JUDGMENT : 1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicant-original accused calls in question the legality and validity of the order dated 17th November, 2017 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar below Exh.265 in the Sessions Case No. 34 of 2014. 2. The case of the applicant, as pleaded in her application, is as under; “3.1 That in the month of July 2008, death of 2 children-Dipesh and Abhishek had occurred near the Ashram at Motera. 3.2 That to find out the truth behind the said incident as commission namely Justice D.K. Trivedi Commission was appointed. 3.3 That in the aforesaid Commission, the evidence of PW-26 being Rajubhai Kishanlal Chandak of the present case had started and PW-26 was also examined before the Justice D.K. Trivedi Commission as witness no.27. 3.4 That a statement of the said witness was recorded by Police Inspector Ms. D.B. Rabiya on 10.11.2013 and as per the witness statement recorded by the Justice D.K. Trivedi Commission the witness had stated that the statement was also recorded in Jodhpur, Rajput. That it is for the sake of convenience of this Hon’ble Court, the petitioner states that an FIR being I-CR No. 218 of 2013 dated 03.10.2013 was registered with Chandkheda Police Station, Ahmedabad against the present petitioner alongwith the other accused persons for the offences punishable under section 376(2)(c), 377, 354, 357, 342, 346, 506(1), 120-B of Indian Penal Code and thereby Charge sheet was also filed being numbered as 11 of 2014 dated 09.01.2014. 3.5 That it is submitted that an application was moved before the Hon’ble Court below for granting permission to contradict the PW No.26 namely Rajubhai Kishanlal Chandak from his previous deposition given before Justice D.K. Trivedi Commission under Exhibit no.265 dated 05.10.2017. That the Hon’ble Court below rejected the application vide order dated 17.11.2017.” 3. Mr. Bhadrish Raju, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant, vehemently submitted that the Trial Court committed a serious error in rejecting the application Exh.265, seeking permission to contradict the witness with his statement made before the Commission. 4. Mr. Bhadrish Raju submitted that the interpretation put upon section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 by the trial court is erroneous. Mr. 4. Mr. Bhadrish Raju submitted that the interpretation put upon section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 by the trial court is erroneous. Mr. Raju contends that reading section 6 as a whole, it is clear that the protection afforded by section 6 is against fastening any civil or criminal liability on a person appearing as a witness before a commission to give evidence, because of any statement in his evidence before the Commission. The counsel submitted that the words “no statement shall be used against him” in section 6 should not be interpreted to mean that such a statement cannot be used for any purpose whatever. The learned counsel also relies on the words “except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement” to contend that these words, by necessary implication, indicate that a statement before the commission can be used and proved to show that the witness making that statement has hereby deliberately given false evidence before the Commission. 5. Mr. Raju submitted that the defence should be permitted to contradict the witness concerned with his statement made before the commission for the following reasons; “(1) Entire extracts of the statement recorded before the Justice D.K. Trivedi Commission have been reproduced verbatim in the S. 161 statement recorded by the police in the present case on a prejudicial pick and choose basis with the statements favouring the petitioner having been intentionally omitted. (2) The witness in respect of whom the present petition is filed, in his 2nd statement under S. 161 of Cr.PC has sought to explain inconsistencies in his 1st statement under S. 161 of Cr.PC and his previous statement recorded before the Justice D.K. Trivedi Commission. (3) The prosecution has sought to rely upon the statement recorded by the witness before the Justice D.K. Trivedi Commission during the course of examination in chief before the trial court as a means to establish the credibility of the witness in question in order to highlight that the witness had deposed in a similar manner at the fist/prior in point of time instance and therefore it is imperative that the petitioner be provided an opportunity to cross-examine the witness based on the same. (4) Material inconsistencies between the statements recorded by the witness before the Justice D.K. Trivedi Commission and before the Trial Court which differences go to the root of the testimony of the witness including the credibility of the witness. (5) That in the present case unlike the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kehar Singh (supra) (see para 31), the Justice D.K. Trivedi Commission proceedings were not held in camera and the petitioner/accused in fact participated all throughout in the proceedings before the Justice D.K. Trivedi Commission including by way of conducting the cross-examination of the witness in question and the basis of the statement recorded by the witness before the Justice D. K. Trivedi Commission. (6) That further in the present case unlike in the case of Kehar Singh (Supra) (see para 32), there was no notification issued under the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act to not table the report of the Commission before the House of People/Legislative of the State.” 6. Mr. Raju, in support of his submissions, placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI, Criminal Revision Petition No.328 of 2012, decided on 3rd August, 2012. Relying on the said decision of the Delhi High Court, Mr. Raju submitted that his case is at par with the facts of the Delhi High Court judgment. He submitted that in the Delhi High Court judgment, the learned Judge has explained the proposition of law as laid by the Supreme Court in the case of Kehar Singh & Ors. vs. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883 and the distinguishing features. 7. According to the learned counsel, it is a fundamental right of the applicant to have a fair trial, which includes the right to cross-examination of a witness. In such circumstances, referred to above, Mr. Raju prays that there being merit in this application, the same be allowed and the impugned order be quashed. 8. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Mitesh Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. According to Mr. Amin, no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Trial Court in rejecting the application Exh.265. 9. Mr. 8. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Mitesh Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. According to Mr. Amin, no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Trial Court in rejecting the application Exh.265. 9. Mr. Amin, the Public Prosecutor, contends that if it was correct to say that Section 6 is intended merely to protect a wit ness making a statement before a Commission from civil or criminal liability then the latter part of Section 6 would be redundant. Mr. Amin contends that if the applicant’s contention is correct, the first part, i.e.. "no statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to any civil or criminal proceeding" would be enough, and the latter part viz. ". . . or be used against him" would be redundant, hence the construction sought to be put upon Section 6 by the applicant cannot be accepted. 10. Mr. Amin tried to distinguish the facts in the Delhi High Court judgment with the facts of the present case. Even otherwise, according to Mr. Amin, the decision of the Delhi High Court does not lay down the correct proposition of law, keeping in mind the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kehar Singh (supra) and the object of section 6 of the Act, 1952. Mr. Amin, in support of his submissions, placed strong reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Kehar Singh (supra) In such circumstances, referred to above, Mr. Amin prays that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected. ANALYSIS. 11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing the impugned order. 12. The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Union of India, on a critical scrutiny of the provisions of the commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 observed at page 699 (of SCC) : (at pp. 137-38 of AIR): "it is clear from the provisions and the general scheme of the Act that a commission of Inquiry appointed under the Act is a purely fact-finding body which has no power to pronounce a binding or definitive judgment. 137-38 of AIR): "it is clear from the provisions and the general scheme of the Act that a commission of Inquiry appointed under the Act is a purely fact-finding body which has no power to pronounce a binding or definitive judgment. It has to collect facts through the evidence led before it and on a consideration thereof it is required to submit its report which the appointing authority may or may not accept. There are sensitive matters of public importance which, if left to the normal investigational agencies can create needless controversies and generate an atmosphere of suspicion the larger interests of the community require that such matters should be inquired into by high powered commissions consisting of persons whose findings can command the confidence of the people.............................. it is only be establishing the truth that the purity and integrity of public life can be preserved and that is the object which the commissions of Inquiry Act seeks to achieve". 13. In an inquiry before the commission, there is neither a dispute nor a decision which prejudicially affects any right. There is an investigation and a mere report of the facts ascertained. There is no decision therefore use of the accolade judicial or quasi-judicial to inquiries before a commission of Inquiry appointed under the commissions of Inquiry Act is inappropriate the commission is not an adjudicating body but an assisting body that assesses the facts and assists the Government in the arrival at an appropriate decision. 14. The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Union of India observed that the commission is only fictionally a civil Court for the limited purposes enumerated in s. 5 (4) of the Act, that there is no accuser no accused and no specific charges for trial before the commission, not is the Government under the law, required to pronounce one way or the other on the findings of the commission. Therefore, the enquiry under the commissions of Inquiry is not quasi-judicial in nature. 15. Now let me look into the main provision, with which, I am concerned, i.e. section 6 of the Act, 1952. 16. Therefore, the enquiry under the commissions of Inquiry is not quasi-judicial in nature. 15. Now let me look into the main provision, with which, I am concerned, i.e. section 6 of the Act, 1952. 16. Section 6 of the Act, 1952, reads as under; “Section 6:-Statements made by persons to the Commission- No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in, any civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement- Provided that the statement- (a) is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer, or (b) is relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry.” 17. The important question, in my opinion, is to determine the intention of the Parliament in enacting section 6 of the Act, 1952 in the light of the words used in that section, which are as follows; Section 6: No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in, any civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement: Provided that the statement-(a) is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer, or (b) is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. The section, therefore, applies only to statements made in reply to a question which a person was required by the Commission to answer or which were relevant to the subject-matter of the enquiry. 18. It is not disputed before this Court that the witness concerned was examined before the Commission and his statement was recorded. 19. The remaining provisions of the section may be analysed as containing three propositions, viz., (1) No statement made by a person in the course of the evidence given by him shall subject him to any civil or criminal proceeding; (2) No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall be used against him in any civil or criminal proceeding; (3) Notwithstanding these two propositions, the person making the statement was liable to prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement. 20. 