JUDGMENT : Introduction: 1. It is a tussle between a bank and a borrower, as usual. The bank auctions the secured asset, certifies the sale, and wants it to be registered in the purchaser’s name. The borrower balks. She wants the property ‘redeemed’—at any length of time—even years later. For she asserts that her right to redeem the property at a tardy pace should triumph over the bank’s right to recover the loan with dispatch. 2. How should a mortgagor’s right to redeem the property under S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act fare vis-a-vis a banker’s right to sell the secured asset and the SARFAESI Act? Case History: 3. There are two Writ Petitions: W.P.(C) No.12045 of 2018 and W.P.(C) No.38194 of 2018. The former is by the bank and the latter by the borrower-couple. The bank wants the sale to be registered, so it can convey the property to the auction purchaser. The borrowers, however, want their property back—redeemed. 4. I will take up the bank’s Writ Petition, the earlier of the two, to set out the facts. So should the parties be described as arrayed in that Writ Petition. Facts: W.P.(C) No.12045 of 2018: 5. Mariyumma and Hameed, wife and husband, took a housing loan, besides securing credit facilities from the Kerala Gramin Bank. To obtain the loan, they mortgaged over 35 cents of land. This was in 2006. 6. On the couple’s default, the Bank started recovery proceedings. First it issued a notice under S.13(2) of the Act, later under S.13(4) took symbolic possession, and finally, under S.14, took physical possession, too. After notifying the sale and after following the procedure, it sold the secured asset to Asharaf, the third respondent. Ext.P2, dt.13.12.2016, is the sale-confirmation letter. 7. To register the property in the purchaser’s name, the Bank applied to the Sub-Registrar, the first respondent. But the Sub Registrar refused. In the Ext.P4 order of refusal, he cited the reason of some other later attachments over the property. The mortgage was in 2006, and the attachments were in 2012, 2013 and 2015. Though apprised of this fact, the Sub-Registrar persisted with his refusal to register. Aggrieved, the Bank has filed W.P.(C) No.12045 of 2018. 8. Hameed and Mariyumma, the couple, filed this Writ Petition. After admitting the loan transactions, they pleaded financial difficulties—business failure—as the reason for the default. Though apprised of this fact, the Sub-Registrar persisted with his refusal to register. Aggrieved, the Bank has filed W.P.(C) No.12045 of 2018. 8. Hameed and Mariyumma, the couple, filed this Writ Petition. After admitting the loan transactions, they pleaded financial difficulties—business failure—as the reason for the default. According to them, this Court’s earlier intervention did not help them, as they had, by then, no money to comply with the conditions. And their efforts to pursue their case before the DRT, too, failed because it was decided ex parte. But when the Review Petition was pending before the DRT, the bank went ahead, auctioned the property, and now wanted it to be registered in the purchaser’s name. So they have assailed the bank’s entire recovery proceedings. Submissions: Bank’s: 9. Summarised, Sri.Sreekumar, the petitioner’s counsel asserts that the bank has followed the procedure to perfection and the debtors’ challenge is only dilatory. Focusing on the Sub Registrar’s Exhibit P4 refusal to register the property, he contends that all the attachments are very recent and they cannot affect the mortgage many years before. According to him, of all the persons the Sub Registrar is the least qualified to refuse registration on the ground of the later attachments. If ever that plea is valid, it must be by those who secured the attachments. 10. Sri.Sreekumar has also further contended the SARFAESI Act prevails over all other enactments, including the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, to sum up, he submits that the Exhibit P4 is illegal and arbitrary. And it must be set aside. In this regard, he relies on (1) Allokam Peddabbayya v. Allahabad Bank (2017) 8 SCC 272 ) and (2) Kerala Gramin Bank v. Sub Registrar Judgment in W.P.C.No.19535 of 2018 dated 28.6.2018 of High Court of Kerala). The Debtors’ 11. Sri. S. Eswaran has, to begin with, submitted that the right to property is a valuable constitutional right, and the right to redeem that property is an equally valuable statutory right. His frontal attack is on, what he calls, the denial of the borrowers’ right to redeem the mortgaged property. 12. To elaborate, Sri. Eswaran has contended that the property was sold when the borrowers’ Review Petition was pending before the DRT. According to him, the bank acted in haste and without justification. His frontal attack is on, what he calls, the denial of the borrowers’ right to redeem the mortgaged property. 