JUDGMENT : 1. Plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and consequential prohibitory injunction has come up in this second appeal by challenging the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court. Prominent prayer in the suit is for a declaration that the plaintiff and his mother had prescribed title over plaint A schedule property by adverse possession and limitation and the defendants (State of Kerala and the Assistant Engineer, PWD, National Highway Section) ceased to have any title to the same. Consequentially, a permanent prohibitory injunction decree restraining the defendants, their men or agents from trespassing into plaint A schedule property is also claimed. 2. In the trial court, the plaintiff succeeded and obtained a decree as prayed for. Against the judgment and decree of the trial court, the State went in appeal before the lower appellate court where the plaintiff was defeated. The lower appellate court relying on a short note report published in a law journal of the decision in held that the plaintiff/appellant is precluded from filing a suit based on an ownership acquired by adverse possession and limitation. Further, the lower appellate court found that the suit is hit by the provisions under the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1957 (in short, “the Act of 1957”). 3. At the time of admission of the appeal, a learned single Judge framed the following substantial question of law and issued notice to the respondents: Was the lower appellate court justified in law in reversing the decree of the trial court holding that the suit is not maintainable in view of the decision in Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram Panchyat Village Sirthala (2013 (4) K.L.T. SN 28, Case 26) when going by Section 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, after the expiry of the period of limitation, the owner is deemed to have lost his title? 4. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Government Pleader, following substantial question of law is also framed: Whether the suit is hit by the provisions in Sections 20 and 20A of the Act of 1957? 5. For a proper resolution of the dispute, it will be useful to have a look at the facts. Plaintiff's father C.K. Krishnan was owning an extent of ten cents of land comprised in R.S.No.431/6 of Nileshwar Village. He had constructed a tiled house thereon and was residing with his family. 5. For a proper resolution of the dispute, it will be useful to have a look at the facts. Plaintiff's father C.K. Krishnan was owning an extent of ten cents of land comprised in R.S.No.431/6 of Nileshwar Village. He had constructed a tiled house thereon and was residing with his family. Later, Krishnan gifted the land in favour of his wife Paru Amma (mother of the appellant) as per Ext.A2 gift deed in the year 1943. The donee accepted the gift during the life time of the donor and took possession of the land. Plaint A schedule land is situate, as shown in Ext.C2 sketch, on the eastern and northern sides of the land covered by Ext.A2 gift deed. Appellant's mother Paru Amma encroached upon plaint A schedule land, which belonged to the State, in the year 1944 and reduced the same into her possession. It has been specifically pleaded that ever since 1944, the plaint A schedule land was in the possession of the appellant's mother. She had planted coconut trees, mango trees, drumstick trees, etc. about 60 years back. She had also constructed a compound wall made of laterite stones on the eastern and northern sides of plaint A schedule land annexing the same to Ext.A2 land. National Highway 17 runs through the north-eastern side of plaint A schedule land. Prior to its formation, there was a road known as West-Coast Road in existence, which was later developed as the National Highway. 6. Paru Amma and her children partitioned their lands in the year 1993 as per Ext.A3 registered partition deed. In that partition, plaint schedule item and land included in Ext.A2 were allotted to the share of the appellant. Thereafter the appellant started possessing and enjoying the land as an absolute owner thereof. It is his case that since plaint A schedule item was outstanding in the exclusive possession of his mother and later with himself, the defendants have lost their right by adverse possession and limitation. On 04.06.2007, the appellant received a notice from the 2nd respondent asking him to vacate the plaint A schedule land within 24 hours. Hence he rushed to the court and filed the suit. 7. In the written statement, the respondents contended that the suit is bad for non-compliance of the provisions in Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, “the Code”). Hence he rushed to the court and filed the suit. 7. In the written statement, the respondents contended that the suit is bad for non-compliance of the provisions in Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, “the Code”). The suit is hit by Sections 20 and 20A of the Act of 1957. Neither Paru Amma nor the appellant has any right over the land in the plaint A schedule. Appellant is in unlawful possession of plaint A schedule land and therefore liable to be proceeded against under the provisions of the Act of 1957. On a detailed survey conducted on 04.05.2007, it was revealed that the appellant had encroached upon a portion of land belonging to the State and therefore proceedings were initiated under the Act of 1957. The suit is liable to be dismissed. 8. Since the first question deserves a deeper consideration, I shall now deal with it. 9. Trial court, on an evaluation of the evidence adduced, found that the documents produced on the side of the appellant clearly established that earlier his mother Paru Amma and later he himself held continuous possession of plaint A schedule land from 1944 onwards. This conclusion was arrived at mainly relying on Ext.C1 report and Ext.C2 sketch. As per Ext.C1 report, which was not at all challenged by the respondents, coconut trees aged about 55 years and mango trees aged about 50 years were found in plaint A schedule land. Noticing the fact that the respondents had no case that the trees belonged to the State, the trial court found that deceased Paru Amma and later the appellant held the land in absolute possession with an open and hostile claim of title over the same. Apart from the recitals in Ext.C1 report, the credible testimony of PW1, who was aged more than 71 years at the time of deposition, was also relied on by the trial court. It also found that the evidence tendered by DW1 on behalf of the respondents was not convincing. Recitals in Ext.A2 gift deed and Ext.A3 partition deed were also considered by the trial court. All these documents were admitted in evidence without any objection from the side of the respondents. It also found that the evidence tendered by DW1 on behalf of the respondents was not convincing. Recitals in Ext.A2 gift deed and Ext.A3 partition deed were also considered by the trial court. All these documents were admitted in evidence without any objection from the side of the respondents. Since the appellant had obtained the requisite leave from the court under Section 80(2) of the Code, the contention of the respondents regarding non-maintainability of the suit for want of a notice under Section 80 of the Code was rightly repelled by both the courts. 