JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment of acquittal dated 1.3.2012, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No. I, Dehra, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh in Cr. Case No. 122-II/2010, whereby respondent-accused came to be acquitted of notice of accusation put to him under Sections 279, 337 and 338 IPC and Section 184 of Motor Vehicles Act, appellant-State has approached this Court by way of instant appeal. 2. Necessary facts shorn of unnecessary details are that complainant Asha Kumari, PW-3 got her statement recorded under Section 154 CrPC that on 2.5.2010, at about 5.00 pm at Maleta, accused was driving motor cycle No. DL-35BK-2891 on public highway rashly, negligently and in dangerous manner, which resulted in causing simple and grievous injuries to the accused, when aforesaid motor cycle being driven by accused, dashed against Bus No. HP-54A-5953. Accused was shifted to FRU Dehra for medical treatment from where Medical Officer telephonically informed the police station about the accident, on the basis of which Rapat Ext. PW-7/A was recorded. After completion of the investigation , police presented Challan in the competent Court of law against the accused under Sections 279, 337 and 338 IPC and Section 184 of Motor Vehicles Act, who being satisfied that prima facie case exists against the accused, put notice of accusation to him, under aforesaid provisions of law, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Prosecution with a view to prove its case, examined as many as seven witnesses, whereas accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.PC, denied the case of the prosecution in toto and claimed himself to be innocent. However, the fact remains that he did not lead any evidence in his defence. Subsequently, learned trial Court, vide judgment dated 1.3.2012, acquitted the respondent-accused. In the aforesaid background, appellant-State has approached this Court, by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein conviction of respondent-accused, after setting aside impugned judgment of acquittal. 3. Mr. P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General, while inviting attention of this Court to the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by learned trial Court, vehemently argued that same is not sustainable in the eye of law, as the same is not based upon correct appreciation of evidence as such, same deserves to be quashed and set aside. Mr. 3. Mr. P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General, while inviting attention of this Court to the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by learned trial Court, vehemently argued that same is not sustainable in the eye of law, as the same is not based upon correct appreciation of evidence as such, same deserves to be quashed and set aside. Mr. Negi, further contended that if judgment passed by learned trial Court is read juxtaposing evidence adduced by prosecution, it clearly emerges that the learned Court below has not read evidence in its perspective, as a result of which, erroneous findings have come on record and accused, who at the relevant time, was driving his motor cycle rashly and negligently, has been wrongly acquitted. With a view to substantiate his aforesaid argument, Mr. Negi, while inviting attention of this Court to the statement of PW-3 Asha Kumari and PW-1 Jagdish Chand contended that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt that accused was driing motor cycle rashly and negligently, as such, there was no occasion for the learned Court below to acquit him of the charges framed against him. Lastly, Mr. Negi, contended that there is no dispute at all with regard to accident of offending vehicle being driven by respondent-accused, as such, judgment passed by trial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Mr. Kishore Pundir, learned counsel representing the respondent-accused, supported the judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court and contended that there is no illegality or infirmity in the same , which is based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by prosecution. Learned counsel representing the respondent-accused further stated that all the material prosecution witnesses turned hostile and none of the prosecution witnesses categorically stated that at the relevant time, offending vehicle was being driven by respondent-accused in a rash and negligent manner, as such, learned Court below rightly acquitted the respondent-accused. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 6. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully. 6. During proceedings of the case, this Court had an occasion to peruse evidence led on record by prosecution, perusal whereof does not persuade this Court to agree with the contention of learned Additional Advocate General that learned Court below while acquitting respondent-accused misread, misinterpreted or misconstrued the evidence adduced on record by the prosecution, rather, this Court, after having carefully gone through the evidence available on record, has no hesitation to conclude that prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the offending vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently as such, there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgment of acquittal recorded by learned Court below. In the case at hand, as clearly emerges from the record, all the material prosecution witnesses i.e. PW-3 Asha Kumari, PW-1 Jagdish Chand and PW-2 Malkit Singh have categorically stated that sand/gravel was stacked on the spot of alleged occurrence and when respondent-accused applied brakes, motor cycle skidded, as a result of which accused suffered simple and grievous injuries. PW-2 Malkit Singh, one of the eye witnesses, as well as passenger of the bus, categorically denied the case of the prosecution and stated that motorcyclist i.e. accused fell down on the road and he could not state that due to whose fault accident occurred. Even cross-examination conducted upon these witnesses, nowhere suggests that prosecution was able to extract anything contrary to what they deposed in their examination-in-chief. Sunny Kumar, conductor of the bus turned hostile by stating that offending motor cycle skidded on the gravel/sand stacked on the spot whereafter, motor cycle dashed against the bus. He also stated that he could not say that due to whose fault, accident occurred. Even cross-examination conducted on this witness, nowhere suggests that prosecution was able to extract anything contrary to what was stated in examination-in-chief by this witness. 7. PW-1 Jagdish Chand, Driver, deposed before the learned Court below that accused dashed his motor cycle with the bus while making an attempt to overtake one Sumo vehicle, but it has categorically come in his cross-examination that grave/sand was stacked on the road and he also admitted suggestion made to him that motor cyclist applied brakes and motor cycle skidded and dashed against bus. 8. 8. PW-3 Asha Kumari also corroborated version put forth by PW-1, that accused while making an attempt to overtake Sumo vehicle, in speed, fell down and suffered injury but in her cross-examination, she also admitted that gravel/sand was staked on the road and possibly motor cycle skidded on gravel stacked on the spot. 9. A joint reading of the depositions made by aforesaid material prosecution witnesses, clearly suggests that none of the prosecution witnesses, categorically stated anything with regard to rash and negligent driving on the part of respondent-accused at the time of alleged accident. Similarly, none of the prosecution witnesses stated anything specific with regard to speed of the motor cycle, which dashed against the bus. 10. Apart from above, none of the prosecution witnesses has specifically stated with regard to speed of the vehicle and as such, no finding could be returned by the court below on mere statement of complainant that at that relevant time vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently. Had any prosecution witness stated something with regard to specific speed, it could be the best piece of evidence for the Court to ascertain the genuineness and correctness of the claim of the complainant with regard to rash and negligent driving of the petitioner-accused. 