JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J —This appeal by the Insurance Company is directed against the award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-I, Solan, (for short ''Tribunal'') , on 17.04.2014, whereby it awarded a compensation of Rs. 11, 69, 000/- alongwith pending and future interest @ 7% per annum from the date of petition till the date of actual payment in favour of the respondents. 2. The facts, in brief, are that respondents No. 1 to 4 (claimants before the learned Tribunal) as legal heirs of late Shri Khem Chand filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short ''Act'') for the grant of compensation on account of the death of deceased Khem Chand, who is stated to have died in an accident of motorcycle bearing No. HP-14-6971 owned by the respondent No. 6 (respondent No. 2 before the learned Tribunal) and being driven by respondent No. 5 (respondent No. 1 before the learned Tribunal) in a rash and negligent manner on 10th August, 2012. The respondents No. 1 to 4 alleged that on 10.08.2012, the deceased was traveling with respondent No. 5 as a pillion rider on the motorcycle owned by respondent No. 6 and when they reached at Galyana Pani, Kumarhatti bye-pass road, National Highway No. 22, respondent No. 5 could not control the motorcycle on account of rash and negligent driving and it struck against the silencer of a truck coming from opposite direction, as a result whereof the pillion rider (deceased) had fallen down from the motorcycle and received injuries which resulted in his death on the spot. FIR No. 113/12 was registered against the driver of the truck under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC and under Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The deceased was stated to be earning Rs.30, 000/- per month from the Dhaba which was being run by him besides an income of Rs.2.00 lacs from the agriculture land. He was stated to be the only bread earner for the family and on these allegations the claimants claimed Rs.20.00 lacs as compensation from the appellant as well as respondents No. 5 & 6 being the Insurance Company and driver and owner of the vehicle. 3. That on receipt of the notices in the petition, separate replies were filed by the appellant as well as respondents No. 5 & 6. 3. That on receipt of the notices in the petition, separate replies were filed by the appellant as well as respondents No. 5 & 6. The accident as claimed by respondents No. 1 to 4 was denied and on the contrary respondents No. 5 & 6 alleged that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the truck. The amount and the income stated in the petition were denied. They averred that respondent No. 5 being the driver of the motorcycle in question was having valid and effective driving licence. The compensation, if any, was stated to be payable by the appellant being insurer of the vehicle. 4. That the appellant in its separate reply denied the accident having been caused by the driver of the motorcycle. The petition was stated to be not maintainable and was bad for nonjoinder of owner, driver as well as the Insurance Company of the truck involved the accident. The insurance of the vehicle involved in the accident was also denied and it was further averred that the driver of the motorcycle was not having a valid and effective driving licence and there were gross violation of the terms and conditions of the policy. The petition was stated to have been filed in collusion with respondents No. 5 & 6 and the amount claimed was stated to be highly exaggerated. 5. No rejoinder was filed and on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Tribunal framed the following issues on 17.06.2013:- 1. Whether the deceased had died due to the accident having been committed by the respondent No. 1, due to his rash and negligent driving on 10.08.2012, as alleged?OPP 2. If issue No. 1, is proved in affirmative, to what amount of compensation, the petitioners are entitled to and from whom? OPP 3. Whether the amount of compensation claimed by the petitioner is excessive, as alleged? OPR-1 & 2 4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable, as alleged in preliminary objection No. 1, of the reply of respondent No. 3, as alleged?OPR-3 5. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, if so, who is the necessary party? OPR-3 6. Whether respondent No.1, was not holding proper, valid and effective driving licence on the date of accident? If so, its effect?OPR-3 7. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, if so, who is the necessary party? OPR-3 6. Whether respondent No.1, was not holding proper, valid and effective driving licence on the date of accident? If so, its effect?OPR-3 7. Whether the motorcylce No. HP-14-6971, was being plied by respondent No. 1 & 2 in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and against the provision of the Motor Vehicles Act?OPR-3 8. Relief. 6. After recording evidence and evaluating the same the learned Tribunal passed the award as aforesaid. 7. Aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the award so passed, the appellant has filed the instant appeal. 8. It is vehemently contended by Shri G. C. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, duly assisted by Ms. Meera Devi, learned Advocate, that the findings of the learned Tribunal on Issue No. 1, holding the driver of the motorcycle to be rash and negligent is not borne out or supported by the evidence that has been led in the case, rather FIR Mark - A was registered against the driver of the truck with specific allegation that it was on account of his rash and negligent driving that led to the death of the deceased. 9. It is further contended that the deceased being only 22 years of age could not be said to be maintaining the claimants, that too, by taking his income to be Rs.9, 000/- per month without there being any evidence to this effect. It was also argued that an amount of 1/4th has been wrongly deducted by the learned Tribunal towards personal expenses being incurred by the deceased when admittedly he was a bachelor and as per settled law 50% amount was required to be deducted under this head. It was was further urged that the amount of Rs. 81, 000/- has been wrongly calculated as contribution of the deceased towards respondents No. 1 to 4 and multiplier of 14 as applied by the learned Tribunal is on higher side. 10. On the other hand, Shri O.C. Sharma, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 to 4, would support the award by claiming the same to be strictly in accordance with law. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records. 11. As regards the findings on Issue No. 1, no exception thereto can be taken by the appellant. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records. 11. As regards the findings on Issue No. 1, no exception thereto can be taken by the appellant. The specific case set out by the claimants was that the deceased Khem Chand was travelling a pillion rider on motorcycle No. HP-14-6971 with respondent No. 1- Devinder Singh (before the learned Tribunal) , who was driving the said motorcycle at the time, in a rash and negligent manner in a high speed from Shiv Temple Kumarhatti towards Solan bye pass, National Highway No. 22. When they reached near Galyana Pani on Kumarhatti bye pass road, the driver of the motorcycle could not negotiate the curve, as a result whereof he lost control of the motorcycle which struck against the silencer of the truck coming from the opposite direction, as a result whereof respondent No. 1- Devinder Singh being driver of the said motorcycle and the deceased Khem Chand being pillion rider fell from the motorcycle and sustained injuries and due to the injuries so sustained in the accident the deceased Khem Chand died on the spot. 12. Even though the respondents No. 1 and 2 have claimed that the driver of the motorcycle was neither rash nor negligent in driving the offending vehicle and the accident had been committed by the driver of the truck, who had run away from the spot, but then this version put-forth by the respondents, including respondent No. 3 i.e. appellant herein, who adopted a similar line of defence, is belied from the statement of PW2 who happens to be the eyewitness of the occurrence. In his statement-affidavit Ext.PW2/A, this witness has clearly deposed that on 10.08.2012, he was travelling on his scooter from Kumarhatti Shiv Temple on the day of Janamshtami and when he reached Kumarhatti bye pass road on National Highway No. 22, at about 5.15 p.m., then the motorcycle No. HP-14-6971, on which two persons were sitting had taken pass from him. The motorcycle was being driven in a fast speed and in a rash and negligent manner on the wrong side of the road and when the said motorcycle reached Galyana Pani, then the motorcyclist, because of fast speed, lost control and struck against the silencer of the truck that was coming from the opposite direction, as a result whereof both the riders fell down. He further solemnly affirmed in his affidavit that this accident had taken place due to sheer negligence and fast driving of the motorcycle by respondent No. 1-Devinder Singh in which accident the pillion rider had lost his life. He has categorically deposed that it was on account of rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 1-Devinder Singh that the accident in question had taken place. 13. Even though this witness was cross-examined at length but nothing material could be elicited therefrom. There is nothing in his testimony to indicate that he was deposing falsely and merely because he happens to be an eyewitness produced by the claimants, without the process of the Court, that by itself cannot be a ground to doubt much less discard the testimony of PW2 as was otherwise sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. There is nothing on record which may suggest that this witness was not present at the spot. 14. At this stage, Shri G.C. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, would vehemently contend that it was respondent No. 1-Devinder Singh, who had registered the FIR MarkA against the driver of the truck with specific allegation that it was on account of his rash and negligent driving that the accident had taken place wherein the deceased had succumbed to his injuries. However, this contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that mere lodging of FIR by respondent No. 1-Devinder Singh cannot be a ground to doubt the version put-forth by the claimants rather the lodging of the FIR, that too, after respondent was discharged from the hospital is clear indicator of the fact that the FIR had been got registered by respondent No. 1-Devinder Singh simply in order to save his skin or else he would have been liable to be prosecuted and punished for a criminal offence. 15. That being the position, no exception can be taken to the findings rendered by the learned Tribunal below on Issue No. 1 whereby it held respondent No. 1 - Devinder Singh to be solely responsible for the accident in question. 16. Now as regards the award of compensation, there can be no dispute that the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is now required to be fixed in accordance with the decision of a Constitutional Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. 16. Now as regards the award of compensation, there can be no dispute that the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is now required to be fixed in accordance with the decision of a Constitutional Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Pranay Sethi and others , (2017) ACJ 2700. 17. Why this case came to be referred to the Constitutional Bench, the answer is not difficult to find and the same is set out in para-1 of the judgment itself which reads thus: "Perceiving cleavage of opinion between Reshma Kumari v.Madan Mohan , (2013) ACJ 1253(SC) and Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh , (2013) ACJ 1403 (SC) , both three-Judge Bench decisions, a twoJudge Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa , (2015) 9 SCC 166 , thought it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement, and that is how the matters have been placed before us." 18. The conflict between the judgments as extracted above was resolved by concluding that the decision in Rajesh versus Rajbir Singh , (2013) ACJ 1403 (SC) was not a binding precedent as it had not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari versus Madan Mohan , (2013) ACJ 1253 (SC) . The Hon''ble Supreme Court after considering the entire conspectus of law arrived at the following conclusions:- "i) The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi , (2012) ACJ 