10. Tacking of adverse possession is permissible in law. A party to a litigation possessing a land adversely against the other party can tack on the period of his own adverse possession to the time during which anyone else, through whom he claims, was in such possession. But, when the party claiming adverse possession by tacking on to his predecessor's possession had no jural relationship with his predecessor-in-possession, but claimed under an independent right, then his possession cannot be tacked on to that of his predecessor. This principle is well settled in law. 11. In this case, the appellant has a specific case that from 1944 onwards his mother was in exclusive possession of the land and after a partition in the year 1993, he keeps independent possession of the same with a hostile animus and therefore the period prescribed in Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short, “the Limitation Act”) stipulating 30 years for prescribing a right against the Government had been elapsed much before institution of the suit. Therefore, for valid reasons the trial court decreed the suit. 12. In the first appeal, the lower appellate court practically agreed with the trial court on all factual issues. It also found that the appellant and his predecessor had planted fruit bearing trees and effected improvements in plaint A schedule land. Assessment of age of trees made by the commissioner supported by other material evidence indicated that for about 60 years the appellant and his predecessor were in exclusive possession of plaint A schedule land. There is a specific finding entered by the lower appellate court that the coconut trees on the land and the compound wall constructed by appellant's mother, enclosing the land together with Ext.A2 property also, are very old. There is a specific finding entered by the lower appellate court that the coconut trees on the land and the compound wall constructed by appellant's mother, enclosing the land together with Ext.A2 property also, are very old. Despite entering a specific finding that the facts justified the judgment and decree of the trial court in favour of the appellant, the lower appellate court tilted the balance in favour of the respondents solely relying on the decision in Gurdwara Sahib (supra). 13. This Court in Thomas v. Lonappan (2016 (4) KLT 637) had occasion to consider the binding nature of Gurdwara Sahib. On mentioning a host of reasons, this Court entered a finding that Gurdwara Sahib was rendered without considering the binding precedents rendered by larger Benches in Sarangadeva Periya Matam and another v. Ramaswami Goundar ( AIR 1966 SC 1603 ) and Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander and others ( AIR 1968 SC 1165 ). I shall deal with these decisions in detail in the succeeding paragraphs as that will be essential for substantiating the vital points arising in this case. Suffice it to say, the lower appellate court erred in relying on Gurdwara Sahib's case to upturn a reasonable decision of the trial court in the facts and circumstances of the case. As Gurdwara Sahib's case cannot be relied on as a binding precedent relevant under all circumstances, especially in the light of overwhelming evidence in this case regarding adverse possession and limitation, I find that the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate court is erroneous and unsustainable in law. 14. The lower appellate court seriously fell in error mainly on the reason that it did not clearly understand the principles in Gurdwara Sahib's case with reference to the facts involved therein. It relied on a short note of the decision, reported in a law journal. In the words of Rupert Cross in “Precedent in English Law”, (Clarendon Law Series – 1961 edition, page 37) every judgments must be read in the light of the facts of the cases in which they are delivered. I shall extract the relevant paragraph for the benefit of the legal fraternity: “There would be no point in setting out many of the remarks of judges insisting on the importance of paying the most scrupulous attention to the facts of the previous cases cited to them. I shall extract the relevant paragraph for the benefit of the legal fraternity: “There would be no point in setting out many of the remarks of judges insisting on the importance of paying the most scrupulous attention to the facts of the previous cases cited to them. The number of such remarks is legion. The requirement goes to the root of the doctrine of precedent according to which like cases must be decided alike. Only so is it possible to ensure that the court bound by a previous case decides the new case in the same way as the other court would have decided it. Of course, it is all a question of probabilities, but the probability that a court will decide a new case in the same way as would the court which decided one of the cases cited becomes less and less as the differences between the facts of the two cases increase.” Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem ((1901) A.C. 495) held thus: “Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but govern and are qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.” The above principle has been religiously followed by the Supreme Court as well as this Court in a plethora of decisions. I intentionally avoid cataloging numerous decisions on a well settled proposition of law. Nevertheless, I may refer to some relevant decisions of the apex Court. In C.I.T. v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. ( (1992) 4 SCC 363 ) the Supreme Court held thus: “It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be complete 'law' declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court, to support their reasonings.” I may also refer to the dictum in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh ( (1999) 6 SCC 172 ) rendered by a Constitution Bench. It reads thus: “......... It is a well-settled proposition of law that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not that everything said therein constitutes a precedent. The courts are obliged to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents bearing it in mind that a decision of the court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it was rendered.” In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat ( (1987) 1 SCC 213 ) it has been held that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. Long standing principle is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically flows from it. