JUDGMENT : Arindam Mukherjee, J. 1. The appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 15th July, 2016 passed in an application under chapter XIIIA of the Original Side Rules of this Court (hereinafter referred to as the said rules). The suit was filed by the respondent above named seeking, inter alia, a decree for recovery of vacant, peaceful possession of an office space being flat No. 13 at the first floor and premises No. 8 Ho-Chi-Minh Sarani, (formerly known as Harrington Street) Kolkata-700071 measuring about 4068 square feet with one servant's quarter and a covered garage at the ground floor respectively measuring about 76 square feet and 130 square feet (hereinafter referred to as the 'suit property') by evicting the appellant/defendant therefrom. 2. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the undisputed fact of the case are as follows:- (i) The suit property was initially owned by one Jaishree Bajoria. The said Jaishree Bajoria had let out the suit property to the appellant/defendant by a tenancy agreement dated 22nd January, 2009, for a monthly rent of Rs. 18,000/-. (ii) By a registered deed of conveyance dated 15th May, 2012 the respondent/plaintiff purchased the suit property for valuable consideration from the said Jaishree Bajoria. (iii) By a letter dated 16th May, 2012 the said Jaishree Bajoria informed the appellant/defendant about the transfer of the suit property in favour of the respondent/plaintiff and requested the appellant/defendant to attorn the tenancy of the said appellant/defendant in favour of the respondent/plaintiff and further to pay all future rents to the plaintiff/respondent. (iv)The appellant/defendant did not attorn its tenancy and also did not tender the rent either to Jaishree Bajoria or to the respondent/plaintiff. (v) By a letter dated 28th August, 2012, the respondent/plaintiff informed the appellant/defendant about the purchase of the suit property and also asserted his claim as the landlord. Despite such notice, the appellant/defendant neither accepted the respondent/plaintiff as its landlord nor tendered or pay any rent to the respondent/plaintiff. (vi) Subsequently, the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant entered into an agreement on 26th November, 2012 with the nomenclature "Agreement for Leave and Licence" by and under which the respondent/plaintiff allowed the appellant/defendant to occupy the suit property with effect from 1st June, 2012 for a period of eleven months with a condition to extend the same for a further period of eleven months on mutual consent. The consolidated licence fee was agreed upon at Rs. 18,660/-. The said consolidated licence fee comprised of Rs. 12,600/- as licence fee, Rs. 1260/- as monthly maintenance, Rs. 2400 as municipal corporation tax and Rs. 2400 as commercial surcharge. The consolidated licence fee was to be paid according to English Calendar month with effect from 1st June, 2012 with stipulation that any increase in municipal corporation tax and commercial surcharge (occupier's share) beyond the agreed amount shall be borne by the appellant/defendant. (vii) In terms of the said agreement the appellant/defendant paid the arrears of license fees for the suit property @18,600/- and continued to pay the monthly license fees. (viii) The eleven months period as per the document dated 26th November, 2012 was to end on 30th April, 2013. (ix) By a letter dated 23rd March, 2013 the respondent/plaintiff informed the appellant/defendant that he was not interested in renewing the licence and thereby requested the appellant/defendant not to use the suit property on expiry of 30th April, 2013 and to station its belongings at the suit property on and from 1st May, 2013. The respondent/plaintiff also made it clear that in the event the appellant/defendant was found to use the suit property or station its belongings thereat on and from 1st May, 2013 it will be treated as a trespasser and appropriate proceedings will be initiated against the appellant/defendant. (x) This notice was replied to by the appellant/defendant by a letter dated 29th April, 2013, wherein it had alleged that Hindustan Fertiliser Corporation Limited (HFCL) was the original tenant since 1961. With effect from 1st April, 2002, the Namrup Unit of HFCL was demerged and Brahmaputra Valley Fertiliser Corporation Limited (BVFCL), the appellant/defendant came to occupy the said property by an agreement of tenancy dated 22nd January, 2009 executed by and between Jaishree Bajoria (erstwhile owner) and BVFCL wherein HFCL being the outgoing tenant signed as a confirming party, the said BVFCL became a tenant of the suit property under the said Jaishree Bajoria. (xi)It was further alleged that, Anirudha Jalan the respondent/plaintiff became the owner of the suit property on 15th May, 2012. Jaishree Bajoria requested BVFCL by a letter dated 16th May, 2012 to attorn the tenancy in favour of the said Anirudha Jalan and to pay the monthly rent against rent receipts with immediate effect to the said respondent/plaintiff. (xi)It was further alleged that, Anirudha Jalan the respondent/plaintiff became the owner of the suit property on 15th May, 2012. Jaishree Bajoria requested BVFCL by a letter dated 16th May, 2012 to attorn the tenancy in favour of the said Anirudha Jalan and to pay the monthly rent against rent receipts with immediate effect to the said respondent/plaintiff. (xii) It was also alleged that, on 16th November, 2012, at the request and insistence of Anirudha Jalan, BVFCL represented by S. Mukherjee the erstwhile in-charge of BVFCL's office at the suit property entered into a Leave & License agreement under compelling circumstances. (xiii) BVFCL further alleged that, the said document dated 26th November, 2012 is a mere notarised document on a non-judicial stamp paper of Rs. 20/-. It was not understood by BVFCL whether such a document was potent enough to determine the tenancy of BVFCL. The appellant/defendant, thus, claimed that the tenancy between itself and Jaishree Bajoria continued and the agreement of Leave & License cannot be but part of the said tenancy. (xiv) BVFCL further alleged that, by a unilateral decision the respondent/plaintiff as the landlord terminated the tenancy camouflaged by an agreement for Leave & License. The termination of tenancy does depend upon the exclusive decision and sweet will of the landlord. 