JUDGMENT J.B. Pardiwala, J. By this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicant-original accused no.2 seeks to invoke the inherent powers of this Court praying for quashing of the proceedings of Criminal Case No.453 of 2016 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jasdan, District-Rajkot, arising from the complaint filed under Section-138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act [for short 'The Act']. 2. It appears from the materials on record that the respondent no.1 viz. Rajkot Nagrik Sahakari Bank Limited filed a complaint under Section-138 of the Act against a Partnership Firm running in the name of Radheshyam Oil Mill and its two Partners. The applicant herein is shown to be one of the partners of the Partnership Firm in the complaint. He is accused no.3. It appears that the Partnership Firm obtained a loan from the Bank to the tune of Rs. 3,94,67,642.86ps. The accused no.2 issued a cheque of Rs. 3,70,00,000/- bearing No.000188, dated 20/03/2016 drawn on the Bank of Baroda, Jasdan Branch, Rajkot, in favour of the complainant bank for the discharge of the loan liabilities. The said cheque was presented by the complainant bank for clearance, but the same came to be dishonoured on account of insufficient funds in the account of the Partnership Firm. In such circumstances, the bank issued a statutory notice, dated 25/03/2016 to the Partnership Firm as well as to the two partners interalia stating as under:- 1. That you Noticee no.1 is a partnership firm and having its registered office at address as mentioned in cause title of this notice and Noticee no.2 and 3 are in charge and responsible person for the day-to-day affairs of the Noticee no.1 firm. 2. That you noticees were in need of financial assistance and accordingly you noticees applied to my client bank for the loan/ credit facility. 3. The said loan has been sanctioned and disbursed by my client bank to you noticees and availed by you noticees for the purpose as mentioned in loan agreement. 4. That in you said loan account Rs. 3,94,67,642.86/- (In words Rupees Three Crore Ninety Four Lacs Sixty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Forty Two and Eighty Six Paise Only) are due and payable by you. 5. That you noticees have drawn and issued a Cheque of Rs. 4. That in you said loan account Rs. 3,94,67,642.86/- (In words Rupees Three Crore Ninety Four Lacs Sixty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Forty Two and Eighty Six Paise Only) are due and payable by you. 5. That you noticees have drawn and issued a Cheque of Rs. 3,70,00,000/- (in words Rupees Three Crore Seventy Lacs Only) bearing Cheque No.000188 dated March 20, 2016 (20.03.2016) drawn on bank of Baroda, Rajkot from your bank account maintained by you with your said banker to partly discharge your above mentioned liabilities. 6. That the said aforesaid cheque is signed by your Noticee no.3 in capacity partner of Noticee no.1 firm. 7. That you noticees have given assurance to my client that the said cheque shall be honoured on presentation of same by my client(s) for collection. My client has presented the above mentioned cheque for collection. However, it is regretted to say that the said cheque was dishonoured due to reason in written Memo dated March 21, 2016 (21.03.2016) i.e. "Funds Insufficient" in your above mentioned bank account. 8. You Noticee No.2 to 3 are in charge and responsible for day-to-day affairs of Noticee no.1 firm at the relevant time when the aforesaid transaction has taken place between you Noticees and my client and therefore you noticees are liable to be prosecuted under the provisions of Negotiable Instrument Act. 9. That Noticee No.2 and 3 being partners of Noticee No.1 firm have actively participated with my client bank in relation to the subject loan transaction, and Noticee no.2 and 3 have signed the relevant loan document pertaining to the subject loan borrowed by Noticee No.1 firm interalia as described in said document(s). My client says that during the loan transactions Noticee No.2 and 3 had actually and actively participated and in negotiation on behalf of Noticee No.1 firm. The officer of my clinet bank as and when visited the Noticee no.1 premises, Noticee No.2 and 3 were found actively involved in the day-to-day affairs of Noticee No.1 firm and were/ are in touch with the financial matters as well as marketing of the firm. The officer of my clinet bank as and when visited the Noticee no.1 premises, Noticee No.2 and 3 were found actively involved in the day-to-day affairs of Noticee No.1 firm and were/ are in touch with the financial matters as well as marketing of the firm. My client says that the Noticee No.2 and 3 are responsible for dayto-day working and management of the Noticee No.1 firm and as such all important decisions relating to the day-to-day financial affairs of the Noticee No.1 firm cannot be taken unless and until there is a concurrence of the same between the Noticee No.2 and 3. And therefore, Noticee No.2 and 3 along with Noticee No.1 firm are liable to be prosecuted and punished under the provisions of The Negotiable Instrument Act. 