20. The first proposition does not apply to the facts of the present case because it cannot be said that when the defence asked a question to the prosecution witness under Sec. 145 with reference to his statement before the Commission, the witness was subjected to civil or criminal proceeding. The real question is whether in making use of the Statement under Sec. 145 of the Evidence Act, the defence was using the statement made by the witness before the Commission "against him" in any civil or criminal proceeding within the meaning of the second proposition indicated in Sec. 6. 21. Analysis and meaning of the section This section lays down that the statement made by a person in course of his examination before the Commission shall not be used against him. It further provides that such statement shall not subject him to any criminal prosecution or civil litigation. The protection against use of his statements extends to all civil or criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence through such statement. According to the proviso appended to the section two conditions have been laid down. Firstly, the statement should be one which is made in reply to a question which the Commission requires him to answer. That is to say that the protection is available only when such statement is made in reply to a question and the person making the statement of reply has been required by the Commission to do so. Secondly, the statement should be relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry. Any statement which is not relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry will not be afforded the protection and immunity provided in Section 6. (vide The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, A Critical Analysis, Edition 2011 by B. M. Parsad & Manish Mohan) 22. Scope and ambit The immunity provided under this section is of immense value in a Commission of Inquiry. Often people shy away from deposing before a Commission for fear that their statements may be used against them in a civil or criminal proceeding. The immunity given under Section 6 goes a long way in allaying such fears. Sometimes a Commission of Inquiry and criminal trials relating to those incidents go on side by side. Often people shy away from deposing before a Commission for fear that their statements may be used against them in a civil or criminal proceeding. The immunity given under Section 6 goes a long way in allaying such fears. Sometimes a Commission of Inquiry and criminal trials relating to those incidents go on side by side. Persons proceeded against in the criminal trials feel shaky in deposing before the Commission for fear that their statements in the Commission may prejudice their trial before Criminal Court. In Commissions where matter relate to company affairs as in Chagla Commission (Mundhra group of companies) and Tendolkar Commission (Dalmia-Jain group of Companies) or Commissions relating to Railway or Industrial accidents, there is a lurking feeling in the persons proceeded against to depose cautiously lest they may be hoist with their own petard in any future action on the basis of the report of the Commission. In view of the immunity provided to the statement of a witness, now it will be more difficult for a witness to refuse to answer a question on the ground that the answer might tend to incriminate him. (vide A Critical Analysis (supra)). 23. Protection to witnesses under the English Law Under the English Law the statements of witnesses were not conferred the same immunity as under the Indian Law. The Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, 1966 (see Appendix 5 for the Report of the Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, 1966) considered this aspect and recommended grant of similar immunity to the statement of a witness before a Tribunal. It recommended in para 63 as follows: 63. Section 1(3) of the Act of 1921 provides that a witness before any Tribunal shall be entitled to the same immunities and privileges as if he were a witness before the High Court or the Court of Session. This means that he cannot be sued for anything he says in evidence, e.g. if he says ‘A is a liar. His evidence is untrue.’ A cannot sue him for defamation. It does not mean however that his answers as a witness cannot be used in evidence against him in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings. This means that he cannot be sued for anything he says in evidence, e.g. if he says ‘A is a liar. His evidence is untrue.’ A cannot sue him for defamation. It does not mean however that his answers as a witness cannot be used in evidence against him in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings. We consider that the witness’s immunity should be extended so that neither his evidence before the Tribunal, nor his statement to the Treasury Solicitor, nor any documents he is required to produce to the Tribunal, shall be used against him in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings in which he is charged with having given false evidence before the Tribunal or conspired with or procured others to do so. This extension of the witness’s immunity would bring the law in this country into line in this respect with similar provisions in the legislation of Canada, Australia and India and in-deed with Section 9 of the Special Commission Act, 1888. It would also, in our View, be of considerable assistance in obtaining relevant evidence, for persons may be chary of coming forward for fear of exposing themselves to the risk of prosecution or an action in the civil courts. Moreover, the suggested extension of the immunity would make it difficult for a witness to refuse to answer a question on the ground that his answer might tend to incriminate him. Thus not only would the witness be afforded a harther measure of protection but the Tribunal would also be helped in arriving at the truth. It was further stated in para 64 of the report as follows: 64. No doubt this entails a risk that a guilty man may escape prosecution. This would be unfortunate, but it is much more important that everything reasonably possible is done to enable a Tribunal to establish and proclaim the truth about a matter which is causing a nation-wide crisis of confidence. Moreover the risk would be minimized by the fact that Tribunals have in the past and no doubt will in the future whenever practicable forebear from investigating any side issues when it is known that a prosecution is in contemplation or may be brought in respect of them. Moreover the risk would be minimized by the fact that Tribunals have in the past and no doubt will in the future whenever practicable forebear from investigating any side issues when it is known that a prosecution is in contemplation or may be brought in respect of them. In any event, it has long been recognized that from a practical point of view it would be almost impossible to prosecute a witness in respect of anything which emerged against him in the course of a hearing before a Tribunal of Inquiry.(Ibid, para 64) (vide A Critical Analysis (supra)). 24 Protection under this Section-How and when available ? The protection under this Section is available to a person only on the fulfillment of the conditions laid down in the Section. Firstly, such statement must be before a Commission appointed under the Act. Secondly, it must be made in the course of giving evidence before the Commission. Two clauses of proviso are appended to the provision. Proviso (a) lays down that the statement is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer. Proviso (b) lays down that the statement is relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The value, purpose and ambit of this provision came up for judicial test before the Delhi High Court in Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swami ( AIR 2006 Del 300 : 2006 (126) DLT 535 ). To understand the point decided therein, it is necessary to advert to facts of the case. The Central Government constituted the Justice M.C. Jain Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the assassination of Late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, a political figure, alleged at a press conference that the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu Miss J. Jayalalitha had prior information that the LTTE cadre would make an assassination attempt on the life of Late Rajiv Gandhi. Dr. Swamy also answered a questionnaire sent to him by the Commission and wanted Miss J. Jayalalitha to be summoned. Dr. Swamy in his testimony before the Commission and also in his written arguments filed in the Commission, made certain remarks that Mr. Jethmalani had received money from the LTTE and the money was deposited in the account of his son in New York. Taking exception to such libelous remark against him, Mr. Jethmalani sued Dr. Swamy for damages. Dr. Swamy in his testimony before the Commission and also in his written arguments filed in the Commission, made certain remarks that Mr. Jethmalani had received money from the LTTE and the money was deposited in the account of his son in New York. Taking exception to such libelous remark against him, Mr. Jethmalani sued Dr. Swamy for damages. In the suit for damages Dr. Swamy took the defence that his statement before the Commission was protected under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. Repelling the contention of Dr. Swamy, the Delhi High Court in the above-mentioned case (supra) observed as, follows in para 38 of the judgment: “The averments made in the plaint quoted above clearly reveal that the cause of action is being claimed by the plaintiff against the defendant on the basis of the ‘written submissions ’ filed by the defendant before the Commission and not on the basis of the statement made by the defendant during the course of his evidence before the Commission. There is nothing on record to show that the written submissions were filed by the defendant in reply to any question by the Commission which the defendant was bound to answer and that the Offence portion of the written submission against the plaintiff was in any way relevant to the inquiry before the Commission. Therefore, the basic ingredients for the applicability of Section 6 of the Act are not fulfilled. Thus, in my view, for the averments made in the plaint the protection provided by this Section cannot be availed by the defendant”. In the same case, (Ibid) the High Court rejected the plea of Dr. Swamy that since the Commission had expunged the offending statement, they cannot be deemed to exist in the eye of law. It was held that whenever a statement is made, whether oral or in writing, making of the statement would be a matter of fact and therefore a reality. That it was expunged as the Court or Tribunal found it to be scandalous would not take away the factual existence of the making of the statement. (vide A Critical Analysis (supra)). 25. That it was expunged as the Court or Tribunal found it to be scandalous would not take away the factual existence of the making of the statement. (vide A Critical Analysis (supra)). 25. View of the Law Commission on Section 6 The Law Commission of India in its 24th Report of 1962 (see Appendix 4 for the 24th Report of 1962 of the Law Commission of India, para 31) has stated as follows in para 31: “Section 6 provides that no statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to or be used against him in a criminal proceeding. In this connection, a question was raised as to whether a person can claim protection under clause (3) of article 20 of the Constitution at the time of answering a question put to him and the Punjab High Court answered it in the affirmative. Subsequently, in a Supreme Court decision, it has been held by a majority that clause (3) of Article 20 applies only where at the time the statements is made the person stands accused of an offence. Section 6 does not require any amendment from this point of view. It has been suggested that the protection given by Section 6 to oral statements should be extended to documents. In our opinion, there is a good deal of difference between the spoken word and the written word. When dealing with inquiries into matters of definite public importance, there would appear to be very little justification for extending protection to persons whose guilt is clear from any documents in their possession or custody. No doubt, if no such protection is extended, such evidence may not be readily forthcoming. One has therefore to balance the two considerations. In any event, any protection given cannot be to the same extent as is given by Section 6 in the case of the spoken word. The interests of a public inquiry would not be promoted by the enlargement of such protection, and we find that in many similar Acts no protection is afforded to the production of document In our country also, the practice has been to treat the spoken word differently from the written word, and to extend protection to the latter only if on the merits of the case protection is9 needed. Such protection has often been of a very limited or specified nature.9 0n the whole, we think that the protection conferred by Section 6 does not require any enlargement.” Thus we find that the Law Commission of India negatived the idea of extending protection under Section 6 to documents produced before the Commission after considering similar enactments of other countries. (vide A Critical Analysis (supra)). 