rules, has not been contemplated within the meaning of Rule 31(c) of Rules 1969. Once the petitioner has been imposed with the punishment of compulsory retirement, further direction to fix the pension at the rate of two third subject to other conditions laid down in CCS (Pension) Rules, may amount to double punishment for one cause of action against the petitioner, which is not permissible in law, as the same has not been prescribed within the meaning of Rule 31, the nature of penalties, as indicated above. 9. A similar question had come up for consideration by the apex Court in the case of Vijay Singh, mentioned supra, where punishment was imposed on a police personnel under the provisions of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991, the Rule 4 of which Rules contemplated punishment. The competence of the disciplinary authority to impose punishment not prescribed under the statutory rules. The competence of the disciplinary authority to impose punishment not prescribed under the statutory rules. So far as withholding of the integrity certificate was not stipulated under Rule 4. The apex Court held that punishment, having not prescribed under the Rules, cannot be awarded, and that the integrity certificate can be withheld for sufficient reasons at the time of filing of annual confidential report or if statutory rules so prescribed as punishment. Thereby, the order passed by the disciplinary authority withholding integrity certificate was held to be without jurisdiction, since the same could not be termed as punishment under the Rules, hence a nullity and was accordingly quashed. For the purpose of just and proper adjudication of the case, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are quoted below:- “11. Admittedly, the punishment imposed upon the appellant is not provided for under Rule 4 of the 1991 Rules. Integrity of a person can be withheld for sufficient reasons at the time of filling up the annual confidential report. However, if the statutory rules so prescribe, it can also be withheld as a punishment. The order passed by the disciplinary authority withholding the integrity certificate as a punishment for delinquency is without jurisdiction, not being provided under the 1991 Rules, since the same could not be termed as punishment under the Rules. The Rules do not empower the disciplinary authority to impose “any other” major or minor punishment. It is a settled proposition of law that punishment not prescribed under the Rules as a result of disciplinary proceedings cannot be awarded. 12. This Court in State of U.P. v. Madhav Prasad Sharma [ (2011) 2 SCC 212 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 300] dealt with the aforesaid 1991 Rules and after quoting Rule 4 thereof held as under: (SCC p. 216, para 16) “16. We are not concerned about other rule. The perusal of major and minor penalties prescribed in the above Rule makes it clear that ‘sanctioning leave without pay’ is not one of the punishments prescribed, though, and under what circumstances leave has been sanctioned without pay is a different aspect with which we are not concerned for the present. However, Rule 4 makes it clear that sanction of leave without pay is not one of the punishments prescribed. However, Rule 4 makes it clear that sanction of leave without pay is not one of the punishments prescribed. Disciplinary authority is competent to impose appropriate penalty from those provided in Rule 4 of the Rules which deals with the major penalties and minor penalties. Denial of salary on the ground of ‘no work no pay’ cannot be treated as a penalty in view of statutory provisions contained in Rule 4 defining the penalties in clear terms.” (emphasis added) 13. The authority has to act or purport to act in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the statute or statutory rules. (See Poona City Municipal Corpn. v. Dattatraya Nagesh Deodhar [ AIR 1965 SC 555 ]; Municipal Corpn., Indorev. Niyamatullah [ (1969) 2 SCC 551 : AIR 1971 SC 97 ] ; J.N. Ganatra v. Morvi Municipality, Morvi [ (1996) 9 SCC 495 : AIR 1996 SC 2520 ] and Borosil Glass Works Ltd. Employees’ Union v. D.D. Bambode [ (2001) 1 SCC 350 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 997 : AIR 2001 SC 378 ] .) 14. The issue involved herein is required to be examined from another angle also. Holding departmental proceedings and recording a finding of guilt against any delinquent and imposing the punishment for the same is a quasi-judicial function and not administrative one. (Vide Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1963 SC 395 ] , Union of India v. H.C. Goel [ AIR 1964 SC 364 ] , Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P. [ (2010) 10 SCC 539 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 180] and Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha [ (2011) 5 SCC 142 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 750] .) 15. Imposing the punishment for a proved delinquency is regulated and controlled by the statutory rules. Therefore, while performing the quasijudicial functions, the authority is not permitted to ignore the statutory rules under which punishment is to be imposed. The disciplinary authority is bound to give strict adherence to the said rules. Thus, the order of punishment being outside the purview of the statutory rules is a nullity and cannot be enforced against the appellant.” 10. In Dhirendra Pal Singh (supra), the apex Court held that when conducting departmental inquiry for misconduct, no proceeding having been drawn under Article 351A, direction given for withholding the pension amount cannot sustain in the eye of law. In Dhirendra Pal Singh (supra), the apex Court held that when conducting departmental inquiry for misconduct, no proceeding having been drawn under Article 351A, direction given for withholding the pension amount cannot sustain in the eye of law. The said case has been considered taking into consideration the U.P. Civil Service Regulations governing the field. The apex Court in paragraphs 7 and 11 of the said judgment, observed as follows:- “7. Admittedly, no departmental enquiry was initiated in the present case against the respondent for the misconduct, if any, nor any proceedings drawn as provided in Article 351-A of the U.P. Civil Service Regulations. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has observed that the document which is the basis of enquiry and relied upon by the State authorities, copy of which was Annexure CA-1 to counter-affidavit filed in the writ petition, itself reflected that the document showing discrepancy in the stock was dated 26-12-2009 i.e. after about more than five months of retirement of the respondent. In the circumstances, keeping in view Article 351-A of the U.P. Civil Service Regulations, we agree with the High Court that the orders dated 23-7-2015 and 6-8- 2015 were liable to be quashed and, to that extent, we decline to interfere with the impugned order. 