JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. State of Rajasthan has preferred these 16 Leave to Appeals being aggrieved by judgments of Special Judge, Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act) Cases, Pali (for short, 'learned Appellate Court'), whereby the judgments rendered in various criminal cases against accused-respondents by Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pali (for short, 'learned trial Court') were quashed and set aside facilitating acquittal of the respondents for offence under Sections 420, 406, 467, 471 and 120-B IPC. 2. At the threshold, upon conclusion of trial, learned trial Court indicted accused-respondents for the charged offences in all the cases and handed down sentences of different durations. Feeling aggrieved by the judgments of learned trial Court, accused-respondents preferred appeals before learned appellate Court and the learned appellate Court by the impugned judgments acquitted all of them for the charged offences by extending benefit of doubt. The requisite details about all Leave to Appeals are mentioned as under:- S. No. Leave to Appeal No. Appeal No. & Date of Judgment Amount involved Rs. Charged offences U/Ss. Period during which offences allegedly committed 1. 252/2017 13/2014 20993 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC July 1995 to Dec.1995 2. 253/2017 23/2014 14284 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC July 1997 to Sept.1997 3. 254/2017 19/2014 14782 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Year 1993 4. 255/2017 15/2014 10049 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Jan. 1994 to June 1994 5. 292/2017 11/2014 18089 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Jan. 1998 to March 1998 6. 294/2017 21/2014 14984 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Jan. 1995 to June 1995 7. 295/2017 18/2014 22267 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Sept. 1996 to Dec. 1996 8. 296/2017 20/2014 20086 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC May 1996 to August 1996 9. 297/2017 12/2014 8089 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Oct. 1991 to May 1993 10. 298/2017 22/2014 9301 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Oct., 1998 to Dec. 1998 11. 299/2017 24/2014 23977 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Jan 1997 to March 1997 12. 300/2017 17/2014 16664 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC April 1997 to June 1997 13. 301/2017 25/2014 16958 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Jan 1996 to April 1996 14. 302/2017 16/2014 28046 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Oct. 1997 to Dec. 300/2017 17/2014 16664 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC April 1997 to June 1997 13. 301/2017 25/2014 16958 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Jan 1996 to April 1996 14. 302/2017 16/2014 28046 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Oct. 1997 to Dec. 1997 15. 303/2017 14/2014 11543 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC July 1998 to Sept. 1998 16. 304/2017 10/2014 13872 420, 467, 471, 406 & 120B IPC Jan. 1999 to March 1999 3. The facts, in general, are identical in all these Leave to Appeals, including the charged offences and accused persons named therein are common but for timings of the commission of alleged offences by them. That apart, prosecution evidence in all the cases is also common to substantiate charges against accused-respondents. Therefore, the facts relevant and germane in respect of Criminal Leave to Appeal No.253/17 may be recapitulated as infra: (i) Inspector, Anti-Corruption Bureau, lodged First Information Report (FIR) No.44/2000 on 11th of February 2000, inter-alia, stating therein that from reliable sources he came to know about wrongful loss of lakhs of rupees caused to the exchequer in deposition of registration charges of vehicles with the District Transport Office, Pali. The report further unfurled that due to connivance of vehicle drivers/their representatives and employees of District Transport Officer, Pali, instead of third leaf of challan, by filling fourth leaf amount was deposited with the Bank for registration of vehicles. The estimated loss to the State Government for the interregnum period from July 1997 to September 1997 is indicated in the report as Rs.14,284 with the specific allegation of defalcation of aforesaid amount by registration clerk and vehicle owner/agent. On the basis of FIR, the then registration clerk Ram Singh of District Transport Office, Pali and registration agents of vehicle owners Bharat Singh and Surendra Singh were charged for offence under Section 13(1) (c) & (d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'PC Act') and Sections 420, 467, 471, 477A and 120-B IPC. The requisite sanction for prosecuting employees of the Transport Department for offence under the P.C. Act was sought but the same was declined, and therefore, finally, after completion of investigation accused-respondents were charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences of IPC before learned trial Court. (ii) The learned trial Court heard arguments on charge and framed charges against respondents for the aforesaid offences. (ii) The learned trial Court heard arguments on charge and framed charges against respondents for the aforesaid offences. Upon their denial, the accused-respondents were put on trial. In order to prove charges against the accused-respondents, prosecution examined 17 witnesses and exhibited 51 documents. After closure of prosecution evidence, accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The learned trial Court, then, proceeded to hear final arguments and by its judgment dated 1st of October 2013 indicted accused-respondents for offence under Sections 420, 471 and 120-B IPC but acquitted of offence under