JUDGMENT : SURENDRA MOHAN, J. 1. The question that arises for consideration in these cases is - Whether the right of a minority community under Article 30(1) of the Constitution would entitle it to categorize its beneficiaries into different groups within the community itself, to reserve seats for admission to the institutions conducted by it on such basis and to admit students from such categories to the seats so reserved? 2. Before we grapple with the question of law, it is necessary to take note of some essential facts. W.P.(C) No. 22168 of 2018 is filed by a Charitable Trust which is conducting a minority educational institution, with the Manager thereof as the second petitioner. The petitioners are conducting a Medical College by name Karuna Medical College. For the purpose of admitting students to the MBBS course for the academic year 2018-2019, the third respondent, who is the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations had directed the petitioners by Ext.P1 to furnish the seat matrix showing the exact break up of seats in the institution including the seats earmarked as the minority quota. Accordingly, in the prescribed pro forma, the second petitioner furnished the seat matrix by Ext.P2. As per Ext. P2, out of the total intake of 100 seats, 12 seats are set apart for general candidates, 13 seats for the socially and educationally backward classes and 5 seats for SC and ST candidates. The remaining 70 seats were set apart for being filled up by allotting candidates from the minority community. Among the said seats, 15 seats were reserved for Palakkad District Muslims, 5 seats for All India Muslims, 7 seats for dependents of Safe Development Alms Trust, 10 seats for dependents of Palakkad District Salafi Educational Association, 3 seats for dependents of PMAC Committee, 3 seats for dependents of Al Nazar Trust, 3 seats for dependents of Grace Educational Trust, 3 seats for dependents of Prime Educational and Charitable Trust, 3 seats for dependents of Kerala Muslim Educational Association, 3 seats for dependents of Salsabeel Educational & Welfare Trust, 5 seats for NRI open merit quota and 10 seats for NRI Muslim community, thus making up the 70 seats earmarked for the minority community. Though a categorization of the seats as mentioned above was sought for, the same was not permitted as evident from Ext.P4 order passed by the Government. Pursuant to Ext. Though a categorization of the seats as mentioned above was sought for, the same was not permitted as evident from Ext.P4 order passed by the Government. Pursuant to Ext. P4, Ext.P13 notification has been issued by the third respondent directing the candidates to produce certificates from Revenue Officials, to prove their community status. By Ext.P4, the number of seats set apart as minority seats is 50, to be filled up by candidates belonging to the Muslim community in general. The petitioners are aggrieved by the seat matrix that has not accepted their proposal in Ext.P2 to earmark seats for the various organizations mentioned in Ext.P2. A second objection raised is regarding the stipulation in Ext.P4 that, the community certificate which is one of the documents to be submitted by each of the candidates while seeking admission, is to be issued by Revenue Officials. It is contended that, in the past, it was sufficient for the candidates to have supported their applications with certificates issued by the religious functionaries of the Muslim community. The petitioners therefore seek the issue of appropriate directions to set right matters by quashing the stipulation in Ext.P4. 3. W.P.(C) No. 22962 of 2018 is filed by the Chairman and Managing Trustee of an Educational Agency conducting a Self Financing Medical College by name Travancore Medical College. According to the petitioners, the College was established in the year 2013. From the inception they had been setting apart some of the seats in their College to be filled up with candidates from specified categories of the Muslim community. During 2014-2015, the Prospectus itself permitted such reservation. The same procedure continued for the year 2015-2016, with the Admission Supervisory Committee approving the same. During 2017, the allotment process was taken over by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. Thereafter, candidates were allotted to the College through the centralized allotment process. During the year 2017-2018, the allotment process was completed in compliance with Ext.P8 order dated 9.5.2017 passed by the Supreme Court where the petitioners had challenged the action of the State in taking over the entire admission process. During the present year, 2018-2019, the Director of Medical Education had sought for the details of community reservation from all Medical Colleges including the petitioner. Accordingly, the seat matrix was furnished. During the present year, 2018-2019, the Director of Medical Education had sought for the details of community reservation from all Medical Colleges including the petitioner. Accordingly, the seat matrix was furnished. As per the seat matrix proposed by the petitioner, 10 seats were set apart for Sunni Muslims, 20 seats for Muslim Shafi Mad-hab, 10 seats for members of Muslim Hanafi Mad-hab, 10 seats for members of Muslim Mujaahid Jama-aths and 10 seats for members of Muslim Jama-ath Islami. However, as per the seat matrix approved by Ext.P12 Government Order, 60 seats have been earmarked to candidates belonging to the Muslim community. The candidates are to submit community certificates from the Revenue officials. Thus, the categorization that was sought for by the petitioner in Ext.P11 was not allowed. The said proceedings are challenged contending that, the seat matrix proposed by the petitioner should be accepted and that, insistence on issue of community certificates by the Revenue authorities should be set aside. 4. W.P.(C) No. 23707 of 2018 is filed by prospective candidates desirous of seeking admission to various Self Financing Colleges including those of the petitioners in the writ petitions mentioned above. Among them, the first and fifth petitioners are stated to have already got admission and ceased to have any interest in this litigation. According to the petitioners, they have qualified in the NEET and have obtained respectable ranking positions. They belong to the Muslim Shaafi Mad-hab, Muslim Hanafi Mad-hab, Muslim Jama-ath Islami and Muslim Mujaahid Jamaa-ath. They are also aggrieved by the impugned action of the authorities in not permitting the petitioners in the other two writ petitions to admit students on the basis of the seat matrix proposed by them. They have sought for the issue of a direction to allot them to the Travancore Medical College. 