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. ( (2003) 2 SCC 111 ) it has been stated that a little difference in the facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of the decision. Therefore it is clear that without reading the judgment as a whole and without considering the observations in the judgment in the light of the questions which were considered by a higher court, no court can render a judgment by relying on a short note report. 15. A decision reported as 'short note' or 'notes on cases' or 'case notes' or by whatever name it is called by a law publisher (i.e., where a full text has not been reported) will be bereft of the essential background facts in which the decision was rendered. 15. A decision reported as 'short note' or 'notes on cases' or 'case notes' or by whatever name it is called by a law publisher (i.e., where a full text has not been reported) will be bereft of the essential background facts in which the decision was rendered. Culling out a portion from a judgment and reporting the same as short note will never serve the purpose of reporting a precedent, because it will be devoid of the basic facts. It will be only a truncated portion of a judgment. Any paragraph or portion thereof extracted from a judgment and reported as short note or notes on cases, as the case may be, cannot be relied on as a binding precedent on account of non-mentioning of the facts involved in the case leading to the decision. So much so, a chance of wrongly applying the principles stated therein to a different set of facts in a given case becomes highly probable. Therefore, adjudication of a dispute by applying blind-foldedly a decision reported as short note will be a great disservice to the litigants and the system. In my view, the only purpose for which a short note in a law journal can be relied on is to understand that in some factual situation, certain legal principles have been stated by a higher court. It is incumbent upon a person relying on a short note (whether it be a law practitioner or a Judge) to understand clearly in what fact situation, the decision was rendered. In other words, whether the principles in a short note report should be applied to a given case or not should be decided only on understanding full facts involved in the judgment. District Judiciary, therefore, must be weary of the pitfalls in relying on short note decisions reported in law journals. In some law journals, they indicate that the full text of the decision, reported as short note, could be read from their web site. That may help the legal fraternity to get at the facts in the decision. I believe, a law journal should be acclaimed not merely for the number of decisions it reports, but for the accuracy of the head notes and the usefulness of the decisions reported, both for the Bench and Bar. That may help the legal fraternity to get at the facts in the decision. I believe, a law journal should be acclaimed not merely for the number of decisions it reports, but for the accuracy of the head notes and the usefulness of the decisions reported, both for the Bench and Bar. Incidentally I may also remind the District Judiciary that the head notes do not form part of the reported judgment and it should be used only as guide to understand the matters dealt with in the judgment. I have no hesitation, therefore, to hold that any decision reported as short note or case note, as the case may be, cannot be relied on as a binding precedent and for that singular reason disposal of a case based on a short note report will be a travesty of justice. 16. There is absolutely no similarity in the facts between the present case and Gurdwara Sahib's case, which was not noticed by the lower appellate court by merely relying on the short note report cited at the Bar. This is also one of the reasons for the lower appellate court to arrive at a wrong conclusion. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the decision rendered by a learned single Judge in Treesa Mohanan v. Alexander ( 2017 (2) KLT 430 ) does not lay down the correct proposition of law. It is also argued that the statements of law contained in certain paragraphs of the decision are completely erroneous. It is the argument that the decision was rendered against the statutory principles and binding precedents. I shall examine the contention elaborately in the succeeding paragraphs. 18. Facts involved in Treesa Mohanan's case: The suit was one for a declaration that the plaintiffs have perfected title over plaint B schedule land by virtue of adverse possession and limitation. They also claimed a perpetual prohibitory injunction against the respondents. Further relief of declaration that Ext.B10 partition deed was not binding on them was also sought for in the plaint. The defendants opposed the suit contending that the plaintiffs were allowed to occupy one of the rooms in a building in the plaint schedule item on humanitarian considerations. Plaintiffs occupied the same only on the basis of a permission granted by the defendants. The defendants opposed the suit contending that the plaintiffs were allowed to occupy one of the rooms in a building in the plaint schedule item on humanitarian considerations. Plaintiffs occupied the same only on the basis of a permission granted by the defendants. They had set up a counter claim seeking a decree directing the plaintiffs to surrender vacant possession of plaint B schedule item. 19. In that context, the learned Single raised the following questions : “(1) Does the term 'right' used in S.27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 denote 'the right to recover possession' of the immovable property, in a suit under Article 65? (2) Whether the 'right' used in S.27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, includes 'title' also? (3) Can the extinguishment of the 'right' under S.27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, confer title on the person in adverse possession of the immovable property? (4) Can adverse possession be used as a 'sword' or as a 'shield' only?" 20. After referring to a short note report on Gurdwara Sahib's case, the learned single Judge held in paragraphs 23 to 26 as follows: “23. Regarding the decree sought for by the plaintiffs, this Court is of the view that the claim for decree of declaration of title by the plaintiffs on account of the adverse possession and limitation is not legally sustainable in view of the decision in Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala & Anr. (2013 (4) KLT SN 28 (C.No.26) SC = (2014) 1 SCC 669 ). 