10. That on account of the above acts, you are liable to be prosecuted under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 for which you are liable to be punished with the imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or are liable to pay an amount which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque or with both. 11. Under the circumstances, I hereby call upon you to make the payment of Rs. 3,70,00,000/- (In words Rupees Three Crore Seventy Lacs Only) bearing Cheque No.000188 dated March 20, 2016 (20.03.2016) drawn on Bank of Baroda, Rajkot signed and issued by you Noticee No.3 in favour of my client to discharge above loan liability, along with the incidental charges incurred on the presentation of the said cheque within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of this notice, failing which, my client shall take necessary action against you in the competent court of law, and in that event, you Noticees shall be liable for all the costs and consequences resulting there from. 3. As the cheque amount was not paid within the statutory time period, the Bank proceeded to file a criminal complaint for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jasdan, which came to be registered as the Criminal Case No.453 of 2016. 4. The Court below took cognizance upon the complaint and issued process to the accused persons. 5. 4. The Court below took cognizance upon the complaint and issued process to the accused persons. 5. In such circumstances referred to above, the applicant original accused no.2 is here before this Court with this application praying for quashing of the criminal proceedings. 6. The principal argument canvassed on behalf of the applicant accused is that on the date of the commission of the offence, the applicant herein was not the partner of the Partnership Firm. According to the applicant herein, he retired as a Partner of the Partnership Firm w.e.f. 01/04/2014. In support of his case, reliance has been placed on Form-'G' of the Registrar of Firms, which reads as under:- REGISTRAR OF FIRMS FORM G Sr. NO.OF APPl.:- 3306 Firm No.:GUJ-RJT:68361 NAME RADHESHYAM OIL MILL ADDRESS OPP. KANTA GAS GODOWN, ATKOT RAOD, OPP:KALYANI PETROL PUMP, JASDAN. BUSINESS MANUFACTURING OF OIL MILL NO.OF ENTRY DATE OF ENTRY NATURE OF ENTRY DATE OF JOINING REMARKS 1 24/11/10 X1. Mayurbhai Dhanani, 2, Bajrang Nagar, Mochigors Plot, Adamji Road, Radheshyam House, Jasdan. 07/01/08 See Ent.2l 2. Amitbhai Dhanani, As above – 1 -- Duration: AT WILL......... Sd/- REGISTRAR OF FIRMS RAJKOT DIVISION RAJKOT. 2 25/08/14 1. Dhirubhai Mohanbhai Dhanani has joined the Firm as New Partner of the W.E.F.1/4/2014 2 25/08/14 Partner No.1 of Entry No.1 has retired as Partner of the Firm w.e.f.1/4/2014. As per Appl. Recd. On 22/7/2014. Sd/- REGISTRAR OF FIRMS RAJKOT DIVISION RAJKOT. 7. In such circumstances, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant prays that no vicarious liability can be fastened upon the applicant herein as he had already retired as a Partner from the firm way-back in the year 2014. The cheque in question came to be issued duly signed by the accused no.2 named in the complaint dated 20/03/2016. The learned counsel prays that there being merit in this application, the same may be allowed and the proceedings be quashed. 8. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. J.R. Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the complainant bank. Mr. Shah would submit that the issue whether the applicant herein had retired from the firm as a Partner in the year 2014 is a question of fact and such a question of fact can be gone into only by the trial Court. Mr. J.R. Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the complainant bank. Mr. Shah would submit that the issue whether the applicant herein had retired from the firm as a Partner in the year 2014 is a question of fact and such a question of fact can be gone into only by the trial Court. Mr. Shah would submit that when the loan was availed of by the Partnership Firm and the documents in that regard were executed, the applicant was very much one of the partners of the firm. This fact has not been disputed by the applicant. Later, behind the back of the bank, all of a sudden, one of the partners retired and that too, without following the procedure as prescribed by the Indian Partnership Act for the purpose of retirement. The applicant cannot absolve himself from his liability at this stage. According to Mr. Shah, by merely producing an extract of the Form-G, it cannot be decided whether the applicant had in fact retired from the Firm as a partner or not. Mr. Shah in support of his submission has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rallis India Ltd. vs. Poduru Vidya Bhushan and Others. reported in, (2011) 13 SCC 88 . The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are as under:- "10. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid averments as found by us in the Criminal Complaint, we are of the considered opinion that sufficient averments have been made against the Respondents that they were the partners of the firm, at the relevant point of time and were looking after day to day affairs of the partnership firm. This averment has been specifically mentioned by the Appellant in the complaint even though denied by the Respondents but the burden of proof that at the relevant point of time they were not the partners, lies specifically on them. This onus is required to be discharged by them by leading evidence and unless it is so proved, in accordance with law, in our opinion, they cannot be discharged of their liability. Consequently, High Court committed an error in discharging them. This onus is required to be discharged by them by leading evidence and unless it is so proved, in accordance with law, in our opinion, they cannot be discharged of their liability. Consequently, High Court committed an error in discharging them. Also, at the cost of repetition, by virtue of their own submissions before the High Court (reproduced in Para 6 above), the Respondents have admitted the fact that the Appellant had referred to them in their capacity as partners who were in-charge of the affairs of the firm in the initial complaints. The question as to whether or not they were partners in the firm as on 31.03.2004, is one of fact, which has to be established in trial. The initial burden by way of averment in the complaint has been made by the Appellant. 11. The primary responsibility of the complainant is to make specific averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no legal requirement for the complainant to show that the accused partner of the firm was aware about each and every transaction. On the other hand, proviso to Section 141 of the Act clearly lays down that if the accused is able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the offence was committed without his knowledge or he had exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, he will not be liable of punishment. Needless to say, final judgment and order would depend on the evidence adduced. Criminal liability is attracted only on those, who at the time of commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm. But vicarious criminal liability can be inferred against the partners of a firm when it is specifically averred in the complaint about the status of the partners "qua" the firm. This would make them liable to face the prosecution but it does not lead to automatic conviction. Hence, they are not adversely prejudiced - if they are eventually found to be not guilty, as a necessary consequence thereof would be acquitted. 12. At the threshold, the High Court should not have interfered with the cognizance of the complaints having been taken by the trial court. The High Court could not have discharged the respondents of the said liability at the threshold. 12. At the threshold, the High Court should not have interfered with the cognizance of the complaints having been taken by the trial court. The High Court could not have discharged the respondents of the said liability at the threshold. Unless parties are given opportunity to lead evidence, it is not possible to come to definite conclusion as to what was the date when the earlier partnership was dissolved and since what date the Respondents ceased to be the partners of the firm. 13. Before concluding the present discussion, we also take this opportunity to strike a cautionary note with regard to the manner in which High Courts ought to exercise their power to quash criminal proceedings when such proceeding is related to offences committed by companies. The world of commercial transactions contains numerous unique intricacies, many of which are yet to be statutorily regulated. More particularly, the principle laid down in Section 141 of the Act (which is pari materia with identical sections in other Acts like the Food Safety and Standards Act, the erstwhile Prevention of Food Adulteration Act etc. etc.) is susceptible to abuse by unscrupulous companies to the detriment of unsuspecting third parties. 14. In the present case, there are several disputed facts involved - for instance, the date when the partnership came into being, who were the initial partners, if and when the Respondents had actually retired from the partnership firm etc. Strictly speaking, the ratio of the SMS Pharmaceuticals (supra) can be followed only, after the factum that accused were the Directors or Partners of a Company or Firm respectively at the relevant point of time, stands fully established. However, in cases like the present, where there are allegations and counter-allegations between the parties regarding the very composition of the firm, the above rule of 'specific averment' must be broadly construed. 15. However, in cases like the present, where there are allegations and counter-allegations between the parties regarding the very composition of the firm, the above rule of 'specific averment' must be broadly construed. 