5. Since the questions raised as well as the contentions put forward are identical, the cases are heard and disposed of together. 6. According to the learned Senior Counsel Sri. Kurian George Kannanthanam who led the arguments, Article 30(1) of the Constitution confers a very valuable right on the minority communities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the right encompasses all aspects of establishing and administering educational institutions. Therefore, every minority community has both a right to establish as well as a right to administer educational institutions of their choice. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the right encompasses all aspects of establishing and administering educational institutions. Therefore, every minority community has both a right to establish as well as a right to administer educational institutions of their choice. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court to contend that, the expressions 'establish' and 'administer' take within their ambit all aspects of administration, with which alone we are concerned in these cases. Since the word 'administer' is further qualified by the expression 'of their choice', the minority community has also been conferred with a freedom of choice, which extends not merely to the choice of its staff, but also to choice of the candidates who may be admitted as students to such institutions. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in which, the right to appoint Headmaster/Principal of Private Educational Institutions was at issue, to point out that, a freedom of choice has been conceded to the minority communities in the matter of selection of Headmasters/Principals. By analogy, it is contended that, the said dicta would apply to the choice of students also since candidates are to be admitted from the common NEET rank list only. It is contended that, the objective of maintaining merit as the paramount consideration for admission would not be affected by permitting the institution to choose candidates from within the community on the basis of the categorization proposed by them. Reliance is placed on paragraphs 124 and 125 of the decision in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [ (2005) 6 SCC 537 ] to contend that, minority educational institutions are not obliged to allocate seats for implementation of the reservation policy of the State. The only restriction on the right of the minority educational institutions to admit students is that, the admission process should be fair, transparent, non-exploitative and based on merit. Once the said criteria are satisfied, institutions like that of the petitioner would have a freedom of choice which they are entitled to exercise even within the minority community for whose benefit the institutions are established. Once the said criteria are satisfied, institutions like that of the petitioner would have a freedom of choice which they are entitled to exercise even within the minority community for whose benefit the institutions are established. Various passages from T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 8 SCC 481 ] are also pressed into service to contend that, admission of students to unaided minority educational institutions cannot be regulated except to the extent of prescribing minimum conditions of eligibility in the interests of maintaining standards of education. Since the sub classifications within the community could be certified only by the religious dignitaries concerned, it is contended that, insistence on certificates issued by the Revenue authorities alone is also unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 7. Supporting the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel, Adv. K.S. Hariharaputhran points out that, the Trust which is the first petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 22168 of 2018 has a number of Trusts under it. The dependents of such Trusts are required to be given preference in the matter of admission to MBBS course in their institutions. Such Trusts are identified and specifically mentioned in the seat matrix proposed by the petitioners. Since the identities of the said Trusts are before the Government, the persons for whose benefit the seats are reserved, are definite and certain. As the minority community has freedom in the matter of choice of candidates, even within the community, the petitioners are entitled to reserve some of the seats for the benefit of the said categories. According to the learned Counsel, Exts. P6 to P12 documents prove the relationship between the said organizations with the petitioners. In view of the above, it is contended that the authorities ought to have accepted the seat matrix proposed by the College. 8. According to Adv. B.H. Mansoor, who appears for the petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 23707 of 2018, insistence on community certificates issued by Revenue officials in the case of Muslim students is arbitrary and discriminatory. The learned counsel points out that, in the case of Christian students, Certificates issued by the Parish Priests, Pastors and other religious functionaries are notified as acceptable. Therefore, a similar facility is necessary to be extended to the petitioners also. It is contended that, the petitioners are all candidates who have obtained the required percentile in the NEET. The learned counsel points out that, in the case of Christian students, Certificates issued by the Parish Priests, Pastors and other religious functionaries are notified as acceptable. Therefore, a similar facility is necessary to be extended to the petitioners also. It is contended that, the petitioners are all candidates who have obtained the required percentile in the NEET. Therefore, in accordance with the seat matrix proposed by the Travancore Medical College, they are entitled to be granted admission. The learned counsel adopts all the contentions put forward by the other counsel and seeks the issue of appropriate directions granting admission to his clients. 