12. To elaborate, Sri. Eswaran has contended that the property was sold when the borrowers’ Review Petition was pending before the DRT. According to him, the bank acted in haste and without justification. In the end, he has also submitted that the borrowers are willing to redeem the property by paying the entire liability to the bank. 13. On the question of sale and the Sale Certificate, Sri.Eswaran asserts that under S.54 of the Transfer of Property Act, read with S.17 of the Registration Act, no title passes to the purchaser until the deed of conveyance is registered. Adverting to the facts, he submits that so far there is no registration. Thus, he underlines two aspects: the mortgagor’s right of redemption and the necessity of registration to foreclose that right. To support his contentions, Sri.Eswaran relies on (1) Mathew Varghese v. Amritha Kumar (2014) 5 SCC 610 ) (2) Ramalinga Iyer v. Chief Manager & Authorized Officers 2017 (3) KHC 496 ); (4) Allokam Peddabbayya v. Allahabad Bank (2017) 8 SCC 272 ); and (5) Dwarika Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh (2018) 5 SCC 491 ). Discussion: 14. Hameed borrowed money, whereas his wife Mariyumma stood guarantee; she mortgaged her property. On their default, the bank initiated recovery proceedings, by invoking the SARFAESI Act. Questioning those proceedings, the borrowers came to this Court “on more than one occasion.” 15. To be precise, Hameed filed W.P.(C) No.31218 of 2014; he sought instalment facility. The Court allowed Hameed to seek a one-time settlement from the bank. That effort failing, he must, in the alternative, pay the loan in ten equal monthly instalments. The bank was asked to keep in abeyance the coercive proceedings, in the meanwhile. The OTS did not materialise, nor did Hameed honour the instalment facility. 16. Then, the bank invoked S.14 of the Act. Complaining of a procedural violation, Hameed this time went to DRT: S.A.No.78 of 2015. Pending that case, the couple filed W.P.(C) No.24819 of 2015. In this Writ petition, they sought only “three months’ time to wipe off the entire liability.” The bank opposed. The Court noted that the sale was scheduled for 24.08.2015. Complaining of a procedural violation, Hameed this time went to DRT: S.A.No.78 of 2015. Pending that case, the couple filed W.P.(C) No.24819 of 2015. In this Writ petition, they sought only “three months’ time to wipe off the entire liability.” The bank opposed. The Court noted that the sale was scheduled for 24.08.2015. Then, it disposed of the Writ Petition allowing the couple “to obtain relief from the Debt Recovery Tribunal.” It has however ordered that “if any sale takes place on 24.08.2015, it shall not be confirmed without orders from the Debt Recovery Tribunal.” 17. In the meanwhile, the bank took possession of the property. Undaunted, Hameed once again filed W.P.(C) No.4998 of 2015, seeking restoration of the secured asset. But the Writ Petition was dismissed at the threshold. Later, the auction purchaser filed O.P (DRT) No.6 of 2016; he complained before this Court of delay in the Tribunal’s disposing of the S.A. On 27 January 2016, this Court disposed of that O.P. observing that the Tribunal will pass the final orders in the S.A. by 30.06.2016. In that judicial backdrop, the DRT took up the matter but found the borrowers’ counsel absent. On 03.11.2016, it decided the case based on the material on record, though. 18. To put the issue in perspective, we may examine the chronology of events: in September 2006, Hameed took the loan, and his wife mortgaged the property. In the next couple of years, they took additional loans on the same security. But that assumes no importance. In January 2013, the bank issued a notice under S.13 (2) of the Act. The couple did not respond. The bank, then, in January 2015, took possession of the property. In July 2015, it notified the sale and, in August 2015, it sold the property. Finally, on 13.12.2016 the bank confirmed the sale. The sale deed refused to be registered, the bank filed W.P.(C) No.12045 of 2017 on 04 April 2017. Later, Hameed and his wife filed W.P.(C) No.38194 of 2017 on 27 November 2017. That is, the borrowers filed the Writ Petition almost two years after the sale. 19. In W.P.(C) No.12045 of 2017, Exhibit P2 is the confirmation of sale; Exhibit P3 the Bank’s request to the Sub-Registrar to register the sale deed; and Exhibit P4 is a Sub-Registrar’s letter of rejection. That is, the borrowers filed the Writ Petition almost two years after the sale. 19. In W.P.(C) No.12045 of 2017, Exhibit P2 is the confirmation of sale; Exhibit P3 the Bank’s request to the Sub-Registrar to register the sale deed; and Exhibit P4 is a Sub-Registrar’s letter of rejection. If we peruse the other documents, too, the Ext.R3(A) is the sale notice dated 21-07-2015; the upset price was fixed at Rs. 35,25,000/. The auction purchaser, as seen from the Ext.R3(D), paid the entire sale consideration. 20. Thereafter the sale was confirmed, and the auction purchaser issued the confirmation-of-sale letter, dated 13.12;.2016. On 28.12.2016, the Bank gave to the auction purchaser the Ext.R3(J) sale certificate, too. Save the registration of the deed, everything else was complete in 2016. 