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2018 DIGILAW 893 (JK)

United India Insurance Co Ltd. v. Vijay Kumar Gupta

2018-11-19

DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, SINDHU SHARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. This Civil Ist Miscellaneous Appeal has been preferred by the appellant/Insurance Company under Section 17 of the Jammu and Kashmir Consumer Protection Act, 1987 (for short, Act of 1987) against the impugned judgment and order dated 9.8.2017 passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Jammu (for short, "Commission") whereby besides an amount of Rs. 14 lacs, an amount of Rs. 20,000/- on account of mental agony and Rs. 10,000/- on account of litigation charges along with 7% interest had been directed to be paid to the claimant/respondent no.1 herein. 2. With a view to understand the background on which the present controversy has arisen, it is necessary to give a few material facts in brief: 3. A complaint came to be preferred under Section 15 of the Jammu and Kashmir Consumer Protection Act, 1987 by the complainant/respondent No. 1 herein claiming compensation for damages to goods on account of a fire incident in the night intervening 17-18/8/2010. 4. It was stated that the goods were hypothecated with the bank, which had got the same insured with the insurance company. The incident appears to have been then reported to the insurance company, who deputed a surveyor on 18.8.2010, assessed the damages and further asked the complainant to furnish certain documents regarding the stocks. 5. The complainant further averred that despite submission of all relevant documents, the Insurance Company had failed to take steps to settle the claims. 6. It was further averred that a reminder dated 6.11.2013 was sent through speed post and yet again a legal notice dated 27.4.2015 asking the respondent/appellant herein to settle the claim, which did not elicit any response from the Insurance Company and hence the complaint. 7. It appears that the insurance company was set ex parte and, therefore, there were no objections filed to the complaint. Finally, the Commission passed the award dated 9.8.2017 impugned in the present appeal. 8. The precise case set up by the counsel for the appellant is that the complaint ought not to have been entertained as the same was barred by limitation as the alleged loss suffered by the complainant had occurred on the intervening night of 17/18.8.2010 and complaint was filed as late as on 29.9.2015. 9. 8. The precise case set up by the counsel for the appellant is that the complaint ought not to have been entertained as the same was barred by limitation as the alleged loss suffered by the complainant had occurred on the intervening night of 17/18.8.2010 and complaint was filed as late as on 29.9.2015. 9. It was urged that there was no application filed by the complainant before the Commission seeking condonation of delay nor was the issue of limitation specifically dealt with by the Commission and that it proceeded to decide the complaint on its merits. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/claimant, on the other than, urged that although the fire incident had taken place in the year 2010, yet till date, the insurance company had not repudiated the claim preferred and, therefore, in the absence of a specific repudiation by the insurance company, the complaint cannot be said to be barred on account of limitation. 11. Since the entire issue depends upon whether the complaint preferred by the complainant was barred by limitation or not, it would be proper to reproduce Section18-A of the Jammu and Kashmir Consumer Protection Act, 1987, which envisages thus: "18-A. Limitation period.- (1) The [District Forum] of the State Commission may not admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action arises. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), a complaint may be entertained after the period specified in sub-section (1) if the complainant satisfies the [District Forum] or the State Commission, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within such period: Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained unless the [District forum] or the State Commission, as the case may be, records its reason for condoning such delay." 12. On a perusal of the Section 18-A, it thus becomes clear that the complainant was under an obligation to explain the delay in preferring the complaint beyond the period of two years on which the Commission was then obliged to record its reasons for condoning the same. In the present case, however, there was no application filed seeking condonation of delay much less, were any reasons recorded by the Commission before entertaining the complaint. In the present case, however, there was no application filed seeking condonation of delay much less, were any reasons recorded by the Commission before entertaining the complaint. The fact that a specific application seeking condonation of delay was a pre-requisite can be gauged on a reading of the proviso to sub section 2 of Section 18-A of the Act of 1987, which prohibits even the entertainment of a complaint unless reasons for condoning the delay are recorded. Only after recording such reasons, could the Commission proceed to entertain the complaint. This procedure, however, was not followed. The fact that the insurance company/appellant herein was set ex parte and, therefore, did not raise any objection as regards limitation, was no bar inasmuch as it is settled that notwithstanding that the issue of limitation has not been set up as a ground of defence, the court is obliged to determine the same. Reference in this regard can be made to Gannmani Anasuya vs. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary, (2007) 10 SCC 296 . To a similar effect were the judgments by the Apex Court in Union of India vs. British India Corporation Ltd., (2003) 9 SCC 505 and Haryana Urban Development Authority vs. B.K. Sood, (2006) 1 SCC 164 where the Apex Court while dealing with Section 24- A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 held thus: "Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (referred to as the Act hereafter) expressly cast a duty on the Commission admitting a complaint, to dismiss a complaint unless the complainant satisfies the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, that the complainant had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the period of two years from the date on which the cause of action had arisen." 13. In State Bank of India vs. M/s B.S. Agricultural Industries (I), (2009) 2 Supreme 784 , the aforementioned judgments found approval of the Apex Court. What was stated by the Apex Court in paragraph 11 held thus: "The section debars any fora set up under the Act, admitting a complaint unless the complaint is filed within two years from the date of which the cause of action has arisen........................" "......................There was not even any prayer by the respondent in his complaint for condoning the delay." 14. Apart from the above, the other important issue that arises for consideration is whether there was any need for filing an application for condonation of delay and whether the cause of action accrued to the complainant on the date when the fire incident took place or would arise on a future date when the claim was formally repudiated and/or communicated. 15. With a view to determine this issue, it may be beneficial to refer to a few judgments rendered on the issue. 16. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, in Sudama Lal Madhwani vs. New India Assurance Co. ltd., (2007) 2 CPJ 144 (NC) was also dealing with an almost similar issue. What was held in paragraph 4 was thus: "...........................We are still unable to appreciate as to what was the petitioner/ complainant doing for 5 years, if the claim was not settled" Even if we presume that the claim was not repudiated but then for five long years, the petitioner should have taken some action for settlement of claim. The law envisages the period of limitation to be counted from the date of cause of action. In this case, even if it is presumed that letter of repudiation was not issued, then the five years should start from the date of accident or at best from the date of filing the claim (both in 1994) which was not getting settled. Nothing has been brought on record that anything was done for 5 long years before filing this complaint.: 17. In Oriental Insurance company Ltd. Vs. Chinar Brick Kiln, (2010) 1 JKJ 223 , a Division Bench of this court drew a distinction between the provisions of the Limitation Act, which required a claim, on account of policy of insurance to be made within three years reckoned from the date of death or loss and the provisions of Section 18-A of the Consumer Protection Act, which required a complaint to be filed within a period of two years reckoned from the date of cause of action. It was held that since the insurance company had not raised the plea of limitation as an objection when the complaint was filed and since the claim was neither repudiated nor closed, the cause of action could be said to be a continuing one and hence the complaint was one filed within the period of limitation. 18. It was held that since the insurance company had not raised the plea of limitation as an objection when the complaint was filed and since the claim was neither repudiated nor closed, the cause of action could be said to be a continuing one and hence the complaint was one filed within the period of limitation. 18. Another Division Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited & ors vs. Ghulam Nabi Shah, (2011) AIR(J&K) 143 held that in case of a fire insurance policy, the date of accrual of cause of action has to be the date on which the fire breaks out. What was stated in paragraph 18 was thus: "The term cause of action is neither defined in the Act nor in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but is of wide import. It has different meanings in different contexts that is when used in the context of territorial jurisdiction or limitation or the accrual of right to sue. Generally, it is described as "bundle of facts", which if proved or admitted entitle the plaintiff to the relief prayed for. Pithily stated, "cause of action means the cause of action for which the suit is brought. "Cause of action" is cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit (See Sidramappa v. Rajashetty 4). In the context of limitation with reference to a fire insurance policy, undoubtedly, the date of accrual of cause of action has to be the date on which the fire breaks out." 19. In Kandimalla Raghavaiah & Co. vs. National National Co. & anr, (2009) 5 Supreme 377 , the Apex court was considering a case, which was also one pertaining to damage caused to goods on account of a fire incident which had taken place on 22/23.3.1988. In that case, the complaint was filed on 24.10.1997 and that too without an application for