JUDGMENT S. Panda, J. - Heard Mr. B.K. Nayak, learned counsel for the petitioner. None appears for the opposite parties nos.2 and 3. 2. The petitioner Officer-in-charge (RRII), Rubber Board of India who was the 1st Party Management in Industrial Dispute Case No. 26 of 1998 (Central) has challenged the award dated 01.06.2000 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, Bhubaneswar in the aforesaid I.D. Case in directing the 1st Party Management to provide employment to the opposite party no.3 Smt. Rohini Das, W/o- Late Kashinath Das on compassionate ground. 3. The Government of India in the Ministry of Labour in exercise of powers under section 10(1)(d) & 10(2A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referred the following dispute for adjudication: "Whether the action of the Management of Rubber Research Institute of India, Kadlipal Farm, Dhenkanal not providing employment to Smt. Rohini Das, W/o Late Kasinath Das, Ex-Employee of Rubber Research Institute of India on compassionate ground is justified? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?" 4. The 2nd Party workman was represented by the President, Annapurna Rubber Board Worker's Union. It is the case of 2nd Party workman before the Court below that the 1st Party Management employed Kasinath Das, the husband of the opp. party no.3 in the Farm on 14.12.1986 and he died on 15.04.1996 while he was in employment under the 1st party Management. He had put in more than nine years of continuous employment in the Farm. He was a landless person and was the only earning member of his family. After his death, his widow Rohini Das (opp. party no.3) sought for employment under the 1st Party management on compassionate ground and made a representation to that effect on 17.10.1996 and subsequently he made another representation on dated 20.11.1996. As it involved a common interest of the workmen, the Union also made a grievance for appointment of the widow of Kasinath Das. During conciliation, the Management pleaded that there is non- existence of any rehabilitation scheme in the establishment to consider the case of appointment of the opp. party no.3 in the Farm. On failure of conciliation, the reference was made to the Tribunal for adjudication. 5. Petitioner-Management took a stand before the learned Court below that the Research Station is not an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. party no.3 in the Farm. On failure of conciliation, the reference was made to the Tribunal for adjudication. 5. Petitioner-Management took a stand before the learned Court below that the Research Station is not an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is further contended that the Research Institute is devoted to scientific and technological research exploring the possibility of rubber cultivation in Orissa with a view to provide technological support to the farmers. The organization does not indulge in any commercial activity nor is any systematic operation carried out in cooperation between the employer and employee to supply or distribute goods and services with a view to satisfy human wants and wishes. It is further contended that the legal heir of the deceased employee Kasinath Das is not a 'workman' within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the service conditions of the workman in the Research Station is governed by standing orders, settlements, awards and legislations applicable to the Rubber Plantation workers in the State which are silent about rehabilitation employment on compassionate ground. It was further contended that as there is no scheme in operation regarding rehabilitation appointment, the question of giving appointment to the widow of late Kasinath Das does not arise. 6. The Union-opposite party no.2 filed its written statement before the Court below stating, inter alia, that Rubber Research Institute of India is under the Department of Rubber Board created by the Central Government and functions under the Ministry of Commerce, Govt. of India. All the officers and field staffs are getting their salary, leave benefit pension, welfare measures etc. as per the Central Governments Rules. It is further averred that the Central Government Establishment and Administrative Rules provides for compassionate appointment to the dependants of the deceased employees who die in service as a welfare measure and the employees of the Rubber Board are availing the said benefits. It is also stated that in other public undertakings, benefits of rehabilitation appointment have been extended to the legal heirs of the deceased employees. 7. The learned Industrial Tribunal framed the following issues:- (i) Whether the case is maintainable? (ii) Whether claim for giving compassionate appointment is an Industrial Dispute to be adjudicated upon by reference under section 10(1) of the I.D. Act, 1947? 7. The learned Industrial Tribunal framed the following issues:- (i) Whether the case is maintainable? (ii) Whether claim for giving compassionate appointment is an Industrial Dispute to be adjudicated upon by reference under section 10(1) of the I.D. Act, 1947? (iii) Whether not providing compassionate appointment to Smt. Rohini Das is justified? (iv) To what relief? 8. The parties adduced their evidence before the Court below. While discussing the issue nos.1, 2 and 3 together, relying upon several decisions, the Tribunal held that the dispute which validly gave rise to a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act need not necessarily be a dispute directly between an employer and his workman and that the definition of the expression 'industrial dispute' is wide enough to cover a dispute raised by the employer's workman in regard to non-employment of others who may not be his workman at the material time. Accordingly, the learned Tribunal turned down the argument advanced by the 1st partymanagement that the widow of the deceased employee being not a workman, no industrial dispute is constituted on the issue of not providing compassionate appointment to the heir of the deceased workman dying in harness. The learned Tribunal taking into account the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Banglore Water Supply & Sewerage Board -Vrs.