JUDGMENT : Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. 1. The present revision has been preferred at the behest of the defendant in a declaratory suit against an order, whereby the amendments of plaint and an injunction application, as prayed for by the plaintiff/opposite party, were allowed. The plaint of the said suit sought for the following reliefs: (a) "for declaration that the impugned deed of Agreement (notarized) dated 07.08.2013 is illegal, fraudulent, void and not binding upon the Plaintiff; (b) for permanent injunction restraining the Defendant and/or their men and agent from making any sort of illegal and unauthorized act or acts inclusive of any illegal and unauthorized construction on filled up water body/ponds/tanks or in anywhere on the suit property; (c) for mandatory injunction directing the Defendant to restore the water bodies/tanks/ponds on the suit property to it original position on removal of all types of concrete construction already made thereon at 3, B.T. Road, Agarpara, Police Station Khardah, District North 24 Parganas; (d) all costs of the suit; (e) for any other relief or reliefs as the plaintiffs entitled in the eye of law and equity." 2. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner argues that, by virtue of the said amendments, not only certain admissions made in the original plaint and injunction applications were withdrawn, but the proposed amendments are barred by limitation. By placing reliance on several paragraphs of the plaint, it is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the categorical plaint case was that, on January 10, 2013, the parties entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ('MOU'), primarily for the purpose of establishing a university. It was the further plaint case that subsequently, without the assent of the governing body of the plaintiff/mission and without authority, an agreement was entered into on August 7, 2013. The original plaint case was that, upon receipt of an enquiry committee report, the plaintiff/opposite party called a meeting of the governing body on February 20, 2014, where it was resolved that the said agreement dated August 7, 2013 was neither approved by the governing body nor signed by the Secretary of the plaintiff as per the MOU and the same be treated as illegal, void and incomplete and should be revised and be placed for approval of the governing body before starting construction work. 3. 3. Subsequently, by virtue of the amendments, the plaintiff sought, inter alia, to incorporate the term "alleged" to qualify the MOU and to introduce a further relief challenging the said MOU dated January 10, 2013, in addition to the original prayer challenging the agreement dated August 7, 2013. 4. The proposed amendments to the plaint were as follows: "(i) In 2nd line of the paragraph 21 of the plaint after the words "declaring the impunged", and before the Word agreement, the Word "MOU" dated 10.1.2013 alleged to have been executed between the parties to the suit, shall be inserted. (ii) In the paragraph 24 of the plaint in the prayer portion the entire prayer (a) shall be deleted and substituted by the following :- "(a) for declaration that the impunged "MOU" dated 10.1.2013 and the impunged deed of Agreement dated 7.8.2013 are both illegal, fraudulent, void, and not binding upon the plaintiff"." 5. The amendment sought in the injunction application, on the other hand, was as follows: "(i) In 2nd line of the paragraph 21 of the injunction application after the Words "declaring the impunged" and before the Word agreement, the word "MOU" dated 10.1.2013 alleged to have been executed between the parties to the suit" shall be inserted." 6. It is argued that all along, the MOU was pleaded to be valid and to be the basis on which the plaintiff required the subsequent agreement to be drawn. However, by the proposed amendments, the said MOU itself was sought to be challenged. 7. Moreover, the MOU dated January 10, 2013 was all along within the knowledge of the plaintiff, which is evident from the original plaint. The amendment applications dated December 2, 2016, sought to challenge such MOU, after expiry of a period of three years, which is the statutory limitation period, from the execution of the said MOU. As such, it is submitted, the said amendments are also time-barred. The following citations were relied on by the defendant/petitioner in support of the aforesaid submissions: I. Bollepanda P. Poonacha and another vs. K.M. Madapa, (2008) 13 SCC 179 ; II. Gurdial Singh and others vs. Raj Kumar Aneja and others, (2002) 2 SCC 445 ; III. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Sri Ram Mirchandani, 2015 3 CalLJ 51 ; IV. The following citations were relied on by the defendant/petitioner in support of the aforesaid submissions: I. Bollepanda P. Poonacha and another vs. K.M. Madapa, (2008) 13 SCC 179 ; II. Gurdial Singh and others vs. Raj Kumar Aneja and others, (2002) 2 SCC 445 ; III. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Sri Ram Mirchandani, 2015 3 CalLJ 51 ; IV. Revajeetu Builders and Developers vs. Narayanaswamy and Sons and others, (2009) 10 SCC 84 ; V. Ashutosh Chaturvedi vs. Prano Devi alias Parani Devi and others, (2008) 15 SCC 610 ; VI. South Konkan Distilleries and another vs. Prabhakar Gajanan Naik and others, (2008) 14 SCC 632 ; VII. Radhika Devi vs. Bajrangi Singh and others, (1996) AIR SC 2358. 