1428 (SC) , should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma , (2009) ACJ 1298 (SC) , a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench. (ii) As Rajesh , (2013) ACJ 1403 (SC) has not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari , (2013) ACJ 1253 (SC) , which was delivered at earlier point of time, the decision in Rajesh is not a binding precedent. (iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. (iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 and 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 and 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. (iv) In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 and 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 and 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component. (v) For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paras 14 and 15 of Sarla Verma , (2009) ACJ 1298 (SC) , which we have reproduced hereinbefore. (vi) The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma , (2009) ACJ 1298 (SC) , read with para 21 of that judgment. (vii) The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier. (viii) Reasonable figures under conventional heads, namely, loss to estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15, 000, Rs.40, 000 and Rs.15, 000 respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10 per cent in every three years." Conclusions (iii) to (viii) are relevant for the adjudication of these cases. 19. It is thus clear from the aforesaid that the compensation henceforth to be awarded in favour of the claimants is essentially to be abide by the aforesaid conclusions, more particularly, conclusions No.(iii) to (viii) which except for conclusions No.(v) and (vi) are self-speaking. 20. Now, as regards conclusions No. (v) and (vi) , it would be apposite to extract paragraphs No.14, 15 and 21 along with table as referred to in Sarla Verma and others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another , (2009) ACJ 1298 (SC) which read thus:- "14. 20. Now, as regards conclusions No. (v) and (vi) , it would be apposite to extract paragraphs No.14, 15 and 21 along with table as referred to in Sarla Verma and others versus Delhi Transport Corporation and another , (2009) ACJ 1298 (SC) which read thus:- "14. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra , (1996) ACJ 831 (SC) , the general practice is to apply standardized deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependant family members is 4 to 6, and one11 fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependant family members exceed six. 15. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent/s and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependent. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependents, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependant on the father. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where family of the bachelor is large and dependant on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as twothird. 21. However, where family of the bachelor is large and dependant on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as twothird. 21. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie) , which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years) , reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M12 13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years." Age of the deceased Multiplier scale as envisaged in Susamma Thomas Multiplier scale as adopted in Trilok Chandra Multiplier scale in Trilok Chandra as clarified in Charlie Multiplier specified in second column in the Table in Second Schedule o MV Act Multiplier actually used in Second Schedule to MV Act (as seen from the quantum of compensatio n) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Up to 15 years - - - 15 20 15 to 20 years 16 18 18 16 19 21 to 25 years 15 17 18 17 18 26 to 30 years 14 16 17 18 17 31 to 35 years 13 15 16 17 16 36 to 40 years 12 14 15 16 15 41 to 45 years 11 13 14 15 14 46 to 50 years 10 12 13 13 12 51 to 55 years 9 11 11 11 10 56 to 60 years 8 10 9 8 8 61 to 65 years 6 8 7 5 6 Above to 65 years 5 5 5 5 5 21. Evidently, the judgment in Pranay Sethi''s case has brought about radical and fundamental changes with regard to award of compensation. Evidently, the judgment in Pranay Sethi''s case has brought about radical and fundamental changes with regard to award of compensation. For this purpose, this Court would deal with the case by drawing a comparative table of the amount actually awarded by the learned Tribunal along with modified award. 22. The learned Tribunal below has calculated the income of the deceased to be Rs.9, 000/- without there being any proof of the same. Therefore, in absence of any proof, the salary of the deceased and after applying the ratio in Pranay Sethi''s case , at best could be taken to be Rs.3000/- per month, on which amount of 50% is required to be deducted as personal and living expenses and since the deceased was self employed an addition of 40% on the established income shall have to be taken into consideration as deemed income of the deceased. 23. Admittedly, the deceased was only 22 years of age and, therefore, a multiplier of 18 instead of 14 ought to have been applied. 24. No doubt, the claimants / respondents have not assailed the award, wherein multiplier of 14 was applied but then the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court is binding on this Court and even otherwise this Court in exercise of its powers under Order 41 Rule 33 can always apply the appropriate multiplier. 25. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:- "33. 25. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:- "33. Power of court of Appeal.- The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised In favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection, and may, where there have been decrees in cross suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees: Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order." 