JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant, Assistant Commissioner, Muzarai Department, (Department of Religious Endowment) (henceforth to be referred to as ‘the Department’, for short), Bengaluru, is aggrieved by an interim order dated 12.3.2018, passed by a learned Single Judge in Writ Petition Nos.23040/2013 & 23161163/2013, whereby upon an interim application filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2, the learned Single Judge has added a line in his previous order dated 13.4.2016, “to the effect ‘With these observations, the petitions stand disposed of’, sentence to the effect, ‘The order dated 18.05.2013 passed in Revn. Petn. No.11/201213 by the 2nd respondent (Annexure-A) stands quashed’ shall be read in the order.” 2. This case has a rather checkered history. But in order to understand the controversy involved in this case, it is imperative to comprehend the checkered history. It is as under: One Mr. Chowbeeni Subba Rao was the owner of certain properties bearing Nos. 29, 30, and 33, located on the 3rd Main Road, Ward No.36, Chamarajpet, Bangalore. According to the appellant, since Mr. Subba Rao and his wife, Smt. Ramakka were issueless, Mr. Subba Rao executed a will on 04.11.1912 in favour of the Department, while giving his wife a life interest in the said property. After the death of Mr. Subba Rao and his wife, the property was supposed to devolve to the Department. 3. However, according to C.R. Shamanna and S. Venkatesh, respondent Nos.1 and 2 respectively, after Mr. Subba Rao executed the Will dated 04.11.1912, he cancelled the said Will. Instead, he executed a fresh Will on 08.11.1912. In the said Will, he bequeathed the said properties in favour of his nephew, Dr. Rama Rao, while creating a life interest in favour of his wife Smt. Ramakka. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are the son and the grandson of Dr. Rama Rao. Therefore, according to the respondent Nos.1 and 2, after the death of Mr. Subba Rao and Ramakka, the property was entered in the name of Dr. Rama Rao in the year 193738. 4. Thus, there were two claimants to the suit property, namely the Department on the one hand, and Dr. Rama Rao and his family members on the other hand. 5. Since Dr. Rama Rao was in possession of the property, the Department filed a civil suit, namely O.S.No.4/193637 for declaration and possession against Dr. Rama Rao and others. 4. Thus, there were two claimants to the suit property, namely the Department on the one hand, and Dr. Rama Rao and his family members on the other hand. 5. Since Dr. Rama Rao was in possession of the property, the Department filed a civil suit, namely O.S.No.4/193637 for declaration and possession against Dr. Rama Rao and others. By judgment and decree dated 30.06.1938, the learned Civil Court decreed the suit in favour of the Department. Since Mr. Rama Rao was aggrieved by the said judgment, he filed a Civil Petition, namely Civil Petition No.20/193839, before the High Court of Mysore. However, by order dated 15.03.1939, the said civil petition was dismissed; the judgment and decree dated 30.06.1938 were confirmed. 6. However, according to the respondent Nos.1 and 2, despite the judgment and decree being in favour of the Department, the Department never got the Katha transferred in its name. It never sought the execution of the judgment and decree. Thus, Dr. Rama Rao continued to be in possession of the suit property till 2004. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 further claim that during this period Dr. Rama Rao continued to pay the property tax to the Government. 7. After the death of Dr. Rama Rao, the respondent Nos.1 and 2, his son and grandson, partitioned the property by Partition Deed dated 12.02.2004. On the basis of the Partition Deed, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 approached the Assistant Revenue Officer, Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (“BBMP”, for short) for changing the Katha of the property from Dr. Rama Rao’s name to their names. By order dated 19.03.2004, the Assistant Revenue Officer directed that the Katha be transferred in the name of respondent Nos.1 and 2. 8. Since the Assistant Commissioner, Muzarai Department was aggrieved by the order dated 19.03.2004, it filed a review petition under Section 114A of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, before the Additional Commissioner, BBMP. But by order dated 06.07.2006, the Additional Commissioner, BBMP dismissed the review petition. 9. Since the Department was aggrieved by the order dated 06.07.2006, it filed a writ petition, namely W.P.No.13548/2006 before this court. By order dated 07.12.2010, this court set aside the order dated 06.07.2006, and remanded the case back to the Assistant Revenue Officer, BBMP. For, this court was of the opinion that there is a disputed question of fact with regard to the possession of the property. By order dated 07.12.2010, this court set aside the order dated 06.07.2006, and remanded the case back to the Assistant Revenue Officer, BBMP. For, this court was of the opinion that there is a disputed question of fact with regard to the possession of the property. Hence, this court could not invoke its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. After hearing both the parties, by endorsement dated 02.02.2012, the Assistant Revenue Officer, BBMP, rejected the case of the Department; the Assistant Revenue Officer opined that in case the Department has records in its favour, it should institute a civil suit before the Civil Court in order to establish its rights. 