24. It is the fundamental principle that the claim of adverse possession can be used as a shield and not as a sword. The said aspect is clearly discernible from S.27 of the Limitation Act itself. As per S.27, at the determination of the period limited in the Limitation Act to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. The terms used are “his right to such property”. The term “title” has not been incorporated therein. What is intended to be extinguished is his right to such property. Then, what is the right? Whether it denotes title? The Section deals with the period limited to any person for instituting the suit for possession. Evidently, the said suits are suits contemplated under Articles 61 to 67 of the Limitation Act. 25. What is intended to be extinguished is his right to such property. Then, what is the right? Whether it denotes title? The Section deals with the period limited to any person for instituting the suit for possession. Evidently, the said suits are suits contemplated under Articles 61 to 67 of the Limitation Act. 25. It is discernible from Article 65 that the persons entitled to seek such possession of immovable property or any interest based on title, have the right to institute such a suit for possession, within the period of 12 years from the date on which the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Therefore, such persons shall have the right to institute such suits only within the period of 12 years mentioned therein. Matters being so, it is evident that the “right” mentioned in S.27 is the right to recover possession and nothing more. What is being extinguished under S.27 is the right to recover possession. Nowhere it is mentioned that the title of such person will be extinguished. The extinguishment of right to property mentioned in S.27 of the Limitation Act in a suit like this, is the extinguishment of the right to recover possession under Article 65 of the Limitation Act and nothing more. 26. When there is no extinguishment of title, the extinguishment of the right of the title holder to recover possession of such an immovable property, will not confer title on the person, who is in adverse possession of such property. That is the reason why it has been said that such adverse possession can be used as a “shield and not as a sword”. The person, who is in adverse possession, can defend the claim of dispossession by making use of such adverse possession as a shield. At the same time, he cannot forward a claim that he has title over the property and he can get it declared through a court. Therefore, in this particular case also, the plaintiffs are not entitled to get a decree declaring their title over plaint B schedule item." 21. With tremendous respect, I am unable to agree with none of the observations in the above paragraphs. Certainly, I need to mention the reasons for my disagreement. The reasons are elaborately stated in the succeeding paragraphs. 22. With tremendous respect, I am unable to agree with none of the observations in the above paragraphs. Certainly, I need to mention the reasons for my disagreement. The reasons are elaborately stated in the succeeding paragraphs. 22. Learned single Judge expressed an opinion that “right” mentioned under Section 27 of the Limitation Act does not denote “title” to immovable property. Learned single Judge deduced further that when there is no extinguishment of “title”, extinguishment of the “right” of the title holder to recover possession of immovable property will not confer “title” on the person who is in adverse possession of such property. According to me, these observations are legally unsound on the first principles in law stated below. I shall substantiate my reasonings based on the principles revealed in a legal research. 23. Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition 41A) defines “title to a thing” in the following words: “The phrase “title to a thing” denotes an aggregate of interests in the thing of such an extent that if the person who has the title is not under a duty to deal with the interests for the benefit of another person, he is the owner of the thing.” 24. Before going further, the expression “title” defined in Black's Law Dictionary shall also be considered. It reads thus: “1. the union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and custody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property; the legal link between a person who owns property and the property itself. ….. 2. Legal evidence of a person's ownership right in property; an instrument (such as a deed) that constitutes such evidence …......... “Though employed in various ways, [title] is generally used to describe either the manner in which a right to real property is acquired, or the right itself. In the first sense, it refers to the conditions necessary to acquire a valid claim to land; in the second, it refers to the legal consequences of such conditions. These two senses are not only interrelated, but inseparable: given the requisite conditions, the legal consequences or rights follow as of course; given the rights, conditions necessary for the creation of those rights must have been satisfied. Thus, when the word 'title' is used in one sense, the other sense is necessarily implied.” 25. Meaning of the term “property” mentioned in Black's Law Dictionary is worthy to be considered. Thus, when the word 'title' is used in one sense, the other sense is necessarily implied.” 25. Meaning of the term “property” mentioned in Black's Law Dictionary is worthy to be considered. It reads thus: 1. The right to possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing (either a tract of land or a chattel); the right of ownership. 2. Any external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised. “in its widest sense, property includes all a person's legal rights, of whatever description. A man's property is all that is his in law. This usage, however, is obsolete at the present day, though it is common enough in the older books. … In a second and narrower sense, property includes not all a person's rights, but only his proprietary as opposed to his personal rights. The former constitute his estate or property, while the latter constitute his status or personal condition. In this sense a man's land, chattels, shares, and the debts due to him are his property; but not his life or liberty or reputation …..... In a third application, which is that adopted [here], the term includes not even all proprietary rights, but only those which are both proprietary and in rem. The law of property is the law of proprietary rights in rem, the law of proprietary rights in personam being distinguished from it as the law of obligations. According to this usage a freehold or leasehold estate in law, or a patent or copyright, is property; but a debt or the benefit of a contract is not ….......... Finally, in the narrowest use of the term, it includes nothing more than corporeal property – that is to say, the right of ownership in a material object, or that object itself.” 