9. The contentions of the counsel appearing for the petitioners are opposed by the learned Government Pleader Sri. V. Manu who appears for the respondents. According to the learned Government Pleader, the reservation sought for by the petitioners is not permissible either in law or fact. It is contended that the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution is available only to a minority community. The expression 'minority community' means a minority community under the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004. Under the said enactment, the Government of India has by a notification dated 18.1.2005 notified Muslims as a minority community. Therefore, the community that is designated as such is the community of Muslims in general. No sub classification within the said general category is acceptable. The learned Government Pleader relies on the History of Jamaat-e-Islami to point out that the same is only a political organization and not even a denomination within the Muslim community. The same applies to the other entities for which seats have been sought to be reserved by the Colleges. The right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution does not entitle the minority community to reserve seats for sub categories within the community itself. Any permission to do so would create a situation where every college would be able to set apart seats without any basis to even categories that are non-existent thereby creating an area where they could grant admission to candidates of their choice. The learned Government Pleader relies on an interim order dated 23.9.2015 in W.P.(C) No. 26542 of 2015 to which one of us [K. Surendra Mohan (J)] was a party, where a similar contention has been negatived. The learned Government Pleader relies on an interim order dated 23.9.2015 in W.P.(C) No. 26542 of 2015 to which one of us [K. Surendra Mohan (J)] was a party, where a similar contention has been negatived. The said interim order, according to the learned Government Pleader, has been approved by another Division Bench judgment dated 28.10.2016 in W.P.(C) No. 30697 of 2016 and connected cases. According to the learned Government Pleader, though minority educational institutions are entitled to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, while making admissions, they are bound to make their choice from within a common source of candidates. Here, the common source is the NEET rank list. They have no freedom to choose their own source of candidates and to make admissions from the said source. The attempt in these cases is to create a source from which they would be entitled to effect admissions to their Colleges thereby creating segmentation even within the minority community. With respect to the NEET rank list published by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations, the learned Government Pleader submits that there are about 10000 Muslim students who figure in the NEET rank list. Therefore, the number of students available is more than sufficient to fill up all the seats available in the Medical Colleges within the State. The choice of candidates would have to be made by the minority educational institutions, from within the said source, strictly on the basis of merit. Any other method, if permitted, merit would become the casualty. Such choice would also lack transparency and would breed nefarious methods of securing admission, like taking of capitation fee. Therefore, it is contended that, the accepted legal position does not permit any such choice as canvassed for by the petitioners herein. The learned Government Pleader for the above reason, seeks dismissal of the writ petitions. 10. Adv. Jacob Alex who appears for some students who belong to the Muslim community in general, who have got themselves impleaded, has also addressed us. According to the learned counsel, the minority seats are set apart for the benefit of the minority community in general and cannot be further sub divided. Such seats are meant for the benefit of the minority community in general. According to the learned counsel, the minority seats are set apart for the benefit of the minority community in general and cannot be further sub divided. Such seats are meant for the benefit of the minority community in general. The right under Article 30(1) is also available to the community as a whole and is not to be claimed separately by the sub-sects that exist in all minority communities. Any permission to make further reservations for the sub sections within the minority community would be unjust and arbitrary. In the process, merit would become the casualty. Ext.P1 certificate issued to the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 22962 of 2018 dated 22.6.2018 is applicable to the Muslim community in general. The same is the position with respect to the certificate issued to the Karuna Medical College in W.P.(C) No. 22168 of 2018. It is further pointed out that, the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution does not permit the minority community to exclude persons belonging to the community in general and to prefer other candidates of their choice. Therefore, it is contended that, candidates would have to be granted admission on the basis of the inter se merit in the NEET rank list applicable to the community in general. On the above grounds, the counsel seeks dismissal of the writ petitions. 11. Heard. In the nature of the contentions put forward before us, it is necessary for us to examine the scope of the right available to a minority community under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, as interpreted and understood by the Apex Court in the decisions on the point. Article 30(1) confers a very valuable and inviolable right on the minority communities and reads as under: “30. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.- (1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.” The above provision confers on all minorities, whether based on religion or language, the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The different facets of the right are, firstly, to establish and secondly, to administer educational institutions of their choice. The word 'choice' therefore qualifies the words 'educational institutions' that precedes it. The different facets of the right are, firstly, to establish and secondly, to administer educational institutions of their choice. The word 'choice' therefore qualifies the words 'educational institutions' that precedes it. Though going by the wording of the provision, the right to establish and administer educational institutions could be exercised as 'chosen by the minority communities'., it is well settled by the decisions on the point that such 'choice' is subject to regulation by the State with the object of maintaining the standards of education. In other words, though Article 30(1) of the Constitution does not stipulate any restrictions on the right conferred, the same is capable of being regulated to the limited extent of ensuring that standards of education are maintained. 