ORDER : TASHI RABSTAN, J. 1. Shri Nirbhay Trehan - respondent herein, has filed a Suit (Annexure A to petition) under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure Svt. 1977, for recovery of sum of Rs. 85.00 Lacs before the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Srinagar ('for short-Trial Court'), on the basis of cheque bearing No. 748588 dated 6th July 2015, payable at J & K Bank Branch Unit Shalimar Road, Jammu, issued by M/s. Iqbal Motors Transport Service - petitioner herein, whereby petitioner had agreed to pay the said amount to respondent. Case set up by respondent before learned Trial Court was that he had transaction with petitioner. Petitioner moved an application (Annexure B to petition) under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5), CPC, for grant of leave to defend suit filed by respondent and file written statement. Petitioner levelled therein the allegation of pilferage of cheque by S/Shri Abdul Majid Sheikh and Nirbhay Trehan. Objections (Annexure C to petition) to the application of petitioner were filed by respondent. Learned Trial Court, after going through pleadings of both parties and hearing counsel for parties, vide order dated 17th September 2018 (Annexure D to petition) has dismissed petitioner's application for leave to defend. It is this order, of which petitioner is aggrieved and seeks setting-aside thereof and allowing application filed by him for leave to defend the claim of respondent before learned Trial Court. 2. The case set up by petitioner is that a civil suit came to be instituted by respondent/plaintiff against petitioner/defendant, seeking a decree for an amount of Rs. 85.00 Lacs, on the premise that respondent has business transaction with petitioner and in discharge of debt, respondent handed over a cheque to respondent, which cheque on being presented by respondent for collection at Axis Bank, Srinagar, was returned back along with memo with endorsement 'insufficient amount'. It is contended that in response to summon, petitioner within time upon entering appearance, filed an application seeking leave to defend in terms of Sub Rule (5) of Rule (3) of Order XXXVII CPC. Petitioner states that he urged availability of good defence to the claim lodged by respondent inasmuch as he raised triable issues indicating that he has a bona fide and reasonable business and even disclosed such facts, which were sufficient to entitle him to defend the claim respondent/plaintiff has projected. Petitioner states that he urged availability of good defence to the claim lodged by respondent inasmuch as he raised triable issues indicating that he has a bona fide and reasonable business and even disclosed such facts, which were sufficient to entitle him to defend the claim respondent/plaintiff has projected. Petitioner states that he brought facts in application that he had reported missing of cheque book through his Accountant - Mahraj Krishen, on 26th February 2014, since cheques in Cheque Book bearing No. 748501 and 748600 were signed blank cheques, to Police as also to concerned Bank and subsequent to lodgement of missing reports, petitioner came to know that said cheques had been removed with aid and assistance of one Abdul Majid Sheikh son of Haji Ghulam Ahmad Sheikh resident of Tengpora, Byepass, Srinagar. Petitioner also averred in the application that the suit was not based on any legal documents, disclosing any jural relationship between petitioner and respondent inasmuch as petitioner had no liability towards respondent. 3. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner states that learned Trial Court has passed impugned order in breach and violation of procedure, mechanism and provisions enshrined in Order XXXVII, CPC, inasmuch as learned Trial Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction, so fixed in it, while considering application of petitioner for leave to defend. He also avers that learned Trial Court has overlooked the grounds urged in the application because grounds urged and contentions raised by petitioner prima facie satisfy availability of good defence to the claim of respondent, besides demonstrate existence of triable issues and indicate that petitioner has a fair bona fide/reasonable defence against claim of respondent as also that petitioner disclosed such facts sufficient to entitle him to defend the claim of respondent inasmuch as statement of facts lead to an inference that at the trial of the case defendant/petitioner will be able to establish defence to respondent's claim. He has also vehemently stated that learned Trial Court has not followed provisions of Order XXXVIII Rule 2(2)(3), Rule (3)(4)(5). He has also vehemently stated that learned Trial Court has not followed provisions of Order XXXVIII Rule 2(2)(3), Rule (3)(4)(5). In support of his submissions as also qua maintainability of petition under Section 104 of the Constitution of J & K, learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on Mechelec Engineers and Manufacturers v. M/s. Basic Equipment Corporation, AIR 1977 SC 577 ; IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd., AIR 2016 SC 5321 ; Mukhtar Ahmed & Anr. v. Mehraj-ud-din and Anr., 2003 (2) JKJ 68 [HC]; Magnolia Experts Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Ghulam Mohamad Wani, 2003 (3) JKJ 201 [HC]; Harnam Dass v. Krishan Lal & Anr., 2017 (II) SLJ 940; and Fayaz Ahmad Najar v. Feroz Ahmad Najar & Anr. 2018 (I) SLJ 140. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents urges that the principal grounds raised by petitioner before learned Court imploring for leave to defend was that the cheque book, of which the cheque in question has been issued to plaintiff/respondent, actually got missing which as alleged by him was removed from the office of petitioner by respondent with the aid and assistance of Abdul Majid Sheikh. Learned counsel for respondent strenuously asserts that alleged pilferage of cheque in question has been found a baseless and unfounded plot created by petitioner, aiming at to wriggle out of liability that is cast upon him consequent upon dishonour of cheque. And in this regard written complaint filed by petitioner before Crime Branch, Kashmir, has been closed as 'not proved'. 6. Learned counsel for respondent has also produced a copy of Status Report of P.V. No. 134/2015 of Crime Branch Kashmir, submitted by Crime Branch before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, in a case titled Ghulam Qadir Akhoon (petitioner herein) v. Ab. Majid Sheikh and Nirbhay Trehan (respondent herein). Copy whereof, at request, is taken on record. Learned counsel has contended, and rightly so, that Status Report would unambiguously unveil written Complaint qua pilferage of cheque book, made sole basement by petitioner before learned Trial Court for seeking leave to defend, has been found untrue and without any edifice and as a sequel whereof, declared as 'not proved'. Copy whereof, at request, is taken on record. Learned counsel has contended, and rightly so, that Status Report would unambiguously unveil written Complaint qua pilferage of cheque book, made sole basement by petitioner before learned Trial Court for seeking leave to defend, has been found untrue and without any edifice and as a sequel whereof, declared as 'not proved'. Learned counsel for respondent, to bolster his arguments, has placed reliance on Ajay Bansal v. Anup Mehta & Ors., 2007 (2) SCC 275 ; Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra, (2009) 13 SCC 729 ; Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010 (8) SCC 329 ; V.K. Enterprises and another v. Shiva Steels : (2010) 9 SCC 256 ; HDFC v. Gautam Kumar Nag & Ors., 2012 (5) SCC 604 ; Goodwill Traders v. Showkat Hussain & Anr., 2012 (3) JKJ 39 ; Rajinder Singh Jamwal v. Kiran, 2014 (4) JKJ 564 ; Rinkash Singh Rakwal v. Shivani Rakwal & Ors., 2015 (2) JKJ 159 ; Harnam Dass v. Krishan Lal & Anr., 2017 (II) SLJ 940; and Mehraj-ud-din Wani vs. JK State Coop. Bank Ltd., 2018 Legal Eagle 365. 7. A civil suit has been filed by respondent against petitioner before learned Trial Court. Petitioner there moved an application in terms of Order 37 Rule (3)(5), CPC, for grant of leave to defend Suit filed by respondent. In said application, it has been stated by petitioner that suit filed by respondent is a mala fide action against petitioner and is aimed at to coerce and cause disreputation of petitioner and impinge upon his estimation, earned by him in his business. Petitioner has also averred in the said application that he is a registered transporter and he has been allotted contract by various agencies. Further submission of petitioner in application is that he filed a missing report of his cheque book, through his Accountant, namely, Maharaj Krishan on 26th February 2014 and that the said cheque book was signed from Cheque Nos. 748501 to 748600. Petitioner claims in the application that he immediately informed his bankers, i.e. J & K Bank, Shalimar Road, Jammu, to stop the payment of cheques, 24 in number, which includes cheque No. 748588 and upon advice and instructions of petitioner, the bankers stopped the payment as against the cheques. 748501 to 748600. Petitioner claims in the application that he immediately informed his bankers, i.e. J & K Bank, Shalimar Road, Jammu, to stop the payment of cheques, 24 in number, which includes cheque No. 748588 and upon advice and instructions of petitioner, the bankers stopped the payment as against the cheques. Later on, it came to fore that cheque book was removed from the office of petitioner by respondent with aid and assistance of one, Abdul Majid Sheikh son of Haji Ghulam Ahmad Sheikh resident of Tengpora, Byepass, Srinagar, and that on his complaint Crime Branch of the State is investigating the matter. Petitioner has claimed and maintained in the application that respondent had been summoned by Crime Branch to appear before it but he is avoiding on one pretext or other. It is also pleaded in the application of petitioner that suit has not been filed in accordance with Order VII, CPC, inasmuch as petitioner has no liability towards respondent. 8. Objections in opposition to application of petitioner were filed by respondent, in which respondent insisted that reference of complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act and evidence adduced by respondent were of no consequence to the controversy in civil suit, which was altogether mechanism of recovery provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. It has also been insisted by respondent in his objections that the complaint as referred to by him with respect to issuance of cheque before the Crime Branch, has already been taken to its logical conclusion as Crime Branch has submitted its closure report and petitioner's complaint has been dismissed as vexatious and the grounds taken by him in the application are unjustified and will not envisage the ground for allowing petitioner to defend the suit. 9. It is pertinent to mention here that petitioner's topmost and prime plea for leave to defend is that a complaint was filed by him before Crime Branch qua missing of cheque book, has been set at rest by Crime Branch, after conducting investigation into the matter and after finding that no case was made out by petitioner. Some averments of status/closure report filed by