JUDGMENT S. Panda, J. - The award passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Odisha dated 22.06.1993 in Industrial Disputes Case No.5 of 1991 (Central) under Annexure-2, is being impugned in this writ application by the petitioner Life Insurance Corporation of India. The Government of India in the Ministry of Labour in exercise of powers conferred upon them by clause (d) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2-A) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had referred the following dispute for adjudication of the Tribunal: "Whether the action of the Management of Life Insurance Corporation of India, Rourkela Branch Office, Sector-19, Rourkela in terminating the services of Shri Paramananda Sahu, Sub-staff with effect from 12.4.1990 is lawful and justified. If not, to what relief, the workman is entitled to?" 2. The case of the workman before the Tribunal was that he had been appointed on 30.09.1985 by the Senior Branch Manager, LIC of India, Rourkela Branch as a sub-staff on daily wage basis and had been discharging his duties to the utmost satisfaction of his employer. During the period of his employment for four and half years, he had been paid bonus, house rent allowance as admissible to the permanent staff but suddenly he was served with a notice of termination on 12.04.1990. It was his further case that in a dispute between the Corporation and some of its workers, the Supreme Court had prohibited any recruitment to various posts until finalization of the matter but that prohibition having been withdrawn, the Life Insurance Corporation of India started the recruitment process. During that time, the General Secretary of the Union representing Class III and Class IV employees of Sambalpur Division had submitted a list of daily and Badli workers for absorption on regular basis but the Management though absorbed all other daily workers but did not absorb the petitioner on the ground that he had crossed the prescribed age limit. It is accordingly contended that the petitioner having entered the services of the Corporation while he was within the age limit, he could not have been excluded from consideration on the ground of overage. 3. The Management contended before the Tribunal that the service conditions of the staff of the Life Insurance Corporation is governed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. 3. The Management contended before the Tribunal that the service conditions of the staff of the Life Insurance Corporation is governed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Under the Regulations, Class-III and Class-IV employees were appointed on temporary basis to meet the exigencies of the work load and such temporary employees cannot claim any right of permanent absorption against any permanent post. It was further urged that in view of the ban on recruitment of new employees imposed by the National Industrial Tribunal, to meet the work load of the Corporation, a few temporary sub-staff had been engaged in the Division Office and the petitioner was one of such employees who had been engaged on 30.09.1985 as a temporary hand. He was being paid his wages daily. He had no right to the post and in accordance with the terms of contract, his services stood terminated. It was also urged that the compromise between the management and workmen in the Supreme Court was in relation to temporary and part-time Badli workmen, who had been recruited between the period 01.01.1982 and 20.05.1985 and the present workman was neither a party to the litigation which was entered into compromise in the Supreme Court nor would he be governed by the terms of the said compromise. 4. The Industrial Tribunal though came to the conclusion that the workman was not a party to the reference which had been adjudicated upon by the National Industrial Tribunal and subsequently by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by virtue of the compromise but those principles should have been applied to the present workman's case and the present workman should have been absorbed on permanent basis. Non-consideration of the case of the workman for regular absorption on the basis of overage was held to be unsustainable. The Tribunal observed that the Management should have relaxed the age limit and should have appointed the workman against a regular vacancy in Class-IV post. With these findings, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Management acted arbitrarily in terminating the services of the workmen and, therefore, the action of the Management was held to be illegal and unjustified. The Tribunal having directed for reinstatement and payment of back wages to the workman-opposite party no.2, the petitioner-Management has assailed the same. 5. With these findings, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Management acted arbitrarily in terminating the services of the workmen and, therefore, the action of the Management was held to be illegal and unjustified. The Tribunal having directed for reinstatement and payment of back wages to the workman-opposite party no.2, the petitioner-Management has assailed the same. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised two contentions in assailing the legality of the impugned award: (i) the service conditions of an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation being governed by statutory provisions called "Staff Regulations", the provision of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 will have no application at all in respect of the matters which are governed by such statutory provisions and therefore, the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the legality of the order of termination; and (ii) the award contains an error apparent on the face of record that the same is based upon the principles of compromise entered into between the Management and the workmen in the Supreme Court even though the present workman was not a party to the aforesaid compromise. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the workman-opposite party no.2, on the other hand, contended that even though the terms and conditions of service of an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation are governed by the Regulations framed under the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act but the question whether an order of termination passed by the employer is legal or illegal cannot be said to be an occupied field under the Regulations and, therefore, the Tribunal has full jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the dispute particularly when the same has been referred to it by the appropriate Government. He further contended that the conclusion of the Tribunal that the order of termination is arbitrary is not on the basis of the principles of compromise entered into between the workers and the employer in some other case in the Supreme Court but essentially on the ground of non-consideration of the petitioner's case on the ground of overage and in view of the power of relaxation of age of an employee with the employer. It is contended that the Tribunal has rightly held the order of termination to be arbitrary. 7. It is contended that the Tribunal has rightly held the order of termination to be arbitrary. 7. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, the first question that arises for consideration is whether the legality of an order of termination of a temporary employee of the Life Insurance Corporation can at all be considered by the Industrial Tribunal. Learned counsel for the Corporation in support of his contention has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A.V. Machane and another -Vrs.- Union of India and another, (1982) AIR SC 1126 , Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Terminated Full Time Temporary L.I.C. Employees Welfare Association -Vrs.- Sr. Divisional Manager, L.I.C. of India Ltd., (1993) 1 SLR 290 and a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. Venugopal -Vrs.- The Divisional Manager Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and another, (1994) AIR SC 1343 . 8. In case of A.V. Machane and another -Vrs.