ORDER 1. The present petition seeks supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the final order of Board of Revenue whereby revision of the petitioner has been dismissed in limine at the very outset for being time barred. The Board of Revenue has held that application under section 5 of the Limitation Act accompanying the revision petition does not disclose the material particulars necessary for establishing the bonafide reasons for delay. 2. It appears that the revision was dismissed on the very first hearing and impugned order does not disclose that any opportunity of filing a proper application under section 5 of the Limitaton Act was afforded to petitioner. 3. The apex Court in cases of Dinbandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj and others [ AIR 1954 SC 411 ] and thereafter Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others [ AIR 1987 SC 1353 ], since being followed till date has discussed elaborately the concept of sufficient cause while dealing with prayer for condonation of delay and has held that the same should receive liberal construction to advance the cause of justice especially when no negligence inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant. The Court has also held that while filing a petition with delay the litigant never benefits and therefore no malafide should be imputable to the litigant unless the delay is unconscionable. The relevant portion of judgment of the apex Court in Dinbandhu Sahu (supra), is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience : "As was observed in the Full Bench decision in Krishna v. Chathappan, in a passage which has become classic, the words "Sufficient cause" should receive "a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. " We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the order dated 2.7.1952, is on the facts a proper one to pass under the proviso to section 86." The relevant portion of judgment of the apex Court in Anantnag (supra), is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience: "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaning- ful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that : 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 4. When testing the factual matrix attending the instant case on the anvil of the law laid down by apex Court as aforesaid, it appears that Board of Revenue did not approach the issue of delay liberally and instead sought day to day explanation which practically speaking is an impossible proposition. More so, records do not reflect that any attempt was made by the Board of Revenue to afford opportunity to the petitioner to prefer a properly constitutedapplication for condonation of delay. 5. More so, records do not reflect that any attempt was made by the Board of Revenue to afford opportunity to the petitioner to prefer a properly constitutedapplication for condonation of delay. 5. As such, jurisdictional error committed by the Board of Revenue is apparent compelling this Court to step in by invoking supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution. 6. Consequently, this petition stands disposed of and the impugned order of Board of Revenue dated 4.7.2018 passed in Revision No. 3724/2018/Bhind/L.R. is quashed. 7. Board of Revenue is requested to reconsider the application of delayed filing of revision by affording reasonable opportunity to petitioner to file a properly constituted application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and decide the same as per law as expeditiously as possible. 8. Accordingly, petition is disposed of with the above said observation.