21. Under these circumstances, the couple came to this Court, much belatedly, on a tenuous ground: the sale was confirmed when their review petition was pending before the Tribunal. I reckon neither law nor procedure comes in the way of a person’s acting under a validly passed judicial order unless its operation is interdicted. It is trite that mere pendency of any preceding, including a revision, does not amount to an automatic stay of all further proceedings. 22. The couple approached the Court on more than one occasion; they were given a long rope, but they failed to use it to extricate themselves out of the debt hole. They sank into it deeper, instead. That is, they did not comply with the Court’s directives. They did not challenge the initial notice; rather, they could not. Their challenge against S.14 proceedings failed. In the manner known to the law, they challenged neither the sale notice nor the very sale. After two years, their relief came through the Sub-Registrar, who refused to register because there were other encumbrances on the property. Twice, before this Court, they wanted just time to square off the loan. And nothing more. Time they had a plenty but never to any particular use. 23. Now, the borrowers hang on to a legal principle: the right of redemption. They contended that the bank has not yet registered the sale deed, so their right has not been extinguished. They want to redeem the property. In W.P.(C) No.38194 of 2017 they sought these reliefs: to have the Exhibit P3 sale confirmation set aside and to have the property redeemed. 24. They contended that the bank has not yet registered the sale deed, so their right has not been extinguished. They want to redeem the property. In W.P.(C) No.38194 of 2017 they sought these reliefs: to have the Exhibit P3 sale confirmation set aside and to have the property redeemed. 24. I am afraid the borrowers lack bona fides. They took delight in deliberately dragging the proceedings. At least, pending those Writ Petitions, they have approached neither the bank nor this Court with an offer to pay the amount, in the last many months. 25. But we will examine the statutory contours and the presidential nuances of the right of redemption. To begin with, it is an incidence of mortgage and subsists so long as the very mortgage subsists. This common law principle has given the legal maxim to us: “once a mortgage, always a mortgage”. And this principle gets its statutory recognition in S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act. As the mortgagor has his equity of redemption, so has the mortgagee his right to foreclose. In fact, S.60 strikes a balance between these two rights. 26. Equally emphatic is the proposition that if there exists a valid mortgage, neither the subsequent sale nor the subsequent encumbrance—say an attachments—affects the mortgagee’s right to proceed against the mortgaged property. Contractually, the mortgagor can redeem his property by discharging the debt. Equitably, the right continues beyond the contractual period and lasts until the events mentioned in Section 60 of the T.P. Act occur. 27. So let us examine S.60 of the T.P. Act. It reads: 60. Contractually, the mortgagor can redeem his property by discharging the debt. Equitably, the right continues beyond the contractual period and lasts until the events mentioned in Section 60 of the T.P. Act occur. 27. So let us examine S.60 of the T.P. Act. It reads: 60. Right of mortgagor to redeem: At any time after the principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender, at a proper time and place, of the mortgage-money, to require the mortgagee (a) to deliver to the mortgagor the mortgage-deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee, (b) where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, to deliver possession thereof to the mortgagor, and (c) at the cost of the mortgagor either to re-transfer the mortgaged property to him or to such third person as he may direct, or to execute and (where the mortgage has been effected by a registered instrument) to have registered an acknowledgement in writing that any right in derogation of his interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished: PROVIDED that the right conferred by this Section has not been extinguished by the act of the parties or by decree of a court. xxx xxx xxx Nothing in this section shall be deemed to render invalid any provision to the effect that, if the time fixed for payment of the principal money has been allowed to pass or no such time has been fixed, the mortgagee shall be entitled to reasonable notice before payment or tender of such money.(italics supplied) 28. Section 60 of the T.P. Act, as extracted above, deals with rights and liabilities of the mortgagor. Once principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right to pay the mortgage-money at a proper time and place. Then, he can ask the mortgagee (a) to deliver to him the mortgage-deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property; (b) to deliver possession to him if the mortgagee has the mortgaged property; and (c) either to re-transfer the mortgaged property to him or to a third person as he may direct, or to execute a registered acknowledgement that any right in derogation of his interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished. 