JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Mr S.Murarka, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr.K.Sarma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. The present plaintiffs respondents filed T.S.No.45/2004 against the defendant petitioner in the Court of learned Munsiff No.1, Sivasagar for ejectment of the defendant petitioner from the suit premises wherein the defendant petitioner is a tenant. Originally the suit was filed by the late predecessor-in-interest of respondents No.1 (a) to 1 (o) and the respondent No.2. The plaintiffs respondents are owners of a plot of land measuring 4 katha 1 lecha covered by dag No. 2038, periodic patta No. 1190 situated at Shankar Mandir Road at Sivasagar Town alongwith a house standing upon 3 kathas of land. The said house was let out to the defendant petitioner at a monthly rent of Rs.1200 per month which falls due on the first day of every month of the tenancy. The plaintiffs respondents decided to construct a house over the suit premises by obtaining necessary permission. The defendant petitioner instituted Title Suit No. 107/1994 alleging that the plaintiffs respondents entered into an agreement for sale of the suit premises following which the plaintiffs respondents did not proceed further. The defendant petitioner deposited the monthly rent @ 800/- in the court under the provision of Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 favouring the plaintiffs respondents. As the defendant petitioner is depositing the rent @ 800/- per month instead of Rs.1200/- per month as such he is defaulter and in addition to that the defendant petitioner failed to deposit the rent in the Court within the fortnight of its falling due. In addition to that the plaintiffs respondents also sought for ejectment of the defendant petitioner as the suit premises is required for renovation and their own use and occupation. 3. The defendant petitioner by filing the written statement denied the contention of the plaintiffs respondents made in the plaint. It is the defence taken by the defendant petitioner that the rent of the suit premises is Rs.800/- and not Rs.1200/- as claimed by the plaintiffs respondents. After institution of the Title Suit No. 107/1994 by the defendant-petitioner, the plaintiffs respondents stopped visiting Sivasagar whereafter he started tendering rent to the plaintiffs respondents and after refusal to accept the rent he has started depositing the rent regularly in the court. After institution of the Title Suit No. 107/1994 by the defendant-petitioner, the plaintiffs respondents stopped visiting Sivasagar whereafter he started tendering rent to the plaintiffs respondents and after refusal to accept the rent he has started depositing the rent regularly in the court. It is also denied that the tenanted premises/suit house has become unfit for human habitation and requires urgent demolition. Disputing the requirements of the suit premises for own use on the part of the plaintiffs respondents, it was the stand taken by the defendant petitioner that the plaintiffs respondents had permanent residence at Bamunpukhuri about 30 KM away from Sivasagar Town and they have no intention at all to shift to Sivasagar. Thus the defendant petitioner sought for the dismissal of the suit. 4. On the basis of the pleadings the learned trial Court framed the following issues: i. Whether there is cause of action for the suit? ii. Whether the suit is barred by waiver, estoppels and acquiescence? iii. Whether the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiffs and is defaulter as alleged in the plaint? iv. Whether there is bonafide requirement of the suit premises as alleged in the plaint? v. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree as prayed for? vi. To what other relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to ? 5. The plaintiffs respondents examined three witnesses and exhibited some documents. On the other hand the defendant petitioner examined himself and two other witnesses alongwith documents which were exhibited. The learned trial court decreed the suit by holding that the defendant petitioner is a defaulter in payment of the rent and in addition to that it was further held that the suit premises is required bonafide by the plaintiffs respondents. 6. The defendant petitioner preferred Title Appeal No. 8/2009 in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Sivasagar and challenged the judgment and decree of the learned trial court which was also dismissed by judgment and decree dated 29.9.2014. Thereafter the present revision petition is preferred challenging the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 8/2009. 