ORDER : Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. 1. Petitioner Surendran Nair is a workman in BPCL-Kochi Refinery. On 16.10.2015, Surendran, while on duty, involved in an altercation-verbal abuse, as the employer terms it-with two other employees. Surendran submitted the Ext.Pl complaint with the management, so did Sajeevakumar, one of the two other workmen. He filed the Ext.P2 complaint on the same day. The allegation is that the petitioner abused him in his caste name. 2. The dispute, then, spilled over from workplace to the public arena: the police station. The petitioner lodged the Ext.P4 FIR with the police, under Sections 34 and 294 (b) of IPC. Sajeevakumar, too, lodged an FIR against the petitioner under Sections 294(b) and 506(1), read with Section 3(1)(X) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 3. Crime No.852/2015, registered at Surendran's behest, ended in acquittal. It was on the ground that the alleged incident occurred at a place that cannot be termed a "public place". In Sajeevakumar's case against Surendran, this Court stayed it. Finally, through the Ext.P33 judgment, dt.06.02.2018, this Court allowed Surendran to plead for discharge after the committal proceedings. 4. But departmentally, the employer went ahead, subjected Surendran to disciplinary proceedings. It issued the Ext.P12 show-cause notice to Surendran, who replied through the Ext.P13. Later, the Ext.P14 charge-sheet led to an inquiry. Eventually, through the Ext.P36 punishment order, dt.06.03.2018, Surendran was "dismissed from the services of the Company with immediate effect." 5. Aggrieved, Surendran filed this writ petition. Indeed, he has taken numerous pleas on merits about why his removal cannot be sustained under law. 6. Earlier this Court issued notice and, on the employer's appearance, it has taken up the matter for disposal because of the urgency the petitioner's counsel has pleaded. 7. When Sri Ravindran, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, began to submit on the merits, Sri Cama, the learned Senior Counsel for Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., (BPCL), raised a preliminary objection: the writ petition is not maintainable. And the maintainability concerns the alternative remedy. 8. So to sustain the preliminary objection, Sri Cama has led the arguments. Submissions: BPCL's: 9. Sri Cama, the learned Senior Counsel for BPCL, has contended that the Industrial Disputes Act (ID Act) is a complete code by itself. According to him, it has provided for both the right and the remedy. And the maintainability concerns the alternative remedy. 8. So to sustain the preliminary objection, Sri Cama has led the arguments. Submissions: BPCL's: 9. Sri Cama, the learned Senior Counsel for BPCL, has contended that the Industrial Disputes Act (ID Act) is a complete code by itself. According to him, it has provided for both the right and the remedy. The ID Act, he continues, has set out an elaborate adjudicatory mechanism. Illustratively, the learned Senior Counsel has drawn my attention to Section 11A of the ID Act. With reference to that Section, he stresses that it gives a second opportunity for the management to lead evidence and cure any procedural defect that may have crept in. 10. Sri Cama refers to one of the grounds the petitioner has pleaded: the denial of principles of natural justice. Then, he contends that the allegation is a matter of evidence. In other words, the employee must establish before the Tribunal how the natural justice was denied and, by that, what prejudice was caused. 11. Indeed, for a few months by now-close to a year-the Industrial Tribunal has not been in session for want of the presiding officer. Sri Cama addresses this issue too. According to him, even before his approaching the industrial Tribunal, Surendran must first raise an industrial dispute. After that, if the grievance remains, Surendran should approach the industrial Tribunal, assailing the employer's action. 12. Referring to the broad contours of the Article 226 of the Constitution, Sri Cama asserts that judicial review in the departmental proceedings is extremely limited. He has also taken me through a few of the grounds Surendran has pleaded. According to him, most of the grounds raised are disputed questions, and this Court, in summary adjudication, cannot grant any relief over them. 13. Eventually Sri Cama has submitted that neither adequacy nor sufficiency of evidence can be the High Court's concern under Article 226. To end his submissions, Sri Cama has submitted that judicial review is no mantra or magical incantation to cure every ill. 14. 13. Eventually Sri Cama has submitted that neither adequacy nor sufficiency of evidence can be the High Court's concern under Article 226. To end his submissions, Sri Cama has submitted that judicial review is no mantra or magical incantation to cure every ill. 14. Precedentially, Sri Cama has relied on the following decisions: Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K. C. (2018) 3 SCC 85 : U.R State Bridge Corporation Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh (2004) 4 SCC 268 Premier Automobiles Limited v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay (1976) 1 SCC 496 , G.M. (Operations) S.B.I. v. R. Periyasamy (2015) 3 SCC 101 and Sanjay Kumar Singh v. Union of India (2011) 14 SCC 692 Petitioner's: 15. Sri Ravindran, the learned Senior Counsel for Surendran, has submitted that judicial review under Article 226, as the Constitution mandates, is quite expansive. And it brooks no limitations. The limitations that remain, according to him, are merely self-imposed. 16. An alternative remedy, even efficacious if it were, cannot by itself denude the Constitutional Court of its power of judicial review. Sri Ravindran has also stressed that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution and, as such, suffers no limitation even in the face of a statutory provision. 17. The learned Senior Counsel has also taken me through a few salient provisions of the ID Act to underline his contention that the Act contains no express bar against an aggrieved workman's invoking his constitutional remedies. According to him, Surendran's illegal termination, as he puts it, infringes his fundamental rights; even on that count, he can eminently maintain the writ petition. 