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Allahabad High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 870 (ALL)

AMBRISH KUMAR SAXENA v. STATE OF U. P.

2018-04-11

IRSHAD ALI

body2018
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Irshad Ali, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner Sri R.C. Saxena, Sri Ashok Kumar Shukla, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 and learned Additional Chief Standing counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 2. Learned counsel for the respondents raised preliminary objection on the basis of the report submitted by the stamp reporting section of this Court that the writ petition is not maintainable before this Court. 3. On the issue of preliminary objection in regard to the maintainability of writ petition before this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner Sri R.C. Saxena submitted that by adding Clause 1(A) in Article 226 by Constitution (15th) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976, the High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue writs to any person or authority, in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories. He further submitted that while exercise of power of jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, arose whole or in part, the writ petition can be entertained. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgement in the case of Naval Kishore Sharma v. Union of India and others decided on 7.8.2014 in Civil Appeal No. 7414 of 2014 and he placed reliance in paragraphs 10, 11, 13 to 18 and 20 which are quoted herein below : 10. The interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid decisions resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction. As a result, Clause 1(A) was inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (15th) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended Clause (2) now reads as under: “226. Power of the High Courts to issue certain writs—(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) xxxxx (4) xxxxx” 11. On a plain reading of the amended provisions in Clause (2), it is clear that now High Court can issue a writ when the person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. 13. In the case of State of Rajasthan and others v. M/s. Swaika Properties and another, (1985) 3 SCC 217 , the fact was that the respondent- Company having its registered office in Calcutta owned certain land on the outskirts of Jaipur City was served with notice for acquisition of land under Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. Notice was duly served on the Company at its registered office at Calcutta. The Company, first appeared before the Special Court and finally the Calcutta High Court by filing a writ petition challenging the notification of acquisition. The matter ultimately came before this Court to answer a question as to whether the service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act at the registered office of the Respondent in Calcutta was an integral part of cause of action and was it sufficient to invest the Calcutta High Court with a jurisdiction to entertain the petition challenging the impugned notification. Answering the question this Court held : “7. Answering the question this Court held : “7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the petition filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution or to make the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order restraining the appellants from taking any steps to take possession of the land acquired. Under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the appellants were entitled to require the respondents to surrender or deliver possession of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so, take immediate steps to secure such possession under sub-section (6) thereof. 8. The expression “cause of action” is tersely defined in Mulla’s Code of Civil Procedure: “The ‘’cause of action’ means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court.” In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(1) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The notification dated February 8, 1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose.” 14. This provision was again considered by this Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and others, (1994) 4 SCC 711 . In this case the petitioner Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) through its consultant Engineers India Limited (EIL) issued an advertisement in the newspaper inviting tenders for setting up of Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit in Gujarat mentioning that the tenders containing offers were to be communicated to EIL, New Delhi. After the final decision was taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi, the respondent NICCO moved the Calcutta High Court praying that ONGC be restrained from awarding the contract to any other party. It was pleaded in the petition that NICCO came to know of the tender from the publication in the “Times of India” within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court by setting aside the order passed by the Calcutta High Court came to the following conclusion : “6. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.” 15. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and another, (2004) 6 SCC 254 , this Court elaborately discussed Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly the meaning of the word ‘’cause of action’ with reference to Section 20(c) and Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and observed : “9. Although in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts. 10. Keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter.” Their Lordships further observed as under : “29. 10. Keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter.” Their Lordships further observed as under : “29. In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, now if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh has, thus, no application. 30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.” 16. In the case of Union of India and others v. Adani Exports Ltd. and another, (2002) 1 SCC 567 , this Court held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide the dispute and the entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis i.e. involved in the case. This Court observed: “17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no [pic]bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the Courts at Ahmedabad.” 17. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and another, (2006) 6 SCC 207 , answering a similar question this Court observed that on a plain reading of Clause(2) of Article 226 it is manifestly clear that the High Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose if the cause of action in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territory. In para 7 this Court observed : “7. The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court’s jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or threat thereof.” 18. In order to maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court’s jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or threat thereof.” 18. In the case of Rajendra Chingaravelu v. R.K. Mishra, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax and others, (2010) 1 SCC 457 , this Court while considering the scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, particularly the cause of action in maintaining a writ petition, held as under: “9. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that as the seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the appellant could not maintain the writ petition before it. The High Court did not examine whether any part of cause of action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action arises wholly or in part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction of the cause of action (that bundle of facts which gives a petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of that State will have jurisdiction. xxxxxx 11. Normally, we would have set aside the order and remitted the matter to the High Court for decision on merits. But from the persuasive submissions of the appellant, who appeared in person on various dates of hearing, two things stood out. Firstly, it was clear that the main object of the petition was to ensure that at least in future, passengers like him are not put to unnecessary harassment or undue hardship at the airports. He wants a direction for issuance of clear guidelines and instructions to the inspecting officers, and introduction of definite and efficient verification/investigation procedures. He wants changes in the present protocol where the officers are uncertain of what to do and seek instructions and indefinitely wait for clearances from higher-ups for each and every routine step, resulting in the detention of passengers for hours and hours. In short, he wants the enquiries, verifications and investigations to be efficient, passenger-friendly and Courteous. He wants changes in the present protocol where the officers are uncertain of what to do and seek instructions and indefinitely wait for clearances from higher-ups for each and every routine step, resulting in the detention of passengers for hours and hours. In short, he wants the enquiries, verifications and investigations to be efficient, passenger-friendly and Courteous. Secondly, he wants the Department/officers concerned to acknowledge that he was unnecessarily harassed.” 20. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the documents relied upon by the appellant. Indisputably, the appellant reported sickness on account of various ailments including difficulty in breathing. He was referred to hospital. Consequently, he was signed off for further medical treatment. Finally, the respondent permanently declared the appellant unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscles disease). As a result, the Shipping Department of the Government of India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling the registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the letter was sent to the appellant at his native place in Bihar where he was staying after he was found medically unfit. It further appears that the appellant sent a representation from his home in the State of Bihar to the respondent claiming disability compensation. The said representation was replied by the respondent, which was addressed to him on his home address in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation. It is further evident that when the appellant was signed off and declared medically unfit, he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made all claims and filed representation from his home address at Gaya and those letters and representations were entertained by the respondents and replied and a decision on those representations were communicated to him on his home address in Bihar. Admittedly, appellant was suffering from serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy) and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place, wherefrom he had been making all correspondence with regard to his disability compensation. Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together, a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him from disability compensation. 4. He next submitted that there are bundle of facts which is necessary for consideration of territorial jurisdiction arises in a particular cases. Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together, a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him from disability compensation. 4. He next submitted that there are bundle of facts which is necessary for consideration of territorial jurisdiction arises in a particular cases. He further place reliance upon the judgements which are herein below : (1) Appeal (Civil) No. 6320 - 6321 of 2000, Union of India and others v. Adani Exports Ltd. and another, decided on 31.10.2001- para 2,3,4 of the internal page 5 of the judgement. (2) Appeal (Civil) No. 1426 of 2007, Alchemist Ltd. and another v. State Bank of Sikkim and others, decided on 16.3.2007 - Para 2 of internal page 6 of judgement - in absence of material facts no cause of action accrue. (3) Appeal (Civil) No. 9159 of 2003, M/S. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and another decided on 28.4.2004 - Last para of internal page 2 - Ground pleaded in writ petition - cause of action. (4) Rakesh Dhar Tripathi v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 All. 47 - page 2 and 3 (Def. of cause of action) and page 5 (irrespective of residence / relief) (5) Om Prakash Dubey v. Union of India Special Appeal No. 823 of 2010 decided on 30.9.2010, page 2 (litigant has right to choose) and page 6 (State Government fixed qualification & relaxation). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petitioner is the dependent of freedom fighter and is resident of Farrukhabad and further claimed relaxation in age on the ground of discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as quashing of the advertisement dated 15.3.2018 contained as Annexure-1 to the writ petition to the extent it provides qualification for Assistant Teacher in English subject as Bachelor’s degree with English Literature. He next submitted that the relaxation in age can be granted by the State Government U.P. at Lucknow. Thus, part of the cause of action arise at Lucknow. Thus the writ petition is maintainable to this Court. 6. He next submitted that the relaxation in age can be granted by the State Government U.P. at Lucknow. Thus, part of the cause of action arise at Lucknow. Thus the writ petition is maintainable to this Court. 6. On the other hand learned Additional Chief Standing counsel and Sri Ashok Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to get benefit of age relaxation in view of the fact that U.P. Public Services (Reservation For Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighters And Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 does not prescribed any relaxation in this regard. This is not entitled to get age relaxation from State Government. He placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgement of this Court passed in Writ-A No. 28971 of 2015 decided on 21.5.2015 wherein the factum of non providing age relaxation to the dependent, freedom fighter was considered and has been held as under : “Prescribing of age limit for a giving post, as also deciding the extent to which any relaxation can be given in age limit, are essentially matters of policy as per the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Shiv Bachan Rai, 2001 (9) SCC 356 . Once a policy decision is there not to accord any age relaxation to the category of Dependants of Freedom Fighter then we in exercise of our authority of judicial review, give a contrary direction. Once such is the factual situation that has so emerged that there is no provision for according age relaxation then on the face value, once petitioner is over age no relief and reprieve for according age relaxation to the petitioner can be accorded as according of any relief to the petitioner would amount to altering the term and condition of the advertisement in question.” 