26. Use of the statements made before the Commission: On the question of bar created by section 6 of the Act regarding the use of statements made by persons before a Commission, there was divergence of opinion among the different High Courts. Although the Supreme Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia’s case (Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 : (1959) 1 SCR 279 at page 544 of AIR) had observed that the statement made by any person before the Commission of Inquiry is, under section 6 of the Act, wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings, Civil or Criminal, yet it was an observation and not a finding on an issue. There is no doubt that even an obiter of the Supreme Court, being the highest court, is worthy of respect and carries considerable weight. But it took thirty years after Dalmia’s case (supra) when the controversy was finally resolved in 1988. (vide A Critical Analysis (supra)) 27. In the aforesaid context, let me look into a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Ibrahim Mohomed Hussein Maddu, reported in 1978 Cri.L.J., 1157. This decision has been relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the applicant. 28. In the case before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, a revision application was filed by the State against an order passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, overruling an objection raised by the Special Public Prosecutor to a question being asked to the prosecution witness. In the said case, the witness was sought to be contradicted with his affidavit filed before the Justice Madon Commission. A question was put to the witness whether he had stated in the affidavit filed before the Commission that he had noticed the accused No.5 and his two sons throwing stones, acid bulbs, sticks and glass bottles through the two windows of a building at the processionists. A question was put to the witness whether he had stated in the affidavit filed before the Commission that he had noticed the accused No.5 and his two sons throwing stones, acid bulbs, sticks and glass bottles through the two windows of a building at the processionists. At that stage, the Special Public Prosecutor, who appeared for the State, objected to the question on the ground that section 6 of the Act prohibits use of the statement made before the Commission for the purpose of contradicting the witness. The Division Bench, while rejecting the revision application filed by the State, observed as under; “[11] It is argued by Mr. Barday, the learned Assistant Government Pleader that when the defence wants to contradict the witness, it wants to use the statement of the witness before the Commission "against him." Mr. Peerbhoy, the learned Counsel appearing for the opponents submitted, on the contrary, that it is a fundamental rule of a fair criminal trial that the prosecution witness must tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, before the Court; and it must, therefore, follow that the accused must have a right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses with regard to the statements which he made before the Commission, under Sec. 145 of the Evidence Act, in exercise of his basic right of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. He argued that the mere fact that the witness was likely to make a statement contradictory to his previous statement before the Commission or that he may thereby make himself liable to be prosecuted for perjury cannot amount to using; of the previous statement of the witnesses before the Commission "against him" within the meaning of Sec. 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. [12] Having regard to these contentions, it is necessary to notice briefly the scheme of the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and its objects. The Act was enacted by Parliament to provide for the appointment of Commissions of Inquiry and for vesting such Commissions with certain powers, as stated in the preamble. [12] Having regard to these contentions, it is necessary to notice briefly the scheme of the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and its objects. The Act was enacted by Parliament to provide for the appointment of Commissions of Inquiry and for vesting such Commissions with certain powers, as stated in the preamble. It enables the Central Government or the State Government with respect to their respective spheres of constitutional activities and powers to appoint commissions "for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification" to be published in the Official Gazette, as per Sec. 3. Sec. 4 declares that the Commission, shall act with the powers of a civil Court, while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of : (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from any part of India and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any Court or office; (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (f) any other matter which may be prescribed. Additional powers could be conferred on the Commission by the appropriate Government if it was of opinion having regard to the nature of the enquiry to be made and other circumstances of the case, under Sec. 5. Sec. 5A empowers the Commission to utilise the services of certain officers and investigation agencies for conducting investigation pertaining to inquiry. [13] It is in the context of these powers and the nature of the Commission of Inquiry that Sec. 6 requires to be interpreted. The Commission is also given the power to regulate its procedure under Section 8. Section 8B requires the Commission to consider, if, at any stage of the enquiry, it considers necessary to enquire into the conduct of any person or is of opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry, whether the Commission should give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the enquiry and to produce evidence in his defence. Section 8B, however, makes it unnecessary for the Commission to give such opportunity to a witness where the credit of the witness is being impeached. [14] It is not necessary to refer to the remaining provisions of the Act, which relate to the procedure and duties of the Commission. What is necessary to emphasise is that the whole object of setting up of the Commission of Inquiry is for the purpose of making an enquiry into any definite matter of public importance. As. a result of the enquiry, the Commission has to record its findings and forward them to the appropriate Government on which the Government may take such action as it deems fit. Such an enquiry necessarily involves investigation into material facts and recording of oral and documentary evidence adduced before the Commission or other materials brought to the notice of the Commission and making of findings on the basis of those facts and materials in its report to the appropriate Government, expressing the views of the Commission. It is, therefore, clear that the object of enacting the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 was to inquire into and to come to conclusions on some matter of public importance. Powers of Courts, conferred under Sec. 4 enable the Commission to make an effective enquiry into the true facts. It is in this context that we must understand the intention of the Parliament in enacting Section 6. [15] Section 6, in our opinion, gives protection to persons making statements before the Commission in reply to questions asked by the Commission or relevant to the matter of enquiry, so that the persons making the statements will state the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth before the Commission, unhampered by any fear, that they would thereby render themselves liable to civil or criminal proceedings or to some prejudice or detriment as a result of the statements made before the Commission. [16] Thus, the first rule in Sec. 6 prohibits a suit being filed against a person, say X, who may have made a statement before the Commission "I burnt the house of A." A cannot file a suit against such person relying on that statement before the Commission. [16] Thus, the first rule in Sec. 6 prohibits a suit being filed against a person, say X, who may have made a statement before the Commission "I burnt the house of A." A cannot file a suit against such person relying on that statement before the Commission. A cannot also file a suit for damages against the person without making use of the statement and then produce such a statement under Section 145 in the suit, as the use of such a statement would be 'against' the person within the meaning of Sec. 6. The Parliament never intended, in our opinion, to bar such statements being produced by way of cross-examining under Section 145 the person making the statements, if at all such statements are relevant or otherwise admissible. The bar is only to prevent use of statements to support some claim against him. There is no bar to the use of such statements in proceedings against third persons in which such person is examined as a witness as in the present case before us. The very fact that the third rule in Section 6 permits prosecution of such person for giving false evidence by making such statements before the Commission, manifestly indicates that the whole purpose of enacting Sec. 6 was to enable the person making the statement before the Commission to be unhampered by any adverse pending or impending or likely civil or criminal proceeding against himself, or by proceedings in which he was likely to be prejudiced in some manner other than prosecution for giving false evidence when making such statement before the Commission. [17] Whether a particular statement made by a witness before the Commission is used "against him" will depend on the prejudice or detriment caused or likely to be caused to the person in civil or criminal proceedings or otherwise. It must, therefore, necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances relating to the use or intended use. Whether any particular prejudice or detriment can be said to result from the use of the statements will also depend on facts. Mere cross-examination under Sec. 145 can at the most expose his statement. It must, therefore, necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances relating to the use or intended use. Whether any particular prejudice or detriment can be said to result from the use of the statements will also depend on facts. Mere cross-examination under Sec. 145 can at the most expose his statement. That does not render the use of the statement "against him" in law because law requires him to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth before the Commission also and implies that he will be prosecuted for perjury if he tells lies. [18] Mr. Barday submitted that such a view is contrary to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Dalmia's case. At p. 547 Section Rule Das C.J., speaking for a unanimous Court observed inter alia as follows: ...But seeing that the Commission of Inquiry has no judicial powers and its report will purely be recommendatory and not effective proprio vigore and the statement made by any person before the Commission of Inquiry is, under Sec. 6 of the Act, wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings, civil or criminal, there can be no point in the Commission of inquiry making recommendations for taking any action 'as and by way of securing redress or punishment' which, in agreement with the High Court, we think, refers, in the context, to wrongs' already done or committed, for redress or punishment for such wrongs, if any, has to be imposed by a Court of law properly constituted exercising its own discretion on the facts and circumstances of the case and without being in any way influenced by the view of any person or body, howsoever august or high powered it may be. Now, these observations, with great respect, cannot be divorced from the facts of that case and the contention to repel which these observations were made. This is "wholly inadmissible" means wholly inadmissible against a person in proceedings against him and nothing else. In that case, Ramakrishna Dalmia and other persons had filed petitions in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing and setting aside the appointment of the one man Commission of Justice Tendolkar. The petitions were dismissed