JUDGMENT : Introduction: A wary purchaser of a secured asset is caught in the litigious cross fire between the borrowers and the banker. Spent his money, burnt his fingers (as he claims), and now wants to salvage the situation. The purchaser wants to withdraw from the sale and get his money back. But he faces uncertainty. After suffering an adverse order before the DRT, the Bank has filed an appeal before the DRAT, Chennai. And its disposal assumes importance for the purchaser to press his claim for refund. He wants the Appellate Tribunal to dispose of the appeal early. 2. Now the question is, Can this Court, in Kerala, assume supervisory jurisdiction over the Appellate Tribunal in Chennai, Tamil Nadu? A question of territorial jurisdiction must be resolved. Facts: 3. Petitioner Thomas Chacko is the fifth respondent in AIR(SR) No. 460 of 2017 before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), at Chennai. Bank of India, the sixth respondent here, filed that appeal. The first and seventh respondents are the Bank officials. The respondents two to five are the borrowers. 4. When the borrowers defaulted on the loan repayment, the Bank started recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. It seems, in that process, the Bank brought the secured asset for sale, and Thomas Chacko purchased it. Then, the defaulting borrowers filed SA No 55/2007 (later renumbered as TSA No. 1198 of 2016) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Ernakulam. Thomas, too, was a party. The DRT allowed the SA. The sale in Thomas’s favour was set aside. 5. Aggrieved, the Bank filed the statutory appeal, AIR (SR) No. 460 of 2017, before the DRAT, Chennai. 6. Thomas pleads that he had parted with his hard-earned money and purchased the property on the Bank officials’ assurance. But now “that the sale has been set aside and the legal proceedings have taken their toll” on him, he is no more interested in contesting the proceedings. So he wishes to get his money back with interest and damages. After claiming the amounts from the Bank, Thomas has also filed W.P.(C)26579/2017 here. It is pending. 7. To press his claim for return of the sale consideration along with interest and damages, Thomas feels the Bank’s appeal before the DRAT is a hurdle. So he has filed this writ petition for a direction to the DRAT, Chennai: an early disposal of the appeal. It is pending. 7. To press his claim for return of the sale consideration along with interest and damages, Thomas feels the Bank’s appeal before the DRAT is a hurdle. So he has filed this writ petition for a direction to the DRAT, Chennai: an early disposal of the appeal. For this, he invoked Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. Given the issue’s intricacy, I have requested Sri Jacob P. Alex, the learned advocate to assist the Court. And he has readily agreed. Besides, supplementing the arguments advanced by the learned counsel on either side, Sri Alex has cited many precedents and took the Court through semantic and judicial nuances of the term “territorial jurisdiction” of the Constitutional Courts. 9. Heard Sri Pramod J Dev, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri J. Harikumar, the learned Standing Counsel for the Bank, and Sri Jaisankar V. Nair, the learned Central Government Counsel, besides Sri Jacob P. Alex, the learned Amicus Curiae. 10. Indeed, the Appellate Tribunal’s situs is Chennai. So the Bank’s counsel, not the borrowers’, has raised an objection: Does this Court have territorial jurisdiction to entertain this OP (DRT) under Article 227 of the Constitution. In other words, does this Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the DRAT, Chennai? 11. To resolve the jurisdictional issue, we must first examine Article 227 of the Constitution. And it reads: 227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court.- (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may- (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein: Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. 12. Plainly read, Article 227 confers on every High Court superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the “territories” over which the High Court exercises its jurisdiction. Then, should we reckon “territories” in the literal, geographical sense or in the figurative, legal sense - as fiction. 13. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 the appellant is a company, with its registered office at Mumbai. It took a loan from the Bhopal Branch of State Bank of India. On the appellant’s default, the Bank invoked SARFEASI Act and issued notice under Section 13 (2) from Bhopal. Then, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. But the Court dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction. So the appellant approached the Supreme Court. 14. Kusum Ingots holds that if a part of the cause of action arises within one or the other High Court, the suitor can choose his forum. When the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority at another, a writ petition would lie at either place. In other words, the appellate authority’s order constitutes a part of cause of action; so a writ petition would lie to the High Court, within whose jurisdiction the appellate authority is located. But Kusum Ingots also holds that if a small part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, that by itself may not compel the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, that High Court can refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. 