7. In the present case, the petitioner is challenging the advertisement issued on 15.2.2018 by the respondent No. 3 U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad inviting applications for selection and appointment on the post of Assistant Teachers wherein qualification has been prescribed as per appendix-A of Chapter-2 Regulation-1 of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. In the present case, the petitioner is challenging the advertisement issued on 15.2.2018 by the respondent No. 3 U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad inviting applications for selection and appointment on the post of Assistant Teachers wherein qualification has been prescribed as per appendix-A of Chapter-2 Regulation-1 of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Thus, if there is no provision in regard to the age relaxation under the aforesaid rules which has been affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court, no part of cause of action arisen at Lucknow to file the present writ petition. 8. Admittedly, the advertisement for selection and appointment has been issued by the U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad. Thus, on the basis of non existing provision for the grant of relaxation in age to the candidate of freedom fighter it cannot be said that part of cause of action for the grant of relaxation in age arisen at Lucknow. Thus, nothing is to be decided by the State Government at Lucknow. 9. On perusal of the judgement relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner shows that the same do not in any manner help the petitioner, in invocation of jurisdiciton to challenge of advertisement at Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court, the Apex Court has specifically held that at least some part of cause of action should have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court to exercise its jurisdiction. In the present case, the advertisement has been issued for selection and appointment at Allahabd by the U.P. Public service Commission, Allahabad which is not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 10. In case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra v. Union of India and others, (2005) 1 UPLBEC 108 , the Full Bench of this Court in paras-39, 40 and 41 has observed as under : “39. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. 40. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. 40. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the Chief of Army Staff can only be sued either at Delhi where he is located or at a place where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 41. We may mention that a “cause of action” is the bundle of facts which, taken with the law applicable., gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. However, it must include some act done by the defendant, since in the absence of an act, no cause of action can possibly occur.” 11. In case of U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P., (1995) 4 SCC 738 , the Apex Court in para-14 has held as under : “14. .....The territorial jurisdiction of a Court and the “cause of action” are interlinked. To decide the question of territorial jurisdiction it is necessary to find out the place where the “cause of action” arose. We, with respect, reiterate that the law laid down by a four-Judge Bench of this Court in Nasiruddin case holds good even today despite the incorporation of an Explanation to Section 141 to the Code of Civil Procedure.” 12. In case of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 7 SCC 640 , the Apex Court in para-38 has held as under : “38. “Cause of action” is a phenomenon well understood in legal parlance. Mohapatra, J. has well delineated the import of the said expression by referring to the celebrated lexicographies. The collocation of the words “cause of action, wholly or in part, arises” seems to have been lifted from Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which section also deals with the jurisdictional aspect of the Courts. As per that section the suit could be instituted in a Court within the legal limits of whose jurisdiction the “cause of action wholly or part arises.......” 13. In case of Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2007) 6 SCC 769 , the Apex Court in paras-17 & 41 has held as under : “17. As per that section the suit could be instituted in a Court within the legal limits of whose jurisdiction the “cause of action wholly or part arises.......” 13. In case of Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2007) 6 SCC 769 , the Apex Court in paras-17 & 41 has held as under : “17. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India as also Clause (2) of Article 226 thereof, the High Court would exercise its discretionary jurisdiction as also power to issue writ of certiorari in respect of the orders passed by the Subordinate Courts within its territorial jurisdiction or if any cause of action has arisen therewithin but the same tests cannot be applied when the appellate Court exercises a jurisdiction over Tribunal situated in more than one State. In such a situation, in our opinion, the High Court situated in the State where the first Court is located should be considered to be the appropriate appellate authority. Code of Civil Procedure did not contemplate such a situation. It provides for jurisdiction of each Court. Even a District Judge must exercise its jurisdiction only within the territorial limits of a State. It is inconceivable under the Code of Civil Procedure that the jurisdiction of the District Court would be exercisable beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the District, save and except in such matters where the law specifically provides therefor. 41. Keeping in view the expression “cause of action” used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction thereof accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter though the doctrine of forum convenience may also have to be considered.” 14. Since the cause of action regarding the selection proceeding which has been initiated by U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahaabd on 15.3.2018. Thus, no cause of action arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court as territorial jurisdiction of the Court has been defined under the relevant provisions of law. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 15. Therefore, I decline to entertain this writ petition and the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents is tenable, accordingly this Court refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and direct the petitioner to approach appropriate forum having jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 15. Therefore, I decline to entertain this writ petition and the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents is tenable, accordingly this Court refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and direct the petitioner to approach appropriate forum having jurisdiction. 16. In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. It shall be open for the petitioner to file appropriate petition before the Court having territorial jurisdiction.