26. It cannot be disputed that the object of the aforesaid rule is to empower the Appellate Court to do complete justice between the parties. This rule gives the Court ample power to make an order appropriate to the ends of justice. It enables the Appellate Court to pass any decree or order which ought to have been made and to make such further order or decree as the case may be in favour of all or any of the parties even though the appeal is as to part only of the decree; and such party or parties may not have filed an appeal. The necessary condition for exercising the power under the rule is that the parties to the proceedings are before the Court and the question raised properly arises out of the judgments of the lower Court. In that event, the Appellate Court can consider any objection to any part of the order or decree of the Court and set it right. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances under which the power can be exercised and each case therefore must depend upon its own facts. In that event, the Appellate Court can consider any objection to any part of the order or decree of the Court and set it right. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances under which the power can be exercised and each case therefore must depend upon its own facts. Although, the general principle is that a decree is binding on the parties to it until it is set aside in appropriate proceedings. Ordinarily, the Appellate Court must not vary or reverse a decree/order in favour of a party who has not preferred any appeal. But in exceptional cases, the rule enables the Appellate Court to pass such decree or order as sought to have been passed even if such decree or order would be in favour of parties who have not filed any appeal. 27. The scope of the rule has repeatedly came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court, but I need only refer to the judgment rendered in Pralhad and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another , (2010) 10 SCC 458 wherein it was held: "18. The provision of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC is clearly an enabling provision, whereby the appellate Court is empowered to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed or made, and to pass, or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. Therefore, the power is very wide and in this enabling provisions, the crucial words are that the appellate court is empowered to pass any order which ought to have been made as the case may require. The expression "order ought to have been made" would obviously mean an order which justice of the case requires to be made. This is made clear from the expression used in the said Rule by saying "the court may pass such further or other order as the case may require". This expression "case" would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law. 19. In fact, the ambit of this provision has come up for consideration in several decisions of this Court. This expression "case" would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law. 19. In fact, the ambit of this provision has come up for consideration in several decisions of this Court. Commenting on this power, Mulla (Civil Procedure Code, 15th Edn., p. 2647) observed that this Rule is modeled on Order 59 Rule 10 (4) of the Supreme Court of Judicature of England, and Mulla further opined that the purpose of this Rule is to do complete justice between the parties. 20. In Banarsi vs. Ram Phal , (2003) 9 SCC 606 , this Court construing the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC held that this provision confers powers of the widest amplitude on the appellate Court so as to do complete justice between the parties. This Court further held that such power is unfettered by considerations as to what is the subject matter of the appeal or who has filed the appeal or whether the appeal is being dismissed, allowed or disposed of while modifying the judgments appealed against. The learned Judges held that one of the objects in conferring such power is to avoid inconsistency, inequity and inequality in granting reliefs and the overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. The learned Judges also held that the power can be exercised subject to three limitations: firstly, this power cannot be exercised to the prejudice of a person who is not a party before the Court; secondly, this power cannot be exercised in favour of a claim which has been given up or lost; and thirdly, the power cannot be exercised when such part of the decree which has been permitted to become final by a party is reversed to the advantage of that party. (See SCC p. 619, para 15 : AIR para 15 at p. 1997) . It has also been held by this Court in Samundra Devi vs. Narendra Kaur , (2008) 9 SCC 100 SCC (para 21) , that this power under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict. 22. (See SCC p. 619, para 15 : AIR para 15 at p. 1997) . It has also been held by this Court in Samundra Devi vs. Narendra Kaur , (2008) 9 SCC 100 SCC (para 21) , that this power under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict. 22. In view of the aforesaid interpretation given to Order 41 Rule 33 CPC by this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court denied the relief to the appellants to which they are entitled in view of the Constitution Bench decision in K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala , (1994) 5 SCC 593 by taking a rather restricted and narrow view of the scope of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC and also on a misconstruction of the ratio in Paripoornan." 28. As regards conventional charges, now in terms of the judgment in Pranay Sethi''s case, only reasonable figures under conventional heads, namely, loss to estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses @ Rs. 15, 000/- Rs. 40, 000/- and Rs.15, 000/- respectively can be awarded. In such circumstances, the award as passed by the learned Tribunal is required to be modified as under:- Sr.No. Award passed by the Tribunal Modified Award by this Court Details/Particulars Details/Particulars (i) Age of the deceased: 22 years (ii) Assumed salary plus future prospects: Rs.9, 000+0=Rs.9, 000/- Modified proved salary plus future prospects: Rs.3, 000+40%=1, 200=4, 200/- 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal is partly allowed in the aforesaid terms and instead of an amount of Rs.11, 69, 000/- as awarded by the learned Tribunal below, the claimants shall now entitle to a sum of Rs.5, 23, 600/- plus interest @ 7% per annum till the date of actual payment, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.