by the Court holding that notification making the appointment was valid. In that case, Ramakrishna Dalmia and other persons had filed petitions in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing and setting aside the appointment of the one man Commission of Justice Tendolkar. The petitions were dismissed by the Court holding that notification making the appointment was valid. Dalmia and others carried appeals to the Supreme Court, raising various contentions regarding the constitutionality of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, with which we are not concerned in the present case. One of the contentions which called for the above quoted observations was that while the Commission may find facts and the Government may take action, legislative or executive, the Commission could not be asked to suggest any measure, legislative or executive, to be taken by the appropriate Government. A contention was made that the Parliament in authorising the appointment of a Commission and the Government in appointing this Commission had arrogated to themselves judicial powers which do not in the very nature of things, belong to their respective domains, which must be purely legislative and executive respectively. It was contended that Parliament cannot convert itself into a Court except for the rare cases of dealing with breaches of its own privileges for which it may punish the delinquent by committal for contempt or of proceedings by way of impeachment. While repelling such a contention and upholding the validity of the Act, S.R. Das C.J. made the aforesaid observations. [19] The question of the proper interpretation of Sec. 6 which arises before us in the instant case, with profound respect, was not agitated before the Supreme Court. The observations are also not even remotely connected with the question with which we are concerned in the present case. Mr. Barday submitted that even assuming that the observations were obiter, they are binding on us. The proposition cannot be disputed. But, are the observations at least obiter regarding the question before us? We do not think so. With utmost respect to the Supreme Court, the observation was made only in the context of the aforesaid contention made before them and for the purpose of repelling that contention. There is not even a hint anywhere in the passage relied upon by Mr. We do not think so. With utmost respect to the Supreme Court, the observation was made only in the context of the aforesaid contention made before them and for the purpose of repelling that contention. There is not even a hint anywhere in the passage relied upon by Mr. Barday to show that the Supreme Court intended to lay down an obiter regarding the question of the use for cross-examination being made of the statement made by a person before the Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, where such a person is not a party but only a witness as in this case. [20] It is well settled at least since the time of Quinn V/s. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. See Earl of Halsbury L.C. (p. 506): ...I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. [21] The Supreme Court was not called upon in Dalmia's case to decide the question of the precise meaning of the words "be used against him" in Sec. 6 of the said Act. Although Section 8B was added in the Act by a subsequent amendment, viz., Act No. 79 of 1971, it is helpful to understand the scheme of the Act. The Act was never intended to bar the production of previous statements made by persons in the cross-examination of such persons when such persons are examined us prosecution witnesses as in the present case. This is clear from the provisions in Section 8B, making an exception to the procedure of giving notice to any one who is likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry before the Commission and by laying down that notice is not required to be given in the case of witnesses whose credit was being impeached. This is clear from the provisions in Section 8B, making an exception to the procedure of giving notice to any one who is likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry before the Commission and by laying down that notice is not required to be given in the case of witnesses whose credit was being impeached. [22] In the instant case, we have to deal with the narrow question as to whether a statement made by the prosecution witnesses previously before the Commission can be used by the defence under Sec. 145 of the Evidence Act and whether such use is barred by the words "or to be used against him" in Sec. 6 of the Act. The learned Additional Sessions Judge compared this section to Sec. 132 of the Evidence Act, which is also intended to see that the witnesses tell the truth before the Court and which runs as follows: 132. A witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding, upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate, or may tender directly or indirectly to criminate, such witness, or that it will expose, or tend directly or indirectly to expose, such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind: Provided that no such answer, which a witness shall be compelled to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer. The words are not identical because the corresponding words used in the proviso in Sec. 132 are "or be proved against him." The word "used" in Sec. 6 is no doubt wider than the word "proved"; but the words "against him" in the two provisions are identical. [23] In our opinion, the bar under the said words can apply only when there is some sort of legal contest between the witness to whom the statement is intended to be put under Sec. 145 and some other person in civil or criminal proceedings (other than proceedings against the witness for perjury committed by such statements) which may result in some detriment or prejudice to the witness in such proceedings, pending or impending. The bar cannot be attracted in a case of using the statement under Sec. 145 for contradicting the witness and thereby discrediting his veracity. Private interest of a person in the witness box to be not discredited must be overridden by the public interest in discovering the truth in a Court of justice. [24] The right of cross-examination of witnesses is a valuable right in common law countries. It is guaranteed by our Constitution, the Evidence Act and the procedural laws. The object of the cross-examination is two fold-to weaken, qualify or destroy the case of the opponent; and to establish the party's own case by means of his opponent's witnesses. We do not think that the Parliament by enacting Sec. 6 intended to impair this right in any manner merely because the Parliament wanted persons making statements before the Commission to have immunity for the truthful statements made by them before the Commission. [25] It is a well established rule of interpretation of statute that a sense of the possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to induce Judges to do violence to well-settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead to the selection of one rather than the other of two reasonable interpretations. Whenever the language of the Legislature admits of two constructions and, if construed in one way, would lead to obvious injustice, the Courts act upon the view that such a result could not have been intended, unless the intention to bring it about has been manifested in plain words. See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th edn., 1969, p. 208. [26] It will be gross injustice, in our opinion, to deny the accused the right to cross-examine a witness under Sec. 145 in the light of the previous statement made by the witness before the Commission. If the statement is contradictory to the statement which the witness had made before the Commission, justice requires that such contradictory statement should be availed of by the defence under Section 145 and an opportunity should be given to the witness to explain the contradiction. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Judge in the facts and circumstances was justified in over-ruling the objection raised by the Special Public Prosecutor. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Judge in the facts and circumstances was justified in over-ruling the objection raised by the Special Public Prosecutor. [27] Although Dalmia's case does not appear to have been brought to the notice of Chitale J. who decided Sohanlal's case, we concur with the view taken by Chitale J. in the said case for the reasons stated hereinabove. [28] So far as the decision of Dixit C.J. and G.P. Singh J. in Puhupram V/s. State of M.P., is concerned, it is true that the M.P. High Court has dissented from Sohanlal's case. With great respect, to the learned Judges, the decision was obiter. In that case they were not called upon to decide the question as to whether a statement made before the Commission could be used in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. That was a case in which the petitioners applied to the High Court for stay of the enquiry against them before the Commission till the conclusion of criminal cases instituted against them in respect of offences under Sections 148, 149, 120B and 302, Indian Penal Code during the pendency of the enquiry before the Commission. One of apprehensions of the petitioners was that they would be compelled to make statements, which would be made use of against them in the criminal case which necessarily is a contest between the accused and the state. The division Bench observed as follows (p. 632): ...It is not necessary for the Petitioners to participate in the inquiry held by the Commission if they think that their participation will prejudice the criminal trial. No doubt, the Commission has the power of summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person. But it is reasonable to think that the Commission, constituted as it is by one of the Judges of this Court, will not compel the petitioners or any of the persons standing trial to give evidence and thus will not give a chance to them to complain that they have been prejudiced in the criminal trial by being forced to give evidence before the Commission. [29] With great respect, we agree with those observations as they were concerned with the possible use of the statements made by the petitioners-accused against the accused. [29] With great respect, we agree with those observations as they were concerned with the possible use of the statements made by the petitioners-accused against the accused. They rightly held that the use of such statements in the criminal case against the petitioners must be barred under Sec. 6 of the Act. The said decision will not help the petitioners in the present case in barring the use of the statement made by the prosecution witness before the Commission for purposes of cross-examination under Sec. 145 of the Evidence Act.