29. 29. The proviso further mandates that the right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by the act of the parties or by a decree of a Court. S.69 of the T.P.Act deals with mortgagee’s power of sale. Under S.69(1)(c), a mortgagee has the power to sell without the court’s intervention. Procedurally, Order 34, Rules 7 and 8 deal with how the right to redemption is exercised or extinguished. They deal with preliminary and final decrees, though. 30. Before moving further, we may also note that S.54 of the T.P.Act defines “sale” and prescribes how that sale is effected. Sale is “a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised”. If the transfer involves tangible immovable property worth one hundred rupees and above, it can be made only by a registered instrument. And delivery of the tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. 31. Finally, we will refer to S.17 of the Registration Act: “all non-testamentary instruments require registration if they purport to create, declare, assign, limit, or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property”. Even S.49 of the Registration Act mandates that a document requiring registration under S.17 or by any provision of the T.P.Act will affect no immovable property the document covers. 32. We may, in this process, examine S.13 (8) of the SARFAESI Act. And it reads: (8) If the dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him are tendered to the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer, the secured asset shall not be sold or transferred by the secured creditor, and no further step shall be taken by him for transfer or sale of that secured asset.(italics supplied) 33. Before we examine the precedents, we may note the differences between S.60 of the T.P.Act and S.13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. Before we examine the precedents, we may note the differences between S.60 of the T.P.Act and S.13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. S.60 of the T.P.Act begins with these words: “At any time after the principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender, at a proper time and place, of the mortgage-money, to require the mortgagee (a) to deliver to the mortgagor . . .” And the only limitation imposed is that the right could be extinguished only “by the act of parties or by decree of a court.” On the other hand, S.13(8) contains the expression “at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer, the secured asset shall not be sold or transferred. ” 34. Section 60 of the T.P.Act marks an event as the starting point and lets the parties act; the only limitation is “the act of parties or a decree” coming in the way. But S.13(8) of the SARFAESI Act marks an event as the terminal point. Narandas Karsondas v. S.A.Kamtam (1977) 3 SCC 247 ) is one of the leading decisions on the right of redemption. But it belongs to the pre SARFAESI era. 35. True, in Mathew Varghese, the Supreme Court, after copiously quoting from Narandas Karsondas, has held that the expression ‘or’ in Rule 9(1) should be read as ‘and’, as that alone would accord with S.13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. That was in the context of the publication of sale notice. But the semantic significance of “or” in “at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer” has not been considered yet. Perhaps, it awaits another authoritative pronouncement like Mathew Varghese. 36. The terminal point under S.13(8) is “sale or transfer” not “sale and transfer.” Sale, I reckon, a singular event; transfer, on the contrary, connotes a series of events—beginning from sale and ending with delivery. With S.47 of the Registration Act, the registration relates back: a registered document will operate from the time it would have operated if no registration had been required or made. It is not merely from the time of its registration alone. The Registration Act allows four months’ time and four more months with a delay for the parties to have a document registered after its execution. It is not merely from the time of its registration alone. The Registration Act allows four months’ time and four more months with a delay for the parties to have a document registered after its execution. So under SARFAESI Act, registration does not seem to be sine qua non to oust the mortgagor’s right to redeem the property; sale is enough. 