JUDGMENT Seth, CJ -- 1. Appellant was placed before the Sessions Judge, Satna to take his trial under sections 302, 307 of IPC and section 27 of the Arms Act. He has been convicted and sentenced as under: Section 302 IPC : R.I. for life and fine of Rs. 1,000/- with default stipulation; Section 307 IPC : 7 years' R.I. and fine of Rs. 500/- with default stipulation; Section 27(1) Arms Act : 3 years' R.I. and fine of Rs. 500/- with default stipulation. The sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. Against his conviction and sentence, appellant has appealed to this Court. 2. The occurrence took place at about 4:00 p.m. in the evening on November 12th, 2007 in village Paldeo, falling under Police Station - Nayagaon, Chitrakoot in District - Satna. 3. As per prosecution case, there was no love lost between appellant and Babu Tiwari @ Narmada Prasad, resident of the same village. On the fateful day, because of the previous animosity, appellant fired gun shots at Babu Tiwari, who providentially escaped and the bullet meant for Babu Tiwari, unfortunately hit Matroo @ Santosh, a young boy, aged 10 years. He died on the spot because of the gun shot injury. 4. Incident was seen by Gore Lal father of the deceased. He immediately went and lodged the first information report (Ex. P-12) in the Police Station Nayagaon, Chitrakoot, naming appellant as the author of crime. This set the investigation rolling. 5. After the inquest, dead body was sent for post-mortem. Dr. Sunil (PW 5) performed the autopsy and the post-mortem report is Ex. P-9. Dr. Sunil found that the cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage, as a result of the gun shot injury. There is no doubt that deceased died a homicidal death. 6. After completing the investigation, police filed the charge sheet indicting appellant and his father (Rama Shankar). Former for the offences as mentioned above and latter for an offence punishable under section 30 of the Arms Act. 7. On due consideration of prosecution evidence, trial Court found accused persons guilty of the offences charged, leading to their conviction. Appellant was sentenced as stated above. Appellant's father (Rama Shankar) was convicted under section 30 of the Arms Act and he was sentenced to pay only the fine amount, which he paid without preferring any appeal. 7. On due consideration of prosecution evidence, trial Court found accused persons guilty of the offences charged, leading to their conviction. Appellant was sentenced as stated above. Appellant's father (Rama Shankar) was convicted under section 30 of the Arms Act and he was sentenced to pay only the fine amount, which he paid without preferring any appeal. Hence, we have no concern with him and have to deal with appellant Amit Tiwari alone, who is in appeal before us. 8. The conviction of appellant rests on the direct evidence of Gore Lal (PW 8); Shiv Mohan (PW 2), Sharda Prasad (PW 3) and Narmada Prasad (PW 11). These witnesses in unison supported each other and the prosecution story as set out in the FIR; and their presence at the time of the incident is neither questioned nor doubted. Nothing has come out in the cross-examination to impeach their credit or doubt the prosecution case. It is clear from the evidence that appellant armed with his father's gun opened fire, causing gunshot injury to the deceased as proved by the medical evidence. The weapon of offence i.e. the gun and an empty cartridge was recovered and seized from the spot. Thus, on due consideration of the evidence available on record, we find no infirmity with the finding of the trial Court on this count. 9. The only point urged by the learned counsel for appellant is that appellant had no intention to kill Matroo who got killed accidentally; therefore, appellant could not be held guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 of IPC. He submitted that the trial Court committed an error in convicting appellant for offence punishable under section 302 of the IPC. According to him, at best, offence would not travel beyond section 304 part-II of the IPC for which appellant has already served out sufficient jail sentence. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 2017 SC 471 . 10. Now, in view of the facts established on the prosecution evidence, question that arises for our consideration is what offence appellant is guilty of? 11. We are not impressed with the submission of learned counsel for the appellant. From the evidence established on record, it is quite clear that it is a case of transferred malice. 10. Now, in view of the facts established on the prosecution evidence, question that arises for our consideration is what offence appellant is guilty of? 11. We are not impressed with the submission of learned counsel for the appellant. From the evidence established on record, it is quite clear that it is a case of transferred malice. Doctrine of transferred malice applies where the mens rea of one offence can be transferred to another, where a person causes death of another, whose death that person neither intended or knew himself likely to cause death. For example, A shoots at B intending to kill B, but misses and hits and kills C. Transferred malice can operate so that the mens rea of A (intention to kill B) can be transferred to the killing of C. Consequently, A is liable for the murder of C, despite the fact that he did not actually intend to kill C. In this connection, we may profitably refer to the following observation of the House of Lords, "The effect of transferred malice, as I understand it, is that intended victim and actual victim are treated as if they were one, so that what was intended to happen to first person (but did not happen) is added to what actually did happen to the second person (but was not intended to happen), with result what was intended and what happened to make a notionally intended and actually consummated crime." [(1997) 3 All ER 936]. The doctrine of transferred malice is embodied in section 301 of the Penal Code. In the instant appeal, appellant opened gun fire with the intention to kill Babu Tiwari, but missed him completely and hit the deceased whom he had no intention to kill. Here the transferred malice will operate so that the mens rea of appellant (intention to kill Babu Tiwari) is transferred to the killing of Matroo. Consequently, appellant is liable for the murder of Matroo, despite the fact that he had no intention to kill him. Therefore, in our considered opinion, appellant is guilty of offence punishable under section 302 r/w 301 of IPC as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1991 SC 982 . The reliance on the decision reported in Gurpal Singh (supra), is clearly distinguishable on the facts in the case in hand. The reliance on the decision reported in Gurpal Singh (supra), is clearly distinguishable on the facts in the case in hand. In the present case, from the evidence on record, it is clear that appellant intended to kill Babu Tiwari and fired at him but Babu Tiwari had a providential escape, and the bullet meant for him hit and killed Matroo. Consequently, appellant is liable for the murder of Matroo on account of transferred malice and was rightly convicted and sentenced by the trial Court. 12. In view of the foregoing discussions, we find no merit in this appeal to interfere with the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court. Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 13. Ordered accordingly.