15. Indeed, it would be nothing short of a travesty of justice if the Directors of a Company of Partners of a Firm, who, having duped a third-party by producing false documents (like a fake partnership deed) or making false statements (that some others were in charge of the Company/Firm), at a subsequent stage, seek protection from prosecution on the ground that they were not directly indicted in the complaint - such a proposition strikes against one of the very basic tenets of the law of natural justice, which is, that none shall be allowed to take advantage of his own default. Of course, the above observation is of a general nature, and has no bearing on the present case, but nonetheless, the power to quash a criminal proceeding with respect to an offence under Section 141 of the Act, must be exercised keeping this advisory note and caveat in mind. 16. On account of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge exercising the jurisdiction conferred on him under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be sustained in law. The same are hereby set aside and quashed. The trial court is directed to dispose of the Criminal complaints filed by Appellant at an early date, after giving opportunity of hearing to both sides, in accordance with law. However, the Trial Court would not be influenced by any of the observations made hereinabove and would decide the matters in accordance with law. The appeals are allowed. Parties to bear their respective costs." 9. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Shah prays that there being no merit in this application, the same may be rejected. 10. Mr. Gupta in rejoinder to the submissions of Mr. Shah submitted that if the document relating to the retirement of the applicant accused as a partner from the Firm goes uncontroverted and on face of the documents, which is beyond suspicion or doubt, then it would be a travesty of justice if such accused is asked to face the trial and prove his defence before the trial Court. In support of such submission, Mr. In support of such submission, Mr. Gupta has placed reliance on the decision of Harshendra Kumar D. Vs. Rebatilata Koley reported in, (2011) AIR SC 1090. 11. In Harshendra Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court has taken the view that if the document relating to the resignation of the accused from the post of Director of company goes uncontroverted and on face of the documents, which are beyond suspicion or doubt placed by the accused, the accusation is without any basis, then it would be a travesty of justice if such accused is relegated to trial and asked to prove his defence before the trial Court. I may quote the observations made by the Supreme Court in paras 19, 20, 21 and 22 as under: 19. The above documents placed on record by the appellant have not been disputed nor controverted by the complainants. As a matter of fact, it was not even the case of the complainants before the High Court that the change among Directors of the Company, on resignation of the appellant with effect from March 2, 2004, has not taken place. The argument on behalf of the complainants before the High Court was that it was not permissible for the High Court to look into the papers and documents relating to the appellant's resignation since these are the matters of defence of the accused person and defence is a matter for consideration at the trial on the basis of evidence which cannot be decided by the High Court. The complainants in this regard relied upon a decision of Single Judge of that Court in the case of Fateh Chand Bhansali, (2005) 1 CalCriLR 581. The counsel for the present appellant (revision petitioner therein) on the other hand referred to a later decision of a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Saroj Kumar Jhunjhunwala v. State of West Bengal and Anr., (2007) 1 CalCriLR 793 wherein it was held that if before the issuance of cheques, the accused had resigned from the directorship, then he cannot be held liable for the offence. Confronted with two Single Bench decisions of that Court in Fateh Chand Bhansali, (2005) 1 CalCriLR 581 and Saroj Kumar Jhunjhunwala, (2007) 1 CalCriLR 793, the Single Judge held that the judicial discipline demanded that he should go by the earlier decision, namely, Fateh Chand Bhansali, (2005) 1 CalCriLR 581 and, accordingly, refused to take into consideration the documents relating to the appellant's resignation as Director from the Company with effect from March 2, 2004. While relying upon Fateh Chand Bhansali, (2005) 1 CalCriLR 581, the Single Judge referred to a decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Others, (2004) 1 SCC 691 which was referred in Fateh Chand Bhansali, (2005) 1 CalCriLR 581. 20. In Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) AIR SC 517, this Court while dealing with the scope of power under Section 482 of the Code observed : "13. It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was a trial Judge.........." 21. In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case where trial is yet to take place and the matter is at the stage of issuance of summons or taking cognizance, materials relied upon by the accused which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 or for that matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents - which are beyond suspicion or doubt - placed by accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage. 22. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a person. No greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case. In our opinion, the High Court fell into grave error in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted documents relating to appellant's resignation from the post of Director of the Company. Had these documents been considered by the High Court, it would have been apparent that the appellant has resigned much before the cheques were issued by the Company. As noticed above, the appellant resigned from the post of Director on March 2, 2004. The dishonoured cheques were issued by the Company on April 30, 2004, i.e., much after the appellant had resigned from the post of Director of the Company. The acceptance of appellant's resignation is duly reflected in the resolution dated March 2, 2004. Then in the prescribed Form (Form No. 32), the Company informed to the Registrar of Companies on March 4, 2004 about appellant's resignation. It is not even the case of the complainants that the dishonoured cheques were issued by the appellant. These facts leave no manner of doubt that on the date the offence was committed by the Company, the appellant was not the Director; he had nothing to do with the affairs of the Company. It is not even the case of the complainants that the dishonoured cheques were issued by the appellant. These facts leave no manner of doubt that on the date the offence was committed by the Company, the appellant was not the Director; he had nothing to do with the affairs of the Company. In this view of the matter, if the criminal complaints are allowed to proceed against the appellant, it would result in gross injustice to the appellant and tantamount to an abuse of process of the court. 12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed so far as the applicant herein is concerned. 13. What has been placed on record is the true copy of the extract of Form-'G' issued by the Registrar of Firms, Rajkot Division, Rajkot. It is evident from the Form-'G' that the applicant herein retired as a partner of the firm w.e.f. 01/04/2014. One Dhirubhai Mohanbhai Dhanani came to be inducted as a new partner w.e.f.01/04/2014. Mr. Shah fairly submitted that so far as the document at Page-34 of the paper-book is concerned i.e. Form-'G' of the Registrar of Firms, the genuineness of the same is not in doubt. However, according to Mr. Shah, the complainant must be given an opportunity in the course of the trial to establish that even if it is believed that the applicant herein had retired from the firm as a partner, such retirement was not in accordance with law and in such circumstances, he would not be absolved from his criminal liability under Section-138 of the Act. To put it in other words, according to Mr. Shah, if the applicant herein intended to retire as a partner, then he should have issued a public notice in this regard and should have informed the bank about the same. The unilateral act on the part of the applicant in retiring as a partner is not sufficient. 14. In the decision V. Sundaram Vs. E.Santhalingam reported in, 2004 CDJMHC 972, it is observed as follows: "3. ........ The unilateral act on the part of the applicant in retiring as a partner is not sufficient. 14. In the decision V. Sundaram Vs. E.Santhalingam reported in, 2004 CDJMHC 972, it is observed as follows: "3. ........ From the decisions cited above, it is clear that a partner who has retired from the partnership is bound to give notice in a verna cular newspaper of the locality wherein the principal place of business of the partnership situated and also in the official gazette. Further from the judgments referred to above, it is also clear that notwithstanding the dissolution of the partnership firm, a partnership continues as to third persons who deal with the members thereof as partners until public notice of dissolution is given, even though, as between the partners the firm has been dissolved prior to such notice. In other words, a partnership is presumed to continue as to third persons until public notice of dissolution has been given unless the person dealing with the firm after its dissolution had actual knowledge of such dissolution. Section 45 of the Indian Partnership Act says that a partnership continues as to third persons unless the dissolving of the firm is taken to the knowledge of the third persons who deal with the firm." 15. In the decision B. Narashimha Rao Vs. T. Raghavalu Naidu & Co, (2007) 3 CTC 356 in paragraph 10 it is observed as follows: "10. The said provision makes it very clear that in case of retirement or expulsion or dissolution, etc., it should be by notice to the Registrar of Firms under Section 63 of the Act and by publication in the Official Gazette in atleast in one verna cular newspaper circulated in the district where the firm does its business. Thus, the public notice as contemplated under this Section makes it very clear that the above three modes have to be carried out relating to the retirement or expulsion of the partners, etc." 16. In the decision N. R. Mahesh Vs. N. Ashok, 2007 CDJMHC 1847, while