12. Though Article 30(1) speaks of minority communities, the word 'minority' is not defined anywhere in the Constitution. The question as to who are the minorities entitled to claim the right under Article 30(1) has come up for consideration before the Apex Court on a number of occasions. In Bal Patil v. Union of India [ (2005) 6 SCC 690 ], a Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court was faced with the question as to whether 'Jains' constituted a minority community and whether a direction to the Central Government to notify 'Jains' as a minority community under Section 2(c) of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992 could be issued, as sought for. The Apex Court has answered the said question in the following words: “11. The expression “minority” has been used in Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution but it has nowhere been defined. The Preamble to the Constitution proclaims to guarantee to every citizen “liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship”. Group of Articles 25 to 30 guarantee protection of religious, cultural and educational rights to both majority and minority communities. It appears that keeping in view the constitutional guarantees for protection of cultural, educational and religious rights of all citizens, it was not felt necessary to define “minority”. Minority as understood from the constitutional scheme signifies an identifiable group of people or community who were seen as deserving protection from likely deprivation of their religious, cultural and educational rights by other communities who happen to be in majority and likely to gain political power in a democratic form of government based on election. 12. Minority as understood from the constitutional scheme signifies an identifiable group of people or community who were seen as deserving protection from likely deprivation of their religious, cultural and educational rights by other communities who happen to be in majority and likely to gain political power in a democratic form of government based on election. 12. In the background of the constitutional scheme, the provisions of the Act therefore instead of giving definition of “minority” only provide for notifying certain communities as “minorities” who might require special treatment and protection of their religious, cultural and educational rights. The definition of “minority” given under the Act in Section 2(c) is in fact not a definition as such but only a provision enabling the Central Government to identify a community as a “minority” which in the considered opinion of the Central Government deserves to be notified for the purpose of protecting and monitoring its progress and development through the Commission.” It is worth noticing in the above context that the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992 has defined 'minority' under Section 2(c) thereof, which is reproduced hereunder. “(c) “minority”, for the purposes of this Act, means a community notified as such by the Central Government.” In terms of the said enactment, the Government of India has issued a notification as 'Notification on “Minority Communities” 1993. As per the said notification, issued under Clause (c) of Section 2 of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992, Muslims have been classified as one of the Minorities. It is necessary to be noticed here that, no sub-sect or denomination within the said community finds a place in the said notification. The Kerala State has enacted the Kerala State Commission for Minorities Act, 2014. Section 2(d) of the said enactment reads as under: “(d) “Minority” means a community notified by the Central Government under the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992 (Central Act 19 of 1992).” The Parliament has thereafter enacted the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004. The Kerala State has enacted the Kerala State Commission for Minorities Act, 2014. Section 2(d) of the said enactment reads as under: “(d) “Minority” means a community notified by the Central Government under the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992 (Central Act 19 of 1992).” The Parliament has thereafter enacted the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004. Sub clauses (f) and (g) of the said enactment read as under: “(f) “minority”, for the purpose of this Act, means a community notified as such by the Central Government; (g) “Minority Educational Institution” means a college or an educational institution established and administered by a minority or minorities;” It is clear from a perusal of the definitions referred to above that a minority community is to be understood as one that has been notified by the Central Government under the National Commission for Minorities Act. 1992. As per the notification issued by the Central Government, the entire Muslim Community in general would come within the scope of the expression. 13. In Bramchari Sidheswar Shai v. State of W.B. [ (1995) 4 SCC 646 ], the Apex Court had to consider whether persons professing, practicing, or propagating the religious doctrines and teachings of Ramakrishna belong to a different religion distinct and separate from the Hindu religion, entitled to protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. Speaking for the Court, Venkitachala, J has held in paragraphs 52 to 55 as follows: “52. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the citizens of India residing in the State of West Bengal, who are professing, practising or propagating the religious doctrines and teachings of Ramakrishna and have become his followers, cannot claim to belong to a minority based on Ramakrishna religion which was distinct and different from Hindu religion and as such are not entitled to the fundamental right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, of establishing and administering educational institutions of their choice through Ramakrishna Mission or its branches in that State and answer point 1 accordingly, in the negative. 53. It is held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Shri Shirur Mutt case that religious denomination is a collection of individuals classed together under the same religious set or body having a common faith and organization and designated by a distinctive name, based on the meaning of that phrase found in Oxford Dictionary. 53. It is held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Shri Shirur Mutt case that religious denomination is a collection of individuals classed together under the same religious set or body having a common faith and organization and designated by a distinctive name, based on the meaning of that phrase found in Oxford Dictionary. It is also held therein that such a religious denomination falls under Article 26 of the Constitution of India. It is further held therein that the followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shrivaishnavas while constitute a religious denomination of their own, the followers of Madhavacharya and other religious teachers could be regarded as those belonging to their respective religious denominations. 