“ 29. In the Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court, there is a reference of its own decision in the case of Sohanlal Prahladrai Vaid vs. State, AIR 1965 Bombay 1, wherein a learned Single Judge decided the very same issue. The learned Judge observed as under; “The expression "no statement. . . shall subject him to" clearly indicates that a statement made before and commission could not be made the basis of a civil or criminal proceeding against the person" making that statement, i.e. , no civil or criminal liability could arise out of such statement, the only exception being the one mentioned in Section 6 itself. The latter part, viz., "no statement. . . shall be used against him" in my opinion, only lays down that in any other civil or criminal proceeding the statement, even though not the sole basis of that proceeding, shall not be used so as to fasten any civil or criminal liability on the person making the statement, of course subject to the exception mentioned in Section 6. Reading Section 6 as a whole, it is clear that it merely lays down that a statement made by a person before a Commission would not expose the person making that statement to any civil or criminal action, which would render him liable on account of that statement, subject to the only exception mentioned in that section. [7] For reasons indicated above, I hold that the learned trial Magistrate as well as the learned sessions Judge-both of them-are wrong in talking the view that in a criminal case, which is not against the person making a statement before a Commission, the use of such a statement for the purpose mentioned in Section 145 of Indian Evidence Act, is Prohibited by Section 9 of the commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. If it is held that such use is prohibited, by Section 6, it would confer on a statement before a Commission, immunity from challenge which the Legislature possibly never intended when it enacted Section 6. [8] Mr. Nain during his arguments relied upon Alien Berry and Co., Private Ltd. v. Vivian Bose, air 1960 Punj 86, Gulab v. The Crown, AIR 1923 Lah 315, Imperatrix v. Pitamber Jina, ILR 2 bom 61, Queen Empress v. Tribhovan Manekchand, ILR 9 Bom 131 and (1837) 7 LJ 268. The point that arises before me did not directly arise in those cases, and in my opinion these cases will not strictly speaking apply to the facts of the present case. I may, however, mention that the decision, ILR 9 Bom 131, may have some relevance. In that case Section 25 of the Indian evidence Act, was considered and it was held that although the confession made to a police officer may be inadmissible to prove the alleged offence against the maker of that confession, it is admissible for other purposes under Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act. Similarly even though a statement made before a Commission cannot be used--subject to the exception mentioned in Section 6-against the person making that statement so as to fasten on him civil or criminal liability, it can be used for other purposes, e. g., to show that that person, when he gives evidence in a subsequent proceeding, is not telling the truth or that he did not tell the truth when he gave evidence before the Commission. [9] Thus, in my opinion, the statements made by the prosecution witnesses before the commission, can be used by the defence for the purpose mentioned in Section 145 of Indian evidence Act. The learned trial Magistrate should, therefore, make the said statements available to the accused for cross-examination, if they so desire. I would like to make it clear that these statements can be utilised by the accused only for the purpose of contradiction, as contemplated by Section 145 of Indian Evidence Act.” 30. In State of Assam v. Suprabhat Bhadra, (State of Assam vs. Suprabhat Bhadra, 1982 Cri. I would like to make it clear that these statements can be utilised by the accused only for the purpose of contradiction, as contemplated by Section 145 of Indian Evidence Act.” 30. In State of Assam v. Suprabhat Bhadra, (State of Assam vs. Suprabhat Bhadra, 1982 Cri. L.J. 1672: (1982) 1 Gau LR 431 (DB)) it was held that Section 6 does not inhibit the use of statement made by a witness before a Commission in a subsequent civil, criminal or other proceeding for the purpose of contradicting the witness.(vide A Critical Analysis (supra)) 31. In Debabrata Chowdhury v. Haricharan Kalita, (Debabrata Chowdhury v. Haricharan Kalita ((1986) 1 Gau LR 393) it was held that keeping in view the guarantee under Section 6 of the Act to a witness before the Commission, the power of the Court is to be exercised based on sound and reasonable principles. The jurisdiction of the Court to order the production of any document will be necessary or desirable for the purpose of trial or other proceedings.(vide A Critical Analysis (supra)) 32. In Kavati Balamallu v. State of Andhra Pradesh (Kavati Balamallu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1986) 1 Andh LT 220), it was held that Section 6 of the Act does not rule out the applicability of Section 145. When the credibility of witness is sought to be impeached, by confronting that person who figured as a witness with the statement made before the Commission in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it cannot be said that the statement was being used against him as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act. (vide A Critical Analysis (supra)) 33. It was in 1988 that an authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court was made when the scope of Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act was considered in detail in the case of Kehar Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration) (Kehar Singh vs. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883 , per Oza, J. at page 1902: (1988) 3 SCC 609 ). The case was an appeal against the confirmation of death sentence by the High Court in a trial arising out of the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi on 31st October, 1984 by two of her security guards. The case was an appeal against the confirmation of death sentence by the High Court in a trial arising out of the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi on 31st October, 1984 by two of her security guards. Soon after the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi, the Government of India by notification dated 20-11-84 constituted a Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, which was presided over by Mr. Justice M.P. Thakkar, a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that neither the report of the Thakkar Commission was made available to them nor the statements of prosecution witnesses who had deposed before the Commission were supplied to them. It was contended that non-furnishing of the copies of statements of witnesses and the report of the Commission prejudiced their case as they were prevented from building up their defence and raise appropriate issues at the trial. Rejecting the contention of the appellants in the face of Section 6 of the Act, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “A perusal of these three Sections clearly indicates that there are two purposes for which a previous statement can be used. One is for cross-examination and contradiction and the other is for corroboration. The first purpose is to discredit the witness by putting to him the earlier statement and contradicting him on that basis. So far as corroboration is concerned it could not be disputed that it is none of the purposes of the defence to corroborate the evidence on the basis of the previous statement. Section 145 therefore is the main section under which relief was sought by the accused. The use for which the previous statement was asked for was to contradict him if necessary and if it was a contradiction then the earlier statement was necessary so that contradiction be put to the Witness and that part of the statement can be proved.” It was further observed as follows: “To my mind, there could be no other purpose for which the appellants could use the previous statements of those witnesses. Contradiction could be used either to impeach his credit or discredit him or pull down or bring down the reliability of the witness. These purposes for which the previous statements are required could not be said to be purposes which were not against the witnesses. Contradiction could be used either to impeach his credit or discredit him or pull down or bring down the reliability of the witness. These purposes for which the previous statements are required could not be said to be purposes which were not against the witnesses. The two aspects of the restrictions which Section 6 contemplates and have been discussed earlier are the only two aspects which could be the result of the use of these statements. I cannot find any other use of such previous statements in criminal proceedings. It is therefore, clear that without going into the wider questions even a plain reading of Section 6 as discussed above will prohibit the use of the previous statements at the trial either for the purposes of cross- examination to contradict the witness or to impeach his credit. (Ibid, at page 1902, per Oza, J.) In his concurring judgment in the above case, Shetty, J. held that the Court should avoid such construction to Section 6 which may stultify the purpose of the Act. Section 6 must on the other hand, receive liberal construction so that the person deposing before the Commission may get complete immunity except in a case of prosecution for perjury. (Ibid, at page 1946) Expounding on the purpose for enacting Section 6 in the Act, Shetty, J. observed as follows: “The Commission under the Act is given power to regulate its own procedure and also to decide whether to sit in camera or in public. A Commission appointed under the Act does not decide any dispute. There are no parties before the Commission. There is no lis. The Commission is not a Court except for a limited purpose. The procedure of the Commission is inquisitorial rather than accusatorial. The Commission more often may have to give assurance to persons giving evidence before it that their statements will not be used in any subsequent proceedings except for perjury. Without such an assurance, the persons may not come forward to give statements. If persons have got lurking fear that their statements given before the Commission are likely to be used against them or utilized for productive use on them, in any other proceeding, they may be reluctant to expose themselves before the Commission. Then the Commission would not be able to perform its task. If persons have got lurking fear that their statements given before the Commission are likely to be used against them or utilized for productive use on them, in any other proceeding, they may be reluctant to expose themselves before the Commission. Then the Commission would not be able to perform its task. The Commission would not be able to reach the nuggests (sic.) of truth from the obscure horizon. The purpose for which the Commission is constituted may be defeated. (Ibid, per Shetty, J. at page 1946).” It was further observed in the case as follows: “Apart from that, it may also be noted that Section 6 contains only one exception. That is a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement. When the Legislature has expressly provided a singular exception to the provisions, it has to be normally understood that other exceptions are ruled out. (Ibid, per Shetty, J. at page 1947)” (vide A Critical Analysis (supra)) 34. Let me now look into the Delhi High Court decision in the case of Sajjankumar (supra), on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the applicant. In paras-1 to 5, the court recorded the facts. Paras-1 to 5 reads as under; “[1] The petitioner Sajjan Kumar is facing trial for committing the offence punishable under Sections 109 r/w 147/148/149/153-A/295/302/396/427/486/449/505 IPC & 201 IPC in case RC No. 24/2005 registered on the directions of Government of India vide D.O. No. U-13018/5/2005 dated 24.10.2005 to investigate/reinvestigate the case FIR No. 416/84, PS Delhi Cantt, New Delhi. [2] In the FIR and the charge-sheet filed against the petitioner, apart from other material, the prosecution relied on the affidavits Ex.PW1/A and B filed by Smt. Jagdish Kaur (PW-1) before Justice Ranganathan Commission and Justice Nanavati Commission and the statement Ex.PW1/C made before Justice Nanavati Commission. [3] To prove the charge, the prosecution led evidence. During examination-in-chief of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur, she proved the two affidavits as Ex.PW1/A and B as well as statement made before Justice Nanavati Commission as Ex.PW1/C. Cross examination of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur by accused Balwan Khokhar and Krishan thorugh Mr. S.A. Hashmi, Adv. was in progress when on 12.07.2010 Mr. R.S. Cheema, Senior Advocate for the CBI raised an objection and recorded by the Trial Court as under : 12.07.2010 PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur w/o Late Sardar Kehar Singh, recalled for further cross examination. S.A. Hashmi, Adv. was in progress when on 12.07.2010 Mr. R.S. Cheema, Senior Advocate for the CBI raised an objection and recorded by the Trial Court as under : 12.07.2010 PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur w/o Late Sardar Kehar Singh, recalled for further cross examination. On SA (At the very outset it is stated by Sh. R.S. Cheema, Senior Advocate for the CBI have argued that affidavits/statements filed by the witnesses before the Commissions under appointed under Commission of Inquiry Act 1952 cannot be used for the purpose of contradiction/impeaching the testimony of the witness. This is opposed by the defence counsel that the affidavits/statements filed before the Nanavati Commission and Ranganath Commission form the very the basis of registration of FIR and CBI got the same exhibited and is relying upon the same and therefore now it cannot be said that the defence cannot use those affidavits/statements for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of the witness. It is further stated that in case appropriate application is moved, they will file the suitable reply and contest the same.) Matter is left open.' [4] No such application as mentioned in the above proceedings was moved by the CBI till the stage of final arguments. When the case was listed for final arguments, accused Sajjan Kumar filed an application on 15.05.2012 requesting the Court to consider the peculiar circumstances created by the prosecution and as per mandate of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, he prayed to the Court to decide the objection dated 12.07.2010 which had been left open by the Court, before commencement of final arguments by defence side. [5] After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner Sajjan Kumar as well as CBI, the learned Trial Court sustained the objection by CBI observing that in view of the provision of Section 6 of Commissions of Inquiry Act, the decision of Apex Court in the case Kehar Singh & Ors. vs. The State (Delhi Admn.), 1988 AIR(SC) 1883, the petitioner cannot be permitted to confront the witness in respect of Ex.PW1/A to C. In the last para No. 29 of the impugned order, the learned Trial Court arrived at the following conclusion : "29. vs. The State (Delhi Admn.), 1988 AIR(SC) 1883, the petitioner cannot be permitted to confront the witness in respect of Ex.PW1/A to C. In the last para No. 29 of the impugned order, the learned Trial Court arrived at the following conclusion : "29. Interpretation given to Section 6 of the Act as referred to above in Kehar Singh's judgment leaves no doubt that in the present case bar under Section 6 of Commissions of Inquiry Act will be attracted and Section 6 is very much attracted and applicable in this case. Question framed in this order is accordingly answered to the effect that bar under section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act will be attracted so far as witness Smt. Jagdish Kaur has been confronted or sought to be contradicted with her affidavit Ex.PW1/A and Ex.PW1/B and her statement Ex.PW1/C, which was given before Inquiry Commissions. Accordingly, objections recorded during cross examination of Smt. Jagdish Kaur on 12.07.2010 is answered and decided to the effect that Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act stands attracted and applicable." 