Sections 467 and 406 IPC by extending the benefit of doubt. The learned trial Court, awarded sentence of 4 years' rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.5,000 and in default sentence of 2 months' simple imprisonment for offence under Section 420 IPC to each of the respondents, and handed down sentence of 5 years' rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000, and in default of payment of fine 4 months' simple imprisonment to each accused-respondents for offence under Sections 471 read with Section 120-B IPC. (iii) Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of learned trial Court, respondents preferred appeal before learned appellate Court and the learned appellate Court by its impugned judgment reversed the judgment of learned trial Court, resulting in acquittal of the respondents for charged offences. The learned appellate Court, in the impugned judgment observed that the learned trial Court has seriously erred in appreciation of evidence and there is no tangible evidence to prove forgery by the respondents. Besides that, while pointing out many loopholes in prosecution evidence and sans any wrongful loss to the exchequer, the learned appellate Court set aside conviction of the respondents by extending them benefit of doubt. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. O.P. Rathi has strenuously urged that the learned appellate Court has committed serious error in appreciation of evidence. It is argued by learned Public Prosecutor that the evidence and other materials available on record were thoroughly scrutinized by the learned trial Court for indictment of the accused-respondents vis-a-vis charged offences and the said finding of guilt is reversed by the learned appellate Court without recording cogent reasons. Learned Public Prosecutor would contend that the learned appellate Court has overstepped its jurisdiction in upsetting the finding of guilt, and therefore, it is a fit case wherein leave to appeal be granted. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused-respondents, Mr. Learned Public Prosecutor would contend that the learned appellate Court has overstepped its jurisdiction in upsetting the finding of guilt, and therefore, it is a fit case wherein leave to appeal be granted. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused-respondents, Mr. Vineet Jain, submits that powers of the appellate Court to reappreciate evidence is unquestionable under the criminal jurisprudence and the appellate Court, if comes to the conclusion that appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court is perverse, it can very well reverse the finding. Learned counsel would argue that the learned appellate Court, for reversing the finding of guilt, has recorded cogent reasons inasmuch as it has noticed serious/legal infirmity in the impugned judgments besides non-consideration/misappropriation of evidence on record. Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, submits that no interference with the impugned judgments is called for. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that scope of judicial review against the judgment of acquittal is very much limited and the appellate Court is not expected to reverse the finding of acquittal even if two views are possible, and therefore, leave to appeal craved for is liable to be declined. In support of his arguments, Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the respondents, has placed reliance on following judgments: State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Punni & Ors, (2009) 1 SCC(Cri) 372 Govindraju alias Govinda Vs. State by Srirampuram Police Station & Anr, (2012) 2 SCC(Cri) 533 Ghurey Lal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 1 SCC(Cri) 60. 6. I have given my anxious considerations to the arguments advanced at Bar, perused the impugned judgments and thoroughly scanned the materials available on record. 7. All these Leave to Appeals require judicial scrutiny in exercise of powers of this Court under sub-sec.(3) & sub-sec.(1) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and Section 386 Cr.P.C. being against the judgments of acquittal but then the judgments of acquittal are passed by appellate Court after reversing the judgments of trial Court, therefore, the Court is also required to examine the findings recorded by appellate Court upon re-appreciation of evidence. Undeniably, in all the cases, at the threshold, learned trial Court has convicted accused-respondents for the charged offences and the learned appellant Court upon reappreciation of evidence has come to a different conclusion for extending them benefit of doubt, therefore, the findings and conclusions of the learned appellate Court require thorough and meticulous examination. Undeniably, in all the cases, at the threshold, learned trial Court has convicted accused-respondents for the charged offences and the learned appellant Court upon reappreciation of evidence has come to a different conclusion for extending them benefit of doubt, therefore, the findings and conclusions of the learned appellate Court require thorough and meticulous examination. 8. In that background, at the threshold, a crucial question about forged challans requires examination on the touchstone of prosecution evidence. While it is true that the prosecution right from inception has persisted with a plea that the amount for registration of vehicles was deposited through forged challans but to substantiate the same neither any investigation is conducted nor any evidence is tendered by the prosecution. It is also noteworthy that the alleged forged challans were neither recovered from the accused persons nor from any other incumbent during investigation and the prosecution has not even collected seal of the concerned branch of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur to prove that seal appended on the challan papers was forged one. It has also come on record that second copy of the challan is sent by Treasury Office to the Regional Transport Office for tallying it with other copy before registration. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that who had presented challans before the Bank and at the time of presentation of challan before the Bank. 9. The normal procedure is that the bank officials check all the four copies of challan while accepting the tendered amount and had there been any discrepancy about chassis number of the vehicle, bank official could have detected the same then and there. Assuming it that the bank officials were also in collusion with the accused persons, then, in absence of their prosecution, obviously, proceedings against accused persons were wholly uncalled for and unwarranted. Therefore in the backdrop of alleged criminal delinquencies of the respondents sans prosecution of bank officials, the said finding of the learned appellate Court, in my considered opinion, is quite apposite satisfying prudency, which has escaped the notice of learned trial Court. Thus, on this count, reversal of the finding of learned trial Court, by the appellate Court, cannot be categorized as perverse or contrary to the basic tenets of criminal jurisprudence. 10. It is also noteworthy that PW1 Rajesh Kumar, the vehicle owner, has turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution case. Thus, on this count, reversal of the finding of learned trial Court, by the appellate Court, cannot be categorized as perverse or contrary to the basic tenets of criminal jurisprudence. 10. It is also noteworthy that PW1 Rajesh Kumar, the vehicle owner, has turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution case. He has deposed in clear and unequivocal terms about not knowing accused-respondent Bharat Singh. Similarly, PW2 Manoj Singh has not recognized accused Bharat Singh and turning hostile has not supported the prosecution case. PW4 Prakash Kumar though has admitted "paying" Bharat Singh a sum of Rs.1500 for registration of the vehicle but during his cross-examination has admitted that he is plying his scooter using the same registration certificate, which was made available to him by accused-respondent Bharat Singh. Therefore, his testimony too is not inculpatory vis-a-vis accused-respondent Bharat Singh. Adverting to the testimony of PW5 Bheem Singh, suffice it to observe that although he has castigated accused-respondent Bharat Singh for giving him forged registration certificate of his vehicle Bajaj Super but the witness has not been able to place on record any notice issued by RTO for again depositing registration charges after receiving the registration certificate from Bharat Singh. Moreover, PW5 Bheem Singh, has not produced second receipt of paying registration charges nor has exhibited the same so as to show that registration certificate made available to him by accused-respondent Bharat Singh was forged one. 11. Two prosecution witnesses; namely, PW6 Sohanlal and PW7 Samela Ram, have also not supported the prosecution case by turning hostile. At this juncture, testimony of PW8 Prem Prakash is also significant wherein he has stated that he deposited the registration charges second time after issuance of first registration certificate. Although the witness has produced Receipt Ex.P/28 for depositing registration charges second time, but during cross-examination has very candidly admitted that RTO office has not issued him new registration certificate and he is using the same registration certificate, which was made available to him by accused-respondent Bharat Singh. In this background, if the evidence of PW11 Mangilal is meticulously scrutinized, then it would ipso facto reveal that pursuant to depositing the challan, requisite amount was also deposited with the bank and there was no discrepancy in any of the four leafs of challan. 12. In this background, if the evidence of PW11 Mangilal is meticulously scrutinized, then it would ipso facto reveal that pursuant to depositing the challan, requisite amount was also deposited with the bank and there was no discrepancy in any of the four leafs of challan. 12. Assuming it without admitting the prosecution case as set out that registration charges for two vehicles were deposited by one challan, then too, the best possible evidence was Scroll Register of the bank but the same was not produced during trial. The non-production of Scroll Register by the prosecution was not taken cognizance of by the learned trial Court for drawing presumption about deposition of requisite amount against registration charges but the learned appellate Court upon reappreciation of evidence has rightly drawn adverse inference, which cannot be faulted. The other witness from Bank PW12 Madanlal Nai, a Class IV Employee, has turned hostile, and has not supported the prosecution case. The witness from RTO office, Dinesh Kumar Deval (PW12-second), though had supported the prosecution case to some extent but has not been able to show about what action taken against erring officials or the accused persons. Similarly, PW16 Shyam Singh Solanki, also an RTO employee, has not pointed out any discrepancy in the challan for registration fee as well as 4th copy of challan including over-writing or erasion. 