3. (i) It appears from the facts and circumstances as alleged in the said reply that the intention of BVFCL was never to end the tenancy by signing the Leave & License Agreement and, as such, its old tenancy under Jaishree Bajoria continued. The agreement termed as "Leave & License" being an insufficiently stamped document and not registered cannot be given effect to. (ii) BVFCL has been in exclusive possession of the suit property and was still holding and enjoying exclusive possession thereof. The lock and key of the said premises belonged to the tenant solely and the landlord had never even had the custody of it even when he purchased the premises from the erstwhile owner. (iii) The unilateral decision of the landlord to terminate the tenancy on his own accord and terming BVFCL to be a trespasser is surely a sign of mala fide intention. 4. On the basis of these allegations, the appellant/defendant refused to vacate the suit property. The said letter was signed by one Baikuntha Sarma claiming to be the in-charge, KPLO, Kolkata. 4. On the basis of these allegations, the appellant/defendant refused to vacate the suit property. The said letter was signed by one Baikuntha Sarma claiming to be the in-charge, KPLO, Kolkata. The KPLO termed as we understand is the abbreviation of Kolkata Purchase, Liaison & Marketing Office of the appellant/defendant. This ultimately led to the filing of the above suit. 5. The respondent/plaintiff in the plaint has described the appellant/defendant to be a licensee. It is the case of the respondent/plaintiff that the appellant/defendant having been served with a notice dated 23rd March, 2013 ought to have vacated the suit property. Having not done so the appellant/defendant is a trespasser and, as such, is liable to be vacated. The application under Chapter XIII A of the Original Side Rules of this Court filed by the respondent/plaintiff is the repetition of its stand in the plaint. The relevant documents according to the respondent/plaintiff are annexed thereto. 6. The appellant/defendant has filed its affidavit in the application filed by the plaintiff under the provisions of Chapter XIII A of the Original Side Rules of this Court wherein it has alleged that on 15th May, 2014 it has filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property before the learned 6th Bench of the City Civil Court and Calcutta, inter alia, praying for declaration and permanent injunction. In the said suit, the respondent/plaintiff is the defendant No. 1 while Subhasish Mukherjee the former in-charge of the KPLO Office and the appellant/respondent is the defendant No. 2. In the said suit, the appellant/defendant had filed an application for temporary injunction but no order was made therein except issuance of notice to the respondent/plaintiff. It has also been alleged that the agreement between the appellant/defendant and Jaishree Bajoria is still subsisting and was never terminated nor was brought to an end either by an agreement or by operation of law. The agreement between the appellant/defendant and the respondent/plaintiff is a product of serious collusion and conspiracy between the said respondent/plaintiff one Subhasish Mukherjee and one Asit Kumar and thereby fraud was committed against the appellant/defendant. The said Subhasish Mukherjee has been issued charge-sheet on 14th December, 2013 (wrongly typed as 2103). The said Subhasish has been issued a second show-cause on 28th April, 2014 after considering his reply dated 22nd December, 2013 to the charge-sheet. The said Subhasish Mukherjee has been issued charge-sheet on 14th December, 2013 (wrongly typed as 2103). The said Subhasish has been issued a second show-cause on 28th April, 2014 after considering his reply dated 22nd December, 2013 to the charge-sheet. On the basis of such reply, the appellant/defendant sought dismissal of the application filed by the respondent/plaintiff. 7. On a comparison of the grounds taken in the reply dated 29th April, 2013 given by the appellant/defendant to the notice of the respondent/plaintiff and the affidavit-in-opposition one can notice substantial alteration in the defence initially put forth by the appellant/defendant in its letter to those taken in its affidavit-in-opposition filed in the Chapter XIII A application of the respondent/plaintiff which are summarised hereinbelow:- 8. In the reply dated 29th April, 2014 there was no mention of any charge sheet issued to Subhasish Mukherjee on 14th December, 2013 or about in reply given by the said Subhasish Mukherjee on 22nd December, 2013. The notice is also silent about the second show-cause notice said to have been issued to Subhasish Mukherjee on 28th April, 2014 though the issuance of charge-sheet to the said Subhasish Mukherjee and his reply thereto as also the second show-cause were issued or received prior to 29th April, 2014 being the date of the reply given by the appellant/defendant to the respondent's/plaintiff's letter. 