JUDGMENT Anand Pathak, J. 1. With consent heard finally. 2. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is preferred by the petitioner, being aggrieved by the order dated 28-02-2018 passed by the labour Court vide Annexure P/1 whereby reference preferred at the instance of respondent/employee before the labour Court has been decided and direction has been given for reinstatement without back wages which caused grievance for the present petitioner as employer. Therefore, petition under Article 227 has been preferred. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised two grounds; first is in respect of inordinate delay and laches because the respondent was terminated in 1986 and after lapse of 26 years, reconciliation proceedings started in 2012. Thereafter, reference was initiated in 2014 before the labour Court resulting into award in 2018. Thus, after 32 years of termination, award has been passed by the labour Court. The said inordinate delay cannot be overlooked in any manner and labour Court erred in causing illegality while ignoring the delay. He referred the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and another, (2015) 15 SCC 1 . 3. Another ground raised by the petitioner is in respect of length of service because according to him, 240 days continuous service was not completed by the respondent, therefore, as per the mandate of this Court in the matter of Zonal Manager uCo Bank v. General Secretary, 2017 (4) MPLJ 104 petitioner has not produced evidence to establish that he worked continuously till the alleged retrenchment. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent opposed the submission made by the petitioner on two grounds; one is that case in hand is not under Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 of classification and it is retrenchment as per Section 25(H) of the Act. After retrenchment of petitioner, other persons were appointed which is contrary to the provisions contained under Section 25(H) of the Act. Therefore, retrenchment is bad in law. While relying upon the judgment of Gujrat High Court in the matter of Raijibhai Bhikhabhai Parmar v. Indian Petrochemicals passed in Special Civil Application No.5491 of 2014, he submits that the labour Court has rightly given the finding in favour of respondent. Therefore, retrenchment is bad in law. While relying upon the judgment of Gujrat High Court in the matter of Raijibhai Bhikhabhai Parmar v. Indian Petrochemicals passed in Special Civil Application No.5491 of 2014, he submits that the labour Court has rightly given the finding in favour of respondent. He submits that record of the case in hand has not been produced before the labour as well as before this Court, therefore, adverse inference needs to be drawn. 5. Through Annexure P/6 filed by the petitioner, respondent submits that petitioner has completed 240 days uninterruptedly and labour Court rightly considered the same. It is further submitted that the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Municipal Council, Guna v. Krishna Pal Singh, 2016 (IV) MPJR 56 decided the controversy and found the dispute within limitation. He also relied upon Section 2-A of the Act. He prayed for dismissal of the petition. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents appended thereto. 7. Before proceeding on merits, it is imperative that matter should be decided on the basis of point of limitation as raised by the petitioner. Admittedly, petitioner was terminated/retrenched in 1986. It is also admitted fact that reconciliation proceedings were started by the respondent in the year 2012, therefore, as per own submission of the respondent and admitted factual position, reference has been made by the respondent after 26 years of alleged retrenchment which is virtually the complete service tenure of an employee. After such belated stage, if any reference has been made then the same being without proper explanation cannot be entertained although it is doubtful whether any explanation for such delay would be plausible acceptable. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar (supra) has given the guidelines: 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exits? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances, disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other than, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.4. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the Labour Authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2-A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for a number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. 42.5. Take another example. A workman approaches the civil court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for a number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that civil court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. 42.5. Take another example. A workman approaches the civil court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for a number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that civil court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a worn forum. 44. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the "appropriate Government" to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words "at any time" used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employer's financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry." 8. In the considered opinion of this Court, labour Court erred in not going into the question of limitation and has decided the question of limitation in a slipshod manner in para 15. Therefore, this Court does not intend to affirm the order of the labour Court on the question of limitation itself. Reference and statement of claim filed by the respondent was hopelessly barred by time and after such long period, no relief can be granted to the respondent. 9. Resultantly, the petition preferred by the petitioner is hereby allowed and the order of labour Court dated 28-02-2018 is hereby set aside. Since impugned order is set aside on the question of limitation, therefore, other question regarding working for 240 days has not been taken into consideration. 10. Petition stands allowed and disposed of.