35. From paras-6 to 16, the submissions of both the sides have been noted. Paras-6 to 16 reads as under; “[6] The petitioner feeling aggrieved that in the garb of bar under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, learned Trial Court has curtailed his right to cross examine PW-1 Jagdish Kaur on the material documents which are also the foundation of the prosecution's case and claiming that he has been denied his right to have fair trial, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 397/401 read with Section 482 CrPC with the prayer that the impugned order dated 02.06.2012 passed by learned ASJ be quashed and the entire cross examination of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur be taken into account by learned Trial Court while deciding the matter. [7] At the outset, on being questioned by the Court whether petitioner/accused Sajjan Kumar would require PW-1 to be recalled for further cross examination with respect to her earlier affidavits and statement Ex.PW1/A to C, Mr. [7] At the outset, on being questioned by the Court whether petitioner/accused Sajjan Kumar would require PW-1 to be recalled for further cross examination with respect to her earlier affidavits and statement Ex.PW1/A to C, Mr. U.U. Lalit, Senior Advocate informed that cross examination of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur is complete in all respect and there will not be any necessity to resummon her for further cross examination in respect of the documents Ex.PW1/A to C if this Court allows the prayer of the petitioner that he has a right to cross examine PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur in respect of the evidence adduced before Inquiry Commission in the form of two affidavits Ex.PW1/A and B and statement Ex.PW1/C. Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Senior Advocate for CBI also submitted that the cross examination of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur by accused persons is complete and in view of the legal bar created under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, only the admissibility of the cross examination of PW-1 in respect of the documents Ex.PW1/A to C is in question. [8] Both the parties have filed written synopsis. I have also heard Mr. U.U. Lalit, Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Senior Advocate for CBI. [9] On behalf of petitioner, Mr. U.U. Lalit, Senior Advocate submitted that the case of the petitioner is clearly distinguishable from Kehar Singh's case as the facts are distinct. In Kehar Singh's case, the entire proceedings before Commission and its recommendation were confidential so much so that report was not even tabled before the House of People. In Kehar Singh's case, the accused persons requested the Court for supply of copies of the statements made before the Commission and at that time even they did not know what statement had been made by various witnesses before the Commission and in that circumstance, the Apex Court had held that use of previous statement at trial either for purpose of cross examination or to contradict the witness is not permissible. [10] It has been further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that in the present case, the prosecution has relied on the affidavits and statements of the witnesses made before Justice Ranganathan Commission and Justice Nanavati Commission, supplied copies of these documents to the accused as required under Section 207 CrPC and examined those witnesses as prosecution witnesses and also proved the affidavits and the statement made before the Commissions in the trial. The accused has a right to cross examine such witnesses in respect of the statement made before the Court in the trial. Thus, the prosecution as well as the witnesses have come out of the umbrella/protection as envisaged under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. Prosecution has voluntarily chosen to produce earlier statements to prove the charge against accused who has a right to confront the witnesses on the affidavits and the statements earlier given which have now become substantive evidence. [11] While referring to Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, it has been contended that it only prohibits using all statements made before the Commission against that person in any civil or criminal proceedings except in case of perjury. No proceedings have been initiated against PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur in respect of the affidavits and statement made before Justice Ranganathan Commission and Justice Nanavati Commission. Thus there is prohibition about using of such statement against the witness but not by the witness against other persons. In the present case the statement is being used against the petitioner. It has been urged on behalf of petitioner that the accused cannot be denied his right to have a fair trial and Kehar Singh's case being clearly distinguishable, as the witness and the prosecution have themselves chosen to use such affidavits and statement against the accused, the Court cannot deny the petitioner his right to cross examine the witness on such affidavits/statement. [12] Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Senior Advocate for CBI submitted that in all fairness, learned Trial Judge recorded the legal objection of learned prosecutor and left it open. The very purpose of filing the application before learned Trial Judge for getting the objections disposed of was not in accordance with the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Bipin Shantilal Panchal vs. State of Gujarat, 2001 3 SCC 1 . The very purpose of filing the application before learned Trial Judge for getting the objections disposed of was not in accordance with the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Bipin Shantilal Panchal vs. State of Gujarat, 2001 3 SCC 1 . The petitioner should have raised these arguments before learned Trial Court making it a part of final arguments instead of getting the objections disposed of by moving such an application. If such practice is encouraged, it would not only delay the trial but the accused persons would challenge every objection before every forum which is contrary to the observation of Apex Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal's case i.e. the objections taken by both the sides should be recorded in evidence and decided at the final stage while passing final judgment in the matter. [13] Referring to the legal issue regarding the bar created by Section 6 of Commissions of Inquiry Act, Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Senior Advocate submitted that if the accused is permitted to contradict the witness with her previous statement, it would have the effect of using the statement 'against' the witnesses which is not permissible in view of Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. While supporting the impugned order, learned Senior Advocate for CBI submitted that it is extensively based on the interpretation given to Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act by the three Judge Bench after analyzing all the legal precedents. Rebutting the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner that the present case is clearly distinguishable from the case of Kehar Singh's case, it has been contended that the findings of Apex Court in Kehar Singh's case is not restricted on the issue of confidentiality of the proceedings and the report of Commission. Rather the Apex Court has not confined itself to the peculiar facts of that case and after interpreting Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, arrived at the conclusion that the Court should avoid any such construction of Section 6 which may stultify the purpose of Act to protect the persons deposing before the Commission. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that Kehar Singh's case puts an embargo on the use of any statement made before Commissions of Inquiry Act against the witness except in relation to perjury. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that Kehar Singh's case puts an embargo on the use of any statement made before Commissions of Inquiry Act against the witness except in relation to perjury. Since the impugned order is based on the legal position about the scope of Section 6 of Commissions of Inquiry Act extensively examined by the Apex Court in Kehar Singh's case, the petition is liable to be dismissed. [14] During the course of arguments, learned Senior Advocate for CBI was questioned by this Court that as per decision of this Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice Tendulkar, 1958 AIR (SC) 538, affirmed in Kehar Singh's case, the statement made by any person before the Commission of Enquiry under Section 6 of the Act is wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings civil or criminal. But in this case those very affidavits filed and statement made before the Commission are forming part of the charge-sheet against the petitioners and not against PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur. These affidavits and statements have been produced and proved by the prosecution against the accused and in that circumstance, how the accused can be denied his right to cross examine the prosecution witnesses in respect of those incriminating documents. Learned counsel for CBI was also asked to explain the conduct of the prosecution that after completing the examination of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur, her cross examination on all material points including Ex.PW1/C continued for three dates i.e. 03.07.2010, 08.07.2010 and 09.07.2010 (from pages 101 to 105 & 131 to 138 as per the petition) when for the first time on 12.07.2010 learned prosecutor for CBI got his objection recorded. CBI was asked to explain the effect of the cross examination with respect to PW1/A to C recorded without objection prior to 12.07.2010 and thereafter subject to objection. Attention of learned Senior Advocate for CBI was also drawn to the statements of accused persons recorded under Section 313 CrPC wherein Ex.PW1/A to C have been put as incriminating evidence to the accused persons to enable them to explain the same. [15] Learned Senior Counsel for CBI was further requested to make submissions how the deposition of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur with reference to affidavits Ex.PW1/A & B and statement Ex.PW1/C without being subjected to cross examination would be admissible in evidence against the accused/petitioner. [16] Mr. [15] Learned Senior Counsel for CBI was further requested to make submissions how the deposition of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur with reference to affidavits Ex.PW1/A & B and statement Ex.PW1/C without being subjected to cross examination would be admissible in evidence against the accused/petitioner. [16] Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Senior Advocate for CBI submitted that when PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur made statement in respect of Ex.PW1/A to C before the Court during her examination-in-chief, the same being not against the witness, is admissible in evidence. However, when the accused sought to confront/contradict the witness with her earlier statements, a specific bar is created under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act as discussed by the Apex Court in para 39 of the report Kehar Singh & Ors. vs. The State (Delhi Admn.) prohibiting use of previous statements at the trial either for purpose of cross examination to contradict the witness or to impeach his credit. He submitted that the only permissible use of such statement as provided under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act is in case of prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement.” 