54. Following the view taken as above as regards “religious denominations”, by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Shri Shirur Mutt Case, a three Judge Bench of this Court in Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta case speaking through Ranganath Misra, J. (as he then was) has held that “Ananda Margis”, who are a collection of individuals, who have a system of beliefs with regard to their conducive spiritual well-being, a common organization, a definite name, could be regarded as a religious denomination within the Hindu religion, stating that the tests laid down by the Constitution Bench for regarding a denomination as a religious denomination were satisfied. 55. In view of the said pronouncements of this Court, persons who claim to belong to religious denomination envisaged under Article 26 of the Constitution can succeed in such claim only when they fulfil or satisfy the tests laid down therein, to wit: (i) a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs with regard to their conducive spiritual well-being; (ii) a common organization; and (iii) a definite name.” 14. The decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in A.S.E. Trust v. The Director of Education, Delhi Administration [AIR 1976 Delhi 207] where the claim of the members of Arya Samaj Education Trust, Delhi for the benefit of the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution had come up for consideration is illuminating on the point. In paragraph 22, the Bench distinguishes the right under Article 25 from the right under Article 30(1) in the following words: “22. ….. In paragraph 22, the Bench distinguishes the right under Article 25 from the right under Article 30(1) in the following words: “22. ….. This implies that the test of minority under Article 30(1) is that the religion as a whole constitutes minority or a minority as opposed to a religion in majority in a given State or Union Territory. Sections of the religion do not constitute different minorities. We have already stated that the meaning of the word “religion” in Article 25 as also in the Hindu Code expressed by the Constitution makers and Parliament is the religion as a whole and not its sections and sects. As observed by Herman Finer, “to admit the right of a minority to Rule (to the right under Article 30(1) in our context) involves the difficulty -with which minority? It gives all minorities equal right-that is, it destroys the integration of society.” (The Theory and Practice of Modern Government (1961) page 81). We are of the view, therefore, that the meaning of religion in Article 30(1) is confined to the well-defined religions of India such as Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, Christianity, Jainism etc.” What emerges from an examination of the precedents referred to above is that, there cannot be a further categorization of a minority community into separate denominations within it, with an entitlement to special protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. 15. The position as to whether the minority status of a community is to be decided treating the country or the State as a unit has been settled by the 11 Judge Bench decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 8 SCC 481 ]. It has been held in paragraph 76 of the said judgment as follows: “76. If, therefore, the State has to be regarded as the unit for determining “linguistic minority” vis-a-vis Article 30, then with “religious minority” being on the same footing, it is the State in relation to which the majority or minority status will have to be determined.” It has further been held by the Apex Court in Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ (2016) 7 SCC 353 ] that the right of unaided professional Colleges to admit students of their choice is subject to selection of students on the basis of their merit through a transparent, fair and non-exploitative procedure. In the above context, the following passage in paragraph 39 of the judgment which reads as under is relevant: “39. This argument has to be rejected in view of the unambiguous and categorical interpretation given by the Supreme Court in P.A. Inamdar with respect to certain observations, particularly in paragraph 68 in T.M.A. Pai Foundation. In this behalf, we would like to recapitulate that in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, a Bench of eleven Judges dealt with the issues of scope of right to set up educational institutions by private aided or unaided, minority or non-minority institutions and the extent of Government regulation of the said right. It was held that the right to establish and administer an institution included the right to admit students and to set up a reasonable fee structure. But the said right could be regulated to ensure maintenance of proper academic standards, atmosphere and infrastructure.” 16. The manner of determining the merit of the student has been set out in paragraph 36 of the said judgment in the following words: “36. In order to see that merit is adjudged suitably and appropriately, the Court candidly laid down that procedure for admission should be so devised which satisfies the triple test of being fair, transparent and non-exploitative. The next question was as to how the aforesaid objective could be achieved? For determining such merit, the Court showed the path in paragraph 59 by observing that such merit should be determined either by the marks that students obtained at qualifying examination or at the CET conducted by the institutions or in the case of professional colleges, by Government agencies. Paragraph 59 suggesting these modes reads as under: “59. Merit is usually determined, for admission to professional and higher education colleges, by either the marks that the student obtains at the education colleges, by either the marks that the student obtains at the qualifying examination or school - leaving certificate stage followed by the interview, or by a common entrance test conducted by the institution, or in the case of professional colleges, by government agencies.” This paragraph very specifically authorises CET to be conducted by Government agencies in the case of professional colleges.” The extent of seats that could be reserved for being filled up by the management is clear from the following passage in paragraph 37 of the same judgment: “37. …......... …......... For instance, a certain percentage of the seats can be reserved for admission by the management out of those students who have passed