9. In the reply letter dated 29th April, 2014 the appellant/defendant raised an issue that the agreement termed as "Leave & License" dated 26th November, 2012 is an unregistered document prepared on a non-judicial stamp paper of Rs.20/- which has been notarised. The appellant/defendant further alleged that it is in exclusive possession of the suit property and the keys of the said premises have been always lying with the appellant/defendant. The respondent/plaintiff even did not have the keys of the said premises when he purchased the same from Smt. Jaishree Bajoria. The main thrust, therefore, was that the document dated 26th November, 2012 though was termed as "Leave & License" it is basically an agreement for tenancy the terms whereof could not be looked into for the document being insufficiently stamped and being unregistered. The exclusive possession of the suit property was put forth to further establish that the right, if any, of the appellant/defendant was that of a tenant and not of a licensee. The exclusive possession of the suit property was put forth to further establish that the right, if any, of the appellant/defendant was that of a tenant and not of a licensee. Probably, the appellant/defendant realised that the case of tenancy, if propounded by it would go against it as the amount of rent would make such relationship a month to month tenancy to be governed by provisions of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 and not by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, for which a simple termination notice without even stating any ground would sufficiently terminate the tenancy. 10. In such a sitution, the appellant/defendant did not further its case to solely rely upon the document being unregistered and insufficiently stamped. It has, therefore, at a subsequent stage filed a suit by trying to make out a case of fraud and collusion in bringing into existence the document termed as "Leave & License". 11. The Indian Easement Act, 1952 which provides for license is not applicable in the judgment reported in state of West Bengal as has been held in 2002 (3) CHN 567 . Only the broad principles thereto are applicable. This judgment though was not cited by any of the parties but was made known to them during the course of hearing. 12. The agreemnt in the instant case is admittedly an unregistered e document. Neither a tenancy agreement nor a "Leave and License Agreement" are compulsorily registerable document under the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. If it is not registered then the terms of the same cannot be looked into but the same can be considered for collateral purpose, that is, as an evidence for possession. The possession of the appellant/defendant in respect of the suit premises is not in dispute, on the contrary an admitted position. So a decree for eviction in any event can be claimed by the respondent/plaintiff on the established fact of possession and granted a Chapter XIII A application taking it as an evidence of possession in absence of any triable issue. The defendant having admitted to be a tenant and in possession, the document can be looked into for the limited purpose of possession even if unregistered and as such we find no triable issue regarding the document being unregistered. 13. The defendant having admitted to be a tenant and in possession, the document can be looked into for the limited purpose of possession even if unregistered and as such we find no triable issue regarding the document being unregistered. 13. Even if we accept that the document is insufficiently stamped then the natural fall out is that the said document cannot be looked into for any purpose. In the instant case in view of the clear assertion of tenancy right and admission by the defendant in its letters, the relationship between itself and the plaintiff/respondent according to the defendant is a tenancy. The moment the defendant claims to be a tenant and admit the rent to be Rs. 18,660 it is not necessary to look into the terms of the agreement to grant an eviction decree particularly when no breach of the terms of the agreement is complained of. Insufficiency of stamp duty as alleged by the appellant/defendant, therefore, does not help them in the facts and circumstance of the case. As the possession and quantum of rent is admitted and established, it is only the termination notice which is, required to be looked into for assessing valid termination in view of the provisions of Chapter XIIIA (1) (B) of the Original Side Rules of this Court. The validity of the notice is separately discussed in the later part of the judgment. 14. We, thoug have proceeded on the basis of an unregistered and h insufficiently stamped document and have held that the relief of eviction can be granted in the instant case we must make it clear that the document dated 26th November, 2012 on being considered as a whole in the touch stone of exclusive possession, intention of the parties, the restrictions contained therein, the attendant circumstances both prior to execution and even thereafter and the manner in which the parties acted in connection with such document being the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of India, other High Courts including our High Court to interpret a document as to whether it is a lease or a license it is clear that the said document has to be held as tenancy and not leave and license. 