JUDGMENT : Dipankar Datta, J. 1. This application for stay has been filed in a stranger's appeal, for which leave has been granted to him to appeal by an order of the coordinate Bench dated June 18, 2018. Simultaneous with grant of leave to appeal to the appellant (hereafter Monsur for short) and condonation of delay in its presentation, the coordinate Bench by the said order had passed an interim order directing status quo as on that date to be maintained in respect of appointment on two additional posts of para-teacher in History in Balijole High School (hereafter the school for short) and service of notice on the respondent no.8 (hereafter Asgar for short), who was not represented on that date. The effect of such interim order was that the respondent no.1 (hereafter Rahimul for short) and Asgar were deprived of the benefit of the judgment and order under challenge in this appeal dated September 9, 2016 passed by a learned Judge of this Court while disposing of a writ petition of Rahimul. Such order directed the official respondents in the writ petition to engage Rahimul and Asgar as additional para-teachers within six weeks of service of a certified copy thereof. 2. The thrust of Monsur's contention is that although he had a right to be considered for engagement on the second post of para-teacher in History in the school, being the second empanelled candidate, he was deliberately not impleaded as a party to the writ petition, out of which this appeal has arisen, and the learned Judge was persuaded to pass an order whereby the panel position was changed to his detriment - Asgar was elevated to the first position from the third position and Rahimul and Monsur were relegated to the second and the third positions respectively - thereby paving the way for engagement of Asgar and Rahimul and consequently directions followed for their immediate engagement in the school. 3. The facts leading to the writ petition of Rahimul have been discussed in detail in the order of the coordinate Bench dated June 18, 2018. We need to refer to the same again for an effective decision on the appeal as well as the stay application, which has been heard in the presence of the parties. 4. 3. The facts leading to the writ petition of Rahimul have been discussed in detail in the order of the coordinate Bench dated June 18, 2018. We need to refer to the same again for an effective decision on the appeal as well as the stay application, which has been heard in the presence of the parties. 4. A process of selection was initiated by the school for appointment on, inter alia, two posts of para-teachers in History (hereafter the said two posts) by a notification August 9, 2006. As has been noted earlier, the positions of Rahimul, Monsur and Asgar were first, second and third respectively in the panel. Although Asgar had a B.Ed. qualification to his credit, he was not allotted marks for such qualification. According to the teacher-in-charge of the school, Asgar did not produce any certificate relating to his B.Ed. qualification and, therefore, no credit was given to him therefor. Aggrieved thereby, Asgar invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court by filing W.P. 26485(W) of 2006. It was disposed of by a learned Judge of this Court on December 15, 2008 directing the State Project Director, Paschim Banga Sarba Siksha Mission, the added respondent therein (hereafter the director), to look into Asgar's grievance and to pass an appropriate order. The director held the selection process to be vitiated in his order dated March 20, 2009. According to the director, the selectors committed an error in not keeping a column in the score-sheet for marks to be awarded to those candidates who possess B.Ed. qualification. The director also took exception to the residential certificate produced by Asgar. Taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, the director was of the opinion that the selectors had not applied their mind while allotting marks and ordered initiation of fresh process upon cancellation of the panel. 5. The aforesaid order of the director was questioned before this Court both by Rahimul and Monsur by presenting separate writ petitions. The order of the director was set aside by an order dated April 29, 2009 passed by another learned Judge of this Court on Rahimul's writ petition [W.P. 7172(W) of 2009] on the sole ground of Rahimul not having been extended an opportunity of hearing. While remitting the matter to the director for a fresh decision, the writ court directed opportunity of hearing to be extended to all the interested parties. 6. While remitting the matter to the director for a fresh decision, the writ court directed opportunity of hearing to be extended to all the interested parties. 6. In compliance with the aforesaid order dated April 29, 2009, the director passed an order dated June 3, 2009. For the reasons assigned in such order, the director maintained his earlier stand that the process of selection stood vitiated and directed commencement of the process of recruitment de novo. 7. Once again, the order dated June 3, 2009 was challenged by Rahimul by filing a writ petition. It is such petition that has been disposed of by the impugned judgment and order. The learned Judge was of the view that Asgar was erroneously deprived of marks for his B.Ed. qualification; and, had such marks been awarded to Asgar, he would figure at the first position of the panel and that the initial first and second position holders, i.e., Rahimul and Monsur, would be relegated to the second and the third positions respectively. In view of availability of two vacancies, Asgar and Rahimul were directed to be engaged. 