11. By now, it is well settled that specific evidence is required to be adduced on record by prosecution to prove rash and negligent driving, if any, on the part of the accused. Mere allegations are not sufficient to hold accused guilty of having committed offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 IPC and Section 184 of Motor Vehicles Act. 12. At this stage, reliance is placed on judgment rendered our own High Court in case titled Akshay Kumar v. State of HP, Latest HP LJ 2009 HP 72, relevant para of which reads as under:- “8. 12. At this stage, reliance is placed on judgment rendered our own High Court in case titled Akshay Kumar v. State of HP, Latest HP LJ 2009 HP 72, relevant para of which reads as under:- “8. In fact, an injury shall be deemed to be negligently caused whomsoever it is willfully caused, but results from want of reasonable caution, in the undertaking and doing of any act either without such skill, knowledge or ability as is suitable to consequences of such act, or when it results from the not exercising reasonable manner of using them or from the doing of any act without using reasonable caution for the prevention of mischief, of from the omitting to do any act which is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury, but without an intention to cause injury or knowledge that it will be probably caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Rash and negligent act may be described as criminal rashness negligence. It must be more than mere carelessness or error of judgment.” The courts below did not appreciate the above facts that there was debris on the side of the road on the curve due to the slip, while negotiating the curve, as stated above, some witnesses have admitted that the danga gave way to the bus which caused the accident and the rash and negligent driving by the petitioner is also denied, therefore, it find that the findings of quilt arrived at against the petitioner by both the courts below were not based upon legal and proper appreciation of evidence. In the circumstances aforesaid, the petitioner cannot be said to have criminal rashness or negligence, thus he is entitled for the benefit of doubt as two views were deducible from the evidence on record.” 13. Reliance is placed upon judgment of this Court reported in Gurcharan Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh 1990 (2) ACJ 598, the relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced here-in-below:- “14. Adverting to the facts of this case, it is in evidence that the truck in question was loaded with fertilizer weighing 90 quintals. Obviously, it cannot be said that the speed of the vehicle was very fast. Secondly, it is a State Highway and not a National Highway. Adverting to the facts of this case, it is in evidence that the truck in question was loaded with fertilizer weighing 90 quintals. Obviously, it cannot be said that the speed of the vehicle was very fast. Secondly, it is a State Highway and not a National Highway. Therefore, the speed on this account as well cannot be considered to be high. “15. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving in high speed but it has not been said as to what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving in a high speed is neither a proper and legal evidence on high speed nor in any way indicates thereby the rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. Further, there are no skid marks which eliminate the evidence of high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of accident. This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance looking to the two points; viz, the first impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near about the place of curve which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no evidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW7, Chander Kanta, PW8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane which was joining the main road in question. Rather the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane which was joining the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than the parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. Minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record, discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why in their deposition they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that horn by him and started crossing the road which could not be seen by him and the result was the accident and the death of the child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slow he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident has actually taken place, has not been clearly and comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the act of the driver. Their versions are, therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact that the child had been finished.” 14. Apart from above, this Court, after having carefully perused evidence available on record is persuaded to agree with the contentions of Mr. Kishore Pundir, learned counsel representing the respondent-accused that no reliance could be placed upon the version put forth by these witnesses since there are material inconsistencies and contradictions in their statements. 15. Apart from above, this Court, after having carefully perused evidence available on record is persuaded to agree with the contentions of Mr. Kishore Pundir, learned counsel representing the respondent-accused that no reliance could be placed upon the version put forth by these witnesses since there are material inconsistencies and contradictions in their statements. 15. By now it is well settled that in a criminal trial evidence of the eye witness requires a careful assessment and needs to be evaluated for its creditability. Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the well established principle that “no man is guilty until proved so”, utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with the situation where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the Court. Most importantly, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that there must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistency in evidence amongst all the witnesses. In nutshell, it can be said that evidence in criminal cases needs to be evaluated on touchstone of consistency. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in C. Magesh and others versus State of Karnataka (2010) 5 Supreme Court Cases 645, wherein it has been held as under:- “45. It may be mentioned herein that in criminal jurisprudence, evidence has to be evaluated on the touchstone of consistency. Needless to emphasis, consistency is the keyword for upholding the conviction of an accused. In this regard it is to be noted that this Court in the case titled Surja Singh v. State of U.P. (2008)16 SCC 686 : 2008(11) SCR 286 has held:-( SCC p.704, para 14) “14. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witness is held to be creditworthy; ..the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” In a criminal trial, evidence of the eye witness requires a careful assessment and must be evaluated for its creditability. Since the fundamental aspect of criminal jurisprudence rests upon the stated principle that “no man is guilty until proven so,” hence utmost caution is required to be exercised in dealing with situation where there are multiple testimonies and equally large number of witnesses testifying before the Court. There must be a string that should join the evidence of all the witnesses and thereby satisfying the test of consistence in evidence amongst all the witnesses.” 16. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made herein above, this Court sees no reason to differ with the judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned Court below, which appears to be based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record. 17. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. Judgment passed by the learned trial Court is upheld. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. Record of the Court below received by this Court, be returned forthwith.