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2018 DIGILAW 89 (BOM)

Ramsingh @ Raisaheb v. State of Maharashtra

2018-01-11

S.B.SHUKRE

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. 3. Heard finally by consent. 4. It is seen from the impugned order that the procedure as prescribed under Section 17, in particular sub-Section (2) thereof has not been followed completely. Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 requires that when a person is produced before the appropriate Magistrate under sub-Section (5) of Section 15 or the Magistrate under sub-Section (2) of Section 16, the appropriate or the concerned Magistrate shall cause an enquiry to be made as to the correctness of the information received under Section 16 only after giving the person produced before him an opportunity of being heard. In the present case, while report of the Probation Officer was called in respect of age, character and antecedents of the person and also the suitability of the person claiming custody and the nature of the influence that person or condition of his house will have on the person rescued, the opportunity of being heard was never granted to the victim. It is pointed out by the learned A.P.P. from the impugned order that the victim was indeed heard by the Court, but I am of the view that hearing of the victim after the Court had already made up its mind, as appears to have been done in the present case, is no compliance with the procedure prescribed in Section 17(2) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. The procedure prescribed in this Section is mandatory and no departure from it can be made. The reason being that the Court being in the position of parens patrae, can decide the question of well being and welfare of the victim only after giving sufficient opportunity of prior hearing to the victim herself and then the Court can appropriately decide about further course of enquiry to be made by it. If the Court does not give such an opportunity first and foremost to the victim, the Court would never know as to what more is required to be enquired into, in addition to what is stipulated in sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. 5. Prior hearing of the victim before an enquiry as contemplated under this provision of law is not an empty formality. It serves a particular purpose about which I have already expressed myself just now. 5. Prior hearing of the victim before an enquiry as contemplated under this provision of law is not an empty formality. It serves a particular purpose about which I have already expressed myself just now. This has not been done in the present case and there is no dispute about it. Hearing granted to the victim after the enquiry was already made, as has been done in the present case, would not meet the mandatory requirement of law and, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. A fresh enquiry strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 17 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 is necessary and for this purpose the matter deserves to be remanded back to the Court below. 6. In the result, the criminal writ petition is allowed. 7. The impugned order is hereby quashed and set aside. 8 The matter is remanded back to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge 10, Nagpur for a fresh enquiry in accordance with Section 17 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and decide the issue of custody afresh. This shall be decided by the learned Sessions Judge within 15 days from the date on which the victim is produced before it. 9. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.