8. Thus, Monsur, not being a party to the proceedings, suffered an order whereby he was relegated from the second position in the panel to the third position. The learned Judge, in our view, was not right in making any direction affecting the interest of Monsur behind his back. It is on this ground alone that the appeal should succeed. 9. We, however, consider it proper to place on record certain other developments that occurred in the year 2010 itself which, for all intents and purposes, would have the effect of putting a quietus to the controversy relating to the engagement of para-teachers on the said two posts. 10. On April 23, 2010, a memorandum bearing No: 273 SE (P)/PBRPSUS/ADMN/9/04-05 was issued. We consider it proper to reproduce it in its entirety for facility of a decision on this appeal: "Consequent upon exorbitant price hike of different commodities, the question of enhancement of honorarium of Para Teachers and Voluntary Resource Persons (VRP) working in different Primary/Upper Primary Schools and Siksha Bandhus and Special Educators working at different levels under SSA is under active consideration of this department. Now after thorough examination of this Departments earlier Notification No. 134-SE(Pry) 55/Ped/PBSSM dated 26/02/2009, Memo No. 53(20)/PLG/PBSSM date: 27/02/2009 and Memo No. 65(20)/IED/PBSSM-09 date: 29/07/2009; and in terms of Finance Department U.O. No. Group P 1429 dated 23/04/2010 it is hereby ordered that consolidated remunerations of the aforesaid contractual employees will be enhanced by 35% as shown below: Category of Contractual Employee Existing Honorarium/ Head/ Month Enhanced Honorarium w.e.f. 01/06/2010 Para Teacher(Primary) Rs. 4,000/- Rs. 5400/- Para Teacher (Upper Primary) Rs. 5500/- Rs. 7425/- Siksha Bandhu Rs. 4000/- Rs. 5400/- Voluntary Resource Persons Rs. 2000/- Rs. 2700/- Special Educator Rs. 6000/- Rs. 8100/- (2) All the existing Para Teachers and all other will not be re-engaged by the Government Officials in the manner to be notified in due course for a period of 1 (One) year subject to renewal till they attain 60 years of age or till the Sarva Siksha Project is winded up, whichever is earlier. But no new para teacher or other contractual employee shall be engaged by any authority except with prior written approval of this Deptt. (3) On attaining 60 years of age or winding up of this project the para-teachers or other contractual employee as shown above will be paid an exgratia Retirement Honorarium of Rs. 1(One) Lakh only on lump sum basis. This order shall come into force w.e.f. 09/06/2010." 11. Order no. 376-SE (Pry) dated June 9, 2010 followed, issued in continuation and partial modification of the aforesaid memorandum dated April 23, 2010. The order reads as follows: "In continuation and partial modification of the Memorandum No. 273SE (P)/PBRPSUS/ADMN/ 9/04-05 dt. 23-04-2010 & 275SE (P)/PBRPSUS/ ADMN/9/04-05 dt. 23.04.2010, the undersigned is directed by the order of the Governor to make the following inclusion/modifications in the aforesaid G.O.:- (i) No other allowance will be admissible to the Para Teachers, Siksha Bandhus, VRPs and other associated with PBSSM and the Contractual Teachers except the enhancement @ 5% of the remuneration, at every interval of 3 years, after the enhancement done as on 01-06-2010. (ii) These persons will remain engaged till they attain 60 years of age, and the State Government will bear the expenditure if the Government of India stops funding the PBSSM Project before their cessation of engagement attaining 60 years of age. (ii) These persons will remain engaged till they attain 60 years of age, and the State Government will bear the expenditure if the Government of India stops funding the PBSSM Project before their cessation of engagement attaining 60 years of age. (2) No new engagement of Para Teacher or any other category of employees can be made after issue of this order." 12. It would appear from the above that on and from June 9, 2010, the State Government has discontinued the policy of engagement of para-teachers in schools. There has, thus, been a change in law during the pendency of the writ petition filed by Rahimul which, if followed in letter and spirit, would render the claim of Rahimul as well as the claims of Monsur and Asgar for engagement as para-teachers in fructuous and relief incapable of being granted to them. 13. It is indeed true that ordinarily right to relief relates back to the date of institution of proceedings before a Court of law; however, it is not an inflexible rule. That relief may be declined owing to change in law during pendency of a writ petition, is settled law. If any authority is required, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Beg Raj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors., (2003) 1 SCC 726 . The relevant passage from such decision is quoted below: "7. *** The ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the court. A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i.e. the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment. ***" 14. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment. ***" 14. In view of the aforesaid statement of law, we do not consider that there is any scope for granting relief to the aspirants on the said two posts. None of the contesting aspirants i.e., Rahimul, Asgar and Monsur, was regularly engaged on the said two posts following due process of selection. Rahimul had been engaged and worked for about 27 months, but that too stood nullified by reason of the order of the director dated June 3, 2009. None of the them could be considered as existing teachers as on June 9, 2010 within the meaning of the Government order of even date and, therefore, giving due regard to the policy of the State Government, it would not be proper to make any direction for engagement of para-teachers at this distance of time. It is also settled law that mere participation in a selection process which has not been taken to its logical conclusion in accordance with law does not vest any right in the contesting candidates to claim appointment/engagement. 