26. I may also refer to Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol.73) to understand the expression “property”. It is sometimes regarded as synonymous with “land”, although it has been said that “property” has a much broader meaning than does land (see page 161). Further observed therein: “Property includes all valuable rights, interests, and benefits in any and every thing that is subject to ownership by man. The term “property” in its strict legal sense is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers, and immunities, comprising a vast variety of rights. Further observed therein: “Property includes all valuable rights, interests, and benefits in any and every thing that is subject to ownership by man. The term “property” in its strict legal sense is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers, and immunities, comprising a vast variety of rights. Thus, property includes practically all valuable rights, the term being indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which a person can have, in any and everything that is the subject of ownership by man. The term is inclusive of every valuable interest which can be enjoyed as property, and recognized as such, equitable interests as well as legal interests, and extending to every species of valuable right or interest in either real or personal property, or in easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments. Furthermore, the term comprises all rights which are incident to the use, enjoyment, and disposition of tangible things, as well as the right to be protected in one's possession of a thing or in one's privileges belonging to him as an individual, or secured to him by law. It also includes the right to contest judicially any invasion of that which one possessses or owns. Under the civil law, property, in its broad sense, denotes all patrimonial rights.” Again it is stated thus : “Property may be defined as everything which is or may be the subject of ownership. In what is sometimes referred to as its broadest sense, the word “property” means the thing owned, or the physical thing which is a subject of ownership. The term is further defined as meaning that to which a person has a legal title. In the Blackstonian sense, “property” means those things which one has the right to hold, possess, and enjoy to the exclusion of any other individual in the universe. The term, however, is not limited to the physical thing that may be owned, and it has been said that the word “property” is all-embracing so as to include every intangible benefit and prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition. Accordingly, the word “property” embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership, or whether beneficial, or private, ownership, or to which the right of property may legally attach. Accordingly, the word “property” embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership, or whether beneficial, or private, ownership, or to which the right of property may legally attach. The term is legally understood to include everything which may belong to a man and in the ownership of which he has a right to be protected by law, or anything which is the proper subject of legal transfer. The term further includes every species of estate, corporeal on incorporeal, tangible or intangible, choate or inchoate, visible or invisible, real or personal or mixed, which may be the subject of ownership. So also, there may be ownership of all inanimate things which are capable of appropriation or of manual delivery.” 27. Halsbury's Laws of England (5th Edition, Volume 87) while dealing with “Real Property and Registration” enunciates the following principles: “69. Right to use land. An owner in fee simple may exercise over the land acts of ownership of all kinds, including the commission of waste, such as the felling of trees, the opening and working of mines and the pulling down of houses, unless in so doing he interferes with some right created either by law or contract, or infringes the provisions of some statute, or unless he has in equity only a limited interest in the land. Thus an unreasonable exercise of his rights which injures his neighbours in the use and enjoyment of their land constitutes an actionable nuisance, and may be restrained by injunction. If the land is subject to easements, profits a prendre or restrictive covenants, he may not use it in a manner inconsistent with the proper enjoyment of the easements or profits, or in a manner inconsistent with the due observance of the covenants. His rights to use land and even of possession may be subject to those of persons entitled under a lease or mortgage. Statutory restrictions on the enjoyment of land have been imposed in the public interest, and, among other things, control the use to which the land may be put and the rent which may be demanded from tenants, contain provisions to secure the repair or demolition of unfit houses, and regulate the construction of new buildings. Statutory restrictions on the enjoyment of land have been imposed in the public interest, and, among other things, control the use to which the land may be put and the rent which may be demanded from tenants, contain provisions to secure the repair or demolition of unfit houses, and regulate the construction of new buildings. However, if an owner of a legal estate in fee simple has in equity only a life interest, or his estate is subject to an executory limitation over, he may be restrained in the interests of the remaindermen from committing waste.” 28. The expression “adverse title”, according to Black's Law Dictionary, means a title acquired by adverse possession. 29. Fundamental principles quoted above will clearly show the nature of the concept called “right to property” or “title”, as commonly known. It can be visualized as a bundle comprising of various rights. Actual possession, right to possession and right to recover possession are the essential components in the bundle. In the light of the aforementioned basic principles in law, the above observations by the learned single Judge that the right to recover possession will be lost without affecting the title to property of the person excluded from possession for the statutory period can only be held unsound in law. 30. There are other reasons for questioning correctness of the above decision. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Nav Rettanmal v. State of Rajasthan (1963 (1) SCJ 426) has clearly held that the statutes of limitation are designed to effectuate a beneficent purpose, viz., to prevent the taking away from one what he has for long been permitted to consider his own and on the faith of which he plans his life, habits and expenses. Further, the Limitation Act, though a “statute of repose” and intended for quieting titles and in that sense looks at the problem from the point of view of the defendant with a view to provide for him a security against stale claims, addresses itself at the same time also to the position of the plaintiff. 31. U.N. Mitra on the Law of Limitation and Prescription (Tagore Law of Lectures – 1882) stated the following principles: “The law of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure the quiet of the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. 