18. To support his contention, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 1125 and Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1 . 19. Heard Sri Cama, instructed by Sri Benny Thomas, for the employer-respondent, and Sri Ravindran, instructed by Sri Ajith Prakash, for the employee-petitioner. Discussion: 20. To begin with, I must acknowledge that both counsel, while trying to sustain their respective pleas on the alternative remedy, have incidentally trenched upon the merits, as it was inevitable. Those references, I reckon, only provided the background to the controversy and also contextualised the alleged efficacy of the alternative remedy, as the employer asserted and as the employee repelled. To begin with, I must acknowledge that both counsel, while trying to sustain their respective pleas on the alternative remedy, have incidentally trenched upon the merits, as it was inevitable. Those references, I reckon, only provided the background to the controversy and also contextualised the alleged efficacy of the alternative remedy, as the employer asserted and as the employee repelled. So I spend no time on the factual controversy. 21. Granted, Surendran has taken elaborate pleas and filed voluminous documents before the Court. Faced with employer's preliminary objection, I must first address that. For the law is well-settled: if a preliminary objection goes to the root of the proceedings and affects their maintainability, the adjudication cannot impinge on the merits. Only if the objection is negatived, can this Court enter the factual arena. So holds the Supreme Court in Lathika v Seth Karsandas Jamnadas and TIN Plate CO. Of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1999) 6 SCC 632 . 22. For deciding the preliminary issue, I reckon the facts are not in di spute. Surendran, a workman, faced disciplinary proceedings and was axed from service. It is the legality of Surendran's removal from service that forms the subject of this Writ petition. Indisputable is the proposition of law that the Industrial Disputes Act governs the relationship between the employer and the workmen, and that relationship encompasses the service, including the disciplinary proceedings. Equally indisputable is the fact that the industrial Tribunal has not been in session for over 10 months. So in this factual backdrop, I must be examining the issue of alternative remedy as a bar against this Writ petition. Alternative Remedy: 23. The issue of alternative remedy, as this Court observed in M/s Indus Logistics v Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, is every High Court's Sisyphean task. To borrow from the Greek mythology, the Court labours on a slippery slope, trying to carry that issue to the precedential pinnacle. Every time the Court rules on it, hoping that to be the last word; the issue in the next case is seen rolled down to the bottom, letting the Court toil once again up the slippery decisional slope. As the precedents proliferate, so do the contradictions. 24. Before addressing this issue, we may incidentally touch upon the judicial review as a basic feature, as the learned Senior Counsel for Surendran has urged. As the precedents proliferate, so do the contradictions. 24. Before addressing this issue, we may incidentally touch upon the judicial review as a basic feature, as the learned Senior Counsel for Surendran has urged. Under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution of India, the Central Administrative Tribunal came into being in 1985. But even before the Tribunal was established, many writ petitions had been filed in various High Courts and the Supreme Court. The challenge centered on the constitutional validity of Article 323-A. For it excludes the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution and the High Court's under Article 226. 25. But by the time the Supreme Court took up the matter, developments took place and the Administrative Tribunals Act stood modified. So most of the original grounds of challenge did not survive. Eventually, the Supreme Court in S.P Sampat Kumar v. Union of India has held that though judicial review is the basic feature of the Constitution, the vesting of the power of judicial review in an alternative institutional mechanism, after taking it away from the High Court, would not be violative of the basic structure of the Constitution, so long it was ensured that the alternative mechanism was an effective and real substitute for the High Court. Later, on reference, a Seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar has held that judicial review is a basic feature of the constitution. And it cannot be tinkered with. 26. In almost all the decisions cited on either side, the issue is the alternative remedy. The law is well established and invariably stands re-iterated in all these judgments that the alternative remedy vis-a-vis Article 226 is a self-imposed limitation. 27. On the exceptions to the alternative remedy, oft-quoted is the proposition laid down in Whirlpool Corpn. Those exceptions are these: (i) when the petitioner's fundamental rights are affected; (ii) when the principles of natural justice are violated; or (iii) when the impugned proceedings are ultra vires. 28. The Supreme Court recently had an occasion to survey the vistas of alternative remedy; in Union of India v. Shri Kant Sharma (2015) 6 SCC 773 it has examined over three scores of judgments on the issue. 