13. The complainant, PW14 Jagdish Singh Rao, during his deposition, has very candidly admitted that no investigation was conducted regarding signatures on the bank challan. Further, he has admitted that during preliminary enquiry he has not collected seal from the Bank or RTO office, or any blank challan. The witness further states that during preliminary enquiry handwritings of accused-respondent Bharat Singh and Surendra Singh were not sent for FSL examination. During his deposition, the witness has admitted that he has not investigated as to wherefrom accused-respondent Bharat Singh purchased the challan forms. The learned appellate Court, while appreciating the evidence of PW13 I.O. Ghewarchand Saraswat and PW15 Parbat Singh, has noticed many pitfalls in their testimonies inasmuch as PW15 Parbat Singh has admitted in clear and unequivocal terms that he has not recovered blank challans from the accused-respondents nor seal or blank registration forms. The witness has further admitted that hand-writings of the accused-respondents were not sent for FSL examination. PW17 Abhay Karan has not recovered anything during investigation. The witness has further admitted that hand-writings of the accused-respondents were not sent for FSL examination. PW17 Abhay Karan has not recovered anything during investigation. The testimony of PW9 Kamlesh is not of sterling worth and the other witness PW10 Madanlal Mali has turned hostile. 14. Strangely, the learned trial Court, while castigating accused-respondents for the charged offences, has though discussed the serious pitfalls in the prosecution evidence, but while relying on the fractured testimony of some of the witnesses has invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act against the accused-respondents. True it is that when any fact is within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is on him, but then if the initial burden is not discharged by the prosecution that challans were forged and not genuine one, shifting burden on the accused-respondents by the learned trial Court is per se a perverse finding. It is also noteworthy that the prosecution evidence is clear and unequivocal that the registration certificates which were made available to the respective vehicle owners by the respondents were never withdrawn or rescinded by the RTO office and all of them continued to ply respective vehicles on the same registration certificates. In common parlance, the burden is on the prosecution, initially to prove guilt of the accused, and that burden is not shifted on to the accused by reason of Section 106, which is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its initial burden of proof, which is fundamental in criminal jurisprudence. The burden of proving alibi, undoubtedly, lies on the accused, but even so, the burden of proving the case is on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a plausible defence. Therefore, in the instant case, the learned trial Court has seriously erred in shifting the burden on accused while ignoring the weakness and credibility of prosecution evidence. 15. Under the common law, two separate and distinct standards of proof are recognized; which are proof beyond reasonable doubt and proof based on preponderance/balance of probability. It is well recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence that quantum of evidence in criminal cases, that may be adduced by the prosecution, requires a high degree of satisfaction. To put it more clear, in criminal trials unlike civil cases where balance of possibilities may prove a case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is insisted. It is well recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence that quantum of evidence in criminal cases, that may be adduced by the prosecution, requires a high degree of satisfaction. To put it more clear, in criminal trials unlike civil cases where balance of possibilities may prove a case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is insisted. If the slightest doubt as to the guilt of the accused is created in the mind of the Court, he is given benefit of doubt and his innocence proclaimed. The foundation of such higher degree of proof is a general belief that the conviction of an innocent man as opposed to the acquittal of a guilty one is a fate more heinous. Moreover, nature of penalty in criminal cases is often harsher in nature, which why the same standard is not adopted in civil cases. A close scrutiny of the judgment of the learned trial Court makes it abundantly clear that the doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt is completely eschewed/overlooked by it while indicting the accused-respondents for the charged offences, which rightly did not find favour of the learned appellate Court. 16. Thus, on overall analysis of evidence, the learned appellate Court has rightly concluded that findings and conclusions of the learned trial Court are not based on sound appreciation of evidence rather the said finding is based on assumptions and hearsay evidence, which is unworthy of any credence for bringing home guilt against accused-respondents. With this sort of definite and affirmative conclusion, the learned appellate Court has reversed the finding of learned trial Court while observing that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove charges against accused persons beyond reasonable doubts. True it is that it is a case of reversal of finding but in overall scenario, from the evidence which has come on record, it is rather difficult to comprehend that the learned appellate Court has failed to consider the evidence available on record, or has misread, or eschewed the material evidence. 