31. U.N. Mitra on the Law of Limitation and Prescription (Tagore Law of Lectures – 1882) stated the following principles: “The law of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure the quiet of the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It incorporates principles of great benefit to the Community. The statute discourages litigation by burying in one common receptacle all the accumulations of past times which are unexplained and have not from lapse of time become inexplicable. It has been said by John Voet, with singular felicity, that controversies are limited to a fixed period of time, why they should be immortal while men are mortal. Rules of limitation are founded on considerations of public policy. They have been viewed by some as an “infamous power created by positive law to decrease litigation and encourage dishonest defences.” This is not wholly sound. In sooth, the law of limitation affords a guarantee to the litigant public that after the lapse of a particular period of time prescribed by the law, the cause of action rests. The object of the rules of limitation is preventive and not curative. They interpose a statutory bar after a certain period and give a quietus to suits to enforce an existing right. Lapse of limitation ordinarily bars only the remedy and does not extinguish the title of the claimant.” 32. In order to attain clarity in the further discussion, I shall excerpt Section 27 of the Limitation Act: “Extinguishment of right to property.-At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.” Corresponding provision was Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which was replaced by the present Act. 33. It has been held by the Privy Council in Gunga Govind Mandal v. The Collector of Twenty-four Pergunahs (11 Moo IA 345 (PC)) that the principle of the Section (under the old Act) was that if a person having a right to possession suffered his right to be barred by the law of limitation, his title itself would be extinguished in favour of the party in possession. In Valliamma Champaka v. Sivathanu Pillai and others (ILR (1963) Mad.1110 (FB) it is held that Section 28 of the old Act (corresponding to Section 27 of the present Act) is an exception to the well accepted rule that limitation bars only the remedy and does not extinguish the title. It lays down a rule of substantive law by declaring that after lapse of the period, the title ceases to exist and not merely the remedy. 34. The decision in Gurdwara Sahib's case was pronounced by a two Judge Bench without referring to the binding decisions by larger Benches in Sarangadeva Periya Matam's case, Nair Service Society's case (supra) and Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi ( AIR 1981 SC 707 ). 35. Before dealing with those decisions, it will be profitable to know about the classical requirements to constitute adverse possession. Ever since the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Corea v. Appuhany (1912 A.C.230), the essential components of adverse possession are nec vi (neither by force), nec clam (neither secretly) and nec precario (neither by licence or permission). Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold and Others (1907 A.C.73) held thus: “It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the Statute of Limitations applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.” 36. Supreme Court in Nair Service Society's case (supra) has qualified the decision in Perry's case as locus classicus and approved the principles in explicit terms in paragraph 22 of the judgment. 37. Yet another decision by a three Judge Bench in Kshitish Chandra Bose's case (supra) is also extremely relevant in this context. It was an appeal to the Supreme Court by the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of his title and recovery of possession and also for a permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant-Municipality for disturbing the plaintiff's possession. 37. Yet another decision by a three Judge Bench in Kshitish Chandra Bose's case (supra) is also extremely relevant in this context. It was an appeal to the Supreme Court by the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of his title and recovery of possession and also for a permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant-Municipality for disturbing the plaintiff's possession. In the suit, the plaintiff based his claim by virtue of a Hukumnama granted to him by the landlord as back as 17.04.1912. Apart from this, he further pleaded that even if the land belonged to the defendant Municipality, he had acquired title by prescription by being in possession of the land to the knowledge of the Municipality for more than 30 years, that is to say from 1912 to 1957. The suit was decreed by the trial court finding that the plaintiff acquired title to the land by adverse possession and limitation. The decree was confirmed in the first appeal before the Additional Judicial Commissioner. The High Court in a second appeal reversed the findings and remanded the case to the first appellate authority mainly relying on some questions of fact. The Supreme Court found fault with the High Court in deciding a second appeal with reference to questions of fact alone. Ultimately, the decree passed by the High Court was set aside and that of the lower court was confirmed by decreeing the plaintiff's suit. In this case also, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that a person acquiring title by prescription could not only defend a suit, but also file a suit to get his adverse title declared and also seek further consequential relief’s. 38. It will be very much clear from the above decisions that larger Benches of the Supreme Court had expressed a definite view that there is no bar in filing a suit for recovery of possession based on a claim of prescriptive title (adverse title) acquired by adverse possession and limitation. If a person wrongfully keeps possession of a property with a hostile animus against the title holder for the statutorily fixed period, whatever title the original owner has in the property will be lost in favour of the person in wrongful possession after the lapse of time. It is trite, if one person loses title to an immovable property, certainly another person should get it. It is trite, if one person loses title to an immovable property, certainly another person should get it. The concept res nullius (thing of no one) applies to an ownerless chattel and not to an immovable property. Title to immovable property can be lost in many ways, that is by operation of law and by act of parties. In the case of a person prescribing title by adverse possession and limitation, the wrongdoer, who causes the extinction of title, gets the benefit by acquiring title. As long as Section 27 of the Limitation Act is vibrantly alive in the statute, no one can complain that the provision lacks morality. As laid down in many decisions, the Section provides a substantive right. Title to property cannot be in a state of suspended animation. If one loses title, another one should get it, either by operation of law or act of parties. Here, under Section 27 of the Limitation Act, the RSA No.423 of 2014 29 adverse possessor gets a title with all incidents thereof by prescription. 