15. 15. It is also n t the case of the parties that respondent/plaintiff and the o appellant/defendant were in joint possession of the suit property on the contrary defendant is in exclusive possession. There is also no assertion by the appellant/defendant that they understood their right to be that of a licensee or that they conducted themselves as a licensee. On the contrary, they asserted tenancy right from the very beginning. The agreement dated 26th November, 2012, therefore, can only be construed as a tenancy agreement on an interpretation of the terms thereof, intention of the parties etc. as aforesaid for which no further evidence is required to be laid. 16. In a case were plaintiff asserts to be a licensor and contend the h defendant to be a licensee and on the other hand the defendant claims itself to be a tenant and the plaintiff to be a landlord, the Court is free to accept any of the said view after considering the fact situation. We in the facts and circumstances of this case and particularly for the admission by the defendant hold that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is that of landlord and tenant. The relationship between the parties as we find is also governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in view of Rs. 18,600/- being paid by the appellant/defendant to the respondent/plaintiff as rent and not under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The appellant/defendant after having run a case of tenancy is also estopped from claiming contrary thereto and seek an opportunity to lay evidence contending the same to be a triable issue. That apart, if we allow the appellant/defendant to run a case of fraud and collusion in bringing the document into existence after replying to the termination notice wherein such point is not taken then we shall be doing grave in justice to the respondent/plaintiff. This will create a bad precedence as all tenants like the appellant/defendant after accepting a document and acting on it will file suits to defeat the landlord's claim. 17. The immeiate fall out of our view that the relationship between the d plaintiff and defendant to be that of landlord and tenant and the relationship is governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 will be whether the suit has been properly valued or not. 17. The immeiate fall out of our view that the relationship between the d plaintiff and defendant to be that of landlord and tenant and the relationship is governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 will be whether the suit has been properly valued or not. On a reading of the plaint it will appear that the suit has been valued at Rs.11,35,578/- on account of a decree for amount of mesne profit for Rs. 9,11,658/- and the rest towards recovery of possession to attract the jurisdiction of this Court. If it is a tenancy then, the valuation of the suit will be twelve months rent which comes to Rs. 2,23,200 calculated at the admitted rate of 18,600 per month. If the mesne profit of Rs. ,11,658 is added to that the same it will come to Rs. 11,34,858. The valuation given in the plaint is in excess of that figure and, as such, this Court retains the jurisdiction to try the suit, even if, it is construed the relationship between the appellant and the respondent is that of a landlord and tenant governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act,1882. Inasmuch as, the plaintiff can include in its suit a claim for mesne profit from 1st May, 2013 to 5th July, 2013 being a date prior to filing of this suit. The valuation is sufficient enough to confer this Court with the pecuniary jurisdiction. 18. As we have held that the relationship is that of landlord and tenant, the e defence taken by the appellant/defendant that an application under the provisions of Chapter XIII A of the Original Side Rules of this Court is not maintainable in case of a 'Leave & License' is of no assistance to the appellant/defendant. The judgments cited by the appellant/defendant reported in AIR 2008 Cal 285 has, therefore, no application in such a situation, though there is no dispute as to the proposition laid down therein. 19. So far as the validity of the notice is concerned, it is well settled principle h that while construing a termination notice, a liberal construction has to be given to its words and the intent has to be curled out thereafter. 19. So far as the validity of the notice is concerned, it is well settled principle h that while construing a termination notice, a liberal construction has to be given to its words and the intent has to be curled out thereafter. On that basis, the notice issued by the respondent/plaintiff clearly states that on expiry of 30th April, 2013 the suit property should not be used by the appellant/defendant and the appellant/defendant should remove its belongings therefrom. It further states that in the event the appellant/defendant is found to use the suit property or have stationed its belongings therein on and from 1st May, 2013 the appellant/defendant will be treated as a trespasser, and appropriate proceedings will be initiated against it. The intention is clear, specific date is mentioned with a threat to initiate proceeding. 