- Union of India and another (supra) what has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court is that in respect of the matter covered by the rules or regulations framed under the Life Insurance Corporation Act in respect of its employees, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act will have no application but that does not mean that an industrial forum will have no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the legality of a dispute relating to the termination of services of an employee. If an order of termination though apparently appears to be in accordance with the terms of appointment but actually it is found to be on the ground of misconduct of the employees or is found to have been passed maliciously or on some extraneous consideration, the industrial forum will have the power to hold such order of termination illegal and grant appropriate relief thereon. In fact in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Terminated Full Time Temporary L.I.C. Employees' Welfare Association -Vrs.- Sr. Divisional Manager, L.I.C. of India Ltd. (supra) on which learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has strongly relied upon also stipulated that whether a particular order of termination is on unfair labour practice of the employer can be gone into by the Tribunal and the burden is on the employee to establish the same. Divisional Manager, L.I.C. of India Ltd. (supra) on which learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has strongly relied upon also stipulated that whether a particular order of termination is on unfair labour practice of the employer can be gone into by the Tribunal and the burden is on the employee to establish the same. The terms and conditions of the services of an employees of the Life Insurance Corporation no doubt are governed by the provisions of the regulations framed by the Corporation in exercise of the power conferred under the Life Insurance Corporation Act but whether an order of termination of an employee is within the such power of the employer or the employer has transgressed his power by passing an order of termination in a malafide manner or contrary to the provisions of the Regulations or on the ground of misconduct of the employee so on and so forth did not come within the expression "occupied field" used by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in A.V. Machane and another -Vrs.- Union of India and another (supra) and, therefore, an industrial forum will have full jurisdiction to go into the questions particularly when the reference to that effect has been made by the appropriate Government. The decision of the Supreme Court in M. Venugopal -Vrs.- The Divisional Manager Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and another (supra) is also to the same effect. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that a Tribunal to whom a reference has been made has no jurisdiction to go into the question of legality of the order of termination passed by the employer. That apart, this question has really not been pointedly posed before the tribunal or answered. The first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly fails. 9. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the award is vitiated, the same having been passed on the basis of a compromise entered into between the Management and the workers to which dispute, neither the present workman was a party nor the compromise can be held to be binding so far as the present workman is concerned. The answer to this question must be in favour of the employer. The answer to this question must be in favour of the employer. It is too well settled that a compromise effected between the parties is not the law of the land and it binds only the parties to the dispute. The Industrial Tribunal itself has categorically found that the present workman was not a party to the reference decided by the National Industrial Tribunal and subsequently by the Supreme Court by virtue of the compromise entered into between the Management and the worker. Having held so, the Tribunal suddenly erred in law in applying those principles of compromise in deciding the present reference. The terms and conditions of compromise entered into between the parties in a matter pending in the Supreme Court certainly cannot govern the service conditions of all employees who were neither parties to the dispute nor had entered into the compromise in question. Learned counsel for the workman-opposite party no.2 in course of his argument vehemently urged that the decision of the Tribunal is not solely based on the terms of the compromise in question. But we do not find any substance on the same. On a bare reading of the award of the Tribunal, we are of the considered opinion that the Tribunal has solely been swayed away by the terms and conditions of the compromise and has applied those terms to decide the legality of the order of termination of services of the workman and thereby has committed gross error of law. The very reference was to the effect whether the order in terminating the services of Sri Paramananda Sahoo (opposite party no.2) with effect from 12.04.1990 was lawful and justified or not. In deciding that reference, the Tribunal was wholly incompetent to look into the compromise entered into between the Management and the workers in some other dispute which was pending before the Supreme Court to which dispute the present workman was not at all a party. In that view of the matter, the impugned award contained an apparent error on the face of it and, therefore, the same has to be struck down and we accordingly strike down the same. 10. In that view of the matter, the impugned award contained an apparent error on the face of it and, therefore, the same has to be struck down and we accordingly strike down the same. 10. The argument of learned counsel for the opposite parties that the award is on the ground of non-consideration of workman's case for regularization as he was overaged, is also of no substance, since the question of non-consideration of regularization of the services of the workman was not at all a point of reference. On the other hand, the reference was whether the order of termination dated 12.04.1990 is legal or illegal and in that context reference to any age limit is wholly irrelevant. The Tribunal was not justified in recording a finding as to what the Management should have done by relaxing the age limit. In answering a reference made to it, the Tribunal was competent merely to find out whether the order of termination of the services of the workman on 12.04.1990 is lawful and justified or not. In view of our conclusion and the apparent error found by us in the award of the Tribunal, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the award cannot be sustainable in the eye of law. 11. In the premises, as aforesaid, we quash the impugned award of the Tribunal and remit the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration and redisposal bearing in mind the observations made by us and such redisposal would be only after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. It would be open for the employer to raise the contention that the matter is governed by "occupied field" under the Staff Regulations and the Tribunal would certainly examine the same and answer it. While quashing the award of the Tribunal under Annexure-2 and remitting the matter for reconsideration, since the employer has already reinstated the employee, we direct that the order of reinstatement may not be interfered with during the pendency of the matter before the Tribunal and it would abide by the ultimate direction to be given by the Tribunal. Since the dispute is a year-old one, the Tribunal shall do well to dispose of the same within the stipulated time i.e., by end of March 2019. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Tribunal in the 2nd week of January 2019 with a certified copy of this order. Since the dispute is a year-old one, the Tribunal shall do well to dispose of the same within the stipulated time i.e., by end of March 2019. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Tribunal in the 2nd week of January 2019 with a certified copy of this order. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the writ application is disposed of. Parties shall bear their own costs.