39. In order to clearly understand the meaning of the expression “prescription of title”, following aspects will have to be kept in mind. 40. Meanings ascribed by Black's Law Dictionary to the word “prescription” are: i. The act of establishing authoritative rules. ii. A rule so established. iii. The effect of the lapse of time in creating and destroying rights. iv. The extinction of a title or right by failure to claim or exercise it over a long period. v. The acquisition of title to a thing (esp. an intangible thing such as the use of real property) by open and continuous possession over a statutory period. vi. The acquisition of a territory through a continuous and undisputed exercise of sovereignty over it. vii. A Louisiana doctrine that extinguishes unused mineral servitudes after ten years if there is no effort to discover or produce on the land or the land pooled with it. Further, the expression “acquisitive prescription” is defined as: i. Prescription, and ii. A mode of acquiring ownership or other legal rights through possession for a specified period of time. 41. The concept, “prescription” as observed by Salmond on Jurisprudence reads thus: “Prescription may be defined as the effect of lapse of time in creating and destroying rights; it is the operation of time as a vestitive fact. A mode of acquiring ownership or other legal rights through possession for a specified period of time. 41. The concept, “prescription” as observed by Salmond on Jurisprudence reads thus: “Prescription may be defined as the effect of lapse of time in creating and destroying rights; it is the operation of time as a vestitive fact. It is of two kinds, namely (1) positive or acquisitive prescription and (2) negative or extinctive prescription. The former is the creation of a right, the latter is the destruction of one, by the lapse of time. An example of the former is the acquisition of a right of way by the de facto use of it for twenty years. An instance of the latter is the destruction of the right to sue for a debt after six years from the time at which it first became payable. Lapse of time, therefore, has two opposite effects. In positive prescription it is a title of right, but in negative prescription it is a divestitive fact. Whether it shall operate in the one way or in the other depends on whether it is or is not accompanied by possession. Positive prescription is the investitive operation of lapse of time with possession, while negative prescription is the divestitive operation of lapse of time without possession. Long possession creates rights, and long want of possession destroys them. ... In may cases the two forms of prescription coincide. The property which one person loses through long dispossession is often at the same time acquired by someone else through long possession. ….. The rational basis of prescription is to be found in the presumption of the coincidence of possession and ownership, of fact and of right. Owners are usually possessors, and possessors are usually owners. Fact and right are normally coincident; therefore the former is evidence of the latter. That a thing is possessed de facto is evidence that it is owned de jure. That it is not possessed raises a presumption that it is not owned either. Want of possession is evidence of want of title. The longer the possession or want of possession has continued, the greater is its evidential value. …....” 42. Article 112 of the Limitation Act governs the suits brought by or on behalf of the Government. It says that 30 years is the time allowed for such suits. Want of possession is evidence of want of title. The longer the possession or want of possession has continued, the greater is its evidential value. …....” 42. Article 112 of the Limitation Act governs the suits brought by or on behalf of the Government. It says that 30 years is the time allowed for such suits. 30 years period should be reckoned when the period of limitation would begin to run under the Limitation Act against a like suit by a private person. For recovery of possession of immovable property on the strength of title by a private person, the suit will have to be instituted under Article 65 of the Limitation Act within 12 years, when possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. This period has been extended in the case of Government from 12 years to 30 years. 43. For the aforementioned reasons, I am of definite view that the observations in Treesa Mohanan's case quoted above are legally incorrect and unapprovable. 44. Firstly, the decision in Treesa Mohanan's case was rendered in ignorance of the binding precedents in Sarangadeva Periya Matam, Nair Service Society and Kshitish Chandra Bose (supra). Further, it was rendered in ignorance of the decisions in Gunga Govind Mandal and Valliamma Champaka (supra). It is axiomatic, any decision rendered without referring to a binding precedent can be ignored. It has been held by a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Rattiram and others v. State of M.P. through Inspector of Police ( AIR 2012 SC 1485 ) following a Constitution Bench decision of the apex Court in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and another ( AIR 1984 SC 718 ) that per incuriam are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, will be demonstrably wrong. It was further observed that if a decision has been given per incuriam, the court can ignore it. For the reasons shown above, with respect, I hold that the decision in Treesa Mohanan's case was rendered in ignorance of the binding precedents and therefore it is per incuriam. 45. It was further observed that if a decision has been given per incuriam, the court can ignore it. For the reasons shown above, with respect, I hold that the decision in Treesa Mohanan's case was rendered in ignorance of the binding precedents and therefore it is per incuriam. 45. In fact the learned single Judge while rendering the judgment in Treesa Mohanan's case was bound by the pronouncement in Thomas's case. Principles stated therein were also not considered while Treesa Mohanan's case was disposed. For this reason also, the ratio in Treesa Mohanan's case is per incuriam. The following legal principles further fortify my view that no reference of the ratio in Treesa Mohanan's case is required to declare the decision per incuriam. 46. A four Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey and others ( AIR 1962 SC 83 ) held the following propositions: “Then there is the question of the practice to be followed when there is a conflict among decisions of Benches of the same High Court. When a Bench of the High Court gives a decision on a question of law, it should in general be followed by other Benches unless they have reasons to differ from it, in which case the proper course to adopt would be to refer the question for the decision of a Full Bench. ….” 