7. 6. The defendant petitioner preferred Title Appeal No. 8/2009 in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Sivasagar and challenged the judgment and decree of the learned trial court which was also dismissed by judgment and decree dated 29.9.2014. Thereafter the present revision petition is preferred challenging the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 8/2009. 7. Mr.Murarka assailed the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court on the ground of perversity as the defendant petitioner has all along been depositing the rent in the court from the month of November, 1994 as per the provisions stipulated under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (herein after referred to as the Act) and only because of the fact that the defendant petitioner failed to exhibit any N.J.Case records, the First Appellate Court held that the defendant petitioner failed to establish the fact that he had deposited the rent in the Court. This submission is in consonance with the admission on the part of the plaintiffs respondents in the plaint that the defendant petitioner deposited the rent in the court since, 1994. He further submits that the learned First Appellate Court wrongly held that the defendant petitioner failed to take steps for issuing notice in the NJ Cases inasmuch as the defendant petitioner are duly taking steps in the NJ Cases by submitting written up notice alongwith rent deposit challan. Non-passing of any order by the court below in the NJ Case records cannot be faulted on the part of the defendant petitioner. The plaintiffs respondents used to collect the rent whenever they visited Sivasagar Town from their residential place at Bamunpukhuri and there was no agreed mode of payment of rent per month and as such holding by the first Appellate Court that the rent fell due on the last day of the month is wrong. The appellate court held that defendant petitioner has the responsibility on his part to deposit the monthly rent even during the pendency of the appeal and non-submission of any materials before the first appellate Court amounts to defaulter. Against this finding Mr.Murarka referring to the annexure in this revision petition which indicates the NJ cases vide which the defendant-petitioner deposited the rent, submits that the findings of the First Appellate Court is liable to be set aside. Against this finding Mr.Murarka referring to the annexure in this revision petition which indicates the NJ cases vide which the defendant-petitioner deposited the rent, submits that the findings of the First Appellate Court is liable to be set aside. Making a dig further on the findings of the issue of bonafide requirements, Mr.Murarka submits that the learned courts below failed to examine the genuinety of the requirement of the suit premises for the own use of the plaintiffs respondents. Citing instances that the plaintiff respondent No.1 is already about 79 years under such circumstances and on the face of the evidence recorded by the court below the claim of the bonafide requirement is purely with an intention to eject the present defendant petitioner without any bonafide. Finally Mr.Murarka submits that the findings of the court below are perverse and liable to be set aside. In support of his submission, Mr.Murarka relies on the following cases: 1. (2014) 9 SCC 78 (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.Vs.Dilbahar Singh). 2. AIR 1970 SC 1 (Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar Vs. Krishnaji Dattaraya Bapat. 3. AIR 1970 SC 5 (Amrit Sagar Gupta and ors Vs.Sudesh Behari Lal and others. 4. (2007) 5 SCC 660 (Ram Kumar Barnwal Vs Ram Lakhan (dead). 5. (2007) 5 SCC 669 (P.Chandrasekharan and ors Vs.S.Kanakaranjan and Ors.) 6. (1999) 7 SCC 275 (T.Sivasubramaniam and ors Vs Kasinath Pujari and ors.) 7. (1989) 2GLR 7 (Upendra Chandra Deb Roy Vs Smti.Subhashini Deb Roy and ors) 8. (1989) 2 GLR 17 (The Election Commission of India and 3 ors (Respondent Nos.3,4,5 and 8 of the Election Petition No.3/1988 Vs.Bhanulal Saha). 9. (1990) 1 GLR 418 (on the death of Upendra Nath Paul his heirs Ranjit Kumar Paul and ors Vs M/s P.Sen & Company). 