11. In the light of the law laid down by this Court, as above, and further considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we modify the impugned order [State of U.P. v. Dhirendra Pal Singh, 2016 SCC OnLine All 971] passed by the High Court in respect of interest directed to be paid on the amount of withheld gratuity and pension. We direct that the appellants shall pay interest @ 6% p.a. on the unpaid amount of pension from the date it had fallen due and interest @ 8% p.a. on the unpaid amount of gratuity from the date of retirement of the employee.” 11. In the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar, mentioned supra, the question of absence from duty unauthorizedly had come up for consideration. In the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar, mentioned supra, the question of absence from duty unauthorizedly had come up for consideration. Whether absence is willful or because of compelling circumstances, that was taken into consideration and, while causing judicial review, the apex Court held that the reasons for absence was due to compelling circumstances and, thereby, the impugned order of dismissal passed by the judicial authority and confirmed by the appellate authority, CAT and High Court were set aside and considering the fact that the appellant had suffered a lot since 1999, when the proceeding was initiated against him, the matter was not remitted to the disciplinary authority and direction was given to reinstate the appellant therein and pay 50% back wages to him. The detailed reasons, in support of such finding, have been assigned in paragraphs 16 to 20 of the said judgment, which are extracted below:- “16. In the case of the appellant referring to unauthorised absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion to duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a government servant. The question whether “unauthorised absence from duty” amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is wilful or because of compelling circumstances. 17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant. 18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct. 19. 18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct. 19. In the present case the inquiry officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold that the absence was wilful; the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty. 20. The question relating to jurisdiction of the court in judicial review in a departmental proceeding fell for consideration before this Court in M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [ (2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 919] wherein this Court held: (SCC p. 95, para 25) “25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.” 12. It is further contended that in the instant case, while imposing penalty against the petitioner, no opportunity of hearing was given to him and, thereby, there is noncompliance of the principles of natural justice. Meaning thereby, the petitioner wanted to examine S.I.- K.N.Rao and Constable-N.K.Pati as witnesses on his behalf, which was not acceded to by the inquiry officer. Further, there was change of inquiry officer, as because the petitioner was transferred from NALCO to P.T.P.S., Patratu, Hazaribag, Bihar. Though request was made to examine the witnesses, but relying upon the evidence of Inspector-S.S.Das, the petitioner was held guilty of the charges. Further, there was change of inquiry officer, as because the petitioner was transferred from NALCO to P.T.P.S., Patratu, Hazaribag, Bihar. Though request was made to examine the witnesses, but relying upon the evidence of Inspector-S.S.Das, the petitioner was held guilty of the charges. Though Sub-Inspector-K.N.Ray was summoned by the Deputy Commandant, but his evidence was not recorded. The basic principle of compliance of natural justice is that the enquiry should be in accordance with law providing due opportunity to the delinquent to produce such documents and witnesses in support of his version. Non-examination of the witnesses, as requested by the petitioner, and change of inquiry officer in the midst of inquiry, without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. But the appellate authority, without considering the appeal on merits, has rejected the same on the ground of barred by limitation. That itself caused prejudice to the petitioner, because the rudiment of principle of law requires that when there is violation of principles of natural justice the authority should be very cautious to dismiss the appeal on technical ground of limitation. In any case, since the petitioner has not been afforded with opportunity of hearing and the punishment has been imposed in a perfunctory manner, without complying with the principles of natural justice, the same cannot sustain in the eye of law. 13. Applying the above discussed ratio, as decided by the apex Court in the judgments cited above, to the present context, under Rule 31(c) compulsory retirement may be one of the punishments prescribed under the Rules, but so far as direction for fixing the pension at the rate of two third subject to other conditions laid down in C.C.S. (Pension) Rules, has not been contemplated under Rule 31(c) so as to be imposed on the petitioner by way of major punishment. Therefore, imposition of such punishment, being contrary to Rule 31 of the Rules, 1969, cannot sustain in the eye of law. 14. In view of such position, since the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in Annexure-4 dated 23.04.1996 and consequential order of the appellate authority in Annexure-5 dated 16/17.07.1997 are liable to be quashed and accordingly the same are hereby quashed. Consequentially, the petitioner is entitled to get the service benefits as due and admissible to him in accordance with law. Consequentially, the petitioner is entitled to get the service benefits as due and admissible to him in accordance with law. As the petitioner died, his legal representatives, who are on record, are entitled to necessary benefits as per the provisions of the CCS (Pension) Rules admissible to the family of the deceased employee in accordance with law. The same shall be calculated and paid within a period of four months from the date of communication of the judgment. 15. The writ application is thus allowed. No order to Application allowed.