15. On behalf of Rahimul, Mrs. Samajpati relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dr. M.V. Nair v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 429 , U.P. Public Service Commission U.P., Allahbad and anr. v. Alpana, (1994) 2 SCC 723 , Bibhudatta Mohanty v. Union of India & ors., (2002) 4 SCC 16 and Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission v. Y.V.V.R. Srinivasulu and ors., (2003) 5 SCC 341 . We have considered the decisions and regret our inability to apply the ratio decidendi thereof to the facts and circumstances at hand. 16. In Dr. M.V. Nair (supra) the question was with regard to the date that is relevant for assessing eligibility. The Court held that the last date for receiving applications would be the relevant date, unless the notification inviting applications itself specifies such a date. 16. In Dr. M.V. Nair (supra) the question was with regard to the date that is relevant for assessing eligibility. The Court held that the last date for receiving applications would be the relevant date, unless the notification inviting applications itself specifies such a date. Having regard to the notification dated August 9, 2006 issued by the school it appears that there was no fixed date for filing of applications by the aspirants; instead, the aspirants, who satisfied the eligibility criteria mentioned in the notification, were required to appear for a "walk-in-interview" on August 20, 2006, which was subsequently deferred to September 6, 2006. We, accordingly, do not find the decision in Dr. N.V. Nair to come to the aid of Rahimul. 17. Alpana (supra) arose out of a decision of the High Court interfering with the decision of the appellant commission despite the candidate not being eligible in terms of the recruitment notification, she was allowed to appear in the written examination. She had successfully cleared the written examination but was not called for interview on the ground that she did not satisfy the eligibility criteria on the last date fixed for receipt of the applications on the intervention of the High Court. The respondent was interviewed and later on directed to be appointed upon creation of a supernumerary post. The decision of the High Court was set aside by the Supreme Court on the ground that many candidates superior to the respondent on merits may not have applied as the results of the LL.B. examination were not declared before the last date for receipt of application. After laying down the law as aforesaid, the Court observed that if the respondent had been appointed in obedience to the High Court's order, such appointment shall not be cancelled; but if she has not been appointed, she will not be entitled to appointment on the basis of the High Court's decisions. We have failed to comprehend the materiality of this decision for deciding the lis before us. 18. The decision in Bibhudatta Mohanty (supra) was cited for the proposition that "preferential qualifications", a provision which is found in rules or guidelines for preference in respect of some higher qualifications, would mean preference in case all other requirements are equal and that it cannot be considered to be the sole criterion for preference in selection of appointment. Indeed, B.Ed. The decision in Bibhudatta Mohanty (supra) was cited for the proposition that "preferential qualifications", a provision which is found in rules or guidelines for preference in respect of some higher qualifications, would mean preference in case all other requirements are equal and that it cannot be considered to be the sole criterion for preference in selection of appointment. Indeed, B.Ed. qualification was not an essential qualification mentioned in the notification dated August 9, 2006. The law laid down admits of no doubt, but the question is how far the same would be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The qualification clause specified that "B.Ed./B.T./P.G.B.T./B. MUS/ART etc." would be preferable. It is only Asgar who could have claimed the benefit of "preferential qualifications" and not the others but having regard to the letter of the teacher-in-charge dated September 11, 2006 addressed to the District Project Officer, respondent no.4 herein that Asgar did not produce his mark-sheet of B.Ed. qualification dated September 6, 2006 and disclosed on September 10, 2006, for the first time after preparation of panel, that he had passed B.Ed. from the BN Mandal University, he was not awarded any marks, the question of Asgar claiming marks for such qualification does not arise. 19. The last decision i.e., Srinivasulu (supra) also relating to preference in the context of recruitment process would mean that when selection is made on the basis of merit assessed through competitive examination and interview, preference to additional qualification would mean other things being qualitatively and quantitatively equal, those having additional qualification would be preferred; it does not mean en-bloc preference irrespective of inter se merit and suitability. 20. Having regard to our aforesaid understanding of the legal position, continuance of the interim order passed in the appeal and keeping it pending for decision on preparation of paper-books, would not serve any useful purpose. We, therefore, propose to dispose of the appeal, as well as the stay application, at this stage. 21. The impugned judgment and order is set aside. In the result, the official respondents shall not be under any obligation to fill up the said two posts. 22. The appeal and the connected applications stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. PROTIK PRAKASH BANERJEE, J. - I agree.