JUDGMENT : Dhiraj Singh Thakur, J. The petitioner, who was working as a Constable Driver in CRPF came to be dismissed from service vide order dated 09.12.2003 by the Commandant 79 Battalion CRPF. The basis of the order of dismissal, lay in the inquiry, which was conducted purportedly in terms of Section 11 of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 and Rule 27 framed thereunder, based upon the following articles of charges:- Article-I “That the said No. 944117654 CT/Dvr (Sector) Satpal Singh of GC, CRPF, BTB while functioning as a Constable/Dvr in the Force on attachment duty with this Unit committed an act of indiscipline in his capacity as a member of the force U/S 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that he left the camp/lies on 3/3/2003 at 1500 Hrs. without prior permission of the competent authority and remained absent from duty till 4/3/2003 (AN), which is prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Force.” Article-II “That the said No. 944117654 CT/Dvr (Sector) Satpal Singh of GC, CRPF, BTB while functioning as a Constable/Dvr in the Force on attachment duty with this Unit committed an act of misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force U/S 11(1) of CRPC, Act, 1949 in that he left the camp/lies on 3/3/2003 without prior permission of competent authority and reported back to Unit Hqr loc. on 4/3/2003 at about 1730 Hrs after consuming liquor unauthorizedly which is prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the Force.” Article-III “That No. 944117654 CT/Dvr (Sector) Satpal Singh of GC, CRPF, BTB while functioning as a Constable/Dvr in the Force on attachment duty with this Unit committed an offence of indiscipline in that he again left camp/lines on 18/3/2003 at about 1445 Hrs without prior permission of competent authority and reported back to camp location at 0730 Hrs. on 19/3/2003, which is prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Force.” Article-IV “That No. 944117654 CT/Dvr (Sector) Satpal Singh of GC, CRPF, BTB while functioning as a Constable/Dvr in the Force on attachment duty with this Unit committed an offence of indiscipline, disobedience/misbehaviour in his capacity as a member of the Force U/S 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that he is habitual offender in having committed a series of offence of indiscipline/ misbehaviour/disobedience in the past on different occasions twice during 1999 and twice during 2001.” 2. The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges levelled against him. Evidence was led thereafter by the official respondents and report submitted before the Commandant, who came to a conclusion that all the four charges stood proved against the petitioner. Accordingly, vide order dated 09.12.2003, the Commandant ordered the dismissal of the petitioner from service. An appeal preferred against the said order was also rejected. 3. No evidence was led by the petitioner in the enquiry proceedings, however, the stand taken by him was that his short absence, as reflected in the charges was on account of the fact that the petitioner had received news that his young child was seriously sick and he required immediate treatment. It was stated that the application for leave was preferred by him on which no action was taken and keeping in view the urgency in the matter, it had become necessary for him to attend to his child. It was further urged that after providing medical treatment and medicines to his child, he immediately returned to the camp and reported for duty. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that the order impugned dismissing the petitioner from service was perverse and illegal, besides being totally disproportionate to the allegations levelled. 5. On the principles of proportionality the Apex Court in Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1987) 4 SCC 611 , in paragraph Nos. 25 and 27 held as under: “25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision making process”. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court- Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1984] 3 Weekly Law Reports 1174 (HL) Lord Deplock said: “... Judicial Review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground l would call ‘illegality’, the second irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community;…. 27. In the present case the punishment is so strikingly disproportionate as to call for and justify interference. It cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected in judicial review.” 6. In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. And Anr. vs. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri & Ors., (2009) 15 SCC 620 , the Apex Court in paragraph Nos. 19, 20 and 21 has held as under:- “19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in access to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be : would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be : would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company’s Rules and Regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations.” 7. In Union of India & Ors. vs. Bodupalli Gopalaswami, (2011) 13 SCC 553 , the Apex Court in paragraph No. 28 has held as under:- “28. ....................Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision making process”. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.” 8. In S.R. Tewari vs. Union of India and Anr., (2013) 6 SCC 602 , the Apex Court in paragraph 29 has held as under:- “29. In Union of India & Ors. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.” 