28. The Supreme Court recently had an occasion to survey the vistas of alternative remedy; in Union of India v. Shri Kant Sharma (2015) 6 SCC 773 it has examined over three scores of judgments on the issue. Finally, it has summarized in paragraph 36 of the judgment: (i) The power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 is one of the basic features of the Constitution, and any legislation cannot override or curtail the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (ii) The High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 and the Supreme Court's under Article 32 though cannot be circumscribed by any enactment, they will have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with that legislative intent. (iii) When the law creates a statutory forum for redressal of grievances, the High Court should not entertain a writ petition, ignoring the statutory dispensation. (iv) The High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. (italics supplied) 29. Jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain a suit in relation to the industrial dispute fell for consideration in Premier Automobiles Limited case. The Supreme Court has summarised the principles that affect the Civil Court's jurisdiction vis-a-vis an industrial dispute: a. if the dispute does not concern an industry, or if it does not relate to enforcing any other right under the Act* the remedy lies only in the Civil Court; b. if the dispute concerns an industrial, and if it arises out of a right or liability under the general or common law, but not under the Act, the Civil Court's jurisdiction is in the alternative, leaving it to the suitor's election; c. if the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act; and d. if the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act, such as under Chapter VA, then the remedy for its enforcement is either under s. 33C or by raising of an industrial dispute. 30. 30. Premier Automobiles also holds that the Industrial Disputes Act was meant to provide a speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes between workmen and their employers. The Tribunal's awards, the Court observes, are no doubt amenable to the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226, as also to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32. But they are extraordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy should "necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them". Indeed, the observations were in the context of a remedy before the Civil Court; yet I reckon they equally apply to the judicial review, too. 31. In U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd., the issue concerns the workmen's illegal strike and unauthorised absence. The appellant, a government company, terminated the respondents stating that they violated the Industrial Standing Orders. The High Court entertained the writ petition. The Supreme Court, in appeal, has disapproved the High Court's approach. The rights and obligations sought to be enforced in the writ petition are those created by the Industrial Disputes Act. So the forum created under that Act is suited to redress the grievance. 32. The Court observed that the only reason given by the High Court to entertain the writ petition is the delay. Yet the Supreme Court has held that the High Court was not the appropriate forum for the enforcement of the rights under the I.D.Act. 33. In Sanjay Kumar Singh, the appellants were dismissed from service on the charges of showing disobedience to orders, committing gross misconduct, and displaying cowardice in execution of their duties as the members of CRPF. The appellants preferred statutory appeals before the appellate authority, but without success. They filed, first, writ petition and, later, writ appeal. But without success. Finally, they appealed to the Supreme Court. 34. The appellants submitted that the principles of natural justice were violated in the departmental proceedings. They have raised many other issues on merits, too. The appellants preferred statutory appeals before the appellate authority, but without success. They filed, first, writ petition and, later, writ appeal. But without success. Finally, they appealed to the Supreme Court. 34. The appellants submitted that the principles of natural justice were violated in the departmental proceedings. They have raised many other issues on merits, too. The Supreme Court has held that in departmental proceedings, it is for the department to conduct an inquiry in accordance with the prescribed Rules; the role of the court is limited. And the court cannot substitute its views or findings in the place of those arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence on record. According to the Supreme Court, re-appreciation of evidence would be impermissible in writ jurisdiction. 35. R. Periyasamy quotes with approval State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 , that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in the departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with the findings of fact recorded in the departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. 36. I am afraid San jay Kumar Singh and R. Periyasamy do not directly address the question of alternative remedy. 37. In Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon (2010) 8 SCC 110 the Supreme Court has observed, though in the statutory backdrop of SARFAESI Act, that the High Court overlooked the settled law that it will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. In General Manager, Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Limited v. Ikbaf (2013) 10 SCC 83 , again under the SARFAESI setting, the Supreme Court has observed that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. But if a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well not to entertain a petition under Article 226. But if a statute provides efficacious and adequate remedy, the High Court will do well not to entertain a petition under Article 226. It has noted that "on misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented." 