10. (1990) 1GLR 426 (Employees State Insurance Corporation Vs. Management of Rajashri Pictures (P) Ltd.) 8. Mr.Sarma on the other hand vehemently opposes the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is submitted that there is no perversity in the findings of the courts below. The evidence on record was duly appreciated by the courts below and came to the findings that the defendant petitioner is a defaulter and the suit premises is also required bonafide to the plaintiffs respondents. It is submitted that there is no perversity in the findings of the courts below. The evidence on record was duly appreciated by the courts below and came to the findings that the defendant petitioner is a defaulter and the suit premises is also required bonafide to the plaintiffs respondents. It is further submitted that if there is no tenancy agreement in the express form under such circumstances, monthly tenancy ends on the last day of the month and as such the rent falls due on the first day of the consecutive month. Regarding the mode of payment, Mr Sarma submits that mere pleading in the plaint that the defendant petitioner is depositing the rent in the court does not mean the same are being deposited as per requirements under Section 5 (4) of the Act. The learned court below more specifically the First Appellate Court examined the exhibit Nos. 3 to 8 which are the N.J.Case records called for by the plaintiffs respondents and was able to show that the rent so deposited in the court by the defendant petitioner does not conform to the stipulation made under Section 5 (4) of the Act. After perusal of the said records the First Appellate Court has come to the findings that the rent so deposited in the court after examining the exhibits 3 to 8 are devoid of any written up notices and futher it came to the conclusion that the rent deposited were not as per the stipulated requirement of the law. The findings recorded with respect to the bonafide requirements needs no further interference by this Court as the same were duly considered keeping in view the depositions of the parties to the suit. Thus Mr.Sarma submits that the scope for revision is too limited against the concurrent findings of the court below and there being no perversity this revision must fail. In support of his submission, Mr.Sarma relies the following: 1. 2017 (3) GLT 80 (Ashit Dey Sarkar Vs Sunil Kumar Dutta) 2. 2005 (Supp) GLT 453 (Promod Hazarika and anr Vs Haren Das). 3. 2010 (4) GLT 223 (Dilip Kumar Deb Vs Musstt.Atabunnessa and Ors) 4. 2005 (4) GLT 562 (Girin Pathak Vs Ghanashyam Das) 5. 2005 (Suppl) GLT 572 (Arati Roy (Mrs) and anr Vs Safiqur Rahman Laskar and anr) 6. 2013 (4) GLT (ML) 851 (Sabir (Md) Vs Abdul Washid (Md) 7. 3. 2010 (4) GLT 223 (Dilip Kumar Deb Vs Musstt.Atabunnessa and Ors) 4. 2005 (4) GLT 562 (Girin Pathak Vs Ghanashyam Das) 5. 2005 (Suppl) GLT 572 (Arati Roy (Mrs) and anr Vs Safiqur Rahman Laskar and anr) 6. 2013 (4) GLT (ML) 851 (Sabir (Md) Vs Abdul Washid (Md) 7. 2010 (1) GLT 107 (Bhanumati Sikdar and ors Vs Binapani Singha Roy and anr) 8. 2004 (2) GLT 435 (Ranjit Kr.Dey and ors Vs Krishna Gopal Agarwala and Ors) 9. AIR 1963 SC 698 (Hari Shankar and others Vs Rao Girdhari Lal,Chowdhury) 9. Considered the submission of the learned counsel. This revision application u/s 115 of the CPC is against the concurrent findings of the courts below. The scope of interference in rent control and eviction suit against concurrent findings is very limited as held in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd Vs Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78 (supra) which is reproduced hereinbelow: "43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court /authority below, if perverse or has been, arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity." 10. It is the contention of Mr.Murarka that the findings of the Court below are perverse. It is an admitted position that there was no express tenancy agreement between the parties and the mode of payment of rent was the plaintiff respondent No.1 used to visit Sivasagar Town monthly and the defendant petitioner handed over the rent and as against that no receipt was issued. This is supported by the evidence of PW 1. From the pleadings of the parties it is seen that the plaintiffs respondents pleaded that the monthly rent is Rs.1200/-. On the other hand, the defendant petitioner denied and pleaded that the rent is Rs.800/- per month and the learned First Appellate Court held the rent to be Rs.800/- per month and while coming to the said conclusion considered the evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses, disbelieved the same as there were no documentary evidence nor any consistent oral evidence. On the other hand it considered the exhibits 3 to 8, the NJ Case records where in the monthly rent has been shown as Rs.800/- per month. Taking into consideration the said exhibits alongwith oral evidence of the defendant side it arrived at a finding that the monthly rent is Rs.800/- per month. 