17. Now adverting to scope of judicial review against acquittal in a criminal leave to appeal, suffice it to observe that mere suspicion about involvement of accused in crime is not sufficient for grant of leave to appeal. My aforesaid view is fortified by a judgment of Supreme Court in Chandigarh Administration Vs. 17. Now adverting to scope of judicial review against acquittal in a criminal leave to appeal, suffice it to observe that mere suspicion about involvement of accused in crime is not sufficient for grant of leave to appeal. My aforesaid view is fortified by a judgment of Supreme Court in Chandigarh Administration Vs. Dharam Singh, (1985) AIR(SC) 1671, wherein the Supreme Court has held: "We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the entire evidence on the record, and we are not satisfied that the High Court has erred. The learned Sessions Judge carefully considered the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, Surinder Kumar Gupta and Ram Look and took into account all the evidence and after weighing the facts and circumstances of the case he was unable to hold that the charges were substantiated, We have been taken through the record by learned counsel and we see no reason to differ. It does appear that the respondent and his family suspected that the deceased was carrying on an illicit affair with Ajit Kaur but that is wholly insufficient by itself to establish that the deceased was murdered by the respondent. There are several weaknesses in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to which the learned Sessions Judge has drawn pointed attention and, to our mind, it is difficult to find fault with his appraisal of the evidence. The evidence and circumstances may conceivably give rise to the suspicion that the respondent was involved in the incident, but suspicion cannot serve as evidence. The High Court was justified in refusing leave to the appellant to appeal to it, and we see no reason to hold a different view." While examining powers of the High Court under Section 378 and 386 Cr.P.C. against judgment of acquittal, Apex Court in case of Tota Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 529 , held: "The High Court has not found in its judgment that the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for discarding the testimony of PW 2 and PW 6 were either unreasonable or perverse. vs. State of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 529 , held: "The High Court has not found in its judgment that the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for discarding the testimony of PW 2 and PW 6 were either unreasonable or perverse. What the High Court has done is to make an independent reappraisal of the evidence on its own and to set aside the acquittal merely on the ground that as a result of such reappreciation, the High Court was inclined to reach a conclusion different from the one recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the mere fact that the appellate court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the appellate court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even it is of the opinion that the view taken by the court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous." 18. In Punni & Ors., Supreme Court, while discussing power of the appellate Court against acquittal, reiterated the principle that appellate Court can re-appreciate the evidence and can take a different view. However, the Court further observed that if two views are reasonably possible, the appellate Court would not normally interfere with the order of acquittal. In Punni & Ors., Supreme Court, while discussing power of the appellate Court against acquittal, reiterated the principle that appellate Court can re-appreciate the evidence and can take a different view. However, the Court further observed that if two views are reasonably possible, the appellate Court would not normally interfere with the order of acquittal. The Court held: "Before we part with our discussion on the findings of the High Court while setting aside the order of conviction of the Additional Sessions Judge, VIth Court at Etah, we may note that reliance was placed at the bar on Kashiram v. State of M.P. In that decision, this Court while considering the power of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal of the trial court held that when two views are possible, the High Court should not interfere only because it feels that sitting as a trial court, it would have preferred conviction and that the High Court should consider every reason given by the trial court in favour of an acquittal and then dislodge them. It was also held in that decision that while deciding an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court can reappraise the evidence, arrive at findings at variance with those recorded by the trial court in its order of acquittal and arrive at its own findings, yet, the salutary principle, which would guide the High Court is - if two views are reasonably possible, one supporting the acquittal and the other recording a conviction, the High Court would not interfere merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court, its view would have been one of recording a conviction. It was further held in that decision that as a necessary corollary, it was obligatory on the High Court, while reversing an order of acquittal, to consider and discuss each of the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dislodge those reasons and if the High Court failed to discharge this obligation, it would constitute a serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court." 