38. In Mathew K.C., the Supreme Court notes with disquiet the High Courts' repeated forays into the areas reserved for Tribunals under special enactments. And it employs strong language in disapproving that tendency: "We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court". When a position in law is well settled because of judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety, to say the least, "for the subordinate courts, including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions" and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. "Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders" granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. Then, the Court urges that this tendency must stop. I reckon "including" may have to be read as "and", for a High Court is not subordinate to the Supreme Court, though it is bound precedentially. Statutory Scheme: 39. Section 2A of the ID Act mandates that discharges, dismissals, and so on must be deemed to be industrial disputes. If any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches, or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer in that context must be treated as an industrial dispute. Sub-section (2) of that Section also prescribes that notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, "any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may make an application" directly to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute. That application received, the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the ID Act. And all the provisions of the ID Act shall apply to that adjudication as they apply to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government. And all the provisions of the ID Act shall apply to that adjudication as they apply to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government. 40. As I see, a workman removed, he must first approach the Conciliation Officer for the conciliation of the dispute. Then, after forty-five days, he may approach the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. Here, Surendran has taken no such steps. Section 2A was engrafted through an amendment in 1965. A long line of decisions, as O.P. Malhotra's The Law of Industrial Disputes puts it, had established that an individual dispute could not per se be an industrial dispute, but could become one if it was taken up by a trade union or a substantial number of workmen of the establishment. This position of law created hardship for individual workmen who were discharged, dismissed, retrenched, when they could not find support, say, from a union. 41. Section 2A has done away with the requirement of espousing an individual dispute only after converting it into an industrial dispute in cases where the dispute arises out of (i) discharge, (ii) dismissal, (iii) retrenchment, or (iv) otherwise termination of services of an individual workman. 42. That apart, a party's approach to this Court under Article 226 may render a provision like Section 11A of the ID Act otiose. Often the management may have made out a strong case on the merits, but it may, at the same time, be found wanting on the procedural front. All its measures as a disciplinary authority may, thus, come a cropper. To obviate such an eventuality, the management does desire to play it safe, and plead before the Tribunal to have a preliminary adjudication on the issue of procedural propriety: the validity of domestic enquiry. 43. Despite the statute being laconic on this procedural safeguard, the Courts, in the course of time, have evolved the necessary judicial principles with a view to ensuring fairness on the processual front. Four of the pioneering judicial pronouncements on this aspect are Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh, AIR 1972 SC 1031 Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. v. Management AIR 1973 SC 1227 , Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe AIR 1975 SC 1900 and Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. AIR 1979 SC 1652 . 44. v. Ludh Budh Singh, AIR 1972 SC 1031 Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. v. Management AIR 1973 SC 1227 , Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe AIR 1975 SC 1900 and Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. AIR 1979 SC 1652 . 44. In fact, in Firestone, the Supreme Court has held that even if an employer has held no enquiry or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, has to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action, and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra. Conclusion: 45. As I have already noted, alternative remedy is an endless enigma. The precedents abound for either proposition. As it is, trite it may sound, a self-imposed limitation, it defies a straitjacket approach, for the judicial review in the face of an alternative remedy is a subjective exercise of jurisdiction. It differs from case to case and from judge to judge, so to say. With no en banc adjudication, the panels of judges invariably take different stands. Additionally, the appellate adjudication keeps the issue ever fluid. It is the systemic limitation that lends continuity to this fluidity. 46. Here, Section 2A cannot be said to present an insurmountable hurdle. After raising an industrial dispute before the Conciliation Officer, the workman need not await its outcome; he merely has to wait for forty five days. Then, he can move on to the Industrial Tribunal. Now the Industrial Tribunal has not been in session for about 10 months. It may resume its session "very shortly" as the learned Assistant Solicitor General has, on instructions, submitted in a matter that sought a mandamus to the Central Government to appoint a presiding officer to the forum. 47. Without an efficacious forum functioning, it is, I reckon, inequitable to force a workman, now out of employment, to go after mythical, unavailable remedies. So I hold that the writ petition is maintainable. That said, I must also acknowledge that the remedial mechanism as provided in the ID Act cannot be replicated here, Section 11A being a case in point. Without an efficacious forum functioning, it is, I reckon, inequitable to force a workman, now out of employment, to go after mythical, unavailable remedies. So I hold that the writ petition is maintainable. That said, I must also acknowledge that the remedial mechanism as provided in the ID Act cannot be replicated here, Section 11A being a case in point. Therefore, if the Tribunal resumes its sessions before this Court could adjudicate the issue, the parties will be relegated to the Industrial Tribunal. Thus I overrule the BPCL's objection about the maintainability of the writ petition, of course, subject to the rider added above.