8. Learned senior counsel for the opposite party, in controverting the petitioner's arguments, submits that the MOU did not retain its independent existence after the same was merged into the agreement dated August 7, 2013. By placing reliance on the said agreement, it is argued that the MOU, in its entirety, was made a part of the agreement, which is reflected from the habendum portion of the agreement. As such, it is argued, the MOU lost its independent character and merged completely into the agreement dated August 7, 2013, which was, in any event, challenged in the original suit. As such, the amendments sought were only of a clarificatory nature and did not seek incorporation of something alien to the original pleadings. 9. Thus, it is submitted by the opposite party, even without the amendments, the original plaint challenged the MOU as an integral part of the agreement itself, which was already challenged, and no new pleading was sought to be introduced by the amendments. 10. In fact, learned senior counsel for the opposite party goes to the extent of submitting that the plaint, in any event, incorporated a challenge to the MOU and the plaintiff could do even without the amendments. However, to provide further details and clarity in the pleadings, the amendments were sought. 11. In such view of the matter, the opposite party argues that the amendments neither amounted to withdrawal of any admission nor could be said to be barred by limitation. 12. Upon hearing both sides, the questions which arise for consideration are: i. Whether the proposed amendments amounted to withdrawal of admissions, thereby displacing the case of the defendant? ii. 11. In such view of the matter, the opposite party argues that the amendments neither amounted to withdrawal of any admission nor could be said to be barred by limitation. 12. Upon hearing both sides, the questions which arise for consideration are: i. Whether the proposed amendments amounted to withdrawal of admissions, thereby displacing the case of the defendant? ii. Whether the proposed amendments were time-barred? 13. For answering the first question, an examination of the original plaint pleadings is necessary. From paragraph no. 9 onwards of the plaint, the plaintiff asserted the execution of the MOU-in-question on January 10, 2013 and thereafter proceeded to plead that the said MOU was approved by the governing body of the plaintiff and was otherwise given effect to by constituting a governing council. In fact, one of the primary objections of the plaintiff to the subsequent agreement dated August 7, 2013, as reflected from the original plaint, was that the said subsequent agreement was not signed as per the MOU and as such, should be treated as illegal, void and incomplete (paragraph no. 18 of the plaint). 14. Thus, the original plaint clearly established the independent existence of the MOU and sought implementation of the said MOU, inter alia, by drawing up an agreement in terms thereof. 15. Thus, it is not that the MOU was a part of the agreement, but just the reverse, that is, the agreement sought by the plaintiff had to be a product of, and drawn up pursuant to, the MOU. Even an examination of the agreement-in-question, which was referred to in the plaint itself, reveals that the same itself referred to the MOU as an independent document and recorded that the agreement was entered into pursuant to the said MOU {Clause (G) of the agreement dated August 7, 2013}. 16. In fact, the agreement did not state anywhere that the MOU was merged with the agreement or became a part thereof and it was nowhere indicated in the agreement that, by virtue of execution of the agreement, the purpose and operation of the MOU became defunct. 17. What was done was that the contents of the MOU were reproduced verbatim as a part of the agreement, without so mentioning. 18. 17. What was done was that the contents of the MOU were reproduced verbatim as a part of the agreement, without so mentioning. 18. Hence, although this Court or the Trial Court could not enter into the merits of the proposed amendments at the amendment stage, a prima facie perusal of the original plaint and the injunction application on the one hand (the averments in the injunction application virtually reproduced the contents of the plaint substantially) on the one hand, and the proposed amendments on the other, reveal that the amendments were clearly designed to withdraw elaborate admissions made by the plaintiff in several paragraphs of the plaint and injunction application, as they stood originally. 19. Moreover, since the MOU was admittedly entered into by both parties on January 10, 2013, and the amendment applications were filed on December 2, 2016, that is, after expiry of the three years' period of limitation, the amendments were clearly time-barred. A challenge to the MOU could not be thrown after the expiry of the said limitation period. 20. As such, the amendments were liable to be refused on both scores. 21. It may be added that, even in the original plaint, one of the grounds of challenge to the agreement was that the same was not signed in terms of the MOU, thereby not only vindicating the existence of the MOU but relying on the authenticity and binding effect of the same. 22. The proposed amendments sought to introduce a stand diametrically opposite to the said original pleadings and hence, amount to withdrawal of admissions, thereby displacing the case of the defendant. 23. In such view of the matter, the impugned orders suffer from patent jurisdictional error and ought to be set aside. 24. Accordingly, C.O. No. 2992 of 2018 is allowed on contest, thereby setting aside the impugned order and dismissing the applications filed by the plaintiff/opposite party for amendments of the plaint and injunction respectively, both filed in Title Suit No. 65 of 2014 before the Fourth Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Sealdah, District: North 24 Parganas. 25. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 26. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.