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2018 DIGILAW 864 (MP)

Shravan Kumar Jain v. Kalpana Jain

2018-10-06

SHEEL NAGU

body2018
ORDER 1. Supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is invoked to assail the interlocutory order dated 7.3.2005 passed by the Court below in Civil Suit No. 61-A/2014 whereby an application under O.1 rule 10 CPC preferred by the plaintiff/petitioner herein has suffered dismissal at the hands of the trial Court by relying upon the decision of the apex Court in Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy reported in AIR 2007 SC 1332 by holding that pendente lite purchaser was a necessary party in the suit for specific performance. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner are heard on the question of admission. 3. Without entering into the prolixity of the argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the factual matrix involved, this Court is of the view that the issue involved herein is no more res integrain view of the subsequent decision of the apex Court in A. Nawab John and others v. V.N. Subramaniyam, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 738 . The relevant portion of which is reproduced below for ready reference and convenience Para (15 to 22) : 15. The first preliminary objection is that the 2nd defendant, being a pendente lite purchaser, has no locus standi to question the correctness of the decision of the Trial Court to condone the delay in representation of the plaint. To understand the legal rights and obligations of a pendente lite purchaser, it is necessary to examine the jurisprudential background of the doctrine of lis pendens and its statutory expression. 16. This Court in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami and Others, (1972) 2 SCC 200 (paras 42 to 44) quoted with approval a passage from the Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland, by Bell, which explains the doctrine of lis pendens : “43. ………….. Bell, in his commentaries on the Laws of Scotland, said that it was grounded on the maxim : “Pendent elite nibil innovandum”. He observed : “It is a general rule which seems to have been recognised in all regular systems of jurisprudence, that during the pendence of an action, of which the object is to vest the property or obtain the possession of real estate, a purchaser shall be held to take that estate as it stands in the person of the seller, and to be bound by the claims which shall ultimately be pronounced.'”(Emphasis supplied) 17. section 52of the Transfer of Property Act, (for short “the T.P.Act”) incorporates doctrine of lis pendens and it stipulates that during the pendency of any suit or proceeding in which any right to immovable property is, directly or specifically, in question, the property, which is the subject matter of such suit or proceeding cannot be “transferred or otherwise dealt with”, so as to affect the rights of any other party to such a suit or proceeding. The section is based on the principle : “………..that it would plainly be impossible that any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination, if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail. The plaintiff would be liable in every case to be defeated by the defendant’s alienating before the judgment or decree, and would be driven to commence his proceedings de novo, subject to be defeated by the some course of proceeding.” Quoted with approval by this Court in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj. 18. It is settled legal position that the effect of section 52 is not to render transfers affected during the pendency of a suit by a party to the suit void; but only to render such transfers subservient to the rights of the parties to such suit, as may be, eventually, determined in the suit. In other words, the transfer remains valid subject, of course, to the result of the suit. The pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor as may be eventually determined by the Court. “12...........The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subjectmatter of the suit. The section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court.” 19. Such being the scope of section 52, two questions arise: whether a pendente lite purchaser (1) is entitled to be impleaded as a party to the suit; (2) once impleaded what are the grounds on which he is entitled to contest the suit ? 20. Such being the scope of section 52, two questions arise: whether a pendente lite purchaser (1) is entitled to be impleaded as a party to the suit; (2) once impleaded what are the grounds on which he is entitled to contest the suit ? 20. This Court on more than one occasion held that when a pendente lite purchaser seeks to implead himself as a party - defendant to the suit, such application should be liberally considered. This Court also held in Smt. Saila Bala Dassi v. Smt. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and another, AIR 1958 SC 394 , that, “justice requires”, a pendente lite purchaser “should be given an opportunity to protect his rights”. It was a case, where the property in dispute had been mortgaged by one of the respondents to another respondent. The mortgagee filed a suit, obtained a decree and ‘commenced proceedings for sale of the mortgaged property’. The appellant Saila Bala, who purchased the property from the judgment-debtor subsequent to the decree sought to implead herself in the execution proceedings and resist the execution. That application was opposed on various counts. This Court opined that Saila Bala was entitled (under section 146 of the C.P.C.) to be brought on record to defend her interest because, as a purchaser pendent elite, she would be bound by the decree against her vendor. 21. There is some divergence of opinion regarding the question, whether a pendente lite purchaser is entitled, as a matter of right, to get impleaded in the suit, this Court in Amit Kumar Shaw V. Farida Khatoon held that : “16...….Further pending the suit, the transferee is not entitled as of right to be made a party to the suit, though the Court has a discretion to make him a party. But the transferee endent elite can be added as a proper party if his interest in the subjectmatter of the suit is substantial and not just peripheral. A transferee pendent elite to the extent he has acquired interest from the defendant is vitally interested in the litigation, where the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the latter having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the suit. He may collude with the plaintiff. A transferee pendent elite to the extent he has acquired interest from the defendant is vitally interested in the litigation, where the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the latter having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the suit. He may collude with the plaintiff. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lis pendens transferee a party, under Order 22 rule 10 an alienee 26endent elite may be joined as party. As already noticed, the Court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. The Court has held that a transferee pendent elite of an interest in immovable property is a representativein-interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation; he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case.” [Emphasis supplied] 22. The preponderance of opinion of this Court is that a pendente lite purchaser’s application for impleadment should normally be allowed or “considered liberally”. 4. In view of the above, law laid down by the apex Court after discussing its earlier divergent views, it goes without saying that in a situation as prevailing in the case at hand, the application under Order 1 rule 10 preferred by pendente lite purchaser ought to have been allowed and having not done so, the trial Court has failed to exercise the jurisiction vested in it and therefore, the impugned order accordingly, is set aside to the extent it rejects the application of the plaintiff under Order 1 rule 10 CPC. 5. The application under Order 1 rule 10 CPC of the plaintiff (Annexure P-4) is allowed. The pendente lite purchaser respondent No.11 herein is directed to be impleaded in the suit in question. 6. Accordingly, the present petition stands allowed. 7. The registry is directed to intimate the trial Court about the passing of this order so that the trial which was held up can proceed and culminate expeditiously.