condonation of delay. It was held that the limitation for purposes of Section 24-A began to run w.e.f., 24.3.1988 and, therefore, a complaint ought to have been filed within two years thereof. It was also held that since the complaint was filed without an application for condonation of delay, it was manifestly barred by limitation. It would be beneficial to reproduce the relevant portions of paragrpah 18 and 19 hereinebelow: "18. It was also held that since the complaint was filed without an application for condonation of delay, it was manifestly barred by limitation. It would be beneficial to reproduce the relevant portions of paragrpah 18 and 19 hereinebelow: "18. ..........It is pertinent to note that in the complaint before the Commission, though there was an averment that the Bank had not disclosed to the appellant whether any amount had been received by them from the Insurance Company against the claim preferred on 14th July, 1988, but appellant's categorical stand therein was that it was because of the pendency of the criminal litigation that they could not make a claim in respect of the policy for the loss suffered and time and again they had been requesting the Insurance Company to send the claim forms, which request was not acceded to by the Insurance Company, and it shows that the appellant was not depending on the claim stated to have been made by the Bank with the Insurance Company. 19. .....................We have no hesitation in holding that the complaint filed on 24th October, 1997 and that too without an application for condonation of delay was manifestly barred by limitation and the Commission was justified in dismissing it on that short ground." 20. The consistent view thus appears to be that the cause of action especially on account of a fire incident, accrues from the date of the fire incident. If that be the view, then the fact that there was either no repudiation or if at all there was a repudiation, the same was not communicated would be inconsequential. To hold that non-repudiation of a claim or its non-communication post repudiation would extend the period of limitation would defeat the very spirit of the prescribed two years period of limitation and have the effect of keeping the limitation period open-ended ad infinitum. 21. Needless to say that the moment, loss is reported to the Insurance Company, it is expected to immediately react by appointing a surveyor or loss assessor, seek clarification and connected documents and then take an appropriate decision within the shortest period of time thereafter. 21. Needless to say that the moment, loss is reported to the Insurance Company, it is expected to immediately react by appointing a surveyor or loss assessor, seek clarification and connected documents and then take an appropriate decision within the shortest period of time thereafter. In case, the company shows lethargy, inaction or is non-responsive or fails to take a decision on the claim made, it can be made answerable before the Consumer Forum or the Consumer Commission, as the case may be, within the time prescribed or seek to have the delay condoned on showing sufficient cause. When a claim is made before the Insurance Company, there are three possibilities:- (a) The claim is allowed in toto. (b) The claim is allowed partially. (c) Refuses to respond at all to consider the claim made. (d) Responds but does not take any decision or shows inaction. In both eventualities as envisaged under (c) and (d) there would thus be no formal repudiation of a claim. If the test were that no cause of action accrues till a repudiation is made or communicated, the result would be that a claimant would be prevented from filing a complaint till such time as a decision in that regard was taken. It would thus be easy for an Insurance Company to avoid liability under the Act by simply not taking a decision, which could lead to make the remedy available to a consumer under the Act totally illusory. 22. A cause of action cannot be said to have accrued to the complainant twice unless the same can be said to be a recurring cause of action. While failure to decide or repudiate a claim may be relevant for deciding the issue of condonation of delay, it cannot be said to give rise to a recurring cause of action inasmuch as the present claim arises on account of a fire incident. 23. While failure to decide or repudiate a claim may be relevant for deciding the issue of condonation of delay, it cannot be said to give rise to a recurring cause of action inasmuch as the present claim arises on account of a fire incident. 23. For the reasons mentioned above, we have no hesitation in holding that the judgment and award impugned in the present appeal is unsustainable for two reasons, firstly that the cause of action to sue accrued to the complainant/respondent No. 1 on 18.8.2010 when the fire incident took place and a complaint ought to have been ordinarily filed within a period of two years thereafter, which has not been done in the present case and secondly, no application for condonation of delay was ever filed by the complainant with a view to explain the delay in preferring the complaint. In the absence of any application for condonation of delay, it was legally impermissible for the court to have entertained the complaint and allowed the same. 24. As a sequel to the above, the appeal filed by the appellant/Insurance Company is allowed and the impugned judgment and order is set aside. 25. Disposed of accordingly along with connected applications.