36. The Court, thereafter, proceeded with the discussion. Paras-17 to 35, reads as under; “[17] Having heard learned counsel for the parties as well as on perusal of record, I am of the view that Bipin Shantilal Panchal's case relied upon by CBI has no application as here the question to be determined is not about the admissibility of the documents or any objection in that regard but right of the accused to cross examine the prosecution witness and to have a fair trial. [18] In Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali vs. The Stage (Govt. of NCT), Delhi, 2012 AIR (SC) 750, the Apex Court, while dealing with a case where the trial concluded without providing legal assistance to the accused, has dealt with the aspect of right of the accused to cross examine the witnesses and to confront the witnesses against him and right to have a fair trial. The observation made in paras 9 to 11 of the report are : "9. The observation made in paras 9 to 11 of the report are : "9. It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case, to confront the witnesses against him not only on facts but also to discredit the witness by showing that his testimony-in-chief was untrue and biased. The purpose of cross-examination of a witness has been succinctly explained by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 3 SCC 569 : 278. Section 137 of the Evidence Act defines what cross-examination means and Sections 139 and 145 speak of the mode of cross-examination with reference to the documents as well as oral evidence. It is the jurisprudence of law that cross-examination is an acid test of the truthfulness of the statement made by a witness on oath in examination-in-chief, the objects of which are: (1) to destroy or weaken the evidentiary value of the witness of his adversary; (2) to elicit facts in favour of the cross-examining lawyer's client from the mouth of the witness of the adversary party; (3) to show that the witness is unworthy of belief by impeaching the credit of the said witness; and the questions to be addressed in the course of cross-examination are to test his veracity; to discover who he is and what is his position in life; and to shake his credit by injuring his character. 10. The aforesaid view is reiterated by this Court in Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 7 SCC 104 wherein it is observed : 24. A right to cross-examine a witness, apart from being a natural right is a statutory right. Section 137 of the Evidence Act provides for examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination. Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a right on the adverse party to cross-examine a witness who had been examined in chief, subject of course to expression of his desire to the said effect. But indisputably such an opportunity is to be granted. An accused has not only a valuable right to represent himself, he has also the right to be informed thereabout. If an exception is to be carved out, the statute must say so expressly or the same must be capable of being inferred by necessary implication. But indisputably such an opportunity is to be granted. An accused has not only a valuable right to represent himself, he has also the right to be informed thereabout. If an exception is to be carved out, the statute must say so expressly or the same must be capable of being inferred by necessary implication. There are statutes like the Extradition Act, 1962 which excludes taking of evidence vis-a-vis opinion. 11. In my view, every person, therefore, has a right to a fair trial by a competent court in the spirit of the right to life and personal liberty. The object and purpose of providing competent legal aid to undefended and unrepresented accused persons are to see that the accused gets free and fair, just and reasonable trial of charge in a criminal case." [19] In Kehar Singh's case, the order impugned before the Apex Court was rejection of the prayer of the accused persons to have the copies of the previous statement of some of the prosecution witnesses recorded during inquiry before the Thakkar Commission to build their defence. The prayer was rejected by the High Court placing reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Dalmia'a case wherein the scope of admissibility of the statement made before the Commission, in future proceedings was also considered as under : "The whole purpose of setting upon a Commission of Inquiry consisting of experts will be frustrated and the elaborate process of inquiry will be deprived of its utility if the opinion and the advice of the expert body as to the measures the situation disclosed calls for cannot be placed before the Government for consideration notwithstanding that doing so cannot be to the prejudice of anybody because it has no force of its own. In our view the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry are of great importance to the Government in order to enable it to make up its mind as to what legislative or administrative measures should be adopted to eradicate the evil found or to implement the beneficial objects it has in view. From this point of view, there can be no objection even to the Commission of Inquiry recommending the imposition of some form of punishment which will, in its opinion, be sufficiently deterrent to delinquents in future. From this point of view, there can be no objection even to the Commission of Inquiry recommending the imposition of some form of punishment which will, in its opinion, be sufficiently deterrent to delinquents in future. But seeing that the Commission of Inquiry has no judicial powers and its report will purely be recommendatory and not effective proprio vigore and the statement made by any person before the Commission of Inquiry is, under section 6 of the Act, wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings, civil or criminal." [20] In Kehar Singh's case, the contention before the Apex Court was that in Dalmia's case, scope of Section of 6 was not before the Court, hence this case could not be accepted as an authority on interpretation of Section 6 of Commissions of Inquiry Act. It would be apposite to quote paras 35, 35A and 36 of the report as under : "35. According to learned Counsel, in that case it was not the scope of Section 6 but the validity of the provisions were in question and the observations were only incidental and it can not be regarded as a binding precedent. The High Court has accepted these observations of this Court in the judgment quoted above and in our opinion rightly. But apart from it, we shall try to examine Section 6 itself and other provisions relevant for the purpose as to whether the appellants i.e. the accused before the trial court were entitled to use the copies of the statement of those prosecution witnesses who were examined before the Thakkar Commission for purposes of cross examination or to use the report of the Commission or whether it could be handed over or given over to the accused for whatever purpose they intended to use. The learned Counsel for the parties on this aspect of the matter have referred to number of decisions of various High Courts and also some of the decisions of the English courts. They are being dealt with in the judgment elsewhere as in my opinion it is not necessary to go into all of them except examining the provisions of the Act itself. 35A. They are being dealt with in the judgment elsewhere as in my opinion it is not necessary to go into all of them except examining the provisions of the Act itself. 35A. Section 6 of the Commission of Enquiries Act reads:- No statement made by any person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in any civil or criminal proceedings except a prosecution for giving false evidence of such statement. 36. On analysis of the provision, it will be found that there are restrictions on the use of a statement made by a witness before the Commission. First is "Shall subject him to ...any civil or criminal proceedings except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement." The second restriction, according to me, is spelt out from the words "or be used against him in any civil or criminal proceedings." Thus if we examine the two restrictions stated above it appears that a statement given in a Commission can not be used to subject the witness to any civil or criminal proceedings nor it can be used against him in any civil or criminal proceedings and in my opinion it is in the context of these restrictions that we will have to examine the provisions of the Evidence Act which permit the use of a previous statement of a witness and for what purpose. Section 145 read with Section 155(3) and Section 157 are the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads: Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing-A witness may be cross examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. This provision permits that a witness may be cross-examined as to the previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing relevant to the matters in question without such writing being shown to him or being proved. This provision permits that a witness may be cross-examined as to the previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing relevant to the matters in question without such writing being shown to him or being proved. But if it is intended to contradict him by the writing his attention must be drawn to those parts of the writing; and it can be proved. A witness could be cross examined on his previous statement but if a contradiction is sought to be proved then that portion of the previous statement must be shown to him and proved in due course. [21] In paras 37 and 38 of the report, after referring the Sections 155 and 157 of the Evidence Act, it was held in para 39 of the report as under : '39. To my mind, there could be no other purpose for which the appellants could use the previous statements of those witnesses. Contradiction could be used either to impeach his credit or discredit him or to pull down or bring down the reliability of the witness. These purposes for which the previous statements are required could not be said to be purposes which were not against the witness. The two aspects of the restrictions which Section 6 contemplates and have been discussed earlier are the only two aspects which could be the result of the use of these statements. I cannot find any other use of such previous statements in criminal proceedings. It is therefore clear that without going into the wider questions even a plain reading of Section 6 as discussed above will prohibit the use of the previous statements at the trial either for the purposes of the cross examination to contradict the witness or to impeach his credit. The only permissible use which has been provided under Section 6 is which has been discussed earlier and therefore the Courts below were right in not granting the relief to the accused." [22] The view taken in Dalmia's case was affirmed in Kehar Singh's case : "242. There is, therefore, much to be said for the observation made in Dalmia's case and indeed that is the proper construction to be attributed to the language of Section 6 of the Act. There is, therefore, much to be said for the observation made in Dalmia's case and indeed that is the proper construction to be attributed to the language of Section 6 of the Act. I respectfully affirm and re-emphasise that view." [23] In view of dictum of Apex Court in Dalmia's case affirmed in Kehar Singh's case, it cannot be disputed that the statement made by any person before the Commission of Enquiry under Section 6 of the Act is wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings civil or criminal except a prosecution for giving false evidence of such statement. [24] It would be advantageous to refer paras 11 and 12 of the decision of the Apex Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. N.R. Vairamani and Anr., 2004 8 SCC 579 on precedents : "11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." [25] The objection of prosecution that accused cannot use the previous statements for purpose of contradiction is based on the observation made by Apex Court in Kehar Singh's case, has