JUDGMENT 1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is finally heard. 2. Rejection of the application under section 45 read with Section 73 of the Evidence Act has led the plaintiff file this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The application was filed in the wake of denial of the signature by respondent/defendant No. 1 in the agreement in question. Evidently, the trial Court rejected the application on the finding that the Court has the discretion under section 73 of the Act to compare the signature. 3. Section 73 of the Evidence Act, 1872 stipulates that "73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved.- In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose. The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person. This section applies also, with necessary modifications, to finger-impressions." 4. In State of Gujarat v. Vinaya Chandra Chhotalal Pathi ( AIR 1967 SC 778 ) it has been held : "10.... ... ..A Court is competent to compare the disputed writing of a person with others which are admitted or proved to be his writings. It may not be safe for a Court to record a findings about a person's writing in a certain document merely on the basis of comparison, but a Court can itself compare the writings in order to appreciate properly the other evidence produced before in that regard...." 5. In Rajaram v. Hazarimal [1961 JLJ 1958 (C.N. 256)] it has been held : "4. But these principles, however sound, cannot altogether neutralÁe the effect of the express provision in the statute that the Court can in appropriate cases do the comparison itself and arrive at its finding. But they can restrict the occasion for the exercise of this power. In Rajaram v. Hazarimal [1961 JLJ 1958 (C.N. 256)] it has been held : "4. But these principles, however sound, cannot altogether neutralÁe the effect of the express provision in the statute that the Court can in appropriate cases do the comparison itself and arrive at its finding. But they can restrict the occasion for the exercise of this power. The rulings never go to the extent of holding that a Court is legally forbidden to make such a comparison, and its results cannot be utilÁed for arriving at a decision. All that they state in more or less emphatic language is that it would be risky or hazardous for a Court to do the comparison itself, especially where it is unassisted by an expert. In the latter event, the Court is not really making the comparison on its own, but is assessing the evidence of the expert. There is a way of reconciling the enabling provision of the statute with the principle of prudence and caution laid down in case law. The Court is competent under law to make the comparison; but it should exercise this power very sparingly, and with utmost-caution, and further, should not make its opinion on the handwriting and sole ground of the decision. If, for example, the parties have adduced expert evidence, or considering the stake in the suit, could be reasonably expected to go through the inconvenience and expense of adducing it, the Court should refuse to make the comparison itself and decide the case on the materials available. On the other hand, if there is no expert, and considering the smallness of the stake, the insistence on an expert would put a disproportionately large burden on the parties, then the Court may itself make the comparison. Secondly, the results of such examination can be used only where the evidence is otherwise more or less equally balanced, and it is practically impossible to make a decision without some additional weight in favour of one or the other of the parties. If within these limits the Court has exercised powers given to it by the law, it cannot be said either that an illegality has been committed, or that the Court has acted with unjustifiable self-confidence. The risk is there but it has reduced very considerably." (Emphasis supplied) 6. If within these limits the Court has exercised powers given to it by the law, it cannot be said either that an illegality has been committed, or that the Court has acted with unjustifiable self-confidence. The risk is there but it has reduced very considerably." (Emphasis supplied) 6. Thus where a dispute arises as to the signature of the handwriting expert's advice in corroboration with other facts is the prudent way to adjudicate. 7. In view whereof the impugned order is set aside. The application for examining the document in question by an expert is allowed. Let steps thereof be taken within reasonable time. The respondent/defendant would be at liberty to contradict the same as per law. 8. The petition is allowed to the extent above. No costs.