11. Since the Department was aggrieved by the order dated 02.02.2012, it filed a review petition before the Additional Commissioner, BBMP. By order dated 18.05.2013, the Additional Commissioner, BBMP, allowed the review petition and directed that the Katha of the schedule property be transferred in the name of the Department. However, simultaneously, the Additional Commissioner, BBMP, also granted liberty to the parties to approach the Civil Court in order to establish their rights over the suit property. 12. Since the respondent Nos.1 and 2 were aggrieved by the order dated 18.05.2013, they filed a writ petition before this court namely W.P.No.23040/2013. Having noticed that the case raised complicated disputed questions of fact, as the case is based on two different wills of Mr. Subba Rao, is based on a decree dated 30.06.1938, and as the issue of adverse possession cannot be decided by this court in its writ jurisdiction, the learned Single Judge, by order dated 13.04.2016, disposed of the writ petition by observing that “however, it is not appropriate for this court to decide the right and title of the parties in the writ. It is for the aggrieved party to approach the Civil Court seeking redressal of grievance. With these observations the petition stand disposed of.” 13. For two years, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 maintained a studied silence over the dispute. However, two years later, in 2018, they filed an interim application for seeking clarification of the order dated 13.04.2016. It is for the aggrieved party to approach the Civil Court seeking redressal of grievance. With these observations the petition stand disposed of.” 13. For two years, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 maintained a studied silence over the dispute. However, two years later, in 2018, they filed an interim application for seeking clarification of the order dated 13.04.2016. By order dated 12.03.2018, the learned Single Judge has modified the order dated 13.04.2016 by adding a line that after the line “ With these observations the petition stand disposed of” another sentence shall be read in the order to the effect that “the order dated 18.05.2013 passed in Revision Petition No.11/201213 by the second respondent (Annexure-‘A’) stands quashed.” 14. Since the appellant-Department is aggrieved by the order dated 18.05.2013, it has filed the present appeal before this court. 15. Mr. N. Shankarnarayan Bhat, the learned counsel for the appellant-Department, has pleaded that the interim application was filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Sections 151 and 152 of C.P.C. However, as the writ petition was disposed of by order dated 13.04.2016, after rejecting the respondents’ plea for quashing the order dated 18.05.2013, passed by the Additional Commissioner, BBMP, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 were not justified in seeking the quashing of the said order in the garb of correcting a clerical mistake under Section 152 C.P.C. Since the learned Single Judge had already rejected the said plea for quashing the said order, the learned Single Judge could not have quashed the said order by substituting a sentence by his order dated 12.03.2018. Secondly, the power under Section 152 C.P.C. cannot be invoked for granting a relief, which was rejected on an earlier occasion. For, Section 152 C.P.C. permits a court to merely amend a clerical or an arithmetical mistake in a judgment. Hence, the learned Single Judge was unjustified in granting a relief in the garb of amending a clerical mistake. Thirdly, if there were a clerical mistake, namely the quashing of the order dated 18.05.2013, which was inadvertently omitted, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 should have approached the court immediately after passing of the order dated 13.04.2016. Instead, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 waited almost for two years before filing the interim application. Thirdly, if there were a clerical mistake, namely the quashing of the order dated 18.05.2013, which was inadvertently omitted, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 should have approached the court immediately after passing of the order dated 13.04.2016. Instead, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 waited almost for two years before filing the interim application. Fourthly, even on an earlier occasion, by order dated 07.10.2012, this court had clearly observed that the parties should approach the Civil Court in order to establish their respective claims over the suit property. In the order dated 13.04.2016, the learned Single Judge had followed a similar reasoning, and had relegated the parties to approach the Civil Court to establish their respective cases. Fifthly, by amending the order dated 13.04.2016 to the extent of quashing the order dated 18.05.2013, the learned Single Judge has taken a self-contradictory stand. For, on the one hand, the learned Single Judge has granted the liberty to the parties to approach the Civil Court in order to establish their case for possession and title, yet on the other hand, the learned Single Judge has quashed the order dated 18.05.2013. Lastly, the learned Single Judge has not given any reasons for quashing the order dated 18.05.2013. Therefore, by allowing the interim application, the order dated 13.04.2016, tantamount to being a non-speaking order. Hence, the impugned order dated 12.03.2018 deserves to be set aside by this court. 16. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that subsequent to passing of the order dated 13.4.2016, the appellant had filed an application for entering its name in the revenue records. Therefore, the respondents had moved the interim application for seeking clarification from the learned Single Judge. Hence, the learned Single Judge has merely clarified his order dated 13.4.2016, by the order dated 12.3.2018. Thus, the learned counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned order. 17. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the orders dated 13.04.2016, and 12.03.2018. 18. Section 152 C.P.C. is as under : Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders. Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. 19. 18. Section 152 C.P.C. is as under : Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders. Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. 19. While dealing with the scope and ambit of Section 152 C.P.C., in the case of State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh [ AIR 2003 SC 4179 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court has opined as under: The powers under Section 152 are neither to be equated with the power of review nor can be said to be akin to review or even said to clothe the Court concerned under the guise of invoking after the result of the judgment earlier rendered, in its entirety or any portion or part of it. The corrections contemplated are of correcting only accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the Court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of section 152 as if it is looking into it for the first time, for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party if at all is to file appeal or revision before the higher forum or review application before the very forum, subject to the limitations in respect of such review. It implies that the section cannot be pressed into service to correct an omission which is intentional, however erroneous that may be. 20. Moreover, in the case of Bijay Kumar Saraogi v. State of Jharkhand [ (2005) 7 SCC 748 ] the Apex Court has observed that “Section 152 can be invoked for the limited purpose of correcting clerical errors or arithmetical mistakes in the judgment. The Section cannot be invoked for claiming a substantive relief, which was not granted under the decree, or as a pretext to get the order, which has attained finality reviewed.” 21. The Section cannot be invoked for claiming a substantive relief, which was not granted under the decree, or as a pretext to get the order, which has attained finality reviewed.” 21. Furthermore, in the case of Shankar K. Mandal v. State of Bihar [ (2003) 9 SCC 519 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court has opined that “if a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judge, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellant to contend before the Supreme court to the contrary.” 22. While exercising the power under Section 152 C.P.C., the learned Single Judge has overlooked these settled principles of law. Firstly, if the order date 13.04.2016 contained a glaring clerical mistake, that the learned Single Judge had inadvertently omitted to quash the order dated 18.05.2013, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 should have immediately rushed to this Court. Yet, they maintained a studied silence over the alleged omission for almost two long years. Thus, clearly, they accepted the order dated 13.04.2016 as correct. Secondly, Since the order dated 13.04.2016 was not challenged for two years, it had achieved finality. Hence, it could not be amended in the garb the power under Section 152 C.P.C. Thirdly, since the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had accepted the order dated 13.04.2016 as being correct for two years, they were unjustified in invoking the power of this court under Section 152 C.P.C. Instead, they should have either filed a review petition, or an appeal against the order dated 13.04.2016. But they have cleverly invoked the power under Section 152 C.P.C. The learned Single Judge should have seen through the clever subterfuge. Fourthly, since the learned Single Judge had declined to quash the order dated 18.05.2013 by the order dated 13.0.2016, the power under Section 152 C.P.C. could not be invoked by the learned Single Judge for granting a relief which was refused on the earlier occasion. Fifthly, by quashing the order dated 18.05.2013, by amending the order dated 13.04.2016, the learned Single Judge has transformed the latter order into a non-speaking order. Fifthly, by quashing the order dated 18.05.2013, by amending the order dated 13.04.2016, the learned Single Judge has transformed the latter order into a non-speaking order. For, in the order dated 13.04.2016, the learned Single Judge has not given elaborate reasons for holding the order dated 18.05.2013 to be illegal. It is only in passing that the learned Single Judge has pointed out some lacunae in the said order. Lastly, by amending the order date 13.04.2016 and by quashing the order dated 18.05.2013, the learned Single Judge has taken a self-contradictory stand: on the one hand, the learned Single Judge has relegated the parties to the Civil Court, yet on the other hand, the learned Single Judge has quashed the order dated 18.05.2013. Once, the parties were relegated to the Civil Court, they should have been directed to pursue their remedy in the said forum. 23. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order dated 12.03.2018 is quashed and set aside; the appeals are, hereby, allowed.