37. But before we discuss the decisions cited at the bar, we must underline the importance, rather the limitations, of any judicial dicta. Precedents: 38. Precedents abound, and for every occasion there are a handful. Prolific. Torn off their context, the judicial dicta present a paradoxical continuum: lined in a series, they are perceptibly little different from one another, but the extremes are quite distinct—almost antithetical—on the same point. One needs no effort to get lost in the maze. Precedents are like Roget’s Thesaurus: in the continuum of connotations, intelligent talk and plain speak are synonyms. 39. It is neither desirable nor permissible, holds the Supreme Court in The Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (1992) 4 SCC 363 ), to pick out a word or a sentence from the Court’s judgment “divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be complete ‘law’ declared by this Court.” The judgment must be read, trite to note, as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions before the Court. A decision takes its colour from the questions involved. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., v. Presiding Officer (1990) 3 SCC 682 ), the Supreme Court quoted with approval the House of Lords to hold that what constitutes binding precedent is the ratio decidendi of a case. And this is almost always to be ascertained by an analysis of the material facts of the case—that is, generally, those facts which the tribunal or court itself holds, expressly or implicitly, to be material. 40. Lord Halsbury’s Quinn v. Leatham (1901 AC 495), puts it felicitously: every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved. The generality of the expressions which may be found there, though, is not intended to be expositional of the whole law. Those expressions are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which they are found. The generality of the expressions which may be found there, though, is not intended to be expositional of the whole law. Those expressions are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which they are found. To put it pithily, a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. Right of Redemption: 41. The Supreme Court in Narandas Karsondas holds that the right of redemption, embodied in S.60 of the T.P.Act, is available to the mortgagor unless the act of parties has extinguished it. The combined effect of S.54 of the T.P.Act and S.17 of the Indian Registration Act, according to Narandas Karsondas, is that a “contract” for the sale of immovable property worth more than one hundred rupees without registration cannot extinguish the equity of redemption. “In India it is only on execution of the conveyance and registration of transfer of the mortgagor’s interest by a registered instrument that the mortgagor’s right of redemption will be extinguished.” It also emphasizes that the power to sell without the court’s intervention by itself will not deprive the mortgagor’s right to redemption. In other words, the mortgagor’s right to redeem will survive until the mortgagee completes the sale by a registered deed. 42. As the facts of Mathew Varghese reveal, a company borrowed money. The first and the second respondent stood guarantee; they mortgaged their properties, too, in the fourth respondent bank’s favour. The company defaulted. So the bank initiated recovery proceedings. First, it issued a notice under S.13(2) of the SARFAESI Act and, later, took symbolic possession of the property under S.13(4). The guarantors questioned the recovery proceedings before the DRT. In the meanwhile, the bank notified the property for sale. When the appellant and another submitted their bids, the guarantors filed a Writ Petition. The Single Bench directed the DRT to dispose of the guarantor’s applications; it also allowed the guarantors to settle the liability. For this purpose, it directed the bank to defer the sale by six weeks if the guarantors deposited the specified amount by a particular date. They complied with the condition—deposited the money. 43. But because of the later developments, the DRT dismissed the guarantors’ application. The next day the appellant was declared the successful bidder. And he deposited the sale price, too. Questioning this sale, the guarantors filed another Writ Petition. They complied with the condition—deposited the money. 43. But because of the later developments, the DRT dismissed the guarantors’ application. The next day the appellant was declared the successful bidder. And he deposited the sale price, too. Questioning this sale, the guarantors filed another Writ Petition. The Writ Petition was dismissed, for the guarantors had an efficacious alternative remedy under the SARFAESI Act. Challenged in an intra-court appeal, the judgment was reversed. But in the meanwhile, the bank transferred the property to the auction purchaser and issued to him a sale certificate, as well. 44. The Division Bench held that sale was vitiated: when the initial sale was postponed by six weeks, the bank neither re-notified the sale nor extended the time for further tenders. The other developments do not concern us. 45. First, Mathew Varghese acknowledges that any secured creditor may enforce its interest in the secured asset without the court’s or the tribunal’s aid. But that