11. On the other hand it considered the exhibits 3 to 8, the NJ Case records where in the monthly rent has been shown as Rs.800/- per month. Taking into consideration the said exhibits alongwith oral evidence of the defendant side it arrived at a finding that the monthly rent is Rs.800/- per month. 11. The pleadings of the plaintiffs respondents that the defendant petitioner has been depositing the monthly rent of Rs.800/- in the court under the provisions of the Act, which Mr.Murarka termed to be an admitted position and submitted that such deposit of rent in the court must be presumed to be as per stipulation of Section 5 (4) of the Act. The First Appellate Court took into consideration the pleadings of the plaintiffs respondents wherein it was raised that the deposit made in the court were not within the fortnight of its falling due as the defendant/petitioner failed to substantiate the same by calling the NJ Case records and considered the evidence on record of DW 1 Binod Kumar Murarka. He deposed that in the month of October, 1994 an altercation took place between him and plaintiffs respondents whereafter the plaintiffs respondents stopped coming to accept rent from him. As a result since the month of November, 1994 the said DW 1 met the predecessor-in-interest of the present plaintiffs respondents and upon his refusal to accept the rent he started depositing the rent in the Court. Thus the appellate court accepted the mode prior to the dispute of payment of rent and finally considering the deposit of rent in the court from the month of November, 1994 onwards it came to the conclusion that the said rent deposit in the court must conform to the conditions of Section 5 (4) of the Act. Referring towards the burden, in order to show that the said deposit in the court are as per terms of the said Section 5 (4) of the Act, the court below discussed the requirements that the land lord must refuse to accept the rent on being tendered and the same ought to be deposited within a period of fortnight from the date of falling due. The appellate court rightly pointed out that that there was no express agreement of tenancy and no fixed mode of payment of rent after the dispute as such the learned appellate court treated the tenancy to be a monthly one and arrived that rent will fall due at the end of the month. Non proving of the fact of depositing the rent in the court within a fortnight from the records i.e. the N.J.Cases the appellate court held that the defendant petitioner to be a defaulter. It would not be out of place to mention that the First Appellate Court compared the date of deposit of rent from exhibits 3 to 8 and found the variation of the date of deposit of rent, which proves the fact that the defendant petitioner failed to deposit the rent within a fortnight for its falling due. 12. The appellate Court thereafter considered the exhibits 3 to 8 which are the NJ Case records called for by the plaintiffs respondents and finally held that the deposit of rent as apparent from the exhibit 3 to 8 were made without written up notices for service of notice upon the landlord. On that ground also the appellate court held that the defendant petitioner is a defaulter. 13. Section 5 (4) of the Act prescribes that where the landlord refuses to accept the lawful rent offered by the defendant, he may within a fortnight of its becoming due deposit in the court together with process fee and written up notices to be served upon the landlord. The tenant who has made such deposit shall not be treated as defaulter. 14. In Arati Roy (Mrs) and anr Vs. Safiqur Rahman Laskar and anr reported in 2004 (Supp) GLT 572 this Court held in para 12 as follows: "Section 5 of the 1972 Act gives certain protection to the tenant on fulfillment of conditions contained therein. Section 5 (4) gives protection to the tenant, if they deposit the rent in Court payable to the landlord within a fortnight of its becoming due, on being refused by the landlord to accept the same. The burden lies on the tenant to prove that the rent was offered, the landlord has refused to accept the rent and on such refusal he has deposited the rent in Court by depositing all the requisite including the process fee and written up notices. The burden lies on the tenant to prove that the rent was offered, the landlord has refused to accept the rent and on such refusal he has deposited the rent in Court by depositing all the requisite including the process fee and written up notices. Unless the said burden is discharged by the tenant the said protection is not available to the tenant under the 1972 Act" 15. Mr. Murarka