Crime Branch before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, are germane to be discussed here for dealing with and squaring off controversy in hand. Some averments of status/closure report filed by Crime Branch before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, are germane to be discussed here for dealing with and squaring off controversy in hand. Crime Branch Report divulges that during course of enquiry contents of complaint were verified from petitioner and he stated before Crime Branch that respondent herein was operating Branch Office of Firm at Narwal Jammu, where petitioner off and on kept bank cheque book duly signed to run work of Firm smoothly. During same period, petitioner came to know that one cheque book, in which most of cheques were already signed by him, had been pilfered from office. Subsequently petitioner informed concerned Bank to prevent misuse of these cheques. It is also mentioned in the report that in the interregnum, partners, namely, Abdul Majid Sheikh, and Nirbhay Trehan (respondent herein) had withdrawn their partnership and demanded from petitioner to return their contributed amount and accordingly, petitioner returned the amount received from them and no balance remained left with him. It is also mentioned in the report that then in the year 2015, to the surprise of petitioner two numbers of pilfered blank signed cheques were converted in valuable instruments to the tune of Rs. 1.85 crores by Abdul Majid Sheikh respondent and presented them before bank with an intention and motive to encash them but failed due to insufficient balance. 10. Aforesaid status/closure report of Crime Branch also discloses that Abdul Majid Sheikh was also examined, who stated that he and his colleague, respondent herein, had paid huge amount to petitioner for business for sharing the profit, but petitioner failed to do so and that is why, they asked him to return the amount. Since some amount was returned by petitioner through different bank accounts, but an amount of Rs. 1.00 Crore remained balance with him. Abdul Majid Sheikh also deposed that after sometime, he was called by respondent that petitioner had provided a cheque bearing No. 748589, the one that is stopped, amounting to Rs. 1.00 crore, which bounced on 21st July 2015, due to insufficient balance. Respondent, as is discernible from status/closure report of Crime Branch, was also examined. He in his statement averred that during course of business, petitioner did not provide them their share of profit. 1.00 crore, which bounced on 21st July 2015, due to insufficient balance. Respondent, as is discernible from status/closure report of Crime Branch, was also examined. He in his statement averred that during course of business, petitioner did not provide them their share of profit. Respondent, as is mentioned in status report, has stated that complaint filed by petitioner before Crime Branch, was simply to stop his partners to produce cheques at the bank, issued to them by petitioner. Having regard to whole case, Crime Branch closed the enquiry as 'not proved'. In that view of matter, Crime Branch Report is Achille's Heel in the case of petitioner as against respondent. 11. Learned Trial Court, on meticulous examination of impugned order, has threadbare discussed all facets of the subject-matter as envisaged under Order XXXVII, CPC, for vouchsafing grant of leave to defend. Order XXXVII, CPC, has been included in the Code of Civil Procedure with the aim of allowing a person, who has a clear and undisputed claim in respect of any monetary dues, to recover the dues quickly by a summary procedure instead of taking long route of a regular suit. The Courts have consistently held that if affidavit filed by defendant discloses a triable issue that is at least plausible, leave should be granted, but when defence raised appears to be moonshine and sham, unconditional leave to defend cannot be granted. What is required to be examined for grant of leave is whether defence taken in application under Order XXXVII Rule 3 CPC makes out a case, which if established, would be plausible in a regular suit. In matters relating to dishonour of cheques, the aforesaid principle becomes more relevant as the cheques are issued normally for liquidation of dues which are admitted. Petitioner's important, basic and leading ground, in the present case, to seek leave to defend had been pilferage of cheque and lodgement of complaint by him before Crime Branch qua missing cheque book. Complaint, filed by petitioner, was found baseless and without any foundation by Crime Branch. 12. Next ground of petitioner to implore grant of leave to defend before learned Trial Court was that he was being vexed twice for the same cause by respondent. Complaint, filed by petitioner, was found baseless and without any foundation by Crime Branch. 12. Next ground of petitioner to implore grant of leave to defend before learned Trial Court was that he was being vexed twice for the same cause by respondent. This facet of the matter, as rightly said by the learned Trial Court as well, has already been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra (supra). The Supreme Court on a sojourn of earlier judgments upheld the right of a creditor to maintain both civil and criminal proceedings simultaneously and distinguished the standard of proof required in civil proceedings from that of criminal proceedings. It was held that civil suit was not barred on the day it was filed and acquittal or conviction in criminal proceedings would not be the basis for determination of a civil suit. 13. It may not be out of place to mention here that judicial pronouncements concerning object and scope of power of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is pari materia to Section 104 of the J & K State Constitution, leaves little scope to interfere with the orders of subordinate courts as a matter of routine. This power cannot be taken as right of another appeal to aggrieved party nor this power can be invoked to point out an error of law or fact in the order or decision of a subordinate court. This power cannot be used to make out that the decision of subordinate court could have been or must have been other than what it was. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari or exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the requirements that the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and that a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, are satisfied. 14. It is well-settled that power of superintendence, so conferred on the High Court, is administrative as well as judicial and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in High Court is paving path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. Power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Else parameters invoking exercise of power are almost similar. 15. The Supreme Court in Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc. ( AIR 1977 SC 842 ), has observed that the Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of the ideological structure or the scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under disguise of interpretation. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to abuse of process of law, it is for legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. 16. Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. 16. Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in administration in larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. Therefore, 'the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but', as held by the Supreme Court in Shalini Shy am Shetty's case (supra), 'its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline.' The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain the efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of the justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of the justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. The Supreme Court in Kokkanda B. Poondacha's case (supra), after recapitulating what has been observed in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case qua Article 227, held that 'learned Single Judge of the High Court totally ignored the principles and parameters laid down' by the Supreme Court 'for exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution qua an interlocutory order passed by the Subordinate Court and set aside the order of the trial Court without assigning any tangible reason' Jurisdiction under Article 227 must be sparingly exercised and may be exercised to correct the errors of the jurisdiction and the like, but not to upset the findings of the fact, which falls in the domain of an appellate court only. Same is true about the present case. The petition on hand is, from the above discussion, an appeal under the attire of petition under Section 104 of the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir. Same is true about the present case. The petition on hand is, from the above discussion, an appeal under the attire of petition under Section 104 of the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir. My above views are fortified by the fiats rendered in Nibaran v. Mahendra AIR 1963 SC 1895 ; D.N. Banerjee v. Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 58 ; Nizzar Rawther v. Varghese Mathew AIR 1992 Ker 312 ; and Khimji Vidhu v. Premier High School AIR 2000 SC 3495 . Judgments relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, are distinguishable from the fact of present case and do not render any aid and assistance to case of petitioner. It is apt to mention here that the power under Article 227 is broader than that conferred on the High Court by Article 226. For example, through its power to issue certiorari under Article 226, a High Court can annul the decision of a tribunal while under Article 227 it can do that and do something--it can issue further directions in the matter. But under Article 227, the High Court does not sit as a Court of appeal inasmuch as it is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior Court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision. The power of superintendent conferred by Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. 17. From the foregoing discussion, it is deducible that instant petition does not call for any interference. The powers, vested in this Court under Section 104 of the Constitution of J & K, are neither substitution to revisional nor appellate power, inasmuch as order impugned is neither perverse nor has occasioned serious miscarriage of justice. Any interference by this Court would only prolong the trial inordinately. Even otherwise, impugned order does not warrant interference by exercise of extraordinary or supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, in that neither the decision-making process of Trial Court suffers from any bias nor do impugned order cause any miscarriage of justice or otherwise suffer from any error of law. 18. In the background of preceding discourse, the petition on hand is devoid of any merit and as a corollary, the same is dismissed, with connected IA(s). 19. 18. In the background of preceding discourse, the petition on hand is devoid of any merit and as a corollary, the same is dismissed, with connected IA(s). 19. Copy of this order be sent down.