enforcement must conform to the other provisions of the SARFAESI Act. Then Mathew Varghese examines both the Rules 8 and 9 of the SARFAESI Rules. It holds that the borrower has a valuable right in the secured asset and he should be “extended an opportunity to take all efforts to stop the sale or transfer till the last minute.” For the right of ownership is a “constitutional right protected under Art.300-A.” 46. Mathew Varghese also observes that the creditor should ensure that the borrower was clearly put on notice of the date and time of the sale, to let the borrower take all possible steps for retrieving his property or at least ensure that, in the sale, the secured asset derives the maximum benefit. On facts, Mathew Varghese finds that the bank has violated sub-rule (6) of Rule 8 and sub-rule (1) of Rule 9. Those rules, in fact, contemplate a clear 30 days’ individual notice to the borrower and a public notice through publication in the newspapers. In other words, merely because a secured interest exists in the bank’s favour, it cannot deal with the asset “in a light-hearted manner by way of sale or transfer or disposal in a casual manner or by not adhering to the prescriptions contained under the SARFAESI Act” and the Rules. Right of Redemption: 47. Mathew Varghese also extensively deals with the right of redemption. It quotes with approval Narandas Karsondas. Right of Redemption: 47. Mathew Varghese also extensively deals with the right of redemption. It quotes with approval Narandas Karsondas. The right of redemption, embodied in S.60 of the Transfer of Property Act, is available to the mortgagor unless the act of parties has extinguished it. S.54 of the T.P.Act and S.17 of the Registration Act together stipulate that a contract for the sale of immovable property worth more than one hundred rupees without registration cannot extinguish the equity of redemption. The bottom line, as both Narandas Karsondas and Mathew Varghese reiterate, “until the sale is complete by registration, the mortgagor does not lose the right of redemption.” 48. Now, let us examine Ramalinga Iyer. In the proceedings the bank initiated to recover its dues, the litigation spilled over from the DRT to this Court. And as noted in that judgment, “by various interim orders, this Court restrained the parties from registering the sale certificate, which had been confirmed on 4.3.2017 by the Bank.” The confirmation was after the borrower’s failure to pay the amounts by the date the learned Single Judge fixed. But pending the Writ Appeal, the appellant-borrowers repaid the entire loan to the bank along with interest. They deposited the interest to be paid to the auction purchasers, too. 49. As the Bank dues having been liquidated and the certificate of sale has not been registered, a Division Bench of this Court has allowed the Writ Appeal. Though the borrowers rely on this decision, it turns on, I reckon, its peculiar facts. And it cannot be said that Ramalinga Iyer has any holding to be treated as a precedent. A decision on facts, trite to note, contains no precedential value. 50. In L.K. Trust v. EDC Ltd. (2011) 6 SCC 780 ), the Supreme Court has observed that in India it is only on execution of the conveyance and its registration, the mortgagor’s right of redemption will be extinguished. It has also underlined the fact that a creditor’s power, as set out in the mortgage deed, to sell the property without a court’s intervention in itself will not deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem the property. 51. The extinguishment of the right to redeem the property under the proviso to S.60 of the Act, once again, fell for consideration in Embassy Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Gajaraj (2015) 14 SCC 316 ). 51. The extinguishment of the right to redeem the property under the proviso to S.60 of the Act, once again, fell for consideration in Embassy Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Gajaraj (2015) 14 SCC 316 ). The Supreme Court has held in the factual context of that case that the executing court’s order got confirmed and the sale certificate, as well, became final. “As a sequel, the ownership of the suit property or at least a major part of it got transferred from the first Defendant to the auction-purchaser.” In such a situation, the court also holds that the mortgagor cannot continue to assert the right of redemption, for the sale of the mortgaged property to a third party through a court auction became final. 52. “Once a mortgage always a mortgage” till it is terminated by the act of the parties themselves, by merger or by order of the court. So reiterated the Supreme Court in Mritunjoy Pani v. Narmanda Bala Sasmal AIR 1961 SC 1353 ). And in Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil v. Shripal Balwant Rainade AIR 1988 SC 1200 ), the Court observed that the mortgagor’s right of redemption remains intact even after the sale, but it cannot last beyond the sale confirmation. 