15. In Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Exercise, (2007) 6 SCC 769 the appellant carried on business at Lucknow. A dispute involving the appellant, however, arose before the CESTAT, New Delhi. The Tribunal exercises its jurisdiction over the cases from the State of Uttar Pradesh, National Capital Territory of Delhi, and the State of Maharashtra. Against the Tribunal’s order, the appellant filed an appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act before the Delhi High Court. A dispute involving the appellant, however, arose before the CESTAT, New Delhi. The Tribunal exercises its jurisdiction over the cases from the State of Uttar Pradesh, National Capital Territory of Delhi, and the State of Maharashtra. Against the Tribunal’s order, the appellant filed an appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act before the Delhi High Court. A Division Bench held that it had no territorial jurisdiction; it dismissed the appeal. So the matter reached the Supreme Court. 16. In the above factual backdrop, Ambica Industries has held that as for Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as also Clause (2) of Article 226, the High Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction over the orders passed by the Subordinate Courts within its territorial jurisdiction. And even if any part of the cause of action has arisen within its territory, that will suffice. But this principle cannot be applied, holds Ambica Industries, when the High Court exercises its jurisdiction over a Tribunal extending its jurisdiction over more than one State. Then, “the High Court situated in the State where the first court is located” should be the proper forum. 17. Let us examine another case. An assessee filed an appeal before the Punjab & Haryana High Court under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962. But the High Court held that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter as the Adjudicating Authority at Mumbai passed the original order and the appellate order by the CESTAT, at Delhi. In Canon Steels (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, (2007) 14 SCC 464 the Supreme Court has reiterated its holding in Kusum Ingots. A Special Bench of the Delhi High Court has considered a similar issue in Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2011 Del. 174. The petitioner-industry is in Madhya Pradesh. An Assistant Commissioner of Customs ICD, Bhind District of that State, passed the initial order. Later, the Appellate Authority of that State passed orders on appeal. Then the petitioner filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, for the office of the Joint Secretary to the Government of India is in Delhi. 18. Sterling Agro Industries elaborated on the doctrine of forum conveniens. It has held that the concept of forum conveniens fundamentally means it is obligatory on the court’s part to see the convenience of all the parties before it. 18. Sterling Agro Industries elaborated on the doctrine of forum conveniens. It has held that the concept of forum conveniens fundamentally means it is obligatory on the court’s part to see the convenience of all the parties before it. Convenience takes into fold the appropriateness of the forum, the expenses, the law that applies to the lis, the verifiability of the facts, and such other ancillary aspects. The balance of convenience, it also observes, must be noted. The cause of action, true, assumes cardinal value, but that by itself will not be the determining factor to compel the court to entertain the matter. 19. Without much ado, I may hold that Ambica Industries’s assertion clinches the issue: when the High Court exercises its jurisdiction over a Tribunal extending its jurisdiction over more than one State, then the High Court in the State where the first court is located should be the proper forum. Indeed, here the first or the primary forum is the DRT, Ernakulam. So this Court can eminently exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over the DRAT, Chennai. Here, the petitioner wants a direction to the Appellate Tribunal to dispose of the appeal early. 20. That said, this Court cannot be oblivious to the docket pressure the Appellate Tribunal faces. Nor can it set impracticable dead-lines, for adjudication is not akin to answering a multiple-choice question paper. It is much more. A back-breaking, brain-racking exercise. 21. So I queried with the learned Central Government Counsel about the Appellate Tribunal’s convenience and the feasibility of an early disposal. He has, presumably on instructions, submitted that the Appellate Tribunal will dispose of the AIR (SR) No.460 of 2017 in three months’ time. Under these circumstances, I hold that the DRAT, Chennai, will dispose of the AIR (SR) No. 460 of 2017 expeditiously in three months. Before parting, I place on record the Court’s appreciation of the services Sri Jacob P. Alex's services as the amicus curiae.