considering a similar set of facts, the learned Judge has observed as under in paragraph 12 as follows: "12. Though in the cause title it appears that the petitioner/accused has been prosecuted as if in his personal capacity, while elaborating the details of the petitioner, it has been stated that the petitioner is a partner of the firm. Though in the cause title it appears that the petitioner/accused has been prosecuted as if in his personal capacity, while elaborating the details of the petitioner, it has been stated that the petitioner is a partner of the firm. The name of the firm has been omitted in the cause title. The cheque in question has been issued only by the petitioner in the name of the partnership firm, mentioned in the complaint. Issuance of notice by the respondent/complainant to the petitioner is not in dispute. For the notice issued, no reply has been sent by the petitioner." 17. All the above referred three decisions came to be considered by the Madras High Court in the case of S. Raja Saravanan S/o. S. Devarajan vs. K. Anandarajan S/o. Kathavarayan, Cri. O.P.No.18129 of 2007, decided on 20.11.2007. The learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court observed in para-28 as under; "As far as the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent based on Sections 45 and 72 of the Indian Partnership Act and the decisions (V.Sundaram Vs. E.Santhalingam reported in, 2004 CDJMHC 972) and (B.Narashimha Rao Vs. T.Raghavalu Naidu & Co, (2007) 3 CTC 356 ) are concerned, I am of the considered view that the said contention is not applicable to this case. In the context of considering the civil liability of a retiring partner or a partner of a dissolved firm it has been held that in the said decisions that the procedure prescribed under Sections 45, 63 and 72 of the Indian Partnership Act should be complied with. The partnership continues to third parties who deal with the members of the firm as partners until public notice of dissolution is given. Even though as between the partners the firm has been dissolved prior to such notice. But while considering the criminal liability of the retiring partner of the firm or the partner of the dissolved firm under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the main question to be considered is as to whether on the date of issue of cheque and on the date of arising of cause of action such partner was really and actually a partner of the firm or not. Therefore, the said decisions referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be applied to the facts of this case." 18. Therefore, the said decisions referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be applied to the facts of this case." 18. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court. The mode and the procedure prescribed for the purpose of retiring from a partnership firm has been explained under the provisions of sections 45, 63 and 72 of the Indian Partnership Act. If the legal procedure prescribed has not been followed, then the civil liability of a retiring partner continues to the third parties who deal with the members of the firm as partners until public notice of dissolution is given. However, I am dealing with a matter under section 138 of the N.I. Act. While considering the criminal liability of the retired partner of the firm or the partner of the dissolved firm under section 138 of the N.I. Act, the main question to be considered is as to whether on the date of issue of the cheque and on the date of arising of the cause of action, such partner was really and actually a partner of the firm or not. 19. Having regard to the materials on record and more particularly, when Form-G, Registrar of Firms has not been questioned by the complainant, there is no reason for me not to accept the fact that on the date of the commission of the offence, the applicant was not the partner of the firm as he had retired much before the cheque came to be issued by the co-accused. The complainant has not been able to show anything to create a doubt as regards the issue of retirement of the applicant herein as a partner from the Partnership Firm. To put it in other words, the complainant has not been able to indicate anything on the basis of which, it could be said that the issue with regard to the retirement of the applicant as a partner from the Partnership Firm is in the realm of a highly disputed question of fact. 20. In the result, this application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The proceedings of Criminal Case No.453 of 2016 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jasdan, District-Rajkot, are hereby quashed so far as the applicant is concerned. 20. In the result, this application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The proceedings of Criminal Case No.453 of 2016 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jasdan, District-Rajkot, are hereby quashed so far as the applicant is concerned. The criminal case shall now be proceeded further expeditiously in accordance with law so far as the other accused are concerned. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.