47. Apex Court in U.P. Gram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh and others v. Daya Ram Saroj and others ( (2007) 2 SCC 138 ) declared the law thus: “Judicial discipline is self-discipline. It is an inbuilt mechanism in the system itself. Judicial discipline demands that when the decision of a coordinate Bench of the same High Court is brought to the notice of the Bench, it is to be respected and is binding, subject of course, to the right to take a different view or to doubt the correctness of the decision and the permissible course then open is to refer the question or the case to a larger Bench, This is the minimum discipline and decorum to be maintained by judicial fraternity.” 48. It is therefore unquestionably clear that a single Judge is bound by an earlier decision on the same point by another single Judge. It is therefore unquestionably clear that a single Judge is bound by an earlier decision on the same point by another single Judge. If there is any doubt regarding the correctness of the earlier decision, the only course open to a single Judge is to refer the case to a Division Bench. If a single Judge finds an earlier decision, rendered by another single Judge in ignorance of a binding precedent, then, even without a reference, he can differ from the earlier view, because the ratio will not bind him. 49. It is unquestionable that the learned single Judge, who rendered the decision in Treesa Mohanan's case, was bound by the ratio in Thomas's case which was rendered on the same point. An earlier decision on the same point will constitute a binding precedent for a coequal Bench. In Treesa Mohanan's case, the learned single Judge did not refer to the principles of law stated in Thomas's case. It is, therefore, clear that the judgment in Treesa Mohanan's case is per incuriam on that score too. 50. Upshot of the discussions is that the observations in Treesa Mohanan's case that a claim of adverse possession can be used only as a shield and not as a sword is an incorrect proposition in law. The expression “right” used in Section 27 of the Limitation Act denotes nothing but the “property” or “title to immovable property”. Further findings in the decision, that “right” mentioned in Section 27 of the Limitation Act is the right to recover possession, nothing more and nowhere in the Section it is mentioned that the title of such person will be extinguished, are incorrect expositions of law. Observations to the effect that what is contemplated in Section 27 of the Limitation Act is the extinguishment of right to recover possession and nothing more; and when there is no extinguishment of title, the extinguishment of right of the title holder to recover possession of such immovable property will not confer title on the person in adverse possession are also completely incorrect statements in law as seen from the detailed discussions made above. 51. 51. On the basis of the classic authorities mentioned above and the legal principles laid down in the aforementioned binding decisions, it can only be held that at the determination of the period prescribed under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, in respect of a property belonging to a private person and Article 112 of the Limitation Act, in respect of a property owned by the Government, in any suit for the possession of property, the plaintiff's right to such property will be extinguished, thereby meaning that the plaintiff's title will be lost by adverse possession and limitation and the same will be prescribed by the person in adverse possession. Any other interpretation of Section 27 of the Limitation Act will lead to absurd results. 52. In the case on hand, there is overwhelming evidence to show that from 1944 onwards the appellant and his predecessor were in continuous possession exhibiting hostile animus openly to the knowledge of everyone, including the defendants. This is, therefore, a classic case of establishing prescriptive title by adverse possession and limitation by the appellant against the respondents. Trial Judge was perfectly right in holding that the suit is liable to be decreed. The lower appellate court committed a grave mistake in reversing the well reasoned judgment of the trial court. Hence the first substantial question of law is decided in favour of the appellant. 53. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the lower appellate court committed another mistake in finding that the suit is barred by Sections 20 and 20A of the Act of 1957. Section 20 says that no suit against the Government shall be entertained in any civil court in respect of any order passed under the Act except upon the ground that the land in respect of which such order has been passed is not the property of Government. Proviso to the Section says that civil courts shall not take cognizance of any such suit unless it is instituted within one year from the date of arising of cause of action. Proviso to the Section says that civil courts shall not take cognizance of any such suit unless it is instituted within one year from the date of arising of cause of action. Section 20A of the Act of 1957 creates a bar on the jurisdiction of the civil courts by saying that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other legal proceedings against the Government in respect of any action taken by it for the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of Government, whether puramboke or not or for the recovery of any fine or any other sum due to the Government under the Act. 54. Learned Government Pleader contended that the suit is hit by the aforementioned provisions. Per contra, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the suit was instituted on getting a notice from the 2nd respondent under the provisions of the Act of 1957. But, the appellant did not challenge the legality of the notice in the suit. According to the appellant, by issuing the notice, the respondents have cast a shadow on his title and to dispel the same, a declaratory suit with a consequential relief has been filed. In other words, appellant never challenged the proceedings under the Act of 1957, but he wanted to assert his ownership over the land through a civil litigation. From the averments in the plaint and the contentions raised by the parties, I find that the suit will not fall within the prohibition under Section 20A of the Act of 1957. Besides, the specific finding that the appellant has prescribed title to the plaint A schedule property by adverse possession and limitation will also be a reason to hold that the suit is not hit by the provisions under the Act of 1957. On the basis of the findings above, it is established that the property ceased to be a Government land. Therefore, provisions of the Act will have no application. This point also is decided in favour of the appellant. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Decree and judgment passed by the lower appellate court is set aside. Decree of the trial court is restored. All pending interlocutory applications will stand closed.