the common entrance test held by itself or by the State/university and have applied to the college concerned for admission, while the rest of the seats may be filled up on the basis of counselling by the State agency. This will incidentally take care of poorer and backward sections of the society. The prescription of percentage for this purpose has to be done by the Government according to the local needs and different percentages can be fixed for minority unaided and non-minority unaided and professional colleges. The same principles may be applied to other non-professional but unaided educational institutions viz. Graduation and post graduation non-professional colleges or institutes.” The extent to which grant of admission to non-minorities could be permitted in such minority educational institutions has been laid down by the Apex Court in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra [ (2005) 6 SCC 537 ] in the following words: “102. It necessarily follows from the law laid down in Pai Foundation that to establish a minority institution the institution must primarily cater to the requirements of that minority of that State else its character of minority institution is lost. However, to borrow the words of Chief Justice S.R. Das in Kerala Education Bill a “sprinkling” of that minority from the other State on the same footing as a sprinkling of non-minority students, would be permissible and would not deprive the institution of its essential character of being a minority institution determined by reference to that State as a unit.” The court has thereafter proceeded to delineate the extent to which State Regulation could be imposed on the right to make admissions and to fix fees in paragraph 43 of the judgment, which is also reproduced hereunder: “43. Thus, the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the private medical colleges had absolute right to make admissions or to fix fee is not consistent with the earlier decisions of this Court. Neither merit could be compromised in admissions to professional institutions nor capitation fee could be permitted. To achieve these objects it is open to the State to introduce regulatory measures. Neither merit could be compromised in admissions to professional institutions nor capitation fee could be permitted. To achieve these objects it is open to the State to introduce regulatory measures. We are unable to accept the submissions that the State could intervene only after proving that merit was compromised or capitation fee was being charged. As observed in the earlier decisions of this court, post -audit measures would not meet the regulatory requirements. Control was required at the initial stage itself. Therefore, our answer to the first question is that though 'occupation' is a fundamental right, which gives right to the educational institutions to admit the students and also fix the fee, at the same time, scope of such rights has been discussed and limitations imposed thereupon by the aforesaid judgments themselves explaining the nature of limitations on these rights.” It has also been held in Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) that the restrictions indicated in the earlier portions of the judgment could be made applicable to minority educational institutions also, as evident from the following passage in paragraph 48. “48. It would be necessary to clarify the position in respect of educational institutions run by minorities. Having regard to the pronouncement in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, with lucid clarifications to the said judgment given by this Court in P.A. Inamdar, it becomes clear that insofar as such regulatory measures are concerned, the same can be adopted by the State in respect of minority run institutions as well.” 17. It is clear from the above that, the right to choose students claimed by the minority educational institutions in these cases is subject to the restriction that merit shall not be compromised. Though the wording of Article 30(1) does not spell out any restrictions on the right under Article 30(1), the right is not absolute and is subject to regulation that the State is empowered to put in place in order to maintain standards in education. In the matter of choice of students also, the conduct of a common entrance test, the drawing up of a common merit list of candidates and an insistence that candidates shall be chosen only from the said merit list are permitted in the light of the dictum laid down by the decisions of the Apex Court on the point. In the matter of choice of students also, the conduct of a common entrance test, the drawing up of a common merit list of candidates and an insistence that candidates shall be chosen only from the said merit list are permitted in the light of the dictum laid down by the decisions of the Apex Court on the point. Therefore, the freedom of choice that a minority educational institution could exercise is now limited and circumscribed by the parameters indicated above. It is in the above background that the contentions advanced before us in these cases have to be examined. 18. As already noticed above, the seat matrix proposed by the colleges envisaged grant of admission to candidates from outside State in the category indicated as 'All India Muslim quota'. The same is not permissible in view of the fact that, the minority status of a community is judged, with the State as a unit. Consequently, candidates from outside the State could be admitted only to the extent permitted by the prospectus issued by the State. 19. With respect to the other categories indicated in the seat matrix, in the case of Karuna Medical College, 35 seats are sought to be demarcated for the Trust conducting the College and its dependent trusts. The contention put forward is that, the Trusts mentioned therein are dependent organizations. The Medical College authorities claim that they are entitled to reserve seats for the dependents of the said Trusts. The words 'dependents of the trust' are not indicative of any definite class or category of persons. Any person could be brought within the umbrella of the said expression, at the whims of the College and its functionaries. Any permission to effect admissions on the said criteria would therefore denude the admission process of transparency. Other categories mentioned in the seat matrix relate to even Muslim political organizations like Jamaat-e-Islami which also cannot be permitted. It is necessary to bear in mind that the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution is available only to a minority community, which is a homogeneous class. As per the Government of India notification, it is the community of Muslims that has been designated as the minority community. Though there may be various denominations or sub-sects within that community, no such denomination or sub-sect could claim a further protection that would extend even against members of the minority community itself. As per the Government of India notification, it is the community of Muslims that has been designated as the minority community. Though there may be various denominations or sub-sects within that community, no such denomination or sub-sect could claim a further protection that would extend even against members of the minority community itself. No such categorization or reservation is permissible in law, nor is any such reservation envisaged or recognized. The above being the position, the contention that the Colleges in these cases that they are entitled to reserve seats for the various categories indicated in their proposed seat matrix is rejected. 