- A. Rajappa & Others, (1978) AIR SC 548 held that the Rubber Board and all its institutions come within the fold of 'industry' and accordingly turned down the challenges of the 1st Party Management relating to the maintainability of the reference and admissibility of the claim. The learned Tribunal further held that the Rubber Board is a statutory Board of the Government of India formulated under the Rubber Act and the Central Government rules are being strictly adhered to in the establishment. The Govt. of India has a scheme of compassionate appointment for the heirs of the deceased workman dying in harness when the family is unable to sustain itself on account of sad demise. It was further held relying upon the decision of this Court in case of Mohini Kumar Naik -Vrs.- Orissa State Electricity Board, (1992) 1 OrissaLR 173 that the Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme is of special category and it is meant to mitigate the hardship caused to the family due to the death of the bread earner in the family. It was further held relying upon the decision of this Court in case of Mohini Kumar Naik -Vrs.- Orissa State Electricity Board, (1992) 1 OrissaLR 173 that the Rehabilitation Assistance Scheme is of special category and it is meant to mitigate the hardship caused to the family due to the death of the bread earner in the family. It was further held that a vacancy upon the death of the husband of opposite party no.2 in the workforce of the establishment still existed and in law and in equity, the widow opposite party no.3 deserves to be considered for such appointment. The action of the 1st Party Management in not providing employment to the opposite party no.3 on compassionate ground was held to be neither legal nor justified. While answering issue no.4, the learned Tribunal directed the 1st Party Management to provide employment to the opp. party no.3 on compassionate ground. 9. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the Petitioner-Management contended that the institute established at Kadlipal being a research station and no commercial activities were going on in such institute and therefore, it was not proper on the part of the learned Tribunal to hold it as an 'industry'. It is further contended that when the opp. party no.3 was not a workman under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Union cannot raise any dispute for compassionate appointment/employment of the opp. party no.3 as legal heir of the deceased workman. It is further contended that the learned Industrial Tribunal has committed illegality in passing the impugned award and therefore, it should be set aside. 10. Before addressing the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to discuss the scope of interference with the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal in the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In case of Syed Yakoob -Vrs.- K.S. Radhakrishnan, (1964) AIR SC 477 , a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath -Vrs.- Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) AIR SC 233 ; Nagendra Nath -Vrs.- Commr. of Hills Division, (1958) AIR SC 398 and Kaushalya Devi -Vrs.- Bachittar Singh, (1960) AIR SC 1168 )." The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sadhu Ram -Vrs.- Delhi Transport Corporation, (1984) AIR SC 1467 held as follows:- "3. We are afraid the High Court misdirected itself. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is truly wide but, for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate Court over Tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to readjudicate upon questions of fact decided by those Tribunals. That the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court and hold that the workman had raised no demand with the management...." In view of such settled position of law, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court will not interfere with weighing of evidence led before the Tribunal as if a Court of appeal. A finding of fact cannot be challenged on the ground that relevant materials and evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the findings. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are the exclusive domain of the Tribunal and the same cannot be agitated before this Court. Even if another view is possible on the evidence adduced before the Tribunal, this Court would not be justified to interfere with the findings recorded by the Tribunal. When the findings recorded by the Tribunal are perverse or irrational or arrived at by ignoring materials on record or arbitrary or contrary to the principles of natural justice, the same can be interfered with by the this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and going through the documents relied upon by him, we find that the learned Tribunal has framed the issues correctly and discussed all the issues elaborately with reference to the materials available on record. The citations placed on the relevant issues have also been considered. There is no error of law apparent on the face of the record. It cannot be said that the view taken by the learned Tribunal is not possible on the evidence adduced before it. We find no patent illegality for interfering with the impugned award which appears to be just and reasonable. In that view of the matter, there is little scope for interference with the same in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 12. Accordingly, the impugned award passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, Bhubaneswar in Industrial Dispute Case No.26 of 1998 stands confirmed and the writ petition being devoid of merits, stands dismissed.