53. In Dwarika Prasad, the appellant moved the DRT and the Allahabad High Court, too. The High Court, by its order, restrained the bank and the auction purchaser from executing the sale deed. The Appellant was directed to deposit an amount of Rs. 7,00,000. He did. But he did not deposit the balance amount. The sale was confirmed, a sale certificate was issued, and a registered sale deed was executed. In this context, the Supreme Court has examined the right of redemption. 54. Significantly, Dwarika Prasad found that the appellant violated S.13(8) of the Act. The only relief the appellant got was to have his earlier-deposited amount refunded with interest. 55. In fact, the Supreme Court in Allokam Peddabbayya, after referring to a profusion of precedents, has held: “The Plaintiffs lost the right to sue for redemption of the mortgaged property by virtue of the proviso to Section 60 of the Act, no sooner than the mortgaged property was put to auction sale in a suit for foreclosure and sale certificate was issued in favour of Defendant No. 2. There remained no property mortgaged to be redeemed. There remained no property mortgaged to be redeemed. The right to redemption could not be claimed in the abstract.”(italics supplied) 56. Indeed, I reckon, Allokam Peddabbayya unravels the statutory knot. It emphasises that the mortgagor loses the right to sue for redemption of the mortgaged property “no sooner than the mortgaged property was put to auction” and “sale certificate was issued” in the purchaser’s favour. The right to redemption could not be claimed in the abstract. The Later Attachments: 57. Three persons had the secured asset attached, after the mortgage though. But not even the borrowers brought those persons on record here. The three attachments are these: one by Sub Court, Manjeri; another by Family Court, Malappuram; and still another by Munsiff Magistrate Court, Perintalamanna. They were all seven to eight after the first mortgage in 2006. 58. This Court through a catena of judgments has held that a mortgagee’s rights remain unaffected in the face of later attachments. A few of those decisions are Madhan v. Sub-Registrar ( 2014 (1) KLT 406 ), Housing Development Finance Corporation v. Sub-Registry Officer 2011 (3) KLJ 561 ), and Rajalekshmi Amma v. Basheer ( 2013 (4) KLT 443 ). So that objection needs no further belabouring. Conclusion: 59. The borrowers have no ground to attack the sale-more so, after the sale has been confirmed and sale certificate issued. The sale per se has not been challenged; only the sale confirmation, a consequence, was challenged. Their right to redeem the property before the sale is registered is not an impregnable fortress, secure for aeons to come. It is an equitable remedy beyond the time the statute permits. 60. First, mortgagor’s conduct must be immaculate; but it is not. Second, the delay in registration must have been because of the mortgagee’s lapses; but it is not, either. Here, the Bank did approach the Sub-Registrar on time. That authority’s refusal, not backed by any lawful justification, cannot enure to the borrowers’ benefit. And the borrowers waited about two years before they could object to the sale. 61. Mathew Varghese, the borrowers’ mainstay, has found an incurable procedural lapse on the bank’s part. And the Supreme Court has felt that lapse affected the borrowers adversely. The lack of notice sale, it is held, goes to the root of the procedural and the lapse is incurable. 62. 61. Mathew Varghese, the borrowers’ mainstay, has found an incurable procedural lapse on the bank’s part. And the Supreme Court has felt that lapse affected the borrowers adversely. The lack of notice sale, it is held, goes to the root of the procedural and the lapse is incurable. 62. But in the facts of his case, the holding of Allokam Peddabbayya is resounding: a party loses his right to sue for redemption of the mortgaged property, as declared under the proviso to S.60 of the T.P.Act, “no sooner than the mortgaged property was put to auction sale” in a suit for foreclosure, “and sale certificate was issued” in the auction purchaser’s favour. “There remained no property mortgaged to be redeemed. The right to redemption could not be claimed in the abstract.” I reckon the reference to suit in Allokam Peddabbayya and its absence here make no difference, precedentially. 63. Besides, Allokam Peddabbayya refers to Narandas Karsondas, which forms the foundation for Mathew Varghese. To sum up, a right in the abstract or in vacuo cannot be claimed—in perpetuity. The existence of a right is no licence to its entitlement. The claimant must prove his entitlement; and this proof is more burdensome if it is equitable, as is here. 64. Thus, viewed from any perspective, the borrowers have failed to press their entitlement for redemption. On the other hand, the Sub-Registrar’s refusal to register falls foul of the statutory mandate both under the Registration Act and the Transfer of Property Act. As a result, I allow W.P.(C) No.12045 of 2017 and dismiss W.P.(C) No.38194 of 2018. No order on costs.