submits that even if the tenant starts depositing the rent in the Court, the court is bound to take into consideration the practice and the mode followed by the landlord in accepting the rent. In the present case in hand admittedly the landlord used to come Sivasagar for collecting rent and there was no fixed mode. Under such circumstances the question of deposit of rent within a period of fortnight from the date of its falling due has no bearing. In such situation the question of issuing notice to the landlord about the deposit of the rent in the court has no relevancy inasmuch as on the basis of the usual mode the landlord ought to have come to collect the rent from the court. To that effect Mr.Murarka relies upon the case of Upendra Ch.Deb Roy Vs Suhasini Dey reported in (1989) 2 GLR 7. 16. The ratio of the said decision is not applicable in the present case in hand wherein the present plaintiff respondents stated in the pleading that the defendant petitioner has been paying rent in the court. But such payment in the court is not within the period of fortnight from the date of its falling due. On the other hand, in the said reported decision the landlord required the house for his own uses and occupation and tenant was a defaulter for non-payment of regular rent and as such the suit was filed for ejectment of the tenant. The tenant contested the suit and one of the grounds was that he surrendered the tenancy to the actual landlord in the year, 1966 and his son entered into a fresh settlement in respect of the suit house with the landlord. The learned trial court decided all the issues in favour of the landlord and decreed the suit. The tenant contested the suit and one of the grounds was that he surrendered the tenancy to the actual landlord in the year, 1966 and his son entered into a fresh settlement in respect of the suit house with the landlord. The learned trial court decided all the issues in favour of the landlord and decreed the suit. The subsequent appeal was also dismissed and this Court held that both the courts below failed to appreciate properly, the requirements of Section 5 (1) of the Act and committed manifest error of law in putting the burden of proving the non-existence of the condition precedent for eviction laid down in the said Section on the tenant which is not the case in hand. In my opinion the findings of the appellate court about non fulfilment of the conditions stipulated under Section 5 (4) of the Act cannot be termed to be perverse keeping in view the submission of Mr.Muraka. The requirement u/s 5 (4) of the Act is mandatory inasmuch as the tenant is protected from eviction once the landlord refused to accept the rent tendered and in order to get the said benefit of protection, the tenant is bound to satisfy the conditions stipulated therein while depositing the rent under the said provision of the Act. 17. The learned appellate court while coming to the issue of bonafide requirement considered the date of purchase of the land and house by the landlord and accepted the deposition of DW 1 that the house standing thereon is constructed with wooden post and beams. The court below came to the conclusion that the house was at least 33 years old and as such it requires repairing and/or needs reconstruction and further held that the claim of bonafide requirements of the suit house by the landlord is always based on the decision of the landlord who is the best judge to decide how to use and utilize his own house. Further the evidence of PW 1 is clear and specific that in order to educate the children at Sivasagar the PW 1 requires the suit premises and the same was supported by PW 2 who is the nephew and deposed that they are settled at Dibrugarh and they require the tenanted premises for reconstruction of a new RCC building after demolition of the existing tenanted premises. This finding in my opinion cannot be held to be perverse inasmuch as it is on record that the plaintiffs respondents obtained building permission for construction of the residential house. Mere having residence at Bamunphukhuri and Dibrugarh of the plaintiffs landlord cannot be a ground for disbelieving the bonafide requirement of the respondents and the findings thereon to be perverse. 18. I do not find any merit in this revision application and same stands dismissed. Send back the LCR. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. 19. The defendant petitioner is given 3 (three) months time from the date of the judgment to vacate the tenanted premises failing which the plaintiffs-respondents shall be entitled to initiate execution proceeding.