20. There is a further reason why the contention of the petitioner Colleges in these cases cannot be accepted. It is settled position of law that the inter se merit among the candidates would have to be maintained even while selecting candidates for admission to a minority institution. Paragraph 15 of the judgment in Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka [ (2003) 6 SCC 697 ] that lays down the above position is extracted hereunder: “15. It must be clarified that minority professional colleges can admit, in their management quota, a student of their own community/language in preference to a student of another community even though that other student is more meritorious. However, whilst selecting/admitting students of their community/language the inter se merit of those students cannot be ignored. In other words, whilst selecting/admitting students of their own community/ language they cannot ignore the inter se merit amongst students of their community/ language. Admission, even of members of their community/language, must strictly be on the basis of merit except that in case of their own students it has to be merit inter se those students only. Further, if the seats cannot be filled up from members of their community/language, then the other students can be admitted only on the basis of merit based on a common entrance test conducted by government agencies.” The common source from which the students could be chosen is also stipulated and the Apex Court has been very categoric that the minority community has no right to choose its own source from which students could be admitted. The above aspect has been made clear in the following passage that forms part of paragraph 61 of the decision in Indian Medical Association v. Union of India [ (2011) 7 SCC 179 ] = [2011 KHC 4502]. “61. A clear set of distinctions emerge between educational institutions that are started and operated by minorities and non-minorities. The level of regulation that the State can impose under Clause (6) of Art.19 on the freedoms enjoyed pursuant to sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Art.19 by non-minority educational institutions would be greater than what could be imposed on minority institutions under Art.30(1) continuing to maintain minority status by admitting mostly students of the minority to which the minority institution claims it belongs to, except for a sprinkling of non-minority students. The critical difference in regulation that would be higher in the case of non-minority educational institutions is that they only select students from the general pool, and based on merit as determined by marks secured in qualifying examinations. The ability to choose from a smaller group within the general pool, becomes available only to those who are constitutionally protected under clause (1) of Art.30. Even that ability to choose from within the smaller group is not really a right to choose a “source”. The source is given. The source can only be the minority to which the minority educational institution claims it belongs to. Once the choice is exercised to be an educational institution that serves minority, the source itself is given by clause (1) of Art.30 and depends on whether the group claiming to be a minority is actually a minority or not, as determined at the State level.” The above aspect is further laid down authoritatively in paragraph 64 of the very same judgment which reads as follows: “64. In light of the above we have to conclude that non-minority private unaided professional colleges do not have the right to choose their own "source" from within the general pool. In light of the above we have to conclude that non-minority private unaided professional colleges do not have the right to choose their own "source" from within the general pool. The equivalence between minority and non-minority unaided institutions, apart from that distinction because of clause (1) of Article 30, was to be on the basis that both are subject to reasonable restrictions pursuant to clause (6) of Article 19, that neither minority nor non-minority institutions could maladminister their educational institutions, especially professional institutions, that affect the quality of education, and by choosing students arbitrarily from within the sources that they are entitled to choose from. In the case of non-minority institutions, especially professional institutions, the "source" can only be the general pool, and selection has to be based on inter-se ranking of students who have qualified and applying or opting to choose to be admitted to such non-minority educational institutions. In the case of minority educational institutions, the "source" can be delimited to the particular minority the institution belongs to. To hold otherwise would be illogical, even if one were to assume that what is afforded to minority institutions is only a protection rather than a full fledged right. The protection under clause (1) of Article 30 is granted to minority institutions so long as they maintain their minority status. If the non-minority educational institutions could choose their own sources, minorities which are assured equal protections as non-minorities should certainly have that right too. The added protections to minority educational institutions makes sense only in the event that non-minorities are restricted to choosing from the general pool, and minorities from the delimited source of their own minority. Otherwise Clause (1) of Article 30 would become meaningless.” Therefore, it is clear that the source from which a minority educational institution is permitted to chose its students is the 'minority community' that enjoys the constitutional protection under Article 30(1). No sub division or sub sect within such community can claim a distinct and separate right that could be exercised even against its own community members. Therefore, the claim of the petitioners are unsustainable. If the right claimed by them is conceded, that would permit them to admit less meritorious students belonging to the sub sects in preference to even Muslim students of higher merit. That would only be counter productive. 