ORDER 1. This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges the order passed by the appellate Court in MCA No. 32/2018 dated 27.8.2018, whereby the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 3 against the order refusing injunction by the trial Court in Civil Suit No. 31- A/2018 dated 18.5.2018 is allowed and the learned appellate Court set aside the said order dated 18.5.2018 and remitted the matter back before the trial Court with certain directions. 2. Mr. Akhilesh Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent No. 3/plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction along with an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The trial Court rejected the injunction application by order dated 18.5.2018 (Annexure P-7). Aggrieved, the respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal under Order 43 rule 1(r) of CPC. After hearing the parties, the appellate Court, by order dated 27.8.2018, set aside the impugned order and directed to undertake certain exercise as mentioned in para 13 of this order and, thereafter, decide the injunction application afresh. 3. Criticizing this order, Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner cont- ended that: (i) as per Order 26 rule 9, CPC, the power to appoint Commissioner cannot be exercised at the initial stage of the suit; (ii) while deciding the appeal under Order 43 rule 1(u), the lower appellate Court cannot exercise power under Order 41 rules 23, 23A and 25, CPC. Reliance is placed on AIR 1988 Rajasthan 26, Nand Lal and others v. Purshottam and other; (iii) in absence of availability of any exceptional circumstance, there was no occasion for the lower appellate Court to remit the matter back to the trial Court with certain directions; (iv) the necessary ingredients for invoking powers under Order 26 rule 9, CPC were not available; (v) the Municipal Corporation was not impleaded by the plaintiff in the instant suit, and (vi) the impugned order gives an opportunity to the plaintiff to collect evidence which is impermissible and beyond the scope of Order 26 rule 9 CPC. 4. Percontra, Mr. Sankalp Kochar, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3/plaintiff supported the impugned order. He placed reliance on 2010 (3) MPLJ 345 , Prem Bai v. Ghanshyam. Mr. 4. Percontra, Mr. Sankalp Kochar, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3/plaintiff supported the impugned order. He placed reliance on 2010 (3) MPLJ 345 , Prem Bai v. Ghanshyam. Mr. Kochar submits that in order to elucidate the disputed facts, the question of encroachment and allocation/identity of the land, the trial Court itself should have exercised the said power. Moreso, when there was no agreed map between the parties. The map issued by the Municipal Corporation was cancelled. Although there exists an interim order against such cancellation in a writ petition filed by the present petitioner, fact remains that the said order is only an interim order because of which the cancellation of map will not vanish in thin air. Mr. Kochar further submits that there exist three enabling provisions in CPC for the purpose of demarcation/investigation etc., which can be seen under Order 26 rule 9, Order 39 rule 7 and Order 18 rule 18 of CPC. He submits that there is no jurisdictional error in invoking power under Order 26 rule 9, CPC. Reliance is placed on (2004) 8 SCC 488 , Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Reg.), Faridkot v. Baldev Dass to contend that in a matter of this nature, no fault can be found in the impugned order. Lastly, Mr. Kochar urged that Order 41 rules 23, 23A and 25 of CPC are applicable when appeal is preferred under Order 43 rule 1(u) against the judgment and decree. Against an interlocutory order, no appeal is tenable under Order 43 rule 1(u), CPC and, therefore, power of remand mentioned in said three provisions have no relevance in the present case. 5. No other point is pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 7. The first point raised by petitioner is that power under Order 26 rule 9 CPC cannot be exercised at initial stage of the suit. A plain reading of said provision shows that it does not indicate any stage in which such power can be exercised. In AIR 2004 U’Chal 30, Rajesh Kumar Gautam v. M.M.V.C. Ashram, the Court opined that the Court can appoint a Commissioner at any stage of the proceeding. In 2001 AIHC 88 R. Narasimhaiah v. Sakammanamma, it was held that an application for issuance of Commission cannot be rejected merely because evidence is yet to commence. 8. In AIR 2004 U’Chal 30, Rajesh Kumar Gautam v. M.M.V.C. Ashram, the Court opined that the Court can appoint a Commissioner at any stage of the proceeding. In 2001 AIHC 88 R. Narasimhaiah v. Sakammanamma, it was held that an application for issuance of Commission cannot be rejected merely because evidence is yet to commence. 8. The Rajasthan High Court in Nandlal (supra), made it clear that there is no restriction in exercising power by the Court under section 151 CPC while hearing an appeal. The basic purpose to exercise power under Order 26 rule 9, CPC is to separate the wheat from chaff and in cases where it is necessary to elucidate the relevant facts, the court can exercise its power. It must be remembered that the procedural law is made to advance the cause of justice and not to strangulate the litigant on hyper technical grounds. In 2014(3) MPLJ 612 , Dataram Singh and others v. Brindawan Singh and others, this Court opined as under: “10. This is settled in law that all the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The apex Court in AIR 1955 SC 425 , Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah opined that a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is “procedure”, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against. The apex Court in 1975 (1) SCC 774 , Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar opined that the mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge’s conscience and points an angry interrogation at the reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal Justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence - processual, as much as substantive. In (1976)1 SCC 719 , State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, the apex Court held that processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence - processual, as much as substantive. In (1976)1 SCC 719 , State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, the apex Court held that processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. In (1984)3 SCC 46 , Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India the apex Court reiterated the need for interpreting a part of the adjective law dealing with procedure alone in such a manner as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it as all the laws of procedure are based on this principle. In (2005)4 SCC 480 , Kailash v. Nanhku and others the apex Court held that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the Court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. [emphasis supplied] 9. I find substance in the argument of Shri Kochhar that provisions contained in Order 41 rule 23, 23A and 25 of CPC can be pressed into service while hearing an appeal filed under Order 43 rule 1(u) CPC where a decree is called in question. The said restriction cannot be injected for a Misc. Appeal filed under Order 43 rule 1(r) of CPC. Hence, I am unable to hold that as per judgment of Nandlal (supra), the appellate Court did not have jurisdiction/ competence to issue directions for appointment of Commissioner. 10. In cases where there is no agreed map between the parties and where question of encroachment is involved, the power under Order 26 rule 9 can very well be exercised. In 1975 JLJ 440 - Durga Prasad v. P. Faujdar, a Division Bench of this Court opined that in case where there is a dispute as to encroachment, the fact whether there is such an encroachment or not cannot be determined in absence of an agreed map except by appointment of the Commissioner under Order 26 rule 9 CPC. 11. In Order 26 rule 9, CPC, the word used is - “elucidate”. The meaning of this word as per Webster’s Dictionary is “to make light or clear, to explain, to remove obscurity from and render intelligible, to illustrate”. 11. In Order 26 rule 9, CPC, the word used is - “elucidate”. The meaning of this word as per Webster’s Dictionary is “to make light or clear, to explain, to remove obscurity from and render intelligible, to illustrate”. According to Chambers Dictionary, “elucidate” means to make lucid or clear or to throw light upon, to illustrate, making clear, explanatory. According to Oxfort Dictionary, “elucidate” means to throw light on, explain etc. 12. In the considered opinion of this Court, ‘for the purpose of elucidating facts in respect of any matter in dispute’ means where the circumstances render it expedient in the interest of justice to do so, the Court has power, which is discretionary in nature, to appoint Commissioner for the purpose of ascertaining, to make it clear, intelligible and ‘to throw light upon the matter in issue’, means the main dispute as well as the facts leading to the dispute. This course may be adopted after the examination of the party or parties or suo motu. {See also: 1996 SCC Online Mad. 17 [A. Nagarajan v. A. Madhanakumar]. 13. The Bombay High Court has consistently taken the view that in cases of boundary dispute and dispute about the identity of land, Courts should order local investigation under Order 26 rule 9, CPC. {See: (2004) 3 MLJ 724 [Sukhdeo Parashramji Bhugul (Dr.) v. Wamanroa Nagorao Charhat]; (2009) 6 AIR Bom R (NOC 1033) 329 [Girish Vasantrao Bhoyar v. Nimbaji Warluji Bambal]; (2010) 4 AIR Bom R (NOC 450) 127 [Yeshwant Bhaduji Ghuse v. Vithabaji Laxman Ladekar]; (2014) 1 AIR Bom R 16 = AIR 2014 (NOC 173) 59 [Malhar v. Shivaji] and (2015) 4 AIR Bom R (NOC 3) 2, [Shyam Janardan Chaoudary v. Asha Ramdas Katkar]. Alok Aradhe, J. in 2012 (III) MPWN 62 , [Beejanwala Talukdar (Smt.) v. Radhakrishna Rai] opined as under: “6. The appellant in the plaint has stated that defendants No. 1 and 2 have taken possession of the land belonging to him which has been marked with letters A, B, C, D which forms part of Khasra No. 32. On the other hand, defendants No. 1 and 2 in the written statement have denied the factum of encroachment and have stated that they are in possession of the land which has been purchased by the defendant No. 2 on 20.1.1976 which forms part of Khasra No. 32. There is no agreed map. On the other hand, defendants No. 1 and 2 in the written statement have denied the factum of encroachment and have stated that they are in possession of the land which has been purchased by the defendant No. 2 on 20.1.1976 which forms part of Khasra No. 32. There is no agreed map. In the absence of any agreed map, the trial Court could not have decided the issue of encroachment. [See: Haryana Waqf Board v. Shanti Sarup [ (2008) 8 SCC 671 ] and decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Durga Prasad v. Parveen Foujdar 1975 (MPLJ 801). For the aforemen-tioned reasons, the substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in negative and in favour of the appellant.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. In view of these judgments, it is clear that for the purpose of determining the identity of land, exercise of power under Order 26 rule 9 of CPC is permissible. 15. In this case, the question of encroachment and identity of the land is in dispute and, therefore, necessary circumstances are very much there for invoking Order 26 rule 9, CPC. I am unable to hold that the impugned order of Court below amounts to permitting the plaintiff to collect the evidence. 16. For these cumulative reasons, I find no basis to interfere in this case. Interference under Article 227 of the Constitution can be made if order suffers from any manifest procedural impro-priety, palpable perversity or jurisdic-tional error. Another view is possible is not a ground for interference. In absence of any such ingredient, interference is declined. Petition is dismissed.