20. The said notice in our view, therefore, speaks of the basic ingredients t required to be contained in a termination notice. It also conforms to requirements laid down under the provisions of Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It clearly makes known to the appellant/defendant that the relationship will stand terminated on expiry of 30th April, 2013. The appellant/respondent also understood the purport of the notice which is clear from its reply. The notice is dated23rd March, 2013 asking the appellant/defendant not to occupy the suit property after 30th April, 2013 thereby giving sufficient time as required under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The notice also conforms to the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 if we consider that there exists no written contract, the document being unregistered and insufficiently stamped and, therefore, cannot be looked into. The suit has also been filed much after expiry of the notice period. The said notice has been duly received by the appellant/defendant. Moreover, a tenancy cannot be in perpetuity. The respondent/plaintiff always had the right to terminate and have exercised the same. The termination is not on the ground of forfeiture as contained in Clause 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which requires us to consider the terms of the agreement to assess the breach and the document being unregistered and insufficiently stamped we are precluded from looking into the terms. The termination is not on the ground of forfeiture as contained in Clause 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which requires us to consider the terms of the agreement to assess the breach and the document being unregistered and insufficiently stamped we are precluded from looking into the terms. We, therefore, hold that the tenancy of the defendant has been duly terminated by the said notice which is also valid. 21. The appellant/defendant has further alleged that its tenancy under the a erstwhile landlord Smt. Jaishree Bajoria in terms of the agreement dated 22nd January, 2009 had never been terminated. This is also not acceptable as the agreement dated 26th November, 2012 on being signed which is an admitted position, had brought to an end to the said tenancy of the appellant/defendant under Smt. Jaishree Bajoria under the agreement dated 22nd January, 2009. The agreement dated 26th November, 2012 after being executed has been clearly acted upon. The signature of the executant on behalf of the appellant/defendant to the said agreement is not denied. In so far as to the allegation of conspiracy between the respondent/plaintiff, Subhasish Mukherjee and Asit Kumar Sarma (latter two being the employees of the appellant/defendant) to bring about the agreement dated 26th November, 2012 is concerned we find no prima facie evidence which may persuade us to hold that there exists a triable issue in respect of such allegations for which the suit is required to be set down for trial. In any event, a principle is bound by the acts of its agents vis a vis a third party. It is not in dispute that Subhasish Mukherjee was not the in-charge of the KPLO office of the appellant/defendant. No document has also been placed even to show that the said Subhasish Mukherjee was not authorised to sign the document dated 26th November, 2012. On the contrary, in usual course as the in-charge of the KPLO the said Subhasish Mukherjee should be deemed to have the authority to execute the document dated 26th November, 2012.After execution of the said agreement the appellant/defendant paid the arrears and continued to pay the monthly rent/license fees which is admitted by the appellant/defendant. In fact, payments have been made even after issuance of a so called charge-sheet to Subhasish Mukherjee on 14th December, 2013. In fact, payments have been made even after issuance of a so called charge-sheet to Subhasish Mukherjee on 14th December, 2013. This goes on to show that the appellant/defendant had acted upon such document, and now, to save its possession is attempting to spin different stories contrary to its letters. Moreover, in a government of India Undertaking like the appellant/defendant it is virtually impossible for an officer without the previous sanction of his superiors to proceed to execute a document and make the organization to act upon such document continuously for a considerable period. We, therefore, are not inclined to believe that Subhasish Mukherjee was not authorised to execute the document. No ground of fraud or collusion now alleged by the appellant/defendant was also made out in the contemporaneous letter and the opposition though the same runs into few pages. 22. Before us the appellant has urged three main points- (i) the provisions of Chapter XIII A of the Original Side Rule of this Court does not apply in respect of Leave and License (ii) there is no notice terminating the tenancy and if the relationship between the appellant/defendant and the respondent/plaintiff is construed to be of tenancy then there is no notice of termination (iii) it is not a lease that expires with time which requires no termination or issuance of a termination notice. 23. In view of the discussion hereinabove, all the above issues raised by the appellant/defendant are answered in the negative and, as such, we are of the firm view that there exists no triable issue for which the suit is required to be relegated to a regular trial. The decree of eviction has been rightly passed and the same is upheld in view of the reasons given by us hereinabove. 24. We have also considered the judgment and decree passed by the learned s Single Judge in minute details and subscribe to the final judgment of eviction of the appellant/defendant from the suit property as described in the schedule of the plaint, in view of the reasons given by us hereinabove. 25. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.