Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 881 (KAR)

H. NAGARAJAPPA S/O T. HANUMAPPA v. K. R. NAGENDRA S/O K. P. RAMASWAMY SHETTY

2018-08-10

DINESH MAHESHWARI

body2018
ORDER : 1. In the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for declaration, injunction and other reliefs, being O.S.No.252/2015 on the file of the II Additional Civil Judge at Arasikere, Hassan District, the Trial Court considered an application for temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff/respondent against raising of construction by the defendant/petitioner on the suit property. After noticing the competing claims of the parties qua the property in question, the Trial Court found it to be a case of balance of equities and hence, proceeded to grant a so-called conditional order of temporary injunction in the following terms: "Application filed by the plaintiff Under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 of CPC is hereby allowed, the defendant is directed to not put up construction on site No.38. It is hereby directed to the parties to co-operate with the court to dispose this case with in 6 month from date of this order. If plaintiff is not co-operated to dispose the case with in 6 months from date of this order the interim order shall stands vacated on the other hand, if the defendant is not co-operated to dispose this matter within 6 months the interim order shall extent further." (sic) 2. The terms aforesaid, though intended to ensure that the parties would co-operate in the trial and conclusion of the suit with expedition, had their inherent shortcomings from the practical standpoint because if the suit was not decided within six months, it would always remain a matter of debate and dispute as to who was to be held responsible for the alleged non-cooperation. The said order was passed on 06.08.2015. 3. However, after the order aforesaid, the defendant preferred a miscellaneous appeal, which was dismissed. In the meantime, the defendant filed applications seeking amendment to the written statement as also for issuance of commission. After disposal of such interlocutory applications, the issues were framed only on 08.12.2016. Thereafter, the plaintiff/petitioner examined himself as P.W.1 but, for one reason or the other, the suit remained pending. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application-I.A.No.23 seeking the orders that the temporary injunction granted on 06.08.2015 be extended until disposal of the suit. The plaintiff/respondent submitted that there was some ambiguity in the order of temporary injunction and taking advantage of the same, the defendant was raising construction. 4. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application-I.A.No.23 seeking the orders that the temporary injunction granted on 06.08.2015 be extended until disposal of the suit. The plaintiff/respondent submitted that there was some ambiguity in the order of temporary injunction and taking advantage of the same, the defendant was raising construction. 4. The Trial Court has proceeded to allow the said application by the impugned order dated 19.02.2018 while observing that the record did not disclose dragging of the proceedings by the plaintiff and if the defendant is allowed to construct the building, it may lead to multiplicity of proceedings and no one could take advantage of the ambiguity of the order. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 19.02.2018, the defendant/petitioner has preferred this writ petition with the submissions that the protraction of the trial had been for the faults of the plaintiff when he filed his affidavit for examination-in-chief only on 15.12.2016 and then, went on taking time upto 17.01.2017 for his evidence. The petitioner would contend that the fault for the delay in disposal cannot be attributed to him; and he would suffer substantial loss and injury if the construction work is stopped at the given stage. 6. On 24.04.2018, at the time of preliminary hearing, this Court found prima facie substance in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and stayed the operation of impugned order dated 19.02.2018, while observing and directing as under: “Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Petitioner is before this Court being aggrieved by the order dated 19.02.2018 whereby the trial Court has been pleased to allow the application-I.A.No.23 injuncting the petitioner from completing the construction. Learned counsel for the petitioner would, draw the attention of the Court to the annexure-E-photographs. 7. Perusal of the same would demonstrate that substantial progress has been made in the construction of the residential house. It is also submitted that the petitioner has also obtained sanction plan from the Competent Authority and that the same is not called in question. Hence, he would submit that interim order granted by the trial Court is inequitable and the trial Court has not put the plaintiff on terms while granting interim order. 8. It is also submitted that the petitioner has also obtained sanction plan from the Competent Authority and that the same is not called in question. Hence, he would submit that interim order granted by the trial Court is inequitable and the trial Court has not put the plaintiff on terms while granting interim order. 8. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the trial Court ought to have put the plaintiff on terms who was not diligent in prosecuting the suit and thereby permitted the continuance of construction to a substantial extent. 9. Hence, there shall be an interim stay of operation of the order dated 19.02.2018 passed on I.A.No.23 in O.S.No.252/2015 pending on the file of the II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Arsikere, till next date of hearing. In the eventuality of any adverse finding, the petitioner is not entitled to plead equities. 10. Issue notice to the respondent. List on 18.06.2018.” 11. It has been pointed out today that since after passing of the order aforesaid, relevant subsequent events have taken place inasmuch as it was found that the suit was not of pecuniary jurisdiction of the Trial Court and hence, the plaint was returned; and the plaintiff, thereafter, presented the plaint to the proper Court; and at present, the suit is pending in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Arasikere, Hassan District. 12. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, suffice it to observe for the present purpose that the plaint having been returned and the suit being not pending in the Court concerned, the interim order as granted earlier could only be considered as having come to an end. This is, of course, without prejudice to the rights of the plaintiff to make a prayer for interim relief in the Court presently dealing with the suit with the corresponding right of the defendant-petitioner to contest such a prayer, of course, in accordance with law. 13. For what has been observed hereinabove, when the interim order as passed earlier cannot be considered subsisting, no further order appears requisite in this petition. 14. However, before parting with the matter, this Court is constrained to observe that the dispute, as involved in the instant writ petition, has its genesis in the avoidable uncertainty that was innate in the initial order for temporary injunction, as made on 06.08.2015. 15. 14. However, before parting with the matter, this Court is constrained to observe that the dispute, as involved in the instant writ petition, has its genesis in the avoidable uncertainty that was innate in the initial order for temporary injunction, as made on 06.08.2015. 15. A perusal of the said order dated 06.08.2015 makes out that the Trial Court found the equities in the case equibalanced when it observed that if the order of injunction was not granted, the plaintiff will be put to irreparable hardship but on granting of temporary injunction, the defendant would also be put to hardship, if he would establish his absolute ownership over the site in question. After these observations, the Court found it to be a fit case to direct the parties to cooperate with the Court to conclude the case within six months and then, granted the temporary injunction, but with the conditions that if the plaintiff would not co-operate in disposal of the matter within six months, the interim order shall stand vacated and if the defendant would not co-operate, then the interim order shall continue further. 16. It appears that though after finding that the matter stood in balance and it was desirable to decide the suit expeditiously; and the defendant should not put up construction until disposal of the suit, the Trial Court passed such an order that had the potential of being impractical, ambiguous and leading to more disputes rather than achieving the intended objective. 17. As is noticed from the record, all such inherent shortcomings in the orders so passed by the Trial Court on 06.08.2015 surfaced with the passage of time. As per the observations in the impugned order dated 19.02.2018, the Court framed the issues only on 08.12.2016 i.e., nearly 1½ years after the aforesaid order dated 06.08.2015. In the meantime, the defendant moved some applications for amendment of the written statement and for issuance of commission. 18. It would always remain a moot question if moving of every application is to be treated as want of co-operation in disposal of the suit and if not, the liability towards the time spent in disposal of such applications is to be assigned in what manner and to whom? After nearly 2½ years of the aforesaid order dated 06.08.2015, the Trial Court observed that "no one can take advantage of the ambiguity of the order". After nearly 2½ years of the aforesaid order dated 06.08.2015, the Trial Court observed that "no one can take advantage of the ambiguity of the order". Such observations cannot be faulted at and remain justified that no one can take advantage of any ambiguity in the order, but it is difficult to appreciate that such an ambiguity is consciously woven in an order of temporary injunction by the Trial Court without having regard to the implications and consequences. The ambiguity in the present case had been of an unnecessary creation that could have been avoided. 19. From another standpoint, it could be observed that while granting temporary injunction, if at all the Court chooses to put the parties to certain terms, the terms ought to be specific and capable of being enforced rather than being dependant on the determination of several such aspects, which may themselves be the matters of debate and dispute; like the terms in the present matter, where it may lead to a serious debate as to whether the plaintiff, or the defendant, or both, or neither were responsible for the delay in disposal of the suit. 20. It is, of course, noticed that for grant of temporary injunction in relation to the matters concerning breach of contract, as per clause (2) of Rule 2 Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court may grant injunction on the terms as regards the duration of injunction, but such a specific provision is not seen in Rule 1 of Order XXXIX, particularly concerning the grant of temporary injunction in relation to the property in dispute. Of course, temporary injunction could be granted to be operative either until disposal of the suit or until further orders, but it is difficult to approve the ambiguous conditions as put in the present matter by the Trial Court at the initial stage. 21. As noticed, in the present matter, because of such a condition which has turned out to be incapable of being effectuated, the result had been that after 2½ years of the said order dated 06.08.2015, the Trial Court passed another order, purportedly extending the temporary injunction until disposal of the suit and this Court, while taking up this petition for consideration, stayed the operation of such order dated 19.02.2018. 22. 22. All these proceedings were avoidable if the Trial Court, while deciding the application for injunction, placed the terms in a practicable manner and then, ensured compliance of such terms and passed such other orders during the course of trial, as found necessary. The Trial Court, even while passing the order of temporary injunction and seeking to put the parties to terms, should also keep in view the provisions of Rule 4 of Order XXXIX that an order of temporary injunction could be discharged, varied or set aside on the reasons and for the circumstances mentioned therein. 23. It would be expected of the Courts dealing with the applications for temporary injunction to keep in view the observations foregoing. 24. So far the present matter is concerned, as noticed above, with the order of temporary injunction not subsisting, no further order is required herein. 25. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.