8. In S.R. Tewari vs. Union of India and Anr., (2013) 6 SCC 602 , the Apex Court in paragraph 29 has held as under:- “29. In Union of India & Ors. v. R.K. Sharma, this Court explained the observations made in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 observing that if the charge was ridiculous, the punishment was harsh or strikingly disproportionate it would warrant interference. However, the said observations in Ranjit Thakur are not to be taken to mean that a court can, while exercising the power of judicial review, interfere with the punishment merely because it considers the punishment to be disproportionate. It was held that only in extreme cases, which on their face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be judicial review and courts should not interfere merely on compassionate grounds.” 9. Testing the facts of the present case on the touch stone of the judgments aforementioned, it can clearly be seen that the punishment of dismissal was extremely harsh and disproportionate to the allegations of the unauthorized absence of the petitioner from duty, which was less than 24 Hrs. on both the occasions. 10. It was urged that the absence from duty without permission, attributed to the petitioner on 03.03.2003 was from 1500 Hrs., which lasted only till the next day when the petitioner reported for duty on 04.03.2003. It was thus stated that the absence was less than 24 Hrs. In regard to Article-III also, it was stated that the alleged absence was on 18.03.2003 at about 1445 Hrs. and the petitioner is stated to have been back on duty in the very next morning at 7.30 Hrs. on 19.03.2003. This also, it was urged was less than 24 Hrs. 11. In regard to Article-II, it was stated that that the allegation that the petitioner had consumed liquor was disproportionate to the punishment imposed on this charge. Reliance was placed upon the report of the Medical Officer of 17th Bn. CRPF to the effect that- “While alcohol was consumed but the delinquent was not under the influence of it.” 12. 11. In regard to Article-II, it was stated that that the allegation that the petitioner had consumed liquor was disproportionate to the punishment imposed on this charge. Reliance was placed upon the report of the Medical Officer of 17th Bn. CRPF to the effect that- “While alcohol was consumed but the delinquent was not under the influence of it.” 12. It was further stated that the IVth Charge was vague and general and did not give any details about indiscipline, disobedience or misbehaviour in the past and, therefore, it was urged that any punishment imposed based upon such a charge was liable to be quashed. 13. The respondents were directed to produce the original records. However, it was stated that the same was not available, inasmuch as, according to their practice, original records are destroyed after a period of five years. What was thus produced before the Court is only a photocopy. 14. On a perusal of the articles of charges levelled against the petitioner, it thus becomes clear that the period of absence in regard to articles of charges I & II was less than 24 hours. Insofar as IInd charge is concerned, it mainly revolves around the factum of the petitioner reporting back to the Unit Headquarter after consuming liquor unauthorizedly. According to the medical evidence, the petionter was not under the influence of liquor, although the factum of consumption of liquor was indicated. Admittedly, the time of medical examination of the petitioner appears to be 855 p.m. on 04.03.2003. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents could not point out from the record as to what were the duty hours of the petitioner, who was working as a Constable Driver and whether there was a general ban on the Constable Drivers or for that matter all CRPF Constables, for consumption of liquor within the camp premises even after duty hours. Notwithstanding the above, even as per the medical certificate, the petitioner was not in an inebriated state, which could result in creating general nuisance or effect others in his close proximity. 16. Insofar as charge-IV is concerned, the same is vague and general. Incidentally, while it has come on record that the petitioner had suffered certain allegations in the past, but the records also reflects that he was punished for the same. 16. Insofar as charge-IV is concerned, the same is vague and general. Incidentally, while it has come on record that the petitioner had suffered certain allegations in the past, but the records also reflects that he was punished for the same. The disciplinary authority ought to have considered each and every incident independently in the facts and circumstances of the case. The explanation tendered by the petitioner for his absence was not at all considered by the authorities in its correct perspective before imposing the punishment. Equally so, the authorities had to connect the explanation tendered to the period of his absence instead of rushing to impose the maximum punishment upon him. None of the authorities even considered the possibility of imposing any of the minor punishments, which would be commensurate with his short period of absence. While nobody denies that the Competent Authority did have the power to punish a Constable under its jurisdiction, yet the exercise of the power had to be calibrated and measured. Every misconduct may not justify dismissal in the name of discipline at the cost of not only a member of the Force but with a heavier cost on his family. 17. Having considered the matter in its entirety, I am of the opinion that the punishment imposed is totally disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner and thus the order of dismissal in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be upheld at all. 18. For the reasons mentioned above, the order impugned dated 09.12.2003 and as upheld subsequently in appeal are set aside. It shall be open to the respondents to consider imposing any of the minor punishments as prescribed in terms of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949. The petitioner is directed to be reinstated. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. 19. Disposed of accordingly.