21. Therefore, the claim of the petitioners are unsustainable. If the right claimed by them is conceded, that would permit them to admit less meritorious students belonging to the sub sects in preference to even Muslim students of higher merit. That would only be counter productive. 21. Apart from the above, as rightly pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, about 10000 Muslim candidates figure in the NEET rank list prepared for the current academic year, which is more than three times the total number of seats available to be filled up. Therefore, there are sufficient number of candidates available for filling up the seats in all the minority educational institutions conducted by the Muslim community. Admission of candidates from the said common source maintaining the inter se merit among the candidates would ensure that the selection is transparent, merit based and non-exploitative as stipulated by the Apex Court. Any permission to deviate from the said procedure would only lead to unethical practices and sacrificing of merit, which is not permissible. 22. The learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. Jose [2007(1) KLT 22(SC)], Corporate Educational Agency v. James Mathew [2017(3) KLT 713 (SC] and the decision in Belsi v. Corporate Management of Latin Catholic Schools [ 2010 (2) KLT 134 ] of a Full Bench of this Court to contend that, minority educational institutions have a right of choice in the matter of appointment of teachers, Headmasters/Principals and also in the matter of admission of students. Certain passages from the decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (supra) are also relied on. Learned Senior Counsel further relies on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Kurian Lizy v. State of Kerala [ 2006 (4) KLT 264 ] to mount a contention that the right of such choice in the matter of appointment of teachers and Headmasters/Principals has been accepted by the Court. 23. However, we do not find any substance in the said contentions. The manner of choice in the matter of appointment of teachers or Headmasters of the various institutions stand on a totally different footing, when compared to the choice of a student for the grant of admission to courses like MBBS, Engineering etc. 23. However, we do not find any substance in the said contentions. The manner of choice in the matter of appointment of teachers or Headmasters of the various institutions stand on a totally different footing, when compared to the choice of a student for the grant of admission to courses like MBBS, Engineering etc. While the general attitude or the capacity of an individual to strive towards achieving the objective with which the institutions have been established would be a relevant consideration in the appointment of teaching staff or Headmaster, no consideration other than merit is permissible in the matter of admitting students to an educational institution. As we have already found on examination of the various decisions of the Apex Court on the point, freedom is granted to the minority community only in the matter of choosing students belonging to their community, strictly maintaining the inter se merit among the candidates from the common pool. A further categorization within the community itself would give the institution a freedom to exclude a more meritorious candidate of the minority community and to choose a less meritorious one, which is not permissible. They have no right to choose a source, as already held above. Therefore, the said contentions are rejected. 24. The other question that remains to be considered is whether the insistence on the production of community certificate issued by the Revenue officials as a document for availing the benefit of the minority community is discriminative or not. We notice that, as per the seat matrix approved by the State, candidates belonging to Christian communities have been permitted to support their applications with certificates issued by various religious functionaries like Pastors, Parish Priests, Bishops etc. At the same time, Muslim students are to produce certificates issued by Revenue authorities, as proof of their community status. This, according to the petitioners, is discriminatory. We also do not find any justification for the said discrimination that appears from the approved seat matrix. However, the learned Government Pleader hastens to clarify that the certificates that are permitted to be produced by the Christian students are in addition to certificates issued by the Revenue authorities. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the said aspect is not clear from the approved seat matrix produced in these cases. However, the learned Government Pleader hastens to clarify that the certificates that are permitted to be produced by the Christian students are in addition to certificates issued by the Revenue authorities. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the said aspect is not clear from the approved seat matrix produced in these cases. Therefore, we make it clear that as a rule, the community status could be certified only by the competent Revenue authorities. Certificates issued by the religious dignitaries, even in the case of Christian students, can be only in addition to or supplementary to the certificate issued by Revenue authorities. This is for the reason that, it is only the Revenue authorities who are competent and authorized in law to issue community certificates. To the said extent, we accept the contentions of the petitioners. In the result, these writ petitions are disposed of as follows: (i) The challenge against the impugned proceedings evidenced by Exts. P4 and P13 in W.P.(C) No. 22168 of 2018 and Ext. P12 in W.P.(C) No. 22962 of 2018 fail and are dismissed. (ii) It is declared that community certificates in the case of students from all communities shall be accepted only if they are issued by the competent Revenue officials. However, such certificates could be supported by certificates issued by the religious functionaries also, if necessary. Any student admitted on the basis of the certificate issued only by religious functionaries shall be granted permission and sufficient time to produce proper certificates from the Revenue authorities. (iii) W.P.(C) No. 23707 of 2018 is dismissed.