been sustained by learned Trial Court vide impugned order without appreciating the context in which it was so held. [26] At this stage, it would be appropriate to take note of the fact that in Kehar Singh's case, the prosecution did not rely upon any affidavit filed or statement made before the Commissions. It was the accused who requested for the copies of the statement of witnesses made before the Commission, to contradict the witness with reference to such statements as part of defence. Therefore, the facts of the case before this Court are altogether different. It was the accused who requested for the copies of the statement of witnesses made before the Commission, to contradict the witness with reference to such statements as part of defence. Therefore, the facts of the case before this Court are altogether different. [27] The contention of learned Senior Advocate for CBI that the affidavits filed and statement made before the Commissions are admissible in examination-in-chief of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur but accused is precluded from contradicting the witness on Ex.PW1/A to C during cross examination in view of bar of Section 6 of Commissions of Inquiry Act, is devoid of any merit as no examination-in-chief which is not allowed to be subjected to cross examination can be read in evidence, since a person against whom a deposition is made/examination-in-chief is directed, has a legal right to cross examine the witness who has deposed against him. [28] Neither the part of examination-in-chief which referred to affidavits Ex.PW1/A & B and statement Ex.PW1/C, nor these documents can be read in evidence against the accused unless he is given an opportunity to cross examine PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur with respect to affidavits filed and statement made before the Commissions. [29] The case before this Court has peculiar dimensions. The petitioner has placed on record the copy of the report under Section 173 CrPC in this case alongwith the list of witnesses and the list of documents. Not only in the charge-sheet, reference to the statement of Smt. Jagdish Kaur and the affidavits filed by her before the Commissions is made, in the list of witnesses also, she is named as prosecution witness at serial No.1. In the list of documents, the prosecution has relied upon at : 'Sl. No.15 - 'File No.W-136 DOH : 08.1.2002 of Justice Nanavati Commission of Inquiry containing original affidavits of Smt. Jagdish Kaur filed before Nanavati Commission, statement recorded before commission and copy of affidavit dated 17.07.1985 filed before Justice Rangnath Mishra Commission, M.No.292/08 (12 pages)'. [30] It is an admitted position that the affidavits filed and statement made before the Commissions by PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur are the foundation of the case of prosecution. [30] It is an admitted position that the affidavits filed and statement made before the Commissions by PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur are the foundation of the case of prosecution. The witness Smt. Jagdish Kaur (PW-1) has extensively referred to the affidavits as well as her statement before the Commissions with a view to corroborate her deposition during trial despite the provision contained in Section 6 of Commissions of Inquiry Act and the dictum of Apex Court in Dalmia's case reaffirmed in Kehar Singh's case that such statement is wholly inadmissible in evidence in any future proceedings civil or criminal. [31] However, in the present case, the prosecution has extensively relied upon the affidavits filed and statement made before the Commissions. These are the documents relied upon by the prosecution to prove the charges against the accused. Prosecution has led evidence against the accused and proved these documents in the examination-in-chief of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur who referred to these documents to corroborate her deposition. No objection was raised by any of the party regarding admissibility of Ex.PW1/A to C either during examination-in-chief or when she was cross examined on 03.07.2010, 08.07.2010 and 09.07.2010. Now therefore prosecution is estopped from raising objection regarding cross examination of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur with respect to Ex.PW1/A to C since this will amount to evidence, which has not been subjected to cross examination being read against the accused. [32] It is settled position of law that no evidence can be read against the accused if not subjected to cross examination. The implication would be that the affidavits Ex.PW1/A & B and statement Ex.PW1/C and the deposition to this effect will not be read in favour of prosecution and against the accused. [33] During the course of arguments before this court, learned counsel for the petitioner has specifically stated that PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur is not required to be recalled for cross examination with respect to Ex.PW1/A to C. Thus, the only question to be determined is about the cross examination which has already taken place albeit partly without objection from the prosecution and partly subject to objection recorded on 12.07.2010. In fact, that part of evidence has already been put to the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC as incriminating circumstance. In fact, that part of evidence has already been put to the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC as incriminating circumstance. The affidavits Ex.PW1/A & B and statement Ex.PW1/C of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur and her deposition in this regard will either be admissible as a whole i.e. examination-in-chief and cross examination in respect of Ex.PW1/A and C or it will be wholly inadmissible. It cannot be admissible in examination-in-chief and inadmissible in cross examination of same witness. [34] Accused has a right to get a fair trial. It is essential that the accused is given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the trial. He is also permitted to confront the witnesses and other evidence that the prosecution is relying upon. Since it is the duty of the Court to ensure that accused gets a fair trial, he has to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself by permitting him to confront the witnesses and other evidence relied upon by the prosecution. Learned Trial Court by curtailing this right of the accused had denied him his right to have a fair trial. [35] The impugned order dated 02.06.2010 is set aside. It is directed that whole of the examination-in-chief and cross examination of PW-1 Smt. Jagdish Kaur with respect to Ex.PW1/A to C will be read in evidence. The question put to the accused/petition in his statement under Section 313 CrPC and answers given by him with reference to said affidavits and statement shall also be taken into consideration. “ 37. The peculiar features in the Delhi High Court decision only in the context of the facts may be noted as under; (I) The affidavits filed and the statement made before the commissions by PW No.1 was the foundation of the case of the prosecution. (ii) The witness-PW No.1 extensively referred to the affidavits as well as her statement before the commissions with a view to corroborate her deposition during the trial despite the provision contained in section 6 of the Act. The documents, in the form of affidavits and statement made before the Commissions, were relied upon by the prosecution to prove the charges against the accused. (iii) No objection was raised by any of the parties regarding the admissibility of the documents either during the examination in chief or cross-examination. The documents, in the form of affidavits and statement made before the Commissions, were relied upon by the prosecution to prove the charges against the accused. (iii) No objection was raised by any of the parties regarding the admissibility of the documents either during the examination in chief or cross-examination. (iv) The court took the view that no evidence could be read against the accused if not subjected to cross-examination. According to the Delhi High Court, the implication would be that the affidavits and the statement and the deposition in that regard would not be read in favour of the prosecution and against the accused. 38. I am of the view that even on facts, the case of the Delhi High Court is distinguishable. In my view, no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Trial Court in rejecting the application Exh.265. The Trial Court has assigned cogent reasons relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kehar Singh (supra). I see no good reason to disturb the order in exercise of my supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 39. With all humility at my command, it is difficult for me to follow the dictum as laid down in the Delhi High Court decision. The Delhi High Court decision proceeds more on the test of prejudice and the principle that it is a right of the accused to have a fair trial. However, once the statement makes it very clear and, more particularly, when interpreted by the Supreme Court that the statement made before the Commission cannot be used for the purpose of contradiction, then the same should put an end to the entire debate. 40. It is a cardinal principle of construction that if the words of the statute are plain and unambiguous, it should be given its literal meaning. Tindal, CJ, in Sussex Peerage s, case, observed ? that "if the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense". Tindal, CJ, in Sussex Peerage s, case, observed ? that "if the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense". Again, VISCOUNT SIMONDS, L.C., in 1940, Appeal Case 1014, which was approvingly quoted in A.I.R. 1987 Supreme Court 117, (Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram), observed that the golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie give their ordinary meaning and the aforesaid principle should not be departed unless it can be Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.146 of 2014 (8) 35 shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires different meaning. 41. In the case at hand, what is sought to be relied upon, is the fact that the police statement of the witness recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C is, by and large, the same like the statement made by the witness before the Commission and secondly in the second statement of the witness under section 161 of the Cr.P.C., certain inconsistencies emerging in the first statement and the statement recorded before the Commission is sought to be explained. Indisputably, in the case on hand, the prosecution does not rely upon any of the statements made before the commission. The only thing highlighted, very vehemently, is the inconsistencies between the statements of the witness recorded before the commission and before the Trial Court. 42. The dictum as laid by the Supreme Court in the case of Kehar Singh (supra) is very clear. The Supreme Court had made it very clear that the plain reading of section 6 prohibits use of the previous statements at the trial either for the purposes of cross-examination to contradict the witness or to impeach his credit. 43. Section 6 of the Commissions of inquiry Act guarantees immunity to a witness. It clearly stipulates that a person making a statement in course of examination before the Commission, enjoys certain protection, inasmuch as no statement made by a person in course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him, in an civil or criminal proceeding. This protection is guaranteed in order to create confidence on the person to speak truth nothing but the truth before the Commission and not to hide anything. This protection is guaranteed in order to create confidence on the person to speak truth nothing but the truth before the Commission and not to hide anything. At the same time, the person is also cautioned that taking advantage of such immunity if he makes a false statement before the Commission, he would be prosecuted. The "statement" as per Section 6 of the Act is explained to be a "statement" made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer. Perusal of Sections 145, 155 and 157 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates that a previous statement can only be used for contradiction or for corroboration. The restrictions imposed under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act stipulating that a statement made by a person before the Commission cannot be used either for the purpose of contradiction in cross-examination of the said witness or for the purpose of impeaching his credibility, is aimed to protect the witness and to provide immunity to the said person. 44. In the result, this application fails and is hereby rejected.