19. In Ghurey Lal, Supreme Court, while examining scope of Section 378 and 386 Cr.P.C, observed that presumption of innocence is reinforced by acquittal of the accused. The Court held: "The earliest case that dealt with the controversy in issue was Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor. In Ghurey Lal, Supreme Court, while examining scope of Section 378 and 386 Cr.P.C, observed that presumption of innocence is reinforced by acquittal of the accused. The Court held: "The earliest case that dealt with the controversy in issue was Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor. In this case, the ambit and scope of the powers of the appellate court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal has been aptly elucidated by the Privy Council. Lord Russell writing the judgment has observed as under: (at AIR p. 230) : (IA p. 404) "...the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The law succinctly crystallized in this case has been consistently followed by this Court. On proper analysis of the ratio and findings of this case, it is revealed that the findings of the trial court are based on the fundamental principles of the criminal jurisprudence. Presumption of innocence in favour of the accused further gets reinforced and strengthened by the acquittal of the trial court. The appellate court undoubtedly has wide powers of re-appreciating and re-evaluating the entire evidence but it would be justified in interfering with the judgment of acquittal only when the judgment of the trial court is palpably wrong, totally ill-founded or wholly misconceived, based on erroneous analysis of evidence and nonexistent material, demonstrably unsustainable or perverse." x x x x x "The following principles emerge from the cases above: 1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong." 20. In Govindraju alias Govinda, Supreme Court has dealt with the applicability of principle of "adverse inference" vis-a-vis criminal trial and observed that if lacuna in the prosecution case remains unexplained and chain of events unconnected by non-examination of material witnesses, such presumption can be drawn. The Court held: "The applicability of the principle of "adverse inference" presupposes that withholding was of such material witnesses who could have stated precisely and cogently the events as they occurred. Without their examination, there would remain a vacuum in the case of the prosecution. The doctor was a cited witness but was still not examined. The name of the Head Constable and the Constable appears in the Police investigation but still they were not examined. It is true that in their absence the post mortem report and the FSL report were exhibited and could be read in evidence. But still the lacuna in the case of the prosecution remains unexplained and the chain of events unconnected. For instance, the Head Constable could have described the events that occurred right from the place of occurrence to the death of the deceased. They could have well explained as to why it was not possible for one Police Officer, one Head Constable and one Constable to apprehend all the accused or any of them immediately after the occurrence or even make enquiry about their names. Similarly, the doctor could have explained whether inflicting of such injuries with the knife recovered was even possible or not. Similarly, the doctor could have explained whether inflicting of such injuries with the knife recovered was even possible or not. The expert from the FSL could have explained whether or not the weapons of offence contained human blood and, if so, of what blood group and whether the clothes of the deceased contained the same blood group as was on the weapons used in the commission of the crime. The uncertainties and unexplained matters of the FSL report could have been explained by the expert. There is no justification on record as to why these witnesses were not examined despite their availability. This Court in Takhaji Hiraji, clearly stated that material witness is one who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case and by examining such witnesses the gaps or infirmities in the case of the prosecution could be supplied. If such a witness, without justification, is not examined, inference against the prosecution can be drawn by the Court. The fact that the witnesses who were necessary to unfold the narrative of the incident and though not examined, but were cited by the prosecution, certainly raises a suspicion. When the principal witnesses of the prosecution become hostile, greater is the requirement of the prosecution to examine all other material witnesses who could depose in completing the chain by proven facts. This view was reiterated by this Court in Yakub Ismailbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat." The Court, while reiterating the principles governing appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 Cr.P.C., relied on its earlier decisions and held: "In the present case, on a cumulative reading and appreciation of the entire evidence on record, we are of the considered view that the learned trial Court had not fallen in error of law or appreciation of evidence in accordance with law. The High Court appears to have interfered with the judgment of acquittal only on the basis that "there was a possibility of another view". The prosecution must prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. Such is not the burden on the accused. The High Court has acted on certain legal and factual presumptions which cannot be sustained on the basis of the record before us and the principles of laws aforenoticed. The prosecution must prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. Such is not the burden on the accused. The High Court has acted on certain legal and factual presumptions which cannot be sustained on the basis of the record before us and the principles of laws aforenoticed. The case of the prosecution, thus, suffers from proven improbabilities, infirmities, contradictions and the statement of the sole witness, the Police Officer PW1, is not reliable and worthy of credence." 21. In view of forgoing discussion and the law laid down by Supreme Court, in my considered opinion, the learned appellate Court has not committed any manifest error of law and fact in reversing the judgments of learned trial Court and acquitting the accused-respondents for some of the charged offences. Therefore, I record my satisfaction about appreciation of evidence by the learned appellate Court and consequently leave to appeal craved for in all these appeals is hereby declined. Resultantly, all these leave to appeals fail and are hereby rejected. Let a copy of this order be placed in each file.