Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 875 (GAU)

Priya Orang Louis v. State of Arunachal Pradesh

2018-05-29

SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO

body2018
ORDER : S. Serto, J. Heard Mr. T.T. Tara, learned counsel for the petitioners and also heard Ms. M. Tang, learned Addl. PP appearing for the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 2. This is an application under section 482 of Cr.P.C., 1973 praying for quashing and setting aside the Charge-Sheet No. 97/17, dated 22.12.2017 of Women Police Station Case No. 35/17, registered under Sections 376 (2) (i)/506 of IPC read with Section 6 of POCSO Act which was submitted before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Capital Complex at Yupia, Arunachal Pradesh on 17.04.2017. 3. The brief facts leading to filing of this petition are that- On 17.04.2017, the petitioner No. 1/the victim lodged a complaint before the Officer-in-Charge of Women Police Station, Itanagar stating that she had been raped by the petitioner No. 2 in whose house she was employed as a maid servant. Following the submission of the complaint an FIR case was registered under Section 376 (2)(i)/506 of IPC read with Section 6 of POCSO Act on the same day and investigation was conducted on the allegation leveled against the petitioner No. 2. In the course of investigation, the statement of the petitioner No. 1 was recorded both under Section 161 & 164 Cr.P.C. She was also examined by a Medical Board for determination of her age and as per the findings of the Medical Board, the age of the petitioner No. 1/the victim was stated to be in between 14-16 years. After investigation was completed, the Investigating Officer submitted the Charge-Sheet under sections law mentioned above before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Yupia. 4. While the Charge-Sheet is pending for committal to the Court of learned Special Judge. POCSO both the accused and the victim have approached this Court by filing the present petition praying for quashing and setting aside the Charge Sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer. 5. Mr. T. T. Tara, learned counsel has submitted that since the parties have come to a compromise settlement, it would be futile to go ahead with the trial of the case and besides it would help to protect the harmony of the family which has been restored in the course of time if the matter is let to rest at this juncture. Therefore, this Court may be gracious enough to quash and set aside the Charge-Sheet in order to avoid abuse of process of the Court and for fomenting the peace and tranquillity in the family. 6. Mr. Tara sought to support his plea by citing judgment of this Court passed in Crl. Petn. 9 (AP) 2017, particularly, to 2nd paragraph of page of the judgment. The contents of the 2nd paragraph reads as follows: In (2014) 9 SCC 653 Yogendra Yadav & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand and Another; it has been held that the High Court can quash criminal proceeding under section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 even though offence alleged is non-compoundable if the parties have amicably settled their dispute and victim has no objection. Further; this would depend on the facts of the each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude/grape offences like rape, murder cannot be effected by quash proceeding because they have harmful effect on the society and are not restricted to two individuals or groups. However; where the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature not effecting public peace or tranquillity and quashing of proceedings on account of compromise would secure ends of justice, it may quash the same. In such cases, prosecution become lame end pursuing such lame prosecution become waste of time and energy and also likely to unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace". Mr. Tara also cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. the relevant paragraph 102, the same reads as follows:- "102. Mr. Tara also cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. the relevant paragraph 102, the same reads as follows:- "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint; even if they are taken at their lace value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any; accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognisable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the un-controverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognisable offence but constitute only a non-cognisable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 7. Ms. M. Tang, learned Addl. PP submits that the petitioner No. 1/the victim is a maid servant of the petitioner No. 2, under such circumstances one can understand how agreements have been signed. Learned Addl. PP further submits that since Section 6 of POCSO Act is involved and there are documents supporting, like the Medical Board findings that the petitioner No. 1/the victim was only 14-16 years at the time the FIR was lodged i.e. in the year 2017, there are sufficient materials to go for trial. Therefore, we would be sending a wrong message if such petition is allowed at this stage. 8. As stated above, the statements of the petitioner No. 1 was recorded under section 164 of Cr.P.C., 1973 and at that time, she had stated that her age was only 13 years and this statement of hers is supported by the Medical Board's findings. Further, on perusal of the records, there are sufficient materials to go for trial against the petitioner No. 2. Besides, it appears both from the records and submissions of the learned counsels that the petitioner No. 1/the victim has been working as maid servant in the house of the petitioner No. 2. Therefore, the agreement signed between the parties cannot be accepted as something that was done voluntarily. Even if it was Signed voluntarily the crime was committed when the victim was a minor. 9. Therefore, the agreement signed between the parties cannot be accepted as something that was done voluntarily. Even if it was Signed voluntarily the crime was committed when the victim was a minor. 9. In view of these facts and circumstance of the case, I am of the view that the petitioners' prayer in this case is not something that can be considered under section 482 of Cr.P.C., 1973 at this stage. 10. All the pleas taken by the petitioner No. 2 